USA v. Requejo-Garcia

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
EDGAR REQUEJO-GARCIA,
Defendant.
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Case No. CR-26-320-D
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND ORDER
Before the Court is Defendant’s Motion to Suppress. [Doc. No. 18]. The government
filed a response [Doc. No. 21], to which Defendant filed a reply [Doc. No. 24].
On October 6, 2026, the Court held a hearing on Defendant’s motion at which
Defendant appeared personally and through appointed counsel, Luciana Perez and Lea
Glossip. [Doc. No. 27]. The government appeared through Assistant United States Attorney
Brandon Hale and presented three witnesses, Officer Chris Villafáne, Officer Aldo Romero,
and Officer Alan Quiroz. Id. The government introduced seven exhibits. Id. The parties
presented their arguments, generally adopting the positions in their written briefs. Id. The
Court took the motion under advisement. Id. Upon consideration of the evidence, case
record, and the parties’ arguments, the Court rules as follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
In a one-count Indictment, Defendant was charged with reentry of a removed alien
in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). [Doc. No. 1]. Defendant moves to suppress his
statements to law enforcement, physical evidence, fingerprints, biometric and identifying
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information, evidence contained in his immigration file, and any other evidence obtained
directly or indirectly from a traffic stop that occurred on July 7, 2026. Officers Villafáne,
Romero, and Quiroz testified at the hearing concerning the events leading up to the
encounter with Defendant and the circumstances surrounding Defendant’s seizure by
officers. The Court finds that the evidence received at the hearing establishes the following
facts pertinent to the motion.
Supervisory 	Deportation 	and 	Detention 	Officer 	Villafáne 	has 	worked 	for
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) for approximately eleven years in the
Street Fugitive Operations Team for Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. He also works with the
Oklahoma City Enforcement Removal Operations (“ERO”) team to locate, encounter,
arrest, and remove individuals unlawfully present in the United States. He is the supervisor
of Officer Romero and Officer Quiroz. Officer Romero has six years of experience as an
ICE deportation officer. He has been working in conjunction with the ERO unit in
Oklahoma City for approximately four years. Officer Quiroz has eight years of experience
working as an ICE deportation officer. He has worked as a deportation officer in both west
Texas and Oklahoma City. Each officer has extensive experience in locating, encountering,
and arresting illegal aliens in Oklahoma City.
On July 7, 2026, the Oklahoma City Street Fugitive Operations Team conducted a
targeted surveillance operation in the area of 700 SE 15th Street in Oklahoma City. The
officers selected this location because their databases showed, and they knew from
experience, that it is an area that has a high concentration of individuals who are unlawfully
present in the United States. They also selected the area because they believed a designated
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target would be there. Officer Romero was working as dispatch in the office on July 7,
2026, and Officer Quiroz was working in the field.
As part of the operation, officers conducted random license plate checks on vehicles
traveling in the area 	to identify individuals unlawfully present 	in the country. At
approximately 8:31 a.m. a Nissan Pathfinder bearing Oklahoma license plate JDD466 was
randomly selected by Officer Cameron Hanks to have database checks conducted on it. At
that time, Officer Quiroz texted Officer Romero the license plate number “Jdd466.”
Upon receipt of the license plate number, Officer Romero ran a search using the
database Accurint.1 The database informed 	him that the vehicle was registered to
Defendant. Using the information he obtained from Accurint, he ran a search using the
database UPAX2. UPAX provided him with a photo of Defendant and informed him that
Defendant 	had 	previously 	been 	voluntarily 	removed 	from 	the 	country 	twice, 	and
involuntarily removed once. It also informed him that there was no record of Defendant
receiving or applying for any immigration benefits, such as an application to be in the
country lawfully, nor were there any records of him entering the country lawfully, such as
a flight record or a record of his encounter with Border Patrol agents. Had Defendant
reentered the country lawfully or been reencountered by Border Control agents, the
1 Accurint is a database created by LexisNexis that aggregates an individual’s various public
information, such as an individual’s license plate number and address, into a single searchable
database for law enforcement.
2 UPAX is a database operated by U.S. Customs and Border Protection. It provides law
enforcement with an individual’s biographical information, alien number, travel information, prior
and pending removals, current immigration status, any immigration benefits the individual has
applied to receive, and the individual’s encounters with most law enforcement agencies.
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database would have shown those records. Officer Romero testified that the combination
of Defendant’s prior involuntary removal and lack of lawful reentry or reencounter records
indicated that Defendant was illegally present in the country in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a).
At approximately 8:33 a.m. Officer Romero gave Officer Quiroz’s message that
contained the license plate number a thumbs up response. Officer Romero testified that this
meant that he believed the officers in the field had reasonable suspicion and probable cause
to believe that the registered owner of the vehicle had committed a crime by being in the
country illegally. He also responded by sending the photo of Defendant that he obtained
from the database to assist the officers in confirming the driver’s identity. At 8:34 a.m.
officer Quiroz, responded “Title 42?”, which he testified meant that he was asking Officer
Romero whether the records indicated that Defendant had a prior voluntary removal.
