Powell v. Stephens County District Court of

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CODY POWELL, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-321-R
)
DISTRICT COURT OF STEPHENS
COUNTY,
)
)
)
Respondent. )
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Cody Powell, a state pretrial detainee proceeding pro se, filed an
Emergency Motion for Mandamus to Compel Performance of Duty, which the Court
reviews as a petition for writ of mandamus (“Petition”). Doc. 1. United States District
Judge David L. Russell referred this matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). For the reasons set forth below, the
undersigned recommends the Court dismiss the Petition without prejudice.
I. Petitioner’s Grounds for Relief
Petitioner brings a “demand” that this Court “order[] Stephens County Court [to]
dismiss [his felony and misdemeanor cases currently pending in Stephens County District
Court] without the ability to refile charges and immediately release Petitioner from
custody.” Pet. at 3. Petitioner brings his demand under Oklahoma law, specifically
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purporting to rely on an Oklahoma statute for “mandamus to compel performance of duty.”
Id. at 2.1 As a basis for this demand, he alleges the following:
• Violation of the Oklahoma Bill of Rights due to excessive bond. Id.
at 1 (citing Article II, § 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution).
• Violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Oklahoma
Constitution and Oklahoma statute. Id. at 2 (citing Article II, § 20 of
the Oklahoma Constitution and Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 812).
• Violation of his due process rights due to (1) a jail administrator
telling him she had placed his petition for a speedy trial “in the judge’s
mailbox,” and then later “claim[ing] she could not find the petition,”
and (2) denial of his right to a speedy trial. Id. at 1-2 (citation
modified).2
II. Screening
When a prisoner seeks relief against a governmental entity or an officer or employee
of a governmental entity, the Court must screen the complaint and dismiss any part that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a)-(b).
“Under the liberal rules applicable to pro se complaints, an action is frivolous if the
1 Petitioner cites Okla. Stat. tit. 37, § 18, which does not exist. Under Oklahoma law related
to initiative petitions, see Okla. Stat. tit. 34, § 18, “any elector” may petition a state district
court “for a writ of mandamus to require such officer to perform such duty,” and the state
district court may “issue writs of mandamus and require performance of such duty as
provided by law.” That statute has no relevance here.
2 Though Petitioner does not provide the date on which the petition was allegedly
misplaced, he was taken into custody on December 10, 2025; given a bond hearing on
December 11, 2025; and “rewrote a motion for speedy trial and got it filed [on] January 9,
2026.” Pet. at 1-2.
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[petitioner] cannot make a rational argument on the law and facts in support of his claim.”
Van Sickle v. Holloway, 791 F.2d 1431, 1434 (10th Cir. 1986).
“A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110
(10th Cir. 1991). The Court will not, however, provide a plaintiff with arguments or act as
his advocate. Id.
Finally, the Court “ha[s] an independent obligation to determine whether subject-
matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” Arbaugh v.
Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).
III. Analysis
The undersigned concludes Petitioner’s claims are frivolous and, more importantly,
the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear those claims. Accordingly, the Court should dismiss
the Petition without prejudice. See Brereton v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216
(10th Cir. 2006) (explaining that when a district court dismisses an action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, it must do so without prejudice). Petitioner brings this action under
Oklahoma state law and seeks relief against an Oklahoma state court. But federal district
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and only have such jurisdiction as has been
specifically conferred upon them by Congress. Petitioner does not provide a basis for this
Court’s jurisdiction; nor does he allege facts from which jurisdiction could arise.
The undersigned considers two possible statutory bases for the current Petition.
First, the All-Writs Act is not a jurisdictional statute but provides that federal courts “may
issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C.
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§ 1651(a). As such, it only authorizes a court to issue appropriate writs when it already
has jurisdiction over the action. United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 913 (2009) (“The
All Writs Act and the extraordinary relief the statute authorizes are not a source of subject-
matter jurisdiction.” (citation modified)); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Rehab. Servs. v.
United States ex rel. Shanahan, No. CIV-18-1197-SLP, 2019 WL 7758681, at *5 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 16, 2019) (“The All Writs Act is not an independent source of subject-matter
jurisdiction for the Court.” (citation modified)); Capener v. Napolitano, 981 F. Supp. 2d
1119, 1124 (D. Utah 2013) (noting the All Writs Act does not “confer jurisdiction”);
Carnage v. Sanborn, 304 F. Supp. 857, 858 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (“28 U.S.C. § 1651 . . . is not
a jurisdictional statute; it merely. . . [authorizes a court] to issue appropriate writs only in
those actions over which it already has jurisdiction.”)
Second, the federal mandamus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is a jurisdictional statute
that gives district courts “original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of mandamus to
compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof to perform a duty
owed to the plaintiff.” That statute, however, is not applicable to the instant case as it
applies only to federal actors, and the Court has “no authority” to issue a writ of mandamus
“to direct state courts or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.” Van
Sickle, 791 F.2d at 1436 n.5 (citation modified); see also Harris v. Denver Dist. Court,
No. 25-1195, 2025 WL 3287664, at *1 (10th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025) (“We affirm on the
grounds that federal courts lack authority to issue writs of mandamus to state courts.”
(citation modified, citing Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011)); Stevens v.
Sheriff of El Paso Cnty., 15 F. App’x 740, 742 (10th Cir. 2001) (“A federal district court
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is without jurisdiction under section 1361 to compel state officials to perform any duty
owed to a [petitioner] under state law.” (citation modified)).3
Finally, even if the Court did have jurisdiction and authority to grant Petitioner’s
demanded relief, the Court should abstain from exercising jurisdiction to interfere with
state proceedings under the Younger abstention doctrine. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1981). The Younger abstention doctrine applies when the following three requirements
are met:
(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding,
(2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the
federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings involve important state
interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or
implicate separately articulated state policies.
Winn v. Cook, 945 F.3d 1253, 1258 (10th Cir. 2019) (citation modified). The doctrine
would apply here as (1) Petitioner’s criminal charges are pending in the Stephens County
District Court; (2) Petitioner has failed to demonstrate (or even allege) that the state
criminal proceeding is not an adequate forum to hear his claims (which arise under state
law); and (3) “state criminal proceedings are viewed as a traditional area of state concern,”
id. at 1258 (citation modified). Nor has Plaintiff demonstrated any “extraordinary
circumstances” that might establish an exception to the doctrine. Perez v. Ledesma, 401
U.S. 82, 85 (1971). As such, Plaintiff’s claims are also barred by the Younger abstention
3 Even if the Court liberally construes Petitioner’s due process claim as arising under
federal law, it would still be “without jurisdiction to grant a writ of mandamus against state
and local officials.” Sockey v. Gray, 159 F. App’x 821, 822 (10th Cir. 2005); see also
Knox, 632 F.3d at 1292 (“We have no authority to issue such a writ to direct state courts
or their judicial officers in the performance of their duties.” (citation modified)).
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doctrine. See, e.g., Chennault v. Jackson Cnty. Jail, No. CIV-25-487-SLP, 2025 WL
2946174, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 27, 2025) (recommending abstention under Younger
from consideration of a pretrial detainee’s civil rights claims) (R&R), adopted, 2025 WL
2710576 (W.D. Okla. Sept. 23, 2025).
IV. Recommendation and Notice of Right to Object
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Court DISMISS
the Petition without prejudice. Petitioner is advised of his right to object to this Report
and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk
of Court not later than March 19, 2026. See id. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).
Failure to object timely waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues
addressed in this Report and Recommendation. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656,
659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues referred to the undersigned
Magistrate Judge in this matter.
ENTERED this 26th day of February, 2026.
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