Spriggs v. Salamon et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
STANLEY LEO SPRIGGS,
Plaintiff,
v.
B. SALAMON, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 1:23-CV-01756
Judge Jennifer P. Wilson
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is an unopposed motion for summary judgement filed by
Defendants. Because Stanley Leo Spriggs (“Plaintiff”) has not responded to this
motion despite Local Rules requiring a response and a court order substantially
extending the response deadline, the court will deem the motion unopposed. Upon
review of the merits, the court will grant Defendants’ motion, enter judgment in
Defendants’ favor, and close the case.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL H ISTORY
Plaintiff, an inmate currently housed at the State Correctional Institution
Rockview in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania (“SCI-Rockview”), initiated this action by
filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in October of 2023. (Doc. 1.) The
complaint named eight defendants: (1) B. Salamon (“Salamon”), Facility Manager;
(2) Keri Moore (“Moore”), Chief Grievance officer; (3) Nicki Paul (“Paul”),
Grievance Coordinator; (4) Major H. Haldeman (“Haldeman”); (5) Pasqualle, Unit
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Manager of CA Block; (6) Sgt. Bush (“Bush”); (7) Correctional Officer Bollinger
(“Bollinger”); and (8) Department of Corrections Head of Medical Department.
(Doc. 1, p. 2.) 1 Plaintiff alleged that on November 4, 2021, he was released from
the restricted housing unit (“RHU”) and moved to C-A unit. (Id., p. 6.) Defendant
Bush told him to go to cell 118 and “he made the guy in the cell give me bottom
bunk due [to] my status and I’m elderly.” (Id.) He then alleged that on November
5, 2021, his cellmate was sent to medical, and when the cellmate returned to the
unit, Plaintiff was told to move to the top bunk. (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that he “had
medical clear me at intake in 2017 [at] SCI-Camp Hill for numerous injuries to my
spinal column as bottom bunk-bottom tier.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that he
confronted Defendant Bush on multiple occasions. (Id.) He also stated that the
told Defendant Bollinger on November 6 and 7, 2021. (Id.) He alleged that he
spoke with the “Unit Manager” about “needing medical to fix the problem [and] he
told me ‘no.’” (Id.) Plaintiff alleged that the following occurred on the morning of
November 8, 2021:
I was trying to get my legs moving and suffer diabetes as well, which
caused my feet to be numb, however trying to come to the ladder I fell
[approximately] 4 feet landing on my back. I could not get up and had
to be put on a stretcher and taken to medical. Once there they admitted
me for x[-]rays and Dr. Preston called the unit to make sure they had a
bottom bunk bottom tier cell for me, which they said they did but when
I got there [they] made me go into cell 118 again on the top bunk.
1 For ease of reference, the court uses the page numbers from the CM/ECF header.
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Meanwhile[,] from the 4th to 9th of November they had a bottom bunk
bed in 103 cell the whole time . . .
(Id.) Plaintiff alleged that he continues to suffer back pain. (Id.) Based on these
facts, Plaintiff raised claims under the Eighth Amendment. (Id., p. 7.)
The court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) on
December 4, 2023, and dismissed all claims against Defendants Salamon, Moore,
Paul, Haldeman, and the Department of Corrections Head of Medical Department
without prejudice for a lack of personal involvement. (Doc. 11.) The court
granted Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his complaint to cure the defect. (Id.)
The court received and docketed an amended complaint on February 1,
2024. (Doc. 16.) The amended complaint names Haldeman, Bush, Pasquale, and
Bollinger as defendants. (Id.) Plaintiff provides the following alleged facts:
Sgt. Bush failed to protect me from harm and neglected to make moves
to safely accommodate my housing, by putting me back in to cell [1]18
after I fell out of the top bunk knowingly setting me up for further
injuries because the only bunk available to me was again top bunk. C/O
Bush put me in direct harm/danger on the 5th thru 8th by forcing me to
sleep on the top bunk knowingly [and] neglecting the fact that I am
elderly [and] have admitted to them (staff – Bush [and] Bollinger [and]
Pasquale) my health issues. 	My fall from the top bunk on 11-8-21
could’ve been avoided if staff would’ve properly looked into more than
what the computer said [and] talked to medical personally which is
always an available option. 	Unit Manager Pasquale was asked by
myself after suffering a couple days in pains to be sent to medical [and]
he denied me and he knew of my medical condition as I informed him
yet he failed to protect me from the life endangering harm. 	Major
Haldeman as a supervisor investigated the cause for my grievance
however she denied me relief if even in partiality due to my proven
status caused harms and failed to adhere to the D.O.C. code of ethics
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Sect. (B)(1). Sgt. Bush, Unit Manager Pasquale [and] Major Haldeman
all have supervisory titles and all directed, encouraged, tolerated [and]
acquiesced in the conduct of placing my person in harm by ordering me
to a top bunk and/or through the denial of relief after careful review of
records showed the harm could’ve been deterred. I still suffer from the
harm and the response was against policy. 	I have right to protection
and Dr. Preston called staff during my visit from falling out of the bed
and told them they never should’ve had me in that bed. The doctor
recommended they open a bed on bottom for me and none of the
supervisors 	made 	the 	correction. 	They 	only 	continued 	the
discriminatory behavior to punish me [and] further my pain [and]
suffering.
