Adams v. Rankin et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHAD JEREMY ADAMS, 	)
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-25-693-HE
)
WILLIAM CHRIS RANKIN, et al., 	)
)
Respondents. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Petitioner Chad Jeremy Adams (“Petitioner”), a pro se state prisoner,1 has filed a
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 	(Doc. 1).2 United States
District Judge Joe Heaton referred the matter to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for initial
proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). (Doc. 4). Respondents filed a
Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 12). Petitioner did not respond. For the reasons set forth below,
the undersigned recommends that Petitioner’s petition for habeas relief be DISMISSED
without prejudice to the re-filing.
1 A pro se litigant’s pleadings are liberally construed “and held to a less stringent standard
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th
Cir. 1991); see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). 	But the court
cannot serve as Plaintiff’s advocate, creating arguments on his behalf. 	See Yang v.
Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).
2 Citations to the parties’ filings and attached exhibits will refer to this Court’s CM/ECF
pagination.
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I. 	Background and Petition
Petitioner is a state inmate currently confined at the Oklahoma State Reformatory
in Granite, Oklahoma. (Doc. 1, at 1); see also OK DOC# 211915, Oklahoma Department
of Corrections OK Offender.3
Petitioner filed the instant Section 2241 petition on June 18, 2025, challenging his
loss of earned credits resulting from a demotion in earned credit level while incarcerated.
(Doc. 1, at 2, 9). Petitioner specifically alleges that, prior to June 1, 2024, he earned credits
for time served according to level four of Oklahoma’s credit-earning classification.4 (Id.
at 7). However, Petitioner claims that after he was alleged to have assaulted prison staff,
prison officials demoted him to level one for a period of 180 days and subtracted credits
that he had already received. 	(Id.) 	Petitioner states that this misconduct claim was
ultimately dismissed, and while prison officials did reinstate the credits they directly
subtracted from his profile, they refused to retroactively reinstate Petitioner’s level back to
level four for those 180 days. 	(Id.) 	As relief, Petitioner requests this retroactive
reinstatement which he calculates would result in ninety-nine additional credits. (Id. at 8).
Respondents contend that because Petitioner did not comply with all steps of the
Oklahoma Department of Corrections’ 	(“ODOC’s”) administrative grievance process
3 https://okoffender.doc.ok.gov/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2026).
4 “Like many states, Oklahoma allows its prisoners to earn good time credits, the accrual
of which may result in the prisoner’s early release. Each earned credit is equivalent to one
day of prison.” Ali v. Taylor, 528 F. App’x 918, 919 (10th Cir. 2013). While credit-earning
levels above level one accrue these credits, prisoners in level one earn no good time credits.
See id.
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before filing the instant habeas petition, his claims are unexhausted. 	(Doc. 12, at 4-6).
Respondents also contend that Petitioner’s claim is substantively meritless because
Petitioner’s demotion to level one, which was partially unrelated to his misconduct
accusation, did not violate any of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 6-7).
II. 	Analysis
A. 	This Court Should Dismiss the Petition Because Petitioner Failed to
Exhaust His Administrative Remedies.
Section 2241 “does not expressly contain” an exhaustion requirement.5 	Garza v.
Davis, 596 F.3d 1198, 1203 (10th Cir. 2010). 	Nevertheless, federal common law
commands that “[t]he exhaustion of available administrative remedies is a prerequisite
for § 2241 habeas relief.” 	Id.; see also Venzor v. Warden, No. 19-CIV-319-D, 2019 WL
4459334, at *1 (W.D. Okla. June 20, 2019) (“[F]ederal common law requires federal
prisoners to exhaust available administrative remedies before they can obtain habeas
relief.”), report and recommendation adopted in part, 2019 WL 3245534, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. July 19, 2019) (“[T]he Court concurs in [the magistrate judge’s] administrative
5 Respondents quote the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
1997e, and related cases in their exhaustion analysis. 	(Doc. 12, at 4). 	“This provision
applies to actions involving ‘prison conditions.’ 	Section 2241 petitions do not involve
‘prison conditions,’ and Section 1997e(a) is inapplicable.” Venzor v. Warden, No. 19-CIV-
319-D, 2019 WL 4459334, at *1 n.1 (W.D. Okla. June 20, 2019) (internal citations
omitted), report and recommendation adopted in part, 2019 WL 3245534 (W.D. Okla.
July 19, 2019); see also Nguyen v. Booker, 156 F.3d 1244, 1998 WL 568285, at *1 (10 th
Cir. Sep. 3, 1998) (“Petitioner’s § 2241 petition does not fall within PLRA’s language
barring suits challenging prison conditions before administrative remedies have been
exhausted.”).
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exhaustion analysis.”). 	“The burden of showing exhaustion rests on the petitioner in
federal habeas corpus actions.” Clonce v. Presley, 640 F.2d 271, 273 (10th Cir. 1981).