Officer Romero responded to the message stating that the records showed Defendant had
two prior voluntary removals and one involuntary removal.
After receiving this information, Officer Quiroz confirmed that the driver of the
vehicle matched the appearance of the individual in the photograph. The vehicle in which
Officer Quiroz was a passenger attempted to conduct a traffic stop on Defendant’s vehicle
in coordination with Officer Hanks’ vehicle. Both vehicles were unmarked, but were
equipped with lights and sirens. Officer Quiroz testified that both law enforcement vehicles
engaged their lights and sirens to initiate the stop. He further stated that Defendant
acknowledged the officers’ efforts to get him to stop with an obscene gesture (flipping them
off), then he failed and refused to stop. Indeed, Officer Quiroz testified that Defendant did
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not slow his vehicle or give any indication that he was going to pullover. Officer Hanks
then maneuvered his vehicle in front of Defendant’s vehicle with Officer Quiroz’s vehicle
blocking the rear. This maneuver resulted in Defendant’s vehicle stopping.
A couple of responding officers then spoke with Defendant, at which point Officer
Quiroz was handed a copy of Defendant’s Mexico identification card. Officer Quiroz texted
a photo of Defendant’s identification card to Officer Romero, confirming that he was in
custody and that he was the same individual depicted in the database results.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. 	Reasonable Suspicion.
The government bears the burden to prove the validity of a warrantless seizure. See
United States v. Neugin, 958 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir. 2020). In this case, the government
seeks to justify Defendant’s seizure as an investigative detention permitted by Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). “To be reasonable, a traffic stop must be justified at its inception
and, in general, the officer’s actions during the stop must be reasonably related in scope to
the mission of the stop itself.”3 United States v. Mayville, 955 F.3d 825, 829 (10th Cir.
2020) (quotation and citation omitted). Under Terry, a stop is lawful at its inception if the
officer has “articulable and reasonable suspicion that the person detained is engaged in
criminal activity.” United States v. King, 990 F.2d 1552, 1557 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).
3 It is uncontested that the traffic stop was reasonably related in scope to the mission of the stop
itself. Thus, for purposes of determining whether the officers had reasonable suspicion the Court
only addresses the issue of whether the officers’ traffic stop was reasonably justified at its
inception.
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Reasonable suspicion requires “a ‘particularized and objective basis for suspecting’
criminal conduct under a totality of the circumstances.” United States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d
1374, 1379 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)).
This standard is “not ... onerous,” id. at 1379 (quoting United States v. Kitchell, 653 F.3d
1206, 1219 (10th Cir. 2011)), with the level of suspicion required being “‘considerably less
than proof by a preponderance of the evidence or that required for probable cause.’” United
States v. McHugh, 639 F.3d 1250, 1256 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Lopez,
518 F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir. 2008)). Courts “‘evaluate each factor alleged to support an
inference of reasonable suspicion separately and in the aggregate.’” United States v.
Jackson, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 2682995, at *5 (10th Cir. Sept. 14, 2026) (quoting United
States v. Gurule, 935 F.3d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 2019)). Courts also “defer to the ability of a
trained law enforcement officer to distinguish between innocent and suspicious actions.”
United States v. McGregor, 158 F.4th 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation and citation
omitted).
Here, the government argues that the factors that support an inference of reasonable
suspicion are: 1) that Defendant was present in an area known to have a high concentration
of individuals unlawfully in the United States, 2) that their database checks informed the
officers that the vehicle was registered to a foreign national, 3) that their database checks
informed them that the owner of the vehicle had been voluntarily removed from the country
twice and involuntarily removed once, 4) that their database checks informed them that
Defendant did not have a record of lawful admission, adjustment of status, an approved
application to remain in the United States, or a reentry encounter with Border Control
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agents, and 5) that their database checks provided them with a photo of the owner of the
vehicle which matched the driver’s appearance.
Defendant argues that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion because the
government’s reliance on a search result that returned a lack of lawful reentry records is
insufficient. Moreover, Defendant contends that the government needs more specific
evidence of not only a prior involuntary removal from the United States, but that Defendant
reentered the country illegally to demonstrate that the officers had reasonable suspicion to
conduct the traffic stop.
Defendant’s presence in an area known to have a high concentration of individuals
who are unlawfully present in the country alone is insufficient to support reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Briggs, 720 F.3d 1281, 1286 (10th Cir. 2013) (“‘[T]he fact
that a stop occurred in a high-crime area cannot alone justify’ an investigative detention.”
(quoting McHugh, 639 F.3d at 1257)). However, “the court [can] consider the location’s
high crime rate when combined with other factors.” Jackson, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL
2682995, at *5 (citing United States v. Conner, 699 F.3d 1225, 1231 (10th Cir. 2012);
United States v. DeJear, 552 F.3d 1196, 1201 (10th Cir. 2009); see also McHugh, 639 F.3d
at 1257 (considering the location’s reputation and past calls regarding possible criminal
activity)).
Based on the totality 	of the circumstances and the evidence 	presented, the
government has shown that the officers had reasonable suspicion that Defendant was
engaged in criminal activity when they initiated the traffic stop. Indeed, Officer Romero
testified credibly that he conducted the database searches which informed him that
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Defendant was the owner of the vehicle at issue, that Defendant had been voluntarily
removed from the country twice and once involuntarily removed, that there were no records
of Defendant’s lawful reentry, and the system provided a photo of Defendant. Had
Defendant reentered the country lawfully, UPAX would have shown records of his lawful
reentry—such as records of his flight, records of his encounter with Border Control agents,
or his applications for immigration benefits. Moreover, Officer Quiroz testified credibly
that he relied upon the information Officer Romero provided him and he confirmed that
Defendant matched the photograph he was provided before initiating the traffic stop. Their
combined testimony is sufficient to support a finding that they had reasonable suspicion to
conduct the traffic stop.
However, their reasonable suspicion is also bolstered by the fact that Defendant was
present in an area that all three officers testified they knew from experience to have a high
concentration of individuals unlawfully present in the United States. Furthermore, their
databases showed the area had a high concentration of individuals in violation of removal
orders. Accordingly, under the circumstances, it was reasonable for the officers to believe
that Defendant was unlawfully present in the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. §
1326(a) when they initiated the traffic stop. Thus, the government has demonstrated that it
had reasonable suspicion.
II. 	Probable Cause.
A warrantless arrest of a person is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the
arresting officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect committed a crime in the
officer’s presence. D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 56-57 (2018). “The government has the
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burden to establish probable cause in support of a warrantless arrest.” United States v.
Carrazco-Escalante, 300 F. Supp. 2d 1155, 1165 (D.N.M. 2004). “Probable cause to arrest
exists where, under the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe
that an offense has been committed by the person arrested.” United States v. Martin, 613
F.3d 1295, 1302 (10th Cir. 2010) (quotation and citation omitted). This is an objective
inquiry. Apodaca v. City of Albuquerque, 443 F.3d 1286, 1289 (10th Cir. 2006). “To
determine whether an officer had probable cause for an arrest, we examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to probable cause.” Wesby,
583 U.S. at 56-57 (quotation and citation omitted). “Because probable cause deals with
probabilities and depends on the totality of the circumstances, ... it is a fluid concept that
is not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.” Id. (quotation and
citation omitted). “It ‘requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity,
not an actual showing of such activity.’” Id. (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 243-
44, n.13 (1983)). “Probable cause is not a high bar.” Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
Here, all the evidence that supports a finding the officers had reasonable suspicion
Defendant was violating 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), is also sufficient to support a finding that the
officers had probable cause. Additionally, Officer Quiroz credibly testified that Defendant
refused to yield in response to the officers’ traffic stop. Officer Quiroz credibly testified
that both law enforcement vehicles’ lights and sirens were engaged when they attempted
to pullover Defendant’s vehicle. However, rather than stop, Defendant acknowledged the
officers by making an obscene hand gesture and attempting to elude them. Defendant’s
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vehicle only came to a stop when the officers maneuvered their vehicles directly in front
of and behind Defendant’s vehicle. Defendant’s attempt to elude officers is a violation of
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A(A).
Section 540A(A) provides in relevant part:
A. Any operator of a motor vehicle who has received a visual
and audible signal, a flashing red light, flashing red and blue
lights, flashing blue and white lights, or any other combination
of flashing red, blue, and white lights, and a siren from a peace
officer driving a motor vehicle showing the same to be an
official police, sheriff, highway patrol or state game ranger
vehicle directing the operator to bring the vehicle to a stop and
who willfully increases the speed or extinguishes the lights of
the vehicle in an attempt to elude such peace officer, or
willfully attempts in any other manner to elude the peace
officer, or who does elude such peace officer, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A(A) (emphasis added).
Defendant’s attempt to elude the officers also supports a finding that they had
probable cause to arrest Defendant without a warrant. See also United States v. Morgan,
936 F.2d 1561, 1569 (10th Cir. 1991) (finding probable cause for a warrantless arrest when,
after a justified Terry stop, the defendant ran from the officer, ignored the officer’s
command to get on the ground, and struggled with the officer). Accordingly, considering
the totality of the circumstances and the evidence presented, the government has met its
burden to establish that Defendant’s warrantless arrest was constitutionally permissible.
III. 	Miranda Rights.
Defendant argues that his statement to the officers that he was in the United States
illegally should be suppressed because he was not provided his Miranda rights prior to
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answering the officers’ question. The government has represented that they do “not seek to
admit this statement.” [Doc. No. 21, at p. 3 n. 1]. Accordingly, the Court finds that this
issue is moot.
ORDER
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion to Suppress Evidence
[Doc. No. 18] is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 15th day of October, 2026.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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