Obama Nfumu v. Grant et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
ISMAEL OBIANG OBAMA NFUMU, )
)
Petitioner, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-25-1574-J
)
WARDEN DR. SCARLET GRANT, et al., )
)
Respondents. )
ORDER
Petitioner, a noncitizen from Equatorial Guinea, filed a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas
Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 challenging his detention with the United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE). [Doc. No. 1]. The matter was referred for initial proceedings to
United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), (C).
Judge Mitchell has issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the Court grant
Petitioner’s Petition and order him released from ICE detention. (Rep. & Rec.) [Doc. No. 8].
Respondents filed an Objection (Obj.) [Doc. No. 9], triggering de novo review. For the reasons
discussed below, the Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED and Respondents are ordered to
RELEASE Petitioner.
I. Background
Petitioner came to the United States in November 2024. In May 2025, an Immigration
Judge (IJ) denied his request for asylum and ordered his removal; however, the IJ also granted
withholding of removal to Equatorial Guinea under the Convention Against Torture. The removal
order became final on June 17, 2025. [Doc. No. 7, Ex. 1].
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Since that time, Italy, Norway, and Gabon have denied requests for Petitioner’s placement
in their countries and neither Canada nor Ghana have responded. The request to Canada was made
in July 2025, and the request to Ghana was made in September 2025. See id.
Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition in December 2025 arguing that his continued
detention is unlawful.
II. Relevant Authority
In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court held that a noncitizen
ordered removed and detained under § 1231(a)(6) cannot be indefinitely detained without violating
the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See id. at 701. Zadvydas held that a six-
month period of post-removal detention is presumptively reasonable, but “[a]fter this 6-month
period, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with evidence
sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
III. Judge Mitchell’s Findings
On review, Judge Mitchell found that Petitioner had met his initial burden of showing that
his detention had surpassed six months and there was no significant likelihood of removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. See Rep. & Rec. at 8-11. She then concluded that Respondents
failed to meet their burden because while they submitted a declaration from ICE Deportation
Officer Nation that officials are “currently coordinating efforts for a future third-country removal
flight to Ghana,” [Doc. No. 7, Ex. 1 at 3], they had not provided any evidence suggesting that
Ghana would actually accept Petitioner. See Rep. & Rec. at 11-14.1
1 Judge Mitchell also stated: “And nothing is clear about Petitioner’s ties to Ghana, if any. The
Government’s decision to seek third-country removal without any evidence in the record that a
petitioner has a legally meaningful connection to the relevant third countries . . . also weighs in
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IV. Analysis
Respondents object, arguing that “‘a mere delay in receiving travel documents does not
trigger the inference that an alien will not be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future because
the reasonableness of detentions pending deportation cannot be divorced from the reality of
bureaucratic delays that almost always attend such removals.’” Obj. at 2 (citation omitted).
However, this is not a circumstance where a country has agreed to accept Petitioner but
bureaucratic systems have caused a delay in the receipt of travel documents. Indeed, Respondents
point to no country that has agreed to accept Petitioner, and over five months have now passed
since the last country, Ghana, was contacted. As such, the Court finds that “[t]he Government has
not provided the Court with a clear timeline or plan for removal and therefore failed to prove that
removal is reasonably foreseeable.” Salazar-Martinez v. Lyons, No. 2:25-CV-00961-KG-KBM,
2025 WL 3204807, at *2 (D.N.M. Nov. 17, 2025) (finding no evidence that removal was
reasonably foreseeable where several countries had denied requests and the other countries
contacted had not responded in five months); see also Horbenko v. Castro, No. 2:25-CV-0764
WJ/DLM, 2026 WL 381867, at *5 (D.N.M. Feb. 11, 2026) (“pending requests [to third countries]
without concrete progress are insufficient to justify continued detention”); Zimran v. Noem, No.
5:25-CV-03143-JFW-KES, 2026 WL 161805, at *15 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2026) (finding no
reasonably foreseeable removal where the last country contacted for travel documents had not
responded in five months), adopted, 2026 WL 167179 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2026); Hassoun v.
Sessions, No. 18-CV-586-FPG, 2019 WL 78984, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 2, 2019) (finding
respondents did not carry their burden of showing reasonably foreseeable removal where “travel
Petitioner’s favor.” Rep. & Rec. at 10. Respondents object to this conclusion, see Obj. at 3-4, but
the Court does not find that portion of the Report and Recommendation relevant to its analysis and
declines to address the objection.
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document requests have been pending” “about five months” and respondents “have not elaborated
on the status or likelihood of success of those requests”).
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the Court, on de novo review, finds that Respondents have
failed to carry their burden of showing a significant likelihood of Petitioner’s removal in the
reasonably foreseeable future. As such, the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 8] is
ADOPTED and Petitioner’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [Doc.
No. 1] is GRANTED. Respondents are ORDERED to immediately RELEASE Petitioner, subject
to the terms of an appropriate Order of Supervision,2 and SHALL certify compliance by filing a
status report affirming that Petitioner has been released from custody within five business days of
the Court’s order.
A separate judgment will issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 6th day of March, 2026.
2 8 C.F.R. § 241.5 governs the issuance and conditions of orders of supervision.
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