Hill v. Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
DALTON GAGE HILL, 	)
Administrator and Personal 	)
Representative of the 	)
Estate of Jeffery Allen Hill, 	)
Deceased, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-1298-D
)
OKLAHOMA COUNTY 	)
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 	)
AUTHORITY et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court are Defendants Dr. Mark Winchester and Terry Deason,
DDS’s (Defendants) motions for imposition of civil contempt sanctions, Doc.
158, and Rule 11 sanctions against Plaintiff’s counsel, Doc. 166. Plaintiff Dalton
Gage Hill has responded to Defendants’ motion for civil contempt sanctions,
Doc. 161, and Defendants replied, Doc. 162. And the time for Plaintiff to respond
to Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions has expired. See LCvR 7.1(g). So,
both motions, Docs. 158 & 166, are ripe for ruling.1
1 	Given 	the 	overlapping 	factual 	allegations 	in 	Defendants’ 	motions
regarding Plaintiff’s counsel’s conduct, the undersigned finds it appropriate to
address both of Defendants’ motions in one Report and Recommendation for
judicial efficiency.
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For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends moving
forward with contempt proceedings against Plaintiff’s counsel, Michael D.
McBride, and granting Defendants’ motion for Rule 11 sanctions, Doc 166, in
part.2
I. 	Discussion.
A. 	Procedure for contempt sanctions.
“There can be no question that courts have inherent power to enforce
compliance with their lawful orders through civil contempt.” Shillitani v.
United States, 384 	U.S. 364, 	370 (1966). Similarly, a “court’s interest in
ensuring a party’s compliance with its orders is a great one, enforceable by fines
or imprisonment.” Ohlander v. Larson, 114 F.3d 1531, 1541 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citation omitted).
In a matter referred to a magistrate judge under 28 U.S.C. 636(b) in
which 	the 	magistrate 	judge 	believes 	an 	act 	of 	civil 	contempt 	has 	been
committed:
2 	Plaintiff also failed to respond to Defendants’ Rule 11 motion. So, it is
deemed confessed. See LCvR 7.1(g) (“Any motion that is not opposed within 21
days may, in the discretion of the court, be deemed confessed.”). Nonetheless,
out of an abundance of caution, the undersigned will address the merits of
Defendants’ motion to determine whether sanctions are warranted. See Talece
Inc. v. Zhang, 2021 WL 242913, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2021) (“‘Rule 11 is an
extraordinary remedy, one to be exercised with extreme caution.’” (quoting
Operating Eng’rs Pension Trust v. A-C Co., 859 F.2d 1336, 1345 (9th Cir.
1988))).
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the magistrate judge shall forthwith certify the facts to a district
judge and may serve or cause to be served, upon any person whose
behavior is brought into question under this paragraph, an order
requiring such person to appear before a district judge upon a day
certain to show cause why that person should not be adjudged in
contempt by reason of the facts so certified. The district judge shall
thereupon hear the evidence as to the act or conduct complained of
and, if it is such as to warrant punishment, punish such person in
the 	same 	manner 	and 	to 	the 	same 	extent 	as 	for 	a 	contempt
committed before a district judge.
28 U.S.C.A. § 636(e)(6)(B)(iii). In certifying the facts under Section 636(e), the
magistrate judge’s role is “to determine whether the moving party can adduce
sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case of contempt.” Bowens v. Atl.
Maint. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 55, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). “If the [magistrate judge]
finds [the nonmovant’s] explanation to be satisfactory, she may choose not to
certify the matter for further proceedings . . . On the other hand, should the
[magistrate judge] not be satisfied with [the nonmovant’s] explanation, she
cannot adjudicate the matter herself, but must follow the certification process
of § 636(e).” In re Kitterman, 696 F. Supp. 1366, 1370 (D. Nev. 1988); see also
Bowens, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (“[T]he magistrate judge may conduct a hearing,
but the magistrate judge functions only to certify the facts and not to issue any
order of contempt.”) (internal quotation and citations omitted).
Upon certification of the facts supporting a finding of contempt, a district
court 	must 	first 	hold 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	to 	make 	de 	novo 	factual
determinations, including relevant credibility determinations, before it can
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impose contempt sanctions. See Bowens, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 71 (citing Taberer
v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 954 F.2d 888, 907-08 (3d Cir. 1992)).
