Williamson et al v. Wetzel et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
BOBBY KENNETH WILLIAMSON,
Plaintiff
V.
JOHN RIVELLO, et al.,
Defendants
CIV. ACTION NO. 1 :23-CV-1781
(JUDGE MANNION)
MEMORANDUM
Presently 	before 	the 	court 	in 	this 	prisoner 	civil 	rights 	case 	is
defendants' motions for summary judgment for plaintiff's failure to exhaust
administrative remedies and plaintiff's motion for sanctions and motion to
compel discovery. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for summary
judgment will be granted and plaintiff's motions will be denied as moot.
I. 	PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff, Bobby Kenneth Williamson, and two other named plaintiffs
filed this case as a putative class action on behalf of themselves and a class
of similarly situated inmates at SCI-Huntingdon on 	September 28, 	2023.
(Doc. 	1 ). 	The case was initially assigned to United States District Judge
Christopher C. 	Conner. On 	April 	2, 	2024, 	Judge Conner dismissed the
complaint with respect to plaintiff Edwards for his failure to pay the requisite
filing fee or move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 17).
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On 	May 20, 	2024, Judge Conner denied plaintiffs' motion for class
certification, dismissed their complaint without prejudice, and granted them
leave to file an amended complaint limited to their individual claims. (Docs.
19-20). Plaintiffs Williamson and Bundy filed separate amended complaints
on 	September 	17 , 2024, 	and 	September 23, 	2024. 	(Docs. 27, 	30). 	On
November 18, 2024, Judge Conner dismissed Bundy's amended complaint
in 	its 	entirety, dismissed 	Williamson's 	amended 	complaint 	in 	part, 	and
allowed 	the 	case 	to 	proceed 	solely 	as 	to 	(1) 	Williamson's 	deliberate
indifference 	claim 	against 	defendants 	Rivello, 	Banks, 	Price, 	McMullen,
Holms, 	and 	the 	facility 	maintenance 	manager, 	and 	(2) 	Williamson 's
negligence claim against defendants Rivello and Holms. (Docs. 31-32).
Defendants moved to dismiss Williamson's amended complaint on
January 16 , 2025. (Doc. 41 ). The case was reassigned to the undersigned
on January 21 , 2025, following Judge Conner's retirement from the court.
The court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part on August
11 , 2025, dismissing the negligence claim because defendants were entitled
to sovereign immunity, but denying the motion to the extent that it sought to
dismiss the deliberate indifference claim for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. (Docs. 61-62). Recognizing, however, that there appeared to be
an 	arguable 	basis 	to 	conclude 	that 	Williamson 	failed 	to 	exhaust
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administrative remedies, the court set an expedited discovery schedule for
discovery related to the issue of exhaustion, and 	requ i red 	all 	dispositive
motions on the issue of exhaustion to be filed no later than October 31 , 2025.
(Docs. 61-62). Defendants then answered the amended complaint on August
25 , 2025. (Doc. 65).
Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment based on
Williamson 's 	purported 	failure 	to 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies 	on
October 30, 2025, along with a statement of material facts and a supporting
brief. (Docs. 70-72). Williamson did not respond to the motion for summary
judgment, nor did he seek an extension of time to do so.
On 	November 	5, 2025, Williamson 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	sanctions,
asserting 	that 	defendant 	Rivello 	deliberately 	destroyed 	video 	evidence
relating to his claims. (Doc. 73). Williamson then filed a motion to compel
defendants 	to 	produce 	discovery 	on 	November 	21, 	2025. 	(Doc. 	77).
Defendants opposed the motion for sanctions on December 19 , 2025, (Doc.
80), but have not responded to the motion to compel discovery. All three
motions are ripe for review and are resolved in this opinion.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment 	is 	appropriate "if the pleadings, 	the 	discovery
[including , depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on fi le]
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and disclosure materials on file , and any affidavits show that there is no
genuine issue as to 	any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. " Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see a/so Celotex Corp.
v. 	Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); 	Turner v. Schering-Plough Corp.,
901 F.2d 335, 340 (3d Cir. 1990). A factual dispute is genuine if a reasonable
jury could find for the non-moving party, and is material if it will affect the
outcome of the trial under governing substantive law. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc ., 	477 	U.S. 242, 	248, 	254 	(1986); 	Aetna 	Gas. 	& Sur. 	Co . v.
Ericksen , 903 F. Supp. 836, 838 (M.D. Pa. 1995). At the summary judgment
stage, "the 	judge's function 	is 	not 	himself to 	weigh 	the 	evidence 	and
determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial. " Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249; see also Marino v. Indus. Crating
Co ., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (a court may not weigh the evidence
or make 	credibility 	determinations). Rather, the 	court 	must consider all
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the
non-moving party. Andreoli v. Gates, 482 F.3d 641 , 647 (3d Cir. 2007).