(Id., pp. 5–6.) Based on these allegations, Plaintiff raises an Eighth Amendment
failure to protect claim under both the United States and Pennsylvania
Constitutions. (Id., p. 7.) He also raises a supervisory liability claim based on his
top bunk placement. (Id.) In doing so, Plaintiff states that “I [was] forced to top
bunk after I fell out of one again or sleep on floor to prevent the harm.” (Id.) As
relief, Plaintiff seeks “compensatory [and] punitive damages in the amount of
$200,000.00 for the injury and pain [and] suffering.” (Id.)
On April 5, 2024, Defendants filed a motion to partially dismiss the
amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
(Doc. 22.) Specifically, Defendants argued that all claims should be dismissed
against Defendant Haldeman for failure to allege personal involvement and all
Eighth Amendment claims based on a requirement to sleep on the top bunk after
the fall should be dismissed because Plaintiff admits that he did not physically
return to the top bunk, but slept on the floor. (Doc. 23.) Plaintiff filed a brief in
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opposition that conceded that Defendant Haldeman should be dismissed as a
defendant for lack of personal involvement, but challenged the dismissal of the
post-fall Eighth Amendment claims. (Docs. 26, 26-1.) On December 27, 2024, the
court entered an order granting Defendants’ motion for partial dismissal and
dismissing all claims against Defendant Haldeman with prejudice, dismissing the
Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim concerning the top bunk status in cell
118 after the November 8, 2021 fall with prejudice, and dismissing all claims for
monetary relief under the Pennsylvania Constitution with prejudice. (Doc. 31.)
The remaining Defendants then filed an answer to the amended complaint on
January 28, 2025. (Doc. 34.) Following discovery, Defendants filed a motion for
summary judgment on August 1, 2025 along with a statement of facts and a brief
in support. (Docs. 49, 50, 51.) Plaintiff did not timely file a brief in opposition to
the motion for summary judgment, and, on August 28, 2025, the court entered an
order granting Plaintiff until September 19, 2025 to file a brief in opposition or the
motion would be considered unopposed. (Doc. 52.) On October 1, 2025, the court
received and docketed a request for an extension of time to file a brief in
opposition from Plaintiff. (Doc. 53.) The court granted this extension and ordered
the brief in opposition due by January 26, 2026. (Doc. 54.) 	To date, the court has
not received any brief in opposition from Plaintiff.
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DISCUSSION
A. Under the Rules of This Court Defendant’s Motion Is Deemed
Unopposed.
Under the Local Rules of this court, Plaintiff is deemed to not oppose the
motion for summary judgment since he has failed to timely oppose the motion or
otherwise litigate this case. This procedural default completely frustrates and
impedes efforts to resolve this matter in a timely and fair fashion, and under the
rules of this court Plaintiff’s failure to respond warrants dismissal of the action.
Local Rule 7.6 imposes an affirmative duty on Plaintiff to respond to motions:
Any party opposing any motion, other than a motion for summary
judgment, shall file a brief in opposition within fourteen (14) days after
service of the movant's brief, or, if a brief in support of the motion is
not required under these rules, within seven (7) days after service of the
motion. Any party who fails to comply with this rule shall be deemed
not to oppose such motion. Nothing in this rule shall be construed to
limit the authority of the court to grant any motion before expiration of
the prescribed period for filing a brief in opposition. A brief in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment and LR 56.1 responsive
statement, together with any transcripts, affidavits or other relevant
documentation, shall be filed within twenty-one (21) days after service
of the movant’s brief.
Local Rule 7.6 (emphasis added).
It is well settled that “Local Rule 7.6 can be applied to grant a motion to
dismiss without analysis of the complaint’s sufficiency ‘if a party fails to comply
with the [R]ule after a specific direction to comply from the court.’” Williams v.
Lebanon Farms Disposal, Inc., No. 09-1704, 2010 WL 3703808, at *1 (M.D. Pa.
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Aug. 26, 2010) (quoting Stackhouse v. Mazurkiewicz, 951 F.2d 29, 30 (3d Cir.