1. 	Defendants’ burden.
In a motion for civil contempt, the moving party—here, Defendants—has
the “burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that a valid court
order existed, that [counsel] had knowledge of the order, and that [counsel]
disobeyed the order.” United States v. Ford, 514 F.3d 1047, 1051 (10th Cir.
2008) (citation omitted). The first and second requirements do not appear
disputed: Mr. McBride recognizes that the Court ordered him to pay reasonable
attorneys’ fees to Defendants Deason, Winchester, and Bradley Logan, see Doc.
143, at 3. He paid Defendant Logan’s attorney’s fees, see Doc. 161, at 4, without
issue. So, he neither disputes the validity of the Court’s order nor contends he
lacked knowledge of the Court’s order. The issue therefore is whether Mr.
McBride 	has 	complied 	with 	this 	Court’s 	orders. 	And 	the 	undersigned
determines he has not.
2. 	Certification of facts.
I hereby find and certify the following facts material to the issue of
contempt:
Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti referred the matter to the undersigned
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Doc. 58. Defendants Deason and
Winchester seek $875.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred for attending the Court’s
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September 	3, 	2025 	show 	cause 	hearing. 	Doc. 	158, 	at 	2 	n.1. 	And 	these
Defendants now seek contempt sanctions against Mr. McBride. See generally
Doc. 158.
1. 	On July 29, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiff and his counsel, Mr.
McBride to appear before the Court to show cause as to why sanctions should
not be imposed under Rule 11 and the Court’s inherent authority for citing
fictitious cases in his response to Defendant Logan’s motion to dismiss. See Doc.
126.
2. 	On September 5, 2025, the undersigned recommended Mr. McBride
pay Defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred for attending the
Court’s show cause hearing. Doc. 134.3
3. 	On December 4, 2025, Judge DeGiusti adopted the Report and
Recommendation. 	Doc. 143. Judge DeGiusti 	also ordered Mr. McBride to
“disclose in all future pleadings whether generative AI was used, the specific AI
tool that was used, and [to] certify in the document that he . . . checked the
accuracy of any portion of the document drafted by generative AI, including all
citations and legal authority.” Id. at 3.
3 	For a summary of the pattern of conduct by Mr. McBride that resulted in
the September 2025 show cause hearing, see the undersigned’s prior Report and
Recommendation on the issue, Doc. 134.
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4. 	On March 3, 2026, the Court ordered the parties to meet and confer
and reach an agreement on the amount of attorney fees owed, given an ongoing
dispute between counsel McBride and Defendants. See Doc. 156; Doc. 158, at 3.
The Court advised Defendants that they must file an appropriate motion no
later than March 17, 2026, if an agreement was not reached. Doc. 156.
5. 	On March 17, 2026, Defendants filed the present contempt motion.
Doc. 158.
3. 	Violations of the Court’s Order.
Defendants Deason and Winchester must show by clear and convincing
evidence that Mr. McBride disobeyed a court order. Defendants contend Mr.
McBride violated the Court’s December 4, 2025 order, Doc. 143. In response,
Mr. McBride asserts that Defendants violated the December 4, 2025 order as
they refused “to negotiate the order for ‘reasonable attorney fees.’” Doc. 161, at
4.4 The Court’s March 3, 2026 order directing the parties to meet and confer
regarding the attorney fees and to attempt to reach an agreement, see Doc. 156,
4 	In his response, Plaintiff suggests Defendants’ counsel has conducted
himself 	improperly 	and 	moves for Rule 11 sanctions against 	Defendant’s
counsel. See Doc. 161, at 7-9. As Defendants note, Doc. 162, at 6, Plaintiff’s
request for Rule 11 sanctions in a responsive pleading violates LCvR 7.1(c), and
is therefore, improperly raised. LCvR 7.1(c)(“A response to a motion may not
also include a motion or a cross-motion made by the responding party.”). So, the
Court does not address Plaintiff’s request any further.
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suggests the possibility of negotiating the amount of fees owed. And Mr.
McBride met and conferred with Defendants as ordered. See Doc. 158, at 3.
But the December 4, 2025 order does not give Mr. McBride the option of
simply refusing to pay Defendants’ attorneys’ fees. See Doc. 143, at 3 (“Mr.
