Lopez Vasquez v. Cerna et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
FERNANDO LOPEZ VASQUEZ, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-26-147-G
)
ROBERT CERNA, Acting Field )
Office Director of Dallas Field Office, )
U.S. Immigration and Customs )
Enforcement, et al., )
)
Respondents.1 )
ORDER
Petitioner Fernando Lopez Vasquez initiated this habeas corpus proceeding
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on January 28, 2026, challenging his detention by U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Pet. (Doc. No. 1). Respondents have
filed an Answer (Doc. No. 19).
The Petition alleged that Petitioner was detained at the ICE Field Office in
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. See Pet. ¶¶ 1, 13, 16. The day after the Petition was filed,
Respondents notified the Court that Petitioner had been transferred to Bluebonnet
Detention Center in Anson, Texas. See Resp’ts’ Notice (Doc. No. 8) at 1. He remains
detained at that facility. Pet’r’s Resp. to Order to Show Cause (Doc. No. 21) at 2.
1 Markwayne Mullin, Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and Todd
Blanche, Attorney General of the United States, are hereby substituted as respondents for
Kristi Noem and Pamela Bondi, respectively, pursuant to Rules 25(d) and 81(a)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
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Arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the action, Respondents assert that
either transfer of this action to the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas or
dismissal is required. See Resp’ts’ Notice at 1-2; Answer at 2-5; Resp’ts’ Reply (Doc. No.
14). Petitioner opposes both transfer and dismissal. See Pet’r’s Am. Resp. (Doc. No. 10);
Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. (Doc. No. 17).
I. Relevant Background
A. The Petition
Petitioner, a “native of Mexico,” entered the United States at the age of 15 and has
lived in the country since that time—approximately 20 years. Pet. ¶¶ 5-6; see Pet’r’s Mot.
(Doc. No. 3) at 3; Answer at 2.
On January 25, 2026, Petitioner received assistance for a disabled vehicle from
emergency responders. Pet. ¶¶ 8-9. Petitioner was then detained by law enforcement due
solely to his “suspected immigration status.” Id. ¶¶ 10-12.
Petitioner was transferred into ICE custody on January 28, 2026. Id. ¶ 11. Petitioner
was initially detained at the ICE Field Office in Oklahoma City. See id. ¶¶ 1, 13; Resp’ts’
Reply at 1. The Petition identifies Robert Cerna, Acting Field Office Director of the ICE
Field Office in Dallas, Texas, as Petitioner’s “immediate custodian” and the official
“responsible for Petitioner’s detention and removal.” Pet. ¶ 37.
B. The Initiation and Filing of Petitioner’s Habeas Proceeding
Petitioner’s counsel submitted the Petition to the Court Clerk by email at 11:03 a.m.
on January 28, 2026. Pet’r’s Am. Resp. at 3, 9. At 11:13 a.m., Petitioner’s counsel emailed
the Petition to an ICE officer at the Oklahoma City ICE Field Office. Id. at 3, 11.
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According to the Declaration of Brandon Hilbun, an ICE acting supervisory
detention and deportation officer, at 12:53 p.m. on January 28, 2026, Petitioner was booked
into a “Hold Room” in the Oklahoma City ICE Field Office. See Resp’ts’ Reply Ex. 1,
Hilbun Decl. (Doc. No. 14-1) ¶ 4. The Hold Room “is not a detention facility, and subjects
are generally held there for 24 hours or less.” Id.
The Petition was filed and this civil case opened by the Court Clerk at 2:41 p.m. on
January 28, 2026. See Doc. No. 1 (receipt). Petitioner’s counsel received e-mail notice of
the opening of the case at 2:46 p.m. See Pet’r’s Am. Resp. at 3, 12.
