KAZIMU v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF PHILADELPHIA COUNTY et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
ABUDUKADIER KAZIMU, 	:
Plaintiff, 	:
:
v. 	: 	Case No. 2:26-cv-04283-JDW
:
MUNICIPAL COURT OF 	:
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY,
et al., 	:
Defendants. 	:
MEMORANDUM
Abudukadier 	Kazimu 	asserts 	claims 	against 	various defendants 	based 	on 	a
conviction in state court and things that happened to him while he was in prison. He
asserts claims against the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County, the Philadelphia
Department of Prisons, the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office, George Smith Towing,
Inc., and Terra Insurance Services. I will grant him leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and
dismiss his Complaint, partly with prejudice and partly without prejudice. For the parts
that I dismiss without prejudice, I will give him a chance to file an amended complaint.
I. 	FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
According to publicly available dockets,1 Mr. Kazimu was arrested in July 2024 and
found guilty of numerous summary offenses on July 2, 2025.
See Commonwealth v.
Kazimu, No. MC-51-SU-0002843-2024 (Phila. Muni. Ct.). On July 2, 2025, Municipal Court
1 I can take judicial notice of publicly available state court dockets.
See Buck v. Hampton
Twp. Sch. Dist., 452 F.3d 256, 260 (3d Cir. 2006).
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Judge William Austin Meehan, Jr. imposed a sentence of 120 days imprisonment, and Mr.
Kazimu was committed to the Philadelphia Department of Prisons on December 17, 2025.
Mr. Kazimu claims that his conviction was wrongful and that he lost all of his
property as a result. He also claims that his human rights were violated while he was in
prison and that a prison social worker lied to him. IN addition, he says that several prison
guards conspired with prison inmates to frame him and instigated other inmates to beat
him. He says that he suffers physical assaults that left his face swollen and caused him
pain.
Mr. Kazimu seeks monetary damages for his time in prison and demands that
prison guards be punished. He also seeks the return of his car and its contents from the
George Smith Towing Company and seeks to assert a claim to file an insurance claim with
Erie Insurance Company based on the fact that Erie continued to collect car insurance
premiums from him while he was incarcerated.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A plaintiff seeking leave to proceed
in forma pauperis must establish that he is
unable to pay for the costs of her suit.
See Walker v. People Express Airlines, Inc., 886 F.2d
598, 601 (3d Cir. 1989). Where, as here, a court grants a plaintiff leave to proceed
in forma
pauperis, it must determine whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be
granted.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). That inquiry applies the standard for a motion to
dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Pursuant to that standard, I must determine whether
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the Complaint contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quotations
omitted). That means I must accept the factual allegations in the Complaint as true, draw
inferences in favor of the plaintiff, and determine whether there is a plausible claim.
See
Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d Cir. 2021). Conclusory allegations do not
suffice.
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. When a plaintiff is proceeding
pro se,, I construe her
allegations liberally.
See Vogt v. Wetzel, 8 F.4th 182, 185 (3d Cir. 2021).
III. 	DISCUSSION
A.	
In Forma Pauperis
Mr. Kazimu has complete the required forms and attested under penalty of perjury
that he lacks the income and assets to pay the required filing fees. I will therefore grant
him leave to proceed
in forma pauperis.
B. 	Constitutional Claims
Because Mr. Kazimu alleges a violation of his “human rights,” I construe his
Complaint as asserting constitutional claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “To state a claim
under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution
and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed
by a person acting under color of state law.”
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). A
plaintiff must allege how each defendant was involved in the events and occurrences
giving rise to the claims.
See Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1998).
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1. 	Claims against the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County
States are not considered “persons” who may be liable under § 1983.
	See Will v.
Mich. Dep’t of 	State 	Police, 	491 U.S. 58, 	65-66 (1989). 	In addition, the Eleventh
Amendment bars suits against a state and its agencies in federal court when the state has
not waived that immunity.
See id. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has not waived
that immunity.
See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8521(b). The Municipal Court of Philadelphia, a
division of the First Judicial District of Pennsylvania, is an arm of the Commonwealth and
therefore shares in the Commonwealth’s Eleventh Amendment immunity.
Benn v. First
Judicial Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 241 (3d Cir. 2005). It also is not a “person” subject to
liability under § 1983.
See Burford v. Delaware County, No. 19-0577, 2019 WL 7048796, at
*4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20, 2019). I will 	therefore dismiss Mr. Kazimu’s claims against the
Municipal Court of Philadelphia with prejudice.
2. 	Claims against the Philadelphia Department of Prisons
City departments are not suable entities under § 1983 because they do not have a
separate 	legal 	existence 	from 	the 	City 	of 	Philadelphia.
	See 	Vurimindi 	v. 	City 	of
Philadelphia, No. 10-88, 2010 WL 3169610, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2010). Because the
Philadelphia Department of Prisons is not subject to suit for purposes of § 1983, Mr.
Kazimu’s claims against it are not plausible, and I will dismiss them with prejudice.
Even if Mr. Kazimu had named a proper defendant, he has not alleged a basis to
hold the City or its agency liable. A municipality or any other suable municipal entity, is
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not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the acts of its employees, meaning a municipality
is not liable simply because its employee commits a constitutional violation.
See Monell
v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). Rather, to state a claim for municipal
liability, a plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s policies or customs caused the alleged
constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. The plaintiff “must identify [the] custom
or policy, and specify what exactly that custom or policy was” to satisfy the pleading
standard.
McTernan v. City of York, 564 F.3d 636, 658 (3d Cir. 2009). It is not enough,
however, to allege the existence of a policy or custom. “A plaintiff must also allege that
the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’ of his injuries.”
Est. of Roman v. City of
Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing
Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1213 (3d
Cir. 1996)). This can be done “by demonstrating an ‘affirmative link’ between the policy or
custom and the particular constitutional violation” alleged.
	Id. 	“It is well-settled that, if
there is no violation in the first place, there can be no derivative municipal claim.”
	See
Mulholland v. Gov’t Cnty. of Berks, Pa., 706 F.3d 227, 238 n.15 (3d Cir. 2013).
Mr. Kazimu has not alleged anything suggesting that his injuries resulted from
some municipal policy, practice or custom. He has not identified who was involved, what
happened, or the policy, practice, or custom that might give rise to municipal liability.
3. 	Claims against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office
To the extent the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office is an entity capable of suit
under § 1983, Mr. Kazimu has not stated a claim against the office because he has neither
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alleged a specific policy or custom that caused the alleged violations of his rights. I will
therefore dismiss the claims against the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office.
4. 	Claims against private entities
Whether a private entity is acting under color of state law—
i.e., whether the
defendant is a state actor—depends on whether there is “such a close nexus between the
State and the challenged action’ that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as
that of the State itself.”
Leshko v. Servis, 423 F.3d 337, 339 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotations omitted). “To answer that question, [the Third Circuit has] outlined three broad
tests generated by Supreme Court jurisprudence to determine whether state action exists:
(1) whether the private entity has exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state; (2) whether the private party has acted with the help of or in
concert with state officials; and (3) whether the state has so far insinuated itself into a
position of interdependence with the acting party that it must be recognized as a joint
participant in the challenged activity.”
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009)
(internal quotations and alteration omitted).
“Action taken by private entities with the mere approval or acquiescence of the
State is not state action.”
Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999). Rather,
to support a finding of state action, “the government must be ‘responsible for the specific
conduct of which the plaintiff complains.’”
Borrell v. Bloomsburg Univ., 870 F.3d 154, 160
(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). “A private party ‘who
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corruptly conspire[s]’ with a state official will be considered a state actor under § 1983.”
Kitko v. Young, 575 F. App’x 21, 26 (3d Cir. 2014) (
per curiam) (quoting
Great W. Mining
& Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 175-76 (3d Cir. 2010)). However, “to
properly plead an unconstitutional conspiracy, a plaintiff must assert facts from which a
conspiratorial agreement can be inferred.”
Great W. Mining & Mineral Co., 615 F.3d at
178. “[A] bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 556 (2007).
Mr. Kazimu has not alleged facts to support a plausible conclusion that George
Smith Towing or Terra Insurance Services (or any other private entity) meet any of the
foregoing tests, and nothing in the Complaint suggests any factual or legal basis for
concluding that George Smith Towing, Inc. and Terra Insurance Services are state actors
who could be held liable under § 1983.
See, e.g., Webb v. Hillside Mun. Police Dep’t, No.
25-1026, 2025 WL 1899560, at *5 (D.N.J. July 8, 2025). Therefore, I will dismiss the claims
against those entities.
B. 	State Law Claims
It is unclear from the Complaint whether Mr. Kazimu intends to assert any state law
claims. 	However, 	because 	I 	am 	dismissing 	his 	federal 	claims, 	I 	will 	not 	exercise
supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) over any state law claims. And, because
it appears that Mr. Kazimu and the Defendants are citizens of Pennsylvania, there is no
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independent basis for the Court to have jurisdiction over those claims. I will therefore
dismiss any state law claims without prejudice.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
I will grant Mr. Kazimu leave to proceed
in forma pauperis and dismiss his
Complaint on statutory screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. I will dismiss the claims
against the Municipal Court of Philadelphia County and the Philadelphia Department of
Prisons with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.
I will dismiss all other claims without prejudice I will give Mr. Kazimu an opportunity to
file an amended complaint as to any claims dismissed without prejudice in the event he
can name proper defendants and plead additional facts that I have noted would be
necessary. An appropriate order follows, with further information about amendment.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Joshua D. Wolson
JOSHUA D. WOLSON, J.
October 8, 2026
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