Ashfield v. Schuylkill County et al

1:22-cv-01369Pamd24 mars 2026

Texte intégral

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
JASON ASHFIELD, 	: Civ. No. 1:22-CV-1369
:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	:
: (Chief Magistrate Judge Bloom)
SCHUYLKILL COUNTY, et al., 	:
:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. 	Introduction
This case comes before us on a motion for summary judgment filed
by several defendants—Schuylkill County, Schuylkill County Prison
(“SCP”), Schuylkill County Prison Board (“SCPB”), David Wapinsky, and
Michael Buchanan. 1 	Ashfield asserts a claim of deliberate indifference
to his medical needs under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and related state law claims
arising out of an altercation that occurred while he was detained at SCP
in September of 2020.2 He also brings Section 1983 claims under a theory
of municipal liability and a failure to protect, intervene, and train and
1 Doc. 50.
2 Doc. 42.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 1 of 19
2
supervise the SCP staff.3 Ashfield further asserts claims against various
correctional 	officer 	defendants, 	who 	he 	claims 	used 	excessive 	force
against him during the encounter at SCP. 4
The defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment. 5
After consideration, the motion for summary judgment will be granted in
part and denied in part.
II. 	Background 6
Ashfield was incarcerated at SCP on September 2, 2020, after he
was 	arrested 	on 	an 	outstanding 	bench 	warrant 	regarding 	the
nonpayment of child support. 	On September 4, 2020, after his initial
check by medical, Ashfield requested a shower and a telephone call.
Correctional Officer Kayes denied Ashfield’s request and escorted him
back to his cell. 	According to the defendants, Ashfield resisted Kayes’
escort commands by pushing back into him, which Ashfield denies.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5 Doc. 50.
6 The factual background of this Memorandum Opinion is taken from the
parties’ submissions to the extent those submissions are consistent with
the evidence in the record. (Docs. 50-52, 60-64).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 2 of 19
3
Kayes then performed a leg sweep to gain control over Ashfield, which
caused him to fall to the ground.
At this point, Correctional Officer Parker stepped in to assist Kayes
in restraining Ashfield. 	Kayes and Parker ordered Ashfield to cuff-up,
but 	he 	continued 	to 	combat 	their 	efforts 	to 	gain 	control 	over 	him.
Correctional Officer Rauco witnessed the incident and issued an all-
guards 	call. 	Correctional 	Officers 	Nitolo, 	Swatt, 	Broomall, 	Menne,
Kruss, Rodriguez, and Lieutenant Escalante responded and assisted in
restraining Ashfield. 	Parker, Swatt, Rodriguez, and Escalante each
reported that they secured Ashfield’s arm so they could cuff Ashfield’s
right wrist. 	Nitolo reported that she restrained Ashfield’s legs and feet.
Ashfield was double cuffed and escorted to medical.
Ashfield was treated by non-party medical staff, who noted a
laceration to the bottom lip; deformity and swelling in the left shoulder;
swelling in the right shoulder; swelling, deformity, and decreased range
of motion in the left elbow; and a bleeding and swollen nose. A Certified
Registered Nurse Practitioner ordered a shoulder, face, and elbow X-ray,
Ibuprofen, and an ice pack. 	Prior to Ashfield receiving x-rays, he was
released from SCP by court order. 	He sought and received medical
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 3 of 19
4
treatment 	at 	Lehigh 	Valley 	Health-Hazelton 	Emergency. 	Ashfield
alleges that he sustained a broken nose, injuries to his clavicle and
shoulders, and permanent injuries to his neck and acromioclavicular
joint from the incident with SCP staff.7
Ashfield initially brought this action against the defendants on
September 4, 2022. 8 	Ashfield’s second amended complaint asserts his
claims pursuant to Section 1983, alleging that this incident and the
injuries he suffered amounted to a violation of his constitutional rights.
With respect to the moving institutional and supervisory defendants,
Ashfield brings a claim for deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs and a
Monell 9 claim, alleging a failure to protect, intervene, and
train and supervise the correctional officers. 	Ashfield further asserts a
claim of civil conspiracy to violate his federal and state civil rights
against these defendants.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that there
is no genuine dispute of material fact, and Ashfield’s claims fail as a
7 Doc 42.
8 Doc. 1.
9
Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 4 of 19
5
matter of law. 10 	The motion also asserts that the correctional officer
defendants should be dismissed because they were never properly served
with the second amended complaint.11
After consideration of the record, we conclude that there are no
genuine disputes of material fact, and Ashfield’s claims against the
supervisory and institutional defendants fail. Accordingly, we will grant
summary judgment as to these defendants. 	However, we will deny the
motion 	with 	respect 	to 	the 	correctional 	officer 	defendants 	and, 	as
discussed in more detail below, will direct that these defendants waive
service and answer the second amended complaint.