McBride . . . shall 	pay Defendants’ reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs
incurred for attending the hearing) (emphasis added). And “[w]hile ‘[t]he failure
to meet the strict requirements of an order does not necessarily subject a party
to a holding of contempt,’ civil contempt ‘includes failures in meaningful
respects to achieve substantial and diligent compliance.’” Casale v. Kelly, 710
F. Supp. 2d 347, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Aspira v. Bd. of Educ., 423 F.
Supp. 647, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)). “‘Reasonable diligence, at the very least,
requires a party to develop and execute reasonable methods of compliance’” and
“‘[i]t need not be established that the violation was willful.’” Id.
Three months passed before Defendants filed their motion for contempt
sanctions. And Mr. McBride had the opportunity to explain to the Court why he
considers the attorneys’ fees Defendants incurred unreasonable in his response
to Defendants’ motion. But he did not. Nor has he indicated what fees would be
reasonable. 	Instead, 	it 	appears 	that 	Mr. 	McBride 	simply 	refuses 	to 	pay
Defendants any attorneys’ fees. So, the undersigned does not find Mr. McBride’s
conduct to be demonstrative of reasonable diligence to comply with the Court’s
December 4, 2025 order.
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Even if the Court were to find Mr. McBride’s conduct regarding the
attorney’s fees issue to be non-contemptuous, the Court finds an additional
basis for finding Mr. McBride in contempt—his ongoing noncompliance with
the 	artificial 	intelligence 	disclosure 	requirement. 	See 	Doc. 	162, 	at 	1-2.
Defendants note that Plaintiff’s response fails to “contain the certification
required by the Sanctions Order.” Id. at 1. And the undersigned identifies the
following erroneous citations in Petitioner’s response:
(1) Plaintiff quotes Dodd Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 935
F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1991) for the proposition that “Rule 11 should
not be used as a litigation tactic or to chill zealous advocacy.” Doc.
161, at 2-3. This sentence is nowhere to be found in the Tenth
Circuit’s opinion.
(2) Plaintiff next cites Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,
393 (1990), for the proposition that “Courts are especially cautious
to prevent misuse of sanctions in civil rights litigation.” Doc. 161,
at 6. As Defendants note, Doc. 162, at 3, Cooter is an antitrust case.
And although the provided pincite discusses the purposes behind
Rule 11, it does not support this heightened Rule 11 sanctions
standard for civil rights cases.
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Perhaps Mr. McBride simply did not read the cited authorities closely,5
but even if the Court were to grant him that, the Court’s generative AI
disclosure 	requirement 	was 	designed 	to 	prevent 	the 	present 	issue 	from
becoming a recurring issue. But Mr. McBride has made no effort to comply with
the requirement in his subsequent filings. For example, the Court struck
Plaintiff’s second amended complaint, in part, for his failure to include the
required AI disclosure. See Doc. 165; Doc. 164. And his response to Defendants’
contempt motion also includes no AI disclosure. See Doc. 161. This repeated
failure to follow the Court’s order supports a finding of contempt as the Court’s
prior sanctions have not sufficiently deterred counsel’s conduct. See O’Connor
v. Midwest Pipe Fabrications, Inc., 972 F.2d 1204, 1211 (10th Cir. 1992)
(“Sanctions for civil contempt may only be employed for either or both of two
distinct remedial purposes: ‘(1) to compel or coerce obedience to a court order
. 	. 	.; and (2) to compensate the contemnor’s adversary for injuries resulting
from the contemnor’s noncompliance[.]’” (quoting Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720
F.2d 1141, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983))).
B. 	Rule 11 standard.
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
5 	Defendants’ counsel states he ran Mr. McBride’s response through an AI
text detection program. See Doc. 162, at 3 n.2 (citing Ex. 1). The undersigned
makes no findings as to the veracity of the tool used by Defendants’ counsel.
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By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper— whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating
it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of
the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an
inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:
. . .
(3) 	the 	factual 	contentions 	have 	evidentiary 	support 	or, 	if
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after
a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery[.]
“Rule 11 establishes a standard of objective reasonableness” and “[t]he test for
imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether counsel’s conduct was reasonable
under the circumstances of the case.” Est. of Strong v. City of Northglenn, 2018
WL 6589813, at *2 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 2018), adopted, No. 17-cv-1276-WJM-SKC,
Doc. 108 (D. Colo. Jan. 14, 2019). “It does not require a finding of subjective bad
faith on the part of the offending attorney.” Id.