1991)) (internal quotations omitted). In this case, Plaintiff has not complied with
the Local Rules, or this court’s order, by filing a timely response to Defendants’
motion. Therefore, these procedural defaults by Plaintiff compel the court to
consider the following:
[A] basic truth: we must remain mindful of the fact that the Federal
Rules are meant to be applied in such a way as to promote justice. See,
Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Often that will mean that courts should strive to resolve
cases on their merits whenever possible. However, justice also requires
that the merits of a particular dispute be placed before the court in a
timely fashion . . .”
Lease v. Fishel, 712 F. Supp. 2d 359, 371 (M.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting McCurdy v.
American Bd. Of Plastic Surgery, 157 F.3d 191, 197 (3d Cir.1998)).
In this case, Plaintiff has failed to comply with Local Rule 7.6 by not filing a
timely response to Defendant’s motion. This failure compels the court to apply the
sanction called for under Local Rule 7.6, deeming the motion to be unopposed.
Under Local Rule 56.1, “[a]ll material facts set forth in the statement required to be
served by the moving party will be deemed to be admitted unless controverted by
the statement required to be served by the opposing party.” Therefore, the court
deems the motion unopposed and the facts set forth by Defendants are admitted.
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B. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Will Be Granted
Defendants seek summary judgment in this action because they relied on the
information contained in SCI-Rockview’s computerized database when assigning
Plaintiff to the top bunk and were unaware of any active physician’s order to place
Plaintiff on the bottom bunk. (Doc. 51.) The facts supporting this argument are
admitted.
1. Summary Judgment Standard
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute of fact is material if resolution of
the dispute “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Summary judgment is
not precluded by “[f]actual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary.” Id. “A
dispute is genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in favor of the
nonmovant’ and ‘material if it could affect the outcome of the case.” Thomas v.
Tice, 943 F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh
Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3d Cir. 2012)).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the facts
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor. Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 288
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(3d Cir. 2018) (citing Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. State Sys. of Higher
Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006)). The court may not “weigh the evidence”
or “determine the truth of the matter.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Instead, the
court’s role in reviewing the facts of the case is “to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id.
The party moving for summary judgment “bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the
absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
317, 323 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The non-moving party must then
oppose the motion, and in doing so “‘may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of [its] pleadings’ but, instead, ‘must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. Bare assertions, conclusory allegations, or
suspicions will not suffice.’” Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at 288–89 (quoting D.E. v. Cent.
Dauphin Sch. Dist., 765 F.3d 260, 268–69 (3d Cir. 2014)).
Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party “fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.”
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support
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of the plaintiff’s position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the
jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. “Where
the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co.,
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
2. Admitted Material Facts
Defendants are non-medical staff at SCI-Rockview. (Doc. 50.) When a
doctor orders an inmate to bottom bunk status, it is reflected in the prisoner’s
“CAPTOR” computer system. (Id.) When assigning inmates to bunks, the non-
medical staff at SCI-Rockview rely on information stored in CAPTOR. (Id.)
Between November 5, 2021 and November 8, 2021, CAPTOR did not show any
indication that Plaintiff was to be assigned to a bottom bunk only. (Id.)
Defendants relied on this information in assigning Plaintiff to a top bunk. (Id.) In
support of these facts, Defendants submitted a declaration from Defendant
Bollinger. (Doc. 50-1.)
3. Defendants Met Their Burden
Prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with deliberate
indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 104–05 (1976). To sustain a constitutional claim under the Eighth Amendment
for inadequate medical treatment, a plaintiff must make (1) an objective showing
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that his medical needs were serious, and (2) a subjective showing that the
defendants were deliberately indifferent to those medical needs. See Pearson v.
Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017). A serious medical need is
“one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or is so obvious
that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor’s attention.”
Monmouth Cty. Corr. Inst'l Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 346–47 (3d Cir.
1987) (citation omitted). A prison official is deliberately indifferent when he or
she “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.”
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
The Third Circuit has held that non-medical prison officials are generally
justified in relaying upon the expertise and care of prison medical providers.
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004). If, however, non-medical
prison personnel had “a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors
or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner,” liability may be
imposed. Id.; see also Bowman v. Mazur, 435 Fed. Appx. 82 (3d. Cir. 2011).
Here, Defendants have presented evidence that they, as non-medical
officials, relied upon the computer system used to communicate with medical
professionals regarding an inmates’ housing location for medical purposes when
placing Plaintiff in a top bunk prior to his fall on November 8, 2021. (Docs. 50,
50-1, 51.) Plaintiff has not opposed the motion in any way, nor submitted any
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evidence that contradicts Defendants or establishes any actual knowledge on the
part of Defendants that was contradictory to the guidance of medical professionals.
Therefore, the court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, enter judgment in Defendants’ favor, and close the case.
An appropriate order follows.
s/Jennifer P. Wilson
JENNIFER P. WILSON
United States District Judge
Middle District of Pennsylvania
Dated: March 9, 2026
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