III. 	Discussion
A. Motion for Summary Judgment – Standard of Review
The 	defendants 	have 	filed 	a 	motion 	for 	summary 	judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(a)
provides that a court shall grant summary judgment “if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 12 	The materiality of
10 Doc. 84.
11
Id.
12 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 5 of 19
6
the facts will depend on the substantive law.13 	Thus, “[o]nly disputes
over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under governing law”
will preclude summary judgment. 14 	A dispute is only genuine if a
reasonable juror could find in favor of the nonmoving party.15
The moving party bears the initial burden to “demonstrate the
absence 	of 	a 	genuine 	issue 	of 	material 	fact,” 	relying 	on 	pleadings,
depositions, affidavits, and other evidence in the record.16 	If the movant
“successfully points to evidence of all of the facts needed to decide the
case on the law,” the nonmovant can still defeat summary judgment by
pointing to evidence in the record which creates a genuine dispute of
material fact and from which a jury could find in its favor. 17 	However,
“[i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative,
summary judgment may be granted.” 18 A court may not make credibility
13
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
17
El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. (SEPTA), 479 F.3d 232,
238 (3d Cir. 2007).
18
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249–50 (citations omitted).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 6 of 19
7
determinations or weigh the evidence, but “must view the facts in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party.”19
B. The Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Will be Granted
in Part and Denied in Part.
As we will discuss, we will deny the motion as to the correctional
officer defendants and direct that these defendants waive service and
answer the second amended complaint. However, we conclude that there
are no genuine issues of material fact with respect to Ashfield’s claims
against the moving defendants. 	Accordingly, we will grant summary
judgment as to those defendants.
1. Failure to Serve the Correctional Officer Defendants.
Ashfield’s second amended complaint names Correctional Officers
Escalante, Kayes, Swatt, Broomall, Menne, Parker, Kruss, Rodriguez,
and Nitolo. 20 	The moving defendants argue the correctional officer
defendants should be dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction because
Ashfield failed to properly serve them.21 	Ashfield contends that defense
19
Hugh v. Butler Cnty. Fam. YMCA, 418 F.3d 265, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
20
See Doc. 42.
21 Doc. 52 at 5.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 7 of 19
8
counsel agreed, in writing, to accept and waive service on behalf of these
defendants. 22
We conclude that, as a technical matter, Ashfield failed to follow
the proper procedure when requesting a waiver of service for these
defendants. 23 However, because “the defense of improper service involves
a matter in abatement and does not go to the merits of the action, . . . [it]
is improperly brought by a motion for summary judgment under Rule
56.”24 	Moreover, district courts are given broad discretion when process
has not been properly served.25 Under the present circumstances, we find
it would be improper to dismiss the correctional officer defendants at this
juncture.
22 Doc. 63 at 12.
23
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1);
Warren v. Baker, No. 07-CV-0188, 2007 WL
3033871, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2007),
aff’d, 349 F. App’x 725 (3d Cir.
2009) (“Merely mailing a request for a waiver does not itself effect proper
service.”). 	We are further constrained to note defense counsel’s explicit
assertion to the plaintiff’s counsel that he was approved to represent
these defendants, that he would sign a waiver of service and appear on
their behalf, and that he would accept service via email and mail.
	See
Doc. 60-1 at 38-39.
24
United States v. Marple Cmty. Rec., Inc., 335 F. Supp. 95, 101 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
25
Umbenhauer v. Woog, 969 F.2d 25, 30 (3d Cir. 1992).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 8 of 19
9
We further find that it is more expeditious to
sua sponte direct
these defendants to waive service under Rule 4(d)—or show good cause
for failure to waive service pursuant to Rule 4(d)(2)—than to require
Ashfield to effectuate proper service. The purpose of Rule 4(d) is to “avoid
unnecessary expenses of serving the summons.”26 	Because counsel has
already indicated he would appear on behalf of the correctional officer
defendants, 27 the expense of properly serving summonses would likely be
unnecessary. In similar circumstances, other courts in the Third Circuit
have either requested or directed defendants to waive service of process. 28
Therefore, we will deny the moving defendants’ motion for summary
judgment 	for 	failure 	to 	serve 	and 	direct 	the 	correctional 	officer
defendants to waive service under Rule 4(d).