Respondent’s motion and attached exhibits outline the steps a prisoner must take to
comply with ODOC’s grievance process. These steps are taken directly from OP-090124,
which “is the written inmate grievance procedure that is made available to all inmates and
that includes at least one level of appeal.” (Doc. 12, at Ex. 6, at 2). Respondents state that:
According to OP-090124 (V), an inmate must first attempt to informally
resolve his complaint by talking with the appropriate staff member. 	If
unsuccessful, then the inmate must submit a Request to Staff (“RTS”) to the
appropriate staff member. Id. at (V)(A). If the inmate’s complaint remains
unresolved, the inmate may begin the formal grievance procedure by
submitting a Grievance to the Reviewing Authority. 	Id. at (VI). 	If a
grievance response fails to resolve the issue, the inmate should appeal to the
Administrative Review Authority (“ARA”). Id. at (VIII). Only after all of
these steps are taken has the grievance process been exhausted.
(Doc. 12, at 5; see id., at Ex. 6, at 7-12, 14-17). 	OP-090124 further states that
“[i]nmates/offenders are required to exhaust the grievance process prior to filing a lawsuit.”
(Doc. 6, at Ex. 6, at 2).
The undersigned agrees that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
before filing the instant petition, foreclosing habeas relief. 	Petitoner’s supporting
documents only show that Petitioner complied with ODOC procedures through his filing
of a formal grievance, which was denied. (Doc. 1, at Ex. 1, at 7-8). Respondents further
provide evidence that Petitioner tried to appeal the denial of his grievance to the ARA, but
it was “improperly submitted.” 	(Doc. 12, at Ex. 8, at 1; id. at Ex. 7, at 4-5). 	While the
ARA “notified [Petitioner] of his procedural error . . . and afforded him ten (10) days to
properly resubmit,” the declaration of an ODOC employee states that the ARA never
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“received a resubmitted grievance appeal or any other correspondence from [Petitioner]
regarding this issue.” (Id. at Ex. 8, at 1).
Petitioner failed to carry his burden of showing he exhausted his administrative
remedies when he failed to provide any evidence of an appeal to the ARA. Respondents
have further shown that Petitioner’s one attempt at an appeal was deficient. 	See Bun v.
Wiley, 351 F. App’x 267, 268 (10th Cir. 2009) (affirming dismissal of Section 2241 petition
where petitioner did not file an appeal as required with administrative body before filing
in federal court). 	Moreover, while “[a] narrow exception to the exhaustion requirement
applies if a petitioner can demonstrate that exhaustion is futile,” Petitioner does not argue
that exhaustion in his case was futile. Garza, 596 F.3d at 1203. For these reasons, habeas
relief should be denied.
B. 	Alternatively, the Petition Should be Denied Because Petitioner Is Not
Entitled to a Specific Credit Level.
Section 2241 relief is only available when a petitioner’s detention violates federal
law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see also Penate v. Byrd, No. 16-CIV-1442-F, 2017 WL
876033, at *2 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 30, 2017) (“It is well established that the federal writ
of habeas corpus reaches only convictions in violation of the United States Constitution,
laws, or treaties.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 876311 (W.D. Okla.
Mar. 3, 2017). When a petitioner claims that his credit level was demoted, constitutional
due process concerns may be implicated because the demotion “inevitably affect[s] the
duration of [a petitioner’s] sentence.” 	Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995).
However, there is no “unconditional liberty interest in an Oklahoma prisoner’s credit-
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earning classification.” 	Cardoso v. Calbone, 490 F.3d 1194, 1198 (10th Cir. 2007). 	A
prisoner has no constitutional interest in credit level demotions where the determination
that a prisoner acted in violation of specific criteria “and the attendant decision to reduce
his classification level were discretionary.” 	Id.; see also Adams v. Rankin, No. 24-CIV-
838-HE, 2025 WL 2048327, at *4 (W.D. Okla. June 9, 2025) (“If a demotion in a prisoner’s
classification level is discretionary, rather than mandatory, he does not have a liberty
interest in his credit-earning classification level.”).
Here, both the criteria leading to Petitioner’s credit level demotion and the ultimate
decision to demote him were discretionary. Petitioner’s adjustment review indicates that
several of the “Current Patterns of Behavior” used to determine his credit level are
discretionary determinations, evaluated on a scale from “poor” to “outstanding.” (Doc. 12,
at Ex. 4, at 1). These criteria include (1) behavior towards staff, (2) behavior towards other
inmates, (3) personal hygiene, and (4) living area. (Id.) Furthermore, the comment section
of the adjustment review notes that Petitioner’s demotion was caused both by the alleged
assault and by an analysis of “poor behavior.” (Id. at 2). Accordingly, Petitioner does not
have a liberty interest in his credit level demotion, and the Petition should also be dismissed
for this reason. See Adams, 2025 WL 2048327, at *4 (recommending dismissal on same
grounds).
III. 	Recommended Ruling and Notice of Right to Object
For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned recommends that the Petition for
a Writ of Habeas Corpus Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED without
prejudice to the re-filing.
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The 	court 	advises 	Petitioner 	of 	his 	right 	to 	object 	to 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation by January 28, 2026, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b)(2). The court further advises Petitioner that failure to make timely objection to this
report and recommendation waives his right to appellate review of both factual and legal
issues contained herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir. 1991).
This Report and Recommendation disposes of all issues and terminates the referral
to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.
ENTERED this 7th day of January, 2026.
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