1. 	Complained-of conduct.
The gist of Defendants’ Rule 11 motion is that Mr. McBride violated Rule
11 by filing “several false statements of fact which could or should have been
discovered through the exercise of ordinary diligence upon a cursory review of
available medical records.” Doc. 166, at 2.6 Specifically, Defendants take issue
6 	Rule 11 imposes certain procedural requirements on parties seeking
sanctions. A party must submit the motion for sanctions separately from other
motions or requests and specifically describe the conduct that allegedly violates
Rule 11(b). The party must serve the motion on the opposing party. If, after 21
days, the offending party does not withdraw the challenged conduct, the party
seeking sanctions may file its motion for sanctions with the court. See Fed. R.
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with allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint that the decedent’s (Jefferey
Allen Hill) penicillin allergy was recorded in his medical file. Id. at 5.7 And that
Defendant Deason was aware of Mr. Hill’s dental infection and examined him
at 	SSM 	but 	failed 	to 	remove 	Mr. 	Hill’s 	infected 	tooth 	and 	“knowingly
disregard[ed] the excessive risk an infected tooth can and did pose.” Doc. 53, at
7; Doc. 166, at 7-9.
Both 	allegations 	are 	crucial 	components 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	deliberate
indifference claim against Defendants. For Defendant Winchester, Plaintiff
alleges that the prescription of penicillin in contravention of Mr. Hill’s recorded
allergy 	is 	“additional 	evidence 	that 	Mr. 	Hill 	was 	not 	receiving 	proper
medication at the Jail, in reckless and deliberate indifference to his known,
obvious and substantial medical needs.” Doc. 53, at 8. And that Defendant
Civ. P. 11(c)(2). In his response to Defendants’ contempt motion, Doc. 161, Mr.
McBride 	suggests 	that 	Defendants’ 	motion 	“ignores 	Rule 	11 	procedural
requirements.” Id. at 6. Setting aside that Mr. McBride was responding to a
contempt 	motion, 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	Defendants 	satisfied 	Rule 	11’s
procedural requirements. On January 30, 2026, Defendants’ counsel sent a
letter to Mr. McBride with the Rule 11 motion enclosed therein. Doc. 161, Ex.
1. And again, on March 20, 2026, Defendants sent a letter to Mr. McBride with
the repeated Rule 11 allegations. Doc. 161, Ex. 2, at 2-3. Mr. McBride received
these letters as he attached them to his response to the contempt motion. See
Doc. 161, Exs. 1 & 2, at 2-3. The undersigned therefore finds Defendants fully
complied with the procedural requirements of Rule 11 prior to filing their
motion.
7 	For a complete recitation of the factual allegations raised in Plaintiff’s
amended 	complaint, 	see 	the 	undersigned’s 	Report 	and 	Recommendation,
denying Defendant Winchester’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 155.
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Deason’s failure to remove the infected tooth led to Mr. Hill dying from “sepsis
due to an infected tooth.” Id. at 11.
Defendants point to Mr. Hill’s medical records, attached to Defendant
Winchester’s answer to the amended complaint, as proof that Mr. McBride was
aware that Mr. Hill’s penicillin allergy was not recorded in his medical file when
he filed the amended complaint against Defendants. Doc. 166, at 5; Doc. 128,
Ex. 1. The medical records state that “previously [Mr. Hill] listed that he had
[no known drug allergies] per his history and medical records available” and
that Mr. Hill “had [a] severe allergic reaction after being given penicillin PO on
1/22/2024.” Doc. 128, Ex. 1, at 1; see also id. at 2-6. Defendants also maintain
that “[t]here is no documentation in [Turn Key Health’s] records of [Defendant]
Deason ever seeing [Mr.] Hill at the Oklahoma County Detention Center or at
SSM Health.” Doc. 166, at 8.
Rule 11 imposes a duty of candor, which the violation of warrants
“sanctions for continuing to advocate a position after learning that it ceases to
have merit or is no longer tenable.” Est. of Strong, 2018 WL 6589813, at *2.
While Mr. McBride did not respond to Defendants’ Rule 11 motion, Defendants
note that on February 5, 2026, Mr. McBride informed Defendants’ counsel that
he had not received the SSM health records. Doc. 166, Ex. 3. And Turn Key’s
medical records show that on January 25, 2024, a “dental sick call” requested
by Mr. Hill was held and Defendant Deason notes in the call record that Mr.
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Hill complained of “pain in back right wisdom tooth,” and “reports it’s ‘sawn in
half.’’ Doc. 166, Ex. 1, at 9. And the same call notes state that Mr. Hill had a
“severe reaction to penicillin” and “had to be hospitalized and while there, had
his wisdom tooth removed.” Id. So, the documentation available to Mr. McBride
does show at least some interaction between Mr. Hill and Defendant Deason,
and that Defendant Deason had knowledge of the ongoing medical issues
regarding Mr. Hill’s infected tooth. The undersigned finds Defendants have not
met their burden of showing that Mr. McBride violated his duty of candor to the
Court regarding his allegations toward Defendant Deason.
On the other hand, the lack of apparent evidentiary support for Plaintiff’s
contention that Mr. Hill’s penicillin allergy was recorded in his medical file is
more troubling. Mr. McBride has had access to the medical records since August
6, 2025, when Defendant Winchester answered the amended complaint, see
Doc. 128.8 And the attached medical records repeatedly state that Mr. Hill had
no known drug allergies. Doc. 128, Ex. 1. Mr. McBride did not seek leave to
amend the complaint to remove this allegation after Defendant Winchester’s
answer was filed. Instead, Mr. McBride moved for leave to file a second
8 	Defendants 	state, 	“upon 	information 	and 	belief, 	Plaintiff 	has
possessed [the Turn Key medical records] since December 10, 2024, at the
latest[.]” 	Doc. 	166, 	at 	5 	(emphasis 	added). 	Defendants 	have 	not 	put 	any
documentation before the Court supporting their assertion that Mr. McBride
has had the Turn Key medical records since December 2024.
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amended complaint, stating: “Mr. Hill is allergic to penicillin and this allergy is
noted in his medical file.” Doc. 7, Att. 1, at 7.
Rule 11 instructs attorneys “to ‘stop, look, and listen before signing a
document subject to Rule 11.’” McNeal v. Zobrist, 2006 WL 2692816, at *10
(quoting Adamson v. Bowen, 855 F.2d 668, 673 (10th Cir. 1988)) (emphasis
added by McNeal). And Mr. McBride ultimately failed to do so. So, “sanctions
are necessary to deter future similar conduct.” Id. (finding Rule 11 sanctions
warranted when “plaintiff’s counsel was made aware of evidence . . . flatly
contradict[ing] material averments in the Third Amended Complaint [and] did
not correct any of her filings with the Court”).
2. 	Requested sanctions.
Defendants urge the Court to:
(1) Strike the false allegations in Plaintiff’s amended complaint;
(2) Permit them to re-urge their respective motions to dismiss; and
(3) Enter 	an 	order 	directing 	Mr. 	McBride 	to 	pay 	Defendants’
reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred from the inception of the case.
Doc. 166, at 12.
“[I]n determining whether (and what) sanctions are appropriate, a court
should consider: ‘(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the [D]efendant[s]; (2) the
amount of interference with the judicial process; . . . (3) the culpability of the
litigant,’ and (4) whether the court warned the party in advance that dismissal
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of the action would be a likely sanction for noncompliance.’” Grady v. Broderson,
2015 WL 1384371, at *4 (D. Colo. Mar. 23, 2015) (quoting Ehrenhaus v.
Reynolds, 965 F.2d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 1992)). “Before a court orders dispositive
sanctions, it should also consider the efficacy of lesser sanctions.” Id.
The 	undersigned 	finds 	it 	currently 	unnecessary 	to 	strike 	Plaintiff’s
allegation that Mr. Hill’s penicillin allergy was recorded in his medical file.
Likewise, Defendants’ request to re-urge their respective motions to dismiss
should also be denied. Discovery has not yet closed, and the deadline to file
dispositive 	motions 	has 	also 	not 	passed. 	See 	Doc. 	155, 	at 	2. 	Defendant
Winchester may address any lack of evidentiary support for the allegations
regarding Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claim against him at the summary
judgment stage.
And Defendants request for Mr. McBride to pay their attorneys’ fees
incurred since the inception of the case is excessive. “Rule 11 is not intended to
function as a fee-shifting provision or to reward parties who are victimized by
litigation.” Est. of Strong, 2018 WL 6589813, at *2.
Nonetheless, the undersigned finds that some monetary sanctions are
appropriate here, given the costs of litigating the Rule 11 motion and counsel
McBride’s conduct. Defendant Winchester was prejudiced by having to move
forward with this motion to address the apparent lack of evidentiary support
for one of Plaintiff’s crucial allegations against him. And Mr. McBride’s failure
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to reasonably investigate and correct the amended complaint interfered with
the judicial process as the Court had to devote time and judicial resources in
adjudicