Ibrahim v. Mullin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOUL IBRAHIM,
Petitioner,
v.
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-26-1846-G
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Joul Ibrahim, a noncitizen1 proceeding with counsel, filed a
petition seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Doc. 1.2
United States District Judge Charles B. Goodwin referred this matter to the
undersigned 	Magistrate 	Judge 	for 	proceedings 	consistent with 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(B), (C). Doc. 4. Respondents filed a response to the petition, Doc.
12, and the deadline for a reply has lapsed. So, the matter is at issue.
1 	This 	Report 	and 	Recommendation 	“uses 	the 	term 	‘noncitizen’ 	as
equivalent to the statutory term ‘alien.’” Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 578
n.2 (2020) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3)).
2 	Citations to a court document are to its electronic case filing designation
and pagination. Except for capitalization, quotations are verbatim unless
otherwise indicated.
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For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends that the
Court GRANT the petition and order Respondents to release Petitioner on an
appropriate order of supervision (OOS).
I. 	Factual background and procedural history.
Petitioner is a citizen of Syria who entered the United States on or
around July 9, 2024. Doc. 1, at 5. On that date, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) detained Petitioner. Id. Sometime afterwards, DHS initiated
removal proceedings against Petitioner before the Immigration Court (IC). See
Doc. 12, Ex. 1, at 1. Petitioner then filed applications for asylum, withholding
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. See id. On
June 22, 2025, an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Petitioner’s applications for
immigration relief and ordered him removed to Syria. Id. at 1, 4. Sometime
afterwards, 	Petitioner 	timely 	appealed 	the 	IJ’s 	decision 	to 	the 	Board 	of
Immigration Appeals (BIA). See id. Ex. 2.
On or around December 15, 2025, Petitioner filed his first bond request,
which he later withdrew following a scheduling conflict with his attorney. Doc.
1, at 5. On or around January 5, 2026, Petitioner filed his second bond request.
Id. The IC granted Petitioner’s request and scheduled a bond hearing for
January 	8, 	2026. 	Before 	this 	date, 	ICE 	transferred 	Petitioner 	from 	the
Bluebonnet Detention Center in Anson, Texas, to the Eden Detention Center
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in Eden, Texas. Id. at 5-6. On the date of his bond hearing, an IJ dismissed
Petitioner’s request because he was no longer at the Bluebonnet Detention
Center. Id. Ex. 1, at 1. On February 2, 2026, Petitioner filed his third bond
request. Doc. 1, at 6. On February 5, 2026, an IJ denied Petitioner’s bond
request citing a “lack of jurisdiction.” See id.; see also id. Ex. 2, at 1.
On February 12, 2026, the BIA denied Petitioner’s appeal, making his
removal order administratively final. See 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a); see also Doc. 12,
Ex. 2. On March 2, 2026, Petitioner appealed the BIA’s decision to the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals, which remains pending.3 Doc. 1, Ex. 3.
On June 12, 2026, Petitioner filed his fourth bond request. See Doc. 15,
at 4. On July 1, 2026, an IJ denied Petitioner’s request because Petitioner did
not establish “a material change in circumstances since the prior custody
hearing where the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to address custody.”
Doc. 12, Ex. 4, at 1. The IJ continued that Petitioner was subject to “an
administratively final order of removal and is therefore detained pursuant to
[§ 1231].” Id.
3 	See Ibrahim v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-60122 (5th Cir. 2026).
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While detained in the Eden Detention Center, Petitioner filed a habeas
petition with the Northern District of Texas.4 See Doc. 15, at 1. Sometime
afterwards, 	Petitioner 	was 	transferred 	to 	the 	Diamondback 	Correctional
Facility in Watonga, Oklahoma. Id. On or around August 21, 2026, Petitioner
was transferred to the Prairieland Detention Center in Alvarado, Texas. Doc.
13, at 1. On September 2, 2026, Petitioner was returned to the Diamondback
Correctional Facility, where he remains detained. Doc. 14, at 1; see also id. Ex.
1, at 1.
II. 	Petitioner’s claims.
Petitioner claims that: (1) his continued detention violates Zadvydas
because ICE has detained him for a period longer than reasonably necessary
to secure his removal; (2) his continued detention violates his substantive Due
Process rights under the Fifth Amendment; and (3) the conditions of his
confinement, which he alleges constitute criminal punishment, also violates
his substantive Due Process rights. Doc. 1, at 12-14; Doc. 15, at 6-7.