To preva il on summary judgment, the moving party must affirmatively
identify those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24. The moving party
can discharge that burden by showing that "on all the essential elements of
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its case on which it bears the burden of proof at trial, no reasonable jury could
find for the non-moving party." In re Bressman, 327 F.3d 229, 238 (3d Cir.
2003); see a/so Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325. If the moving party meets this initial
burden , the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is
some metaphysical doubt as to material facts," but must show sufficient
evidence to support a jury verdict in its favor. Boyle v. County of Allegheny,
139 F.3d 386, 393 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Matsushita E/ec. Indus. 	Co. 	v.
Zenith Radio Corp ., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). However, if the non-moving
party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an
element essential to [the non-movant's] case, and on which [the non-movant]
will bear the burden of proof at trial ," Rule 56 mandates the entry of summary
judgment 	because 	such 	a 	failure 	"necessarily 	renders 	all 	other 	facts
immaterial. " Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; 	Jakimas v. Hoffman-La Roche,
Inc. , 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007).
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Ill. 	MATERIAL FACTS 1
A. 	Grievance Policy
Exhaustion of administrative remedies in the DOC is governed by the
three-step process outlined in the DOC's grievance policy, DC-ADM 804.
(See DC-ADM 804, available at https://www.pa.gov/content/dam/copapwp-
pagov/en/cor/documents/about-us/doc-policies/804%20lnmate%20Grievan
ces.pdf) (last visited Jan. 27, 2026). 2 Under DC-ADM 804, a prisoner must
1 Local Rule 	56.1 	requires a motion for summary judgment to "be
accompanied by a separate, short and concise statement of the material
facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there
is no genuine issue to be tried" and requires that the party opposing a motion
for 	summary 	judgment 	file 	a 	statement 	responding 	to 	the 	numbered
paragraphs in the movant's statement of material facts, which "shall include
references 	to 	the 	parts 	of 	the 	record" 	that 	support 	the 	nonmovant's
opposition to the motion. M.D. Pa. L.R. 56.1. If a non-moving party fails to
respond to a moving party's statement in the manner required by Local Rule
56.1, the facts asserted in the moving party's statement are "deemed to be
admitted." Id. In this case, defendants have filed a statement of material facts
as required by Local Rule 56.1, (Doc. 71 ), but Williamson has not responded
to the statement. The facts included in defendants' statement are accordingly
deemed 	admitted for the 	purpose of resolving the 	motion 	for summary
judgment. 	M.D. 	Pa. 	L.R. 	56.1. 	The 	court 	cites 	directly 	to 	defendants'
statement as to any facts included in the statement.
2 As requested by defendants, (see Doc. 72 at 6 n.1 ), the court takes
judicial notice of the policy and its contents as a document that is publicly
available on a government website. See Vanderklok v. 	United States, 868
F.3d 189, 205 n.16 (3d Cir. 2017). All citations to DC-ADM 804 will be to the
version of the policy that is available on the DOC's website. The current
version of DC-ADM 804 has been in effect since May 1, 2015, and was
therefore in effect at all relevant times.
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first submit a written grievance within fifteen working days from the date of
the incident. 	Id. §1 (A)(8). DC-ADM 804 provides that the grievance must
include "a statement of the facts relevant to the claim ," "identify individuals
directly involved in the events," and "specifically state any claims [the inmate]
wishes to make concerning violations of Department directives, regulations,
court orders, or other law ." Id. §1 (A)(11 ). If the inmate is unable to comply
with the fifteen-day deadline, he may request an extension of time to file a
grievance. Id. §1 (C)(2). Next, the prisoner must submit a written appeal to
an 	intermediate review level within fifteen working 	days. 	Id. §2(A)(1 )(a).
Finally, the inmate must submit an appeal to the Secretary's Office of Inmate
Grievances 	and 	Appeals 	("SOIGA") 	within 	fifteen 	working 	days. 	Id.
§2(8)(1 )(b ).
B. 	Plaintiff's Grievances
Williamson's claims assert generally that he was exposed to asbestos
and other ha rmf ul substances as a result of renovations that were performed
in his housing block. (See Doc. 27). The renovation work began in mid-2021.
(Doc. 	71 	,I15). He filed eight grievances during the period 	of time from
September 2021 to July 2023. (Id. ,I16). Seven of those eight grievances did
not pertain to the conditions of his confinement. ( See id. ,I,I17-21 ). The only
grievance that pertained to the conditions of his confinement during the
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relevant 	period 	was 	Grievance 	Number 	1025327. 	(Id. 	1121 ). 	Grievance
Number 1025327 was rejected as untimely. (Id. 1123) . Williamson ultimately
appealed the grievance to SOIGA, which rejected 	it for failure to submit
required or legible documentation in support of his claims. (Id. 1127).