26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1).
27 We recognize this is dependent upon which “Rodriguez” the plaintiff
intended to bring this action against.
	See Doc. 60-1 at 38-39.
28
Carter v. Phelps, No. 15-CV-1203-SLR, 2016 WL 1039462, at *3 (D.
Del. Mar. 15, 2016) (directing the Delaware Department of Corrections
and Delaware Department of Justice to waive service of process where
the plaintiff was proceeding
pro se);
Martin v. Sec’y of Corr., No. 3:16-CV-
2060, 2016 WL 6661156, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2016),
aff’d, No. 21-1522,
2022 WL 1576758 (3d Cir. May 19, 2022) (specially appointing the Clerk
of Court to serve, among other things, a Request to Waive Service of
Summons (form AO 398) form on the defendant).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 9 of 19
10
2. Claims against SCP and Schuylkill County
The plaintiff’s opposition brief concedes that SCP is not an entity
that can be sued under Section 1983. 29 	Additionally, while the plaintiff
continues to pursue his
Monell claims against SCPB and the individual
supervisory defendants, he concedes that “the record does not support a
Monell claim against Defendant Schuylkill County.” 30 	Accordingly, the
claims against SCP and Schuylkill County will be dismissed.
3. Medical Deliberate Indifference
The 	amended 	complaint 	alleges 	that 	the 	defendants 	were
deliberately indifferent to Ashfield’s medical needs. Ashfield asserts that
the defendants knew he was injured and needed medical attention but
chose to release him to obtain medical treatment at his own expense. At
the outset, we note that while Ashfield was a pretrial detainee at the time
of the events in the complaint, and the Supreme Court has held that
pretrial detainee claims fall under the Fourteenth rather than the Eighth
Amendment, 	courts 	in 	this 	circuit 	have 	continued 	to 	apply 	Eighth
29 Doc. 63 at 13.
30
Id. at 16.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 10 of 19
11
Amendment standards in the context of medical care provided to pretrial
detainees. 31
Ashfield faces a high burden to show that these defendants violated
the 	Eighth 	Amendment 	by 	exhibiting 	deliberate 	indifference 	to 	his
medical needs. The Eighth Amendment protects inmates from “cruel and
unusual punishment.” 32 	Prison officials have a duty to provide inmates
with “adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must ‘take
reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates.’”33 	To be
liable for an Eighth Amendment violation, prison officials must have “a
sufficiently culpable state of mind,”34 which, in the prison context, is one
of “‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health and safety.”35
In the medical context, an inmate alleging an Eighth Amendment
violation 	must 	demonstrate 	that 	prison 	officials 	were 	deliberately
indifferent to a serious medical need. 36 Accordingly, an inmate asserting
31
See Evans v. Columbia Cnty., 711 F. Supp. 3d 256, 275 (M.D. Pa. 2024)
(collecting cases).
32 U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
33
	Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting
	Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526–27 (1984)).
34
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834.
35
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation
omitted).
36
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 11 of 19
12
a claim of deliberate indifference must establish that he had a serious
medical need, and that prison officials, by affirmative acts or omissions,
were deliberately indifferent to that serious medical need. 37 	Deliberate
indifference in this context can be shown by a failure to provide care, the
delay of medical care for non-medical reasons, or denial of reasonable
requests for treatment. 38 	However, mere disagreement over a course of
treatment does not amount to deliberate indifference.39 	Further, non-
medical correctional staff cannot be deemed to be deliberately indifferent
“absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or
their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner.” 40
Here, 	we 	cannot 	conclude 	that 	the 	moving 	defendants 	were
deliberately indifferent to Ashfield’s serious medical needs. 	Ashfield
claims 	that, 	rather 	than 	get 	him 	help 	for 	his 	medical 	issues, 	the
defendants released him. This characterization completely overlooks the
undisputed 	fact 	that 	immediately 	after 	the 	underlying 	altercation,
Ashfield was taken to the medical department and treated by medical
37
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999).
38
Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 68 (3d Cir. 1993).