4 	See Ibrahim v. Noem, No. 6:26-CV-00083-H (N.D. Tex. Jul. 16, 2026). On
July 16, 2026, the Texas court denied Petitioner’s petition, finding that his
claim under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001 ) was premature because he
had not been detained for over six months following an administratively final
order of removal. Id. Doc. 12.
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Petitioner requests that the Court: (1) find that his continued detention
violates the Due Process Clause and order his immediate release; (2) issue
injunctive 	relief ordering Respondents to release Petitioner on the 	same
grounds; and (3) “[i]ssue a declaration” that Petitioner’s detention violates the
Due Process Clause. Doc. 1, at 14.
III. 	Standard of review.
An application for a writ of habeas corpus “is an attack by a person in
custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of
the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S.
475, 484 (1973). Habeas corpus relief is warranted only if the petitioner “is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). “Challenges to immigration detention are
properly brought directly through habeas.” Soberanes v. Comfort, 388 F.3d
1305, 1310 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88).
IV. 	Petitioner is entitled to relief under § 1231 and Zadvydas.
A. Petitioner’s detention is subject to § 1231.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), § 1226(a) allows for
the arrest of noncitizens under a warrant and grants ICE the discretion to keep
the noncitizen detained or released on bond. By contrast, § 1231(a)(2) requires
the mandatory detention of noncitizens who have an administratively final
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order of removal during the 90-day removal period. A noncitizen may be subject
to an administratively final order of removal following the dismissal of an
appeal before the BIA. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(a).
Here, Respondents assert that Petitioner’s detention is subject to §
1226(a) and, in light of Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226 (10th Cir.
2026), Petitioner is entitled to a custody redetermination before an IJ. Doc. 12,
at 1-3. But because Petitioner has an administratively final order of removal,
§ 	1231(a)(2) 	governs 	his 	detention. 	See 	id. 	Ex. 	2. 	And, 	as 	Respondents
recognize, an IJ previously denied Petitioner’s release on bond because he is
subject to an “administratively final order of removal.” Doc. 12, at 2; see also
id. Ex. 4, at 1.
Under § 1231(a)(1)(A), “when an alien is ordered removed, the Attorney
General shall remove the alien from the United States within a period of 90
days[.]” The 90-day period is known as the “removal period.” Id. After the
removal period, ICE has the discretion to continue to detain inadmissible or
criminal noncitizens. Id. § 1231(a)(6). The “basic purpose” of § 1231 is “assuring
the alien’s presence at the moment of removal.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699.
However, detention of a noncitizen subject to an administratively final
order of removal may not be “indefinite,” and the Supreme Court set the
“presumptively 	reasonable 	period 	of 	detention” 	under 	§ 1231(a)(6) 	at 	six
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months. Id. at 699, 701; see also Morales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116,
1123 (10th Cir. 2005) (reiterating “the reasonable period of post-removal
detention is presumptively six months”); Roble v. Pontesso, 90 F. App’x 334,
336 (10th Cir. 2004) (describing that “[a]s the possibility of removal becomes
remote,” the purpose of securing a noncitizen’s appearance at immigration
proceedings “drops out”). “After this 6–month period, once the alien provides
good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Therefore, under Zadvydas, a petitioner has the initial burden to: (1)
show his post-removal-order detention has surpassed six months or to rebut
the presumption of reasonableness if such detention is less than six months;
and (2) “provide[] good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood
of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future[.]” Id.; see also Soberanes, 388
F.3d at 1311 (“If removal is not reasonably foreseeable, the court should hold
continued detention unreasonable.” (citation modified)). If a petitioner meets
his initial burden, “the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to
rebut that showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
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B. Petitioner has met his initial burden.
To satisfy the burden under Zadvydas, a petitioner “must demonstrate
the 	existence 	of 	either 	institutional 	barriers 	to 	repatriation 	or 	obstacles
particular to his removal.” Dusabe v. Jones, No. CIV-24-464-SLP, 2024 WL
5465749, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2024), adopted, 2025 WL 486679 (W.D.
Okla. Feb. 13, 2025); see also Khaliq v. Noem, 828 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1267-68
(W.D. Okla. 2026) (confirming that Judges in this District have “looked to
whether the petitioner has demonstrated institutional barriers to repatriation
or 	obstacles 	particular 	to 	his 	removal”) 	(citation 	modified). 	Notably, 	a
petitioner is not required to “show the absence of any prospect of removal—no
matter how unlikely or unforeseeable.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 702. Rather, a
petitioner need only demonstrate that there is “good reason to believe that
there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future[.]” Id. at 701.
Here, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has met his initial burden
under 	Zadvydas. 	Id. 	First, 	because 	Petitioner 	has 	been 	detained 	for
approximately 	eight 	months 	following 	an 	administratively 	final 	order 	of
removal, he has shown that he has been detained past the presumptively
reasonable period. See id.; see also Doc. 12, Ex. 2.
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Second, Petitioner has provided good reasons to believe that there is not
a significant likelihood that he will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable
future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701. The record does not demonstrate that
ICE has made meaningful progress in securing Petitioner’s removal to Syria
or an alternative country. See Vishal v. Chestnut, 811 F. Supp. 3d 1179, 1184
(E.D. Cal. 2025) (finding that petitioner satisfied his burden when he alleged
that respondents “failed to provide notice of any progress that has been made
over the past seven months to effectuate [petitioner's] removal”); Trejo v.
Warden of ERO El Paso E. Mont., No. EP-25-CV-401-KC, 2025 WL 2992187,
at *5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 24, 2025) (finding that petitioner met his burden in part
by demonstrating “that ICE has not identified a third country that will accept
him”).
Additionally, “mere intent to find a third country,” absent “specific
communications between the United States and an identified country,” is “too
speculative to permit indefinite detention.” Momennia v. Bondi, No. CIV-25-
1067-J, 2025 WL 3011896, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 15, 2025). Here, there is no
argument or evidence in the record that demonstrates the Government’s
purported intent, let alone evidence that the Government has specifically
communicated with Syria or an alternative country.
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As a result, the undersigned finds that Petitioner has satisfied his initial
burden.
C. Respondents have not rebutted Petitioner’s showing.
Having concluded that Petitioner established “good reason to believe
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future, the Government must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that
showing.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
Here, Respondents offer no argument or evidence rebutting Petitioner’s
showing. Instead, they contend that his detention is governed by § 1226(a).
Doc. 12, at 1-3. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Respondents have not
rebutted Petitioner’s showing.
So, the undersigned recommends the Court grant Petitioner’s petition
and order his immediate release subject to an appropriate OOS. See, e.g., Bui
v. Bondi, No. CIV-26-91-J, 2026 WL 788947, at *5-6 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2026)
(ordering the petitioner’s immediate release “subject to an appropriate Order
of Supervision” after finding a due process violation based on the petitioner’s
prolonged detention with no reasonable likelihood of removal to Vietnam).
V. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
The undersigned recommends that the Court grant the petition insofar
as it seeks release under § 1231 and Zadvydas and decline to reach Petitioner’s
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remaining grounds for release. The undersigned recommends that the Court
order his immediate release subject to an appropriate OOS.5 The Court should
further order Respondents to certify compliance by filing a status report within
five business days of the Court’s order.
The undersigned advises the parties of their right to file an objection to
this Report and Recommendation with the Clerk of this Court by October 23,
2026, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
72.6 The undersigned further advises the parties that failure to make timely
objections to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate
5 	The Court cannot grant relief for Petitioner’s conditions of confinement
claim in a habeas action. Munoz v. Blanche, No. CIV-26-1688-J, 2026 WL
2532095, at *4 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2026) (finding that “a detainee's challenge
to the conditions of his confinement must be brought through a civil rights
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).”).
6 	Given the expedited nature of these proceedings, the undersigned has
reduced the typical objection time to this Report and Recommendation. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1983 addition (noting that
rule establishing 14-day response time “does not extend to habeas corpus
petitions, which are covered by the specific rules relating to proceedings under
Sections 2254 and 2255 of Title 28.”); see also Whitmore v. Parker, 484 F. App’x
227, 231 (10th Cir. 2012) (“The Rules Governing § 2254 Cases may be applied
discretionarily to habeas petitions under § 2241” and that “while the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied in habeas proceedings, they need not
be in every instance–particularly where strict application would undermine
the habeas review process.”).
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review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Moore v. United
States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991). This Report and Recommendation
disposes of the issues referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the
captioned matter.
ENTERED this 16th day of October, 2026.
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