Respondents represent that at 3:46 p.m., Petitioner was “moved from the Oklahoma
City Field Office” to Bluebonnet Detention Facility in Anson, Texas. Resp’ts’ Reply at 1;
see Hilbun Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.2
At 5:22 p.m. on January 28, 2026, the Court issued an Order directing Respondents
to file a pre-answer motion or an answer to the Petition and to provide at least 72-hours’
notice prior to moving the Petitioner. See Order (Doc. No. 5) at 1-2. Counsel for
Respondents received an email notification of the Court’s Order at 5:26 p.m., but the email
was not reviewed and relayed to an ICE official “until later.” Resp’ts’ Reply at 1 n.1.
2 According to Officer Hilbun, the Bluebonnet Detention Center had space to receive
Petitioner, and individuals who are citizens of Mexico, like Petitioner, “usually go to
Bluebonnet.” Hilbun Dec. ¶ 6.
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II. Discussion
A. The Court’s Jurisdiction
The record therefore reflects, and the parties do not dispute, that Petitioner was
located in Oklahoma City, within the Western District of Oklahoma, when this action was
initiated and filed. See Pet’r’s Am. Resp. at 2-3; Resp’ts’ Reply at 1; Hilbun Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.
Respondents argue that transfer to the Northern District of Texas or dismissal of this
action is required, however, because Petitioner was outside the Western District of
Oklahoma when the case “became operative/coercive” as to Respondents and because
Petitioner did not name a custodian within the Court’s jurisdiction. Resp’ts’ Reply at 1-2;
see Answer at 2-5. Respondents further argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over any
official with the authority to direct Petitioner’s release. Resp’ts’ Reply at 3-5; Answer at
2-5.
Petitioner responds that Petitioner’s transfer does not defeat the Court’s jurisdiction
because Respondents caused Petitioner’s transfer. See Pet’r’s Suppl. Br. at 1-2, 4.
Petitioner further argues that Acting Director Cerna was his immediate custodian while he
was held in Oklahoma City and during transit because Acting Director Cerna “has
supervisory authority over ICE operations in Oklahoma.” Id. at 4; see also id. at 7.
“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . within their
respective jurisdictions.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). In Rumsfeld v. Padilla, the Supreme Court
explained that “[w]henever a § 2241 habeas petitioner seeks to challenge his present
physical custody within the United States,” the petitioner generally “should name his
warden as respondent and file the petition in the district of confinement.” Padilla, 542
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U.S. 426, 447 (2004). The “immediate custodian rule,” which states “that the proper
respondent is the warden of the facility where the prisoner is being held, not the Attorney
General or some other remote supervisory official,” is the “default rule” for “core
challenges”—i.e., challenges to “present physical confinement.” Id. at 435 (internal
quotation marks omitted). This respondent-custodian “is ‘the person’ with the ability to
produce the prisoner’s body before the habeas court.” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2242,
2243).
The Padilla Court expressly declined to resolve, however, the issue of “whether the
Attorney General is a proper respondent to a habeas petition filed by an alien detained
pending deportation.” Padilla, 542 U.S. at 435 n.8. Additionally relevant here is an
“important but limited” exception to the default rule: “when the government moves a
habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian,” “the
District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its
jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release.” Id. at 441 & n.14;
see also Pinson v. Berkebile, 604 F. App’x 649, 652-53 (10th Cir. 2015). Stated differently,
“jurisdiction attaches on the initial filing for habeas corpus relief, and it is not destroyed by
a transfer of the petitioner and the accompanying custodial change.” Santillanes v. U.S.
Parole Comm’n, 754 F.2d 887, 888 (10th Cir. 1985).
Here, the Petition identified three respondents: Acting Director Cerna as
“Petitioner’s immediate custodian,” Secretary Mullin as the official who “has ultimate
custodial authority over Petitioner,” and Attorney General Blanche as the official who is
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“responsible for the Department of Justice,” which operates the Executive Office of
Immigration Review and the Immigration Court system. Pet. ¶¶ 37, 38, 40.
The Court finds that:
(1) At the time of the filing of the Petition, Petitioner was in ICE custody and
detained in the ICE Oklahoma City Field Office. Id. ¶ 13; Hilburn Decl. ¶¶
4-5.