39
James v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 230 F. App’x 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2007).
40
Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 12 of 19
13
staff. 	Further, with respect to his assertion that the defendants “fast
track[ed]” his release “so he could receive medical treatment at his own
expense,”41 it is undisputed that Ashfield was released by court order. 42
Further, in his response to the defendants’ statement of material facts,
Ashfield conceded that that neither the Warden or Deputy Warden
personally acted to deny Ashfield medical treatment.43
Given 	these 	undisputed 	facts, 	we 	cannot 	conclude 	that 	the
individual moving defendants, non-medical correctional officials, were
deliberately indifferent to Ashfield’s serious medical needs. 	As we have
noted, it is well settled that non-medical correctional staff cannot be
deemed to be deliberately indifferent “absent a reason to believe (or
actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating
(or not treating) a prisoner.” 44 	Here, Ashfield was seen by medical staff
who addressed his injuries but he was released by court order that same
day. 	There is no evidence that the moving defendants had reason to
believe, 	or 	actual 	knowledge, 	that 	medical 	staff 	were 	not 	properly
41 Doc. 63 at 5.
42 Doc. 60, Ex. 1.
43 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 11-18; Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11-18.
44
Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 13 of 19
14
treating Ashfield and thus, were deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs.
Nor can we conclude that releasing Ashfield constitutes deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. 	As we have explained, the
correctional 	officers 	took 	Ashfield 	to 	the 	medical 	department
immediately after the altercation and he was treated for his sustained
injuries. 	Further, Ashfield proffered evidence establishing his release
resulted simply from a court order stemming from the fulfillment of his
financial obligations. 	Accordingly, we cannot conclude that Ashfield’s
release constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs. 	Thus,
Ashfield’s medical deliberate indifference claims fail as to the moving
defendants. 45
45 	To the extent Ashfield brings his conspiracy claim against these
defendants based on these assertions, such a claim fails, as the plaintiff
has conceded these individual defendants were not present nor had
knowledge of the alleged excessive force incident, and we have concluded
that these defendants were not deliberately indifferent to his medical
needs. 	Further, to the extent this claim is brought against SCPB, it is
well settled that “allegations that an entity conspired with its employees
fails to meet the first requirement of a civil conspiracy.”
	Houser v.
Feldman, 600 F. Supp. 3d 550, 570 (E.D. Pa. 2022). 	Accordingly, any
conspiracy claim against SCPB fails.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 14 of 19
15
4.
Monell Claims
Ashfield’s complaint also asserts
	Monell claims against SCPB,
Warden Wapinsky, and Deputy Warden Buchanan. 	A municipal entity
may be liable for a constitutional violation under Section 1983 if the
violation was a direct result of the entity’s policy, custom or practice. 46
However, an entity may not be held liable “solely because injuries were
inflicted 	by 	its 	agents 	or 	employees.”47 	Rather, 	a 	plaintiff 	must
demonstrate a “direct causal link” between the alleged constitutional
violation and the municipal policy or custom. 48 A plaintiff may show that
either an official policy of the municipality was the moving force behind
the violation, or that the municipality had an informal custom such that
it operated as the municipality’s policy. 49 In either scenario, the plaintiff
has the burden to show that the policy or custom was implemented by or
acquiesced to by a policymaker. 50
46
Monell, 436 U.S. at 695.
47
Jiminez v. All Am. Rathskeller, Inc., 503 F.3d 247, 249 (3d Cir. 2007).
48
City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989).
49
Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481 (1986);
Monell, 436
U.S. at 690.
50
Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1480 (3d Cir. 1990).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 15 of 19
16
To state a failure to protect claim, the plaintiff must show “(1) he
was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious
harm, (2) the official was deliberately indifferent to that substantial risk
to his health and safety, and (3) the official’s deliberate indifference
caused 	him 	harm.” 51 	Deliberate 	indifference 	under 	this 	standard
requires a prison official to “have known or been aware of the excessive
risk to inmate safety.”52 Additionally, a supervisor may be held liable for
a failure to intervene to stop unconstitutional conduct when they had a
reasonable opportunity to intervene and failed to do so.53
Further, in cases where a plaintiff is alleging a failure to train
officers, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the “municipality’s failure
to train [] officers . . . amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom the police come into contact.” 54 	To establish such a
claim, the plaintiff must demonstrate “contemporaneous knowledge of
the 	offending 	incident 	or 	knowledge 	of 	a 	prior 	pattern 	of 	similar
incidents,” coupled with “circumstances under which the supervisor’s
51
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 367 (3d Cir. 2012)
52
	Id. (quoting
	Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir.