Williamson additionally alleges harm from exposure to asbestos during
renovation work performed on February 22, 	2021. 	(Id. 	1131 ). He filed two
grievances during the period of time relevant to this claim. (Id. 1134 ). One of
these grievances, Grievance Number 1077706, pertained to the conditions
of his confinement. (Id. 1136). He stated that two staff members exposed him
to dust, but did not allege that the dust contained asbestos or lead paint. (Id.
1137) . The only staff members identified 	in the grievance were Sergeant
Snook and Correctional Officer Miller. (Id. 1141 ). The defendants were not
named in the grievance. (Id. 1140).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Under 	the 	Prison 	Litigation 	Reform 	Act 	("PLRA" ), 	prisoners
complaining 	about 	the 	conditions 	of 	their 	confinement 	must 	exhaust
available administrative remedies before they may file suit in federal court.
42 	U.S.C . §1997e(a). 	The 	PLRA 	requires 	proper 	exhaustion, 	meaning
plaintiffs must administratively grieve their claims 	in accordance with the
procedural rules of the prison in which they are incarcerated. Downey v. Pa.
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Dep't of Corr., 968 F.3d 299, 305 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548
U.S. 	81, 	88 	(2006)). 	Failure 	to 	exhaust 	administrative 	remedies 	is 	an
affirmative defense that defendants must plead and prove; it is not a pleading
requirement for plaintiffs. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).
A prisoner is only required to exhaust administrative remedies that are
"available." 	Rinaldi 	v. 	United 	States, 	904 	F.3d 	257, 	268 	(2018) 	(citing
Woodford, 	548 U.S. at 93). An administrative remedy is unavailable, and
administrative exhaustion is thus excused, in three situations: "(1) when 'it
operates as a simple dead end-with officers unable or consistently unwilling
to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates '; (2) when it is 'so opaque that it
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use, ' such as when no ordinary
prisoner can discern or navigate it ; or (3) when 'prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation."' Id. at 266-67 (quoting Ross v. Blake, 578
U.S. 	632, 	643-44 	(2016)). 	If 	defendants 	establish 	failure 	to 	exhaust
administrative remedies, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the
administrative remedy process was unavailable. Id. at 268.
Defendants 	argue that Williamson 	failed 	to 	exhaust administrative
remedies 	in 	the instant case because one of the relevant 	grievances-
Grievance Number 1025327-was dismissed by SOIGA for failure to provide
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required 	or 	legible 	documentation, 	and 	the 	other 	relevant 	gnevance-
Grievance Number 1077706-failed to name the defendants and failed to
state that he was exposed to asbestos or lead paint. (Doc. 72 at 9-12).
The summary judgment record confirms defendants' assertion that
Williamson failed to exhaust administrative remedies. First, defendants are
correct that he failed to properly appeal Grievance Number 1025327 through
all 	stages 	of 	administrative 	review. 	(See 	Doc. 	71-10 	at 	2). 	Second,
defendants are correct that 	he failed to name any of the defendants 	in
Grievance Number 1077706. (See Doc. 71-11). Although the failure to name
a defendant in a grievance may be excused if the unnamed defendant is
"fairly within the compass of the prisoner's grievance," Spruill v. Gillis, 372
F.3d 218, 234 (3d Cir. 2004), here, other than naming non-defendants Miller
and 	Snook, Williamson's 	only 	assertion 	of which 	prison 	officials 	were
responsible for his injuries was a vague allusion to "staff." (See Doc. 71-11
at 13 , 15). This is plainly insufficient to conclude that defendants were "fairly
within the compass" of the grievance. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 234.
The burden accordingly shifts to Williamson to show that the grievance
process was unavailable to him. Rinaldi, 904 F.3d at 268. Williamson has
clearly 	failed 	to 	meet 	that 	burden 	because 	he 	has 	not 	responded 	to
defendants' motion for summary judgment in any manner. Thus, the court
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will grant defendants' motion for summary judgment based on Williamson's
failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Having done so, the court will deny Williamson's motion for sanctions
and motion to compel discovery as moot. Both motions seek relief based on
defendants' alleged failure to 	produce evidence relevant to the merits of
Williamson's claims. (Docs. 73, 77). Neither of the motions nor the evidence
plaintiff 	seeks 	is 	relevant 	to 	the 	issue 	of 	exhaustion 	of 	administrative
remedies.
V. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant defendants' motion for
summary judgment, deny Williamson 's motion for sanctions and motion to
compel discovery as moot, and close this case. An appropriate order shall
issue.
E. Mannion
tates District Judge
Dated: 	fr~G23-1781-02
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