(2) After the filing of the Petition, Respondents transferred Petitioner out of the
Western District of Oklahoma. See Hilbun Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.
(3) The “Dallas Field Office of ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations” has
“supervisory authority over ICE operations in Oklahoma.” Pet’r’s Suppl. Br.
at 4, 7; Pet. ¶ 13.
(4) Respondent Cerna, as Acting Field Office Director of the ICE Field Office
in Dallas, Texas, has authority over ICE operations both in Oklahoma and in
Anson, Texas, where Petitioner is presently detained.
(5) Respondent Cerna, therefore, is able to effect the requested habeas relief.
Therefore, the undersigned concludes that Petitioner adequately identified both his
immediate custodian at the time of filing and Respondents who are ultimately responsible
for Petitioner’s detention. See Pet. ¶¶ 37, 38, 40; Ozturk v. Hyde, 136 F.4th 382, 392-93
(2d Cir. 2025) (finding that the government’s argument that a petitioner failed to name the
proper respondent was not likely to succeed because the ICE field office director or a more
remote custodian can be a proper respondent when a habeas petition is filed while an
immigration detainee is in transit); see also Padilla, 542 U.S. at 439 (noting that
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“identification of the party exercising legal control only comes into play when there is no
immediate physical custodian with respect to the challenged ‘custody’”); 28 U.S.C § 2242
(requiring a habeas petition to allege “the name of the person who has custody over [the
petitioner] . . . if known”).
The undersigned also concludes that, in this instance, at least Acting Director Cerna
is within the jurisdiction of the Court due to his supervision of ICE activities in Oklahoma,
including ICE’s detention of Petitioner and ICE’s decision to transfer Petitioner from
Oklahoma to Texas. See Hilbun Decl. ¶¶ 5-6; Pet. ¶ 17; see also Kaliku v. U.S. Immigr. &
Customs Enf’t, No. 24-3144, 2024 WL 4854523, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2024) (noting
that “the United States Attorney,” “ICE,” and the ICE field office director “are responsible
for complying with [the] Court’s directives”); Parra Molina v. Mullin, No. CIV-26-456-
HE, 2026 WL 1916277, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 7, 2026). The Court therefore rejects
Respondents’ argument that dismissal or transfer is required due to a lack of jurisdiction.
B. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims
Petitioner argues that he is entitled to relief pursuant to Bautista v. Santacruz, 813
F. Supp. 3d 1084 (C.D. Cal. 2025), appeal docketed sub nom. Bautista v. U.S. Dep’t of
Homeland Sec., No. 25-7958 (9th Cir. Dec. 19, 2025). See Pet. ¶¶ 42-46.3 Petitioner also
3 According to Petitioner, the Bautista court “entered final judgment,” which “certif[ied] a
nationwide Bond Eligible Class” whose members, based on that court’s issuance of
declaratory relief, “are detained under § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2), and therefore, may not
be denied consideration for release on bond.” Pet. ¶¶ 25-26. On March 31, 2026, the Ninth
Circuit ordered a stay of the district court order on which Petitioner relies to the extent the
order “extend[s] beyond the Central District of California.” Bautista v. Exec. Off. for
Immigr. Rev., No. 25-7958 (9th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (order).
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argues that his continued detention without a custody determination violates the
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq., and the due process
rights afforded him by the Fifth Amendment. See Pet. ¶¶ 23-24, 46, 48-52.
Respondents argue that Petitioner relies exclusively and improperly on Bautista and
that Petitioner has not adequately claimed a violation of the INA premised upon 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) being an unlawful basis for his detention. See Answer at 2, 5-8.
While Respondents are correct that the Petition is primarily based on Bautista and
that its description of an independent INA claim is relatively meager, the Court finds that
Petitioner’s allegations are sufficient to plausibly assert such a claim. In describing the
controlling law, Petitioner states that the “threshold legal question” when immigration
detention is challenged is “whether [the] detention authority arises under § 1226(a) or §
1225(b)(2).” Pet. ¶ 24. Petitioner claims that, based on the characteristics of his detention,
he “is entitled to consideration for release under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).” Id. ¶¶ 32, 42.