2001)).
53
Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002).
54
City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 16 of 19
17
actions or inaction could be found to have communicated a message of
approval to the offending subordinate.”55
Finally, to establish individual supervisory liability for such claims:
The plaintiff must identify a supervisory policy or practice
that the supervisor failed to employ, and then prove that: (1)
the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged
injury 	created 	an 	unreasonable 	risk 	of 	a 	constitutional
violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the policy
created 	an 	unreasonable 	risk; 	(3) 	the 	defendant 	was
indifferent to that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was
caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or
procedure.56
In the instant case, Ashfield asserts a
Monell claim and a failure to
protect, intervene, and train against SCPB, Warden Wapinsky, and
Deputy Warden Buchanan, alleging that 37 Pa. Code § 91.6 and the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Policy DC-ADM 201 set forth
use of force standards, which the defendants violated. But Ashfield fails
to show how these policies, which instruct on the proper use of force, were
the 	“moving 	force” 	behind 	the 	alleged 	unconstitutional 	conduct.
Additionally, Ashfield concedes that “this [is] a single incident matter
55
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing
Bonenberger v. Plymouth Twp., 132 F.3d 20, 25 (3d Cir. 1997)).
56
Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d 307, 317 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing
Sample 	v. 	Diecks, 	885 	F.2d 	1099, 	1118 	(3d 	Cir. 	1989));
	Brown 	v.
Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2001)).
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 17 of 19
18
where there is no record of prior similar instances,” 57 and relies solely on
his own experience in this isolated case, which is insufficient to state a
Monell claim. 58
Additionally, liability under Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to
show 	that 	the 	defendant 	had 	personal 	involvement 	in 	the 	alleged
constitutional violation. 59 	Personal involvement may be shown through
allegations regarding the defendant’s own conduct, or that the defendant
had knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct and acquiesced in the
behavior. 60 Accordingly, a supervisor cannot be held liable under Section
1983 merely because a subordinate committed a constitutional violation,
as “liability cannot be predicated solely on the operation of
respondeat
superior.” 61 	Here, Ashfield proffered no evidence that the supervisory
57 Doc. 60 at 16.
58
See Taylor v. Dist. Att’ys Off., 802 F. App’x 701, 706 (3d Cir. 2020)
(granting summary judgment for the defendant where the plaintiff had
“not identified any policies or customs that extended beyond his own
experience underlying his claims against the City.”);
see also Taylor v.
Cnty. of Chester, No. 23-CV-4031, 2023 WL 7329497, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Nov.
6, 2023) (dismissing a Monell claim premised on “allegations [that] [we]re
pled in a generalized manner and appear[ed] to be predicated almost
entirely on [the plaintiff's] own experiences, which are insufficient bases
for a plausible Monell claim.”).
59
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207–08 (3d Cir. 1988).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1207.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 18 of 19
19
defendants had knowledge of the unconstitutional conduct other than the
fact they permitted him to be released. 	In fact, Ashfield conceded that
neither the Warden or Deputy Warden were physically present or had
contemporaneous knowledge of the alleged use of force incident, or that
they personally acted to deny Ashfield medical treatment. 62
Accordingly, 	we 	find 	that 	Warden 	Wapinsky, 	Deputy 	Warden
Buchanan, and SCPB, are not liable under
Monell, and these claims will
be dismissed.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the motion for summary judgment will
be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART as follows:
1. The motion will be GRANTED with respect to the claims against
SCP, SCPB, Schuylkill County, Warden Wapinsky, and Deputy
Warden Buchanan; and
2. The motion will be DENIED with respect to the plaintiff’s claims
against the correctional officer defendants.
An appropriate order follows.
s/ Daryl F. Bloom
Daryl F. Bloom
Chief United States Magistrate Judge
62 Doc. 51 ¶¶ 11-18; Doc. 60 ¶¶ 11-18.
Case 1:22-cv-01369-DFB Document 65 Filed 03/24/26 Page 19 of 19

Poursuivez vos recherches dans ChatGPT ou Claude

Connectez Omnilex pour rechercher dans le corpus juridique depuis votre assistant IA.