Vasquez v. Grant et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
JOSE VALENTIN MEDINA VASQUEZ,
Petitioner,
v.
SCARLET GRANT, et al.,
Respondents.
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Case No. CIV-25-1377-D
ORDER
Petitioner Jose Valentin Medina Vasquez filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. [Doc. No. 1]. Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who has
resided in the United States since 2007. Petitioner has been in the custody of the U.S.
Immigration 	and 	Customs 	Enforcement 	since August 	28, 	2025, 	and 	his 	removal
proceedings are ongoing. Petitioner is currently detained pursuant to the mandatory
detention provision contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). In his Petition, Petitioner
contends that § 1225(b)(2)(A) “does not apply to those who previously entered the country
and have been residing in the United States prior to being apprehended and placed in
removal proceedings….” [Doc. No. 1, at p. 13]. Because of his assertion that §
1225(b)(2)(A) does not apply to him, Petitioner further asserts that his continued detention
without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.
The matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Suzanne Mitchell for
initial proceedings in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). [Doc. No. 3].
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Respondents filed a Response in Opposition to the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[Doc. No. 8], and Petitioner filed a reply [Doc. No. 9].
On January 14, 2026, the magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation
[Doc. No. 10], recommending that the Court grant in part the Petition and order
Respondents to provide Petitioner a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).
Respondents filed a timely Objection to the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 11].
Thus, the Court must “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or
specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made” and “may
accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
First, Respondents contend that the Court does not have jurisdiction to consider
Petitioner’s claims, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Section 1252(g) limits the Court’s
jurisdiction to hear “any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the
decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or
execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). However,
the Supreme Court requires § 1252(g) to be read narrowly and applied “to just those three
specific actions themselves.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018) (citation
omitted).
In a separate case involving the same issue, the undersigned previously found that
“because [the] [p]etitioner [did] not challenge [the] [r]espondents’ decision to commence
or adjudicate proceedings or execute removal orders, … 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) [did] not
jurisdictionally bar consideration of the petition.” Colin v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1189-D, 2025
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WL 3645176, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 16, 2025). Here, because Petitioner challenges the
legal question of whether he is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) or
detention under § 1226(a), and he does not challenge Respondents’ decision to commence
or adjudicate proceedings or execute removal orders, § 1252(g) does not jurisdictionally
bar consideration of the Petition. See also Valdez v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1250-R, 2025 WL
3709021, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 22, 2025) (finding that the petitioner’s challenge of his
mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A) “do[es] not fall within the narrow jurisdictional
bar stated in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)”); see also Martinez Diaz v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1179-J,
2025 WL 3296310, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 26, 2025) (same); Ramirez Rojas v. Noem, CIV-
25-1236-HE, 2026 WL 94641, at *1 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2026) (same); Gonzalez Cortes
v. Holt, No. CIV-25-1176-SLP, 2026 WL 147435, at **2-3 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 20, 2026)
(same).
Next, Respondents object to the magistrate judge’s conclusion that § 1226(a) applies
to Petitioner’s detention, and not § 1225(b)(2)(A), as suggested by Respondents. Generally,
Ҥ 1225 mandates detention without the opportunity for a bond hearing for the noncitizens
to whom it applies.” Hernandez v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-cv-03094-CNS, 2025 WL 2996643,
at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 24, 2025) (citation omitted). In comparison, § 1226 provides the
noncitizen with the opportunity for a bond hearing. Id.; see also Aranda v. Olson, No. 4:25-
cv-156-GNS, 2025 WL 3499061, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2025) (“Overall, Section 1226(a)
provides for a discretionary authority requiring an individualized bond determination
before a noncitizen may be taken into custody.”) (quotation and citation omitted).
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Respondents 	contend 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	properly 	detained 	pursuant 	to
§ 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides:
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien
who 	is 	an 	applicant 	for 	admission, 	if 	the 	examining
immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission
is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the
alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of
this title.
8 	U.S.C. 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A). 	Respondents 	assert 	that 	Petitioner 	is 	an 	“applicant 	for
admission” because he is present in the United States and has not been admitted, citing
§ 1225(a)(1). See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (“An alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted … shall be deemed for purposes of this chapter an applicant for
admission.”).