Petitioner further states:
By denying Petitioner a bond hearing under § 1226(a) and asserting that he
is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2), Respondents violate
Petitioner’s statutory rights under the INA and the Court’s judgment in
Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz.
Id. ¶ 46. This is enough, if only just, to raise as an independent ground for habeas relief
that Petitioner is being held in custody in violation of § 1226(a) of the INA. See Larios
Lopez v. Gantt, No. CIV-26-134-G, 2026 WL 2455796, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 21,
2026); see also Puentes-Puentes v. Grant, No. CIV-26-192-J, 2026 WL 657199, at *1-2
(W.D. Okla. Mar. 9, 2026) (“Petitioner discussed the framework under § 1226(a) and
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addressed why he was eligible for a bond hearing. As such, the allegations in the Petition
are sufficient to raise the § 1225 and § 1226 issue, and thus sufficient for the Court to
determine Petitioner’s case on the merits.” (omission and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
C. Petitioner’s Claim for Violation of the INA
Petitioner asserts that Respondents’ detention of him under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)
violates the INA. See Pet. ¶¶ 46. He argues that his detention should instead be governed
by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which permits release of a detained noncitizen on bond after an
individualized custody determination. See id. ¶¶ 22-23; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2).
Petitioner’s INA claim is controlled by the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in
Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, in which that court held that § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory-
detention requirement “applies only to [noncitizens] seeking admission” at the border of
the United States. Santillan Quiroz v. Mullin, 180 F.4th 1226, 1239-40 (10th Cir. 2026).
The Tenth Circuit further held “that noncitizens who entered the United States and were
thereafter detained in the interior of the country are,” instead, “usually subject to § 1226(a)
(and thus eligible for bond).” Id. at 1237; see also id. at 1232, 1251 (concluding that the
petitioner, who was detained at a traffic stop in the interior of the country, was “eligible for
release” and “entitled to a bond hearing”).
Here, as in Santillan Quiroz, Petitioner was taken into custody in the interior of the
United States after having entered the country. See Pet. ¶¶ 5-6, 8-9, 11; Santillan Quiroz,
180 F.4th at 1233-34. Accordingly, § 1225(b)(2)(A) is inapplicable. See Santillan Quiroz,
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180 F.4th at 1246-51. Because Petitioner “can properly be subject to detention under §
1226(a),” he is entitled to a bond hearing. Id. at 1251 n.13.4
D. Petitioner’s Request for Fees and Costs
Petitioner also requests attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (“EAJA”). See Pet. at 11.
The EAJA “unambiguously authorize[s] fees in habeas actions challenging
immigration detention.” Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025), petition for
cert. filed, No. 26-146 (U.S. July 30, 2026). Such attorney’s fees must be sought pursuant
to the EAJA and by separate motion, however. See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2), 81(a)(4);
LCvR 54.2. Any recovery of costs is governed by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 2412(a), Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), and Local Civil Rule 54.1.
CONCLUSION
In accordance with the above, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1)
is GRANTED as to Petitioner’s claim for relief based upon a violation of the INA.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Respondents are ORDERED to, within seven (7) days of the date of this Order,
either provide Petitioner with a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or
release Petitioner into the United States.
2. Petitioner’s Motion (Doc. No. 3) is DENIED as moot; and
3. Petitioner’s remaining claims for relief are DISMISSED without prejudice.
4. Respondents shall file a declaration with the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746
within ten (10) days of the date of this Order affirming either that a bond hearing
4 Based on this determination, the Court need not reach Petitioner’s remaining claims for
relief.
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was conducted or that Petitioner was released from detention into the United
States.
5. The Court will separately enter judgment but retains jurisdiction over this matter
to ensure compliance with this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 29th day of September, 2026.
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