In previously construing § 1225(b)(2)(A), the undersigned concluded in Colin that
the subsection “unambiguously requires that an ‘applicant for admission’ also be ‘seeking
admission’ for the section to control.” See Colin, 2025 WL 3645176, at *4. In their
Objection, Respondents argue that “seeking admission” is merely stating “applicant for
admission” another way. Respondents also argue that Petitioner is “seeking admission”
because Petitioner has not voluntarily self-deported.
The Court finds helpful the Seventh Circuit’s recent analysis of this issue. In
Casañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048 (7th Cir. 2025), the Seventh
Circuit denied the government’s request to stay orders of the district court, finding that the
government’s 	argument 	that 	certain 	individuals 	were 	properly 	detained 	under 	§
1225(b)(2)(A) was likely to fail on the merits:
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[W]hile a noncitizen arrested in the Midwest might qualify as
‘an alien present in the United States who had not been
admitted,’ § 1225(a)(1), the mandatory detention provision
upon which Defendants rely, limits its scope to an ‘applicant
for admission’ who is ‘seeking admission’, § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Put 	another 	way, 	‘U.S. 	immigration 	law 	authorizes 	the
Government to detain certain aliens seeking admission into the
country under §§1225(b)(1) and (b)(2). It also authorizes the
Government to detain certain aliens already in the country
pending the outcome of removal proceedings under §§ 1226(a)
and (c).
Id. at 1061 (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289).
In addressing the government’s argument that “applicant for admission” is simply
synonymous with a person “seeking admission,” the Seventh Circuit admitted that the
argument has “some superficial appeal,” acknowledging that § 1225(a)(3) “refers to
noncitizens ‘who are applicants for admission or otherwise seeking admission[.]’” Id.
However, the Seventh Circuit continued:
[I]t is Congress’s prerogative to define a term however it
wishes, and it has chosen to limit the definition of an ‘applicant
for admission’ to ‘an alien present in the United States who has
not been admitted or who arrives in the United States.’ 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(a)(1). It could easily have included noncitizens who are
‘seeking admission’ within the definition but elected not to do
so.
What 	is 	more, 	Defendants’ 	construction 	would 	render
§ 1225(b)(2)(A)’s 	use 	of 	the 	phrase 	‘seeking 	admission’
superfluous, violating one of the cardinal rules of statutory
construction.
Id. (citation omitted).
Upon 	consideration, 	the 	Court 	continues 	to 	conclude 	that 	§ 	1225(b)(2)(A)
unambiguously requires that an “applicant for admission” also be “seeking admission” for
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the subsection to control. Further, the Court declines to find that refusing to self-deport
constitutes “seeking admission” for purposes of this subsection. Here, because Petitioner
has been residing in the United States for many years and was present in the country when
he was detained, Petitioner does not fall into the mandatory detention provision of
§ 1225(b)(2)(A). See Colin, 2025 WL 3645176, at *5; Valdez, 2025 WL 3709021, at *3
(“Because Petitioner has been unlawfully living in the United States for many years without
seeking admission, this provision does not apply to him.”); Martinez Diaz, 2025 WL
3296310, at *3 (“Here, Petitioner has resided in the United States for approximately twenty
years … and, therefore, is not ‘seeking admission’ into the United States. Accordingly, the
Court finds § 1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable to Petitioner.”); see also Gonzalez Cortes, 2026
WL 147435, at * 6. Accordingly, § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s detention.
Having found that § 1226(a) controls Petitioner’s detention, and noting no objection
by Respondents as to their obligation to provide bond hearings for noncitizens under
§ 1226(a), the Court concludes that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing. See Hernandez,
2025 WL 2996643, at *3 (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306) (“Federal regulations also
provide that noncitizens detained pursuant to § 1226(a) are entitled to individualized bond
hearings.”).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No.
10] is ADOPTED, and the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 [Doc. No. 1] is GRANTED in part.1
1 Because the Court grants the relief the Petitioner requests based on the applicability of 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a), the Court declines to decide the merits of Petitioner’s due process claim.
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall provide Petitioner with a
prompt bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), or release Petitioner. A separate judgment
shall be entered.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27 th day of January, 2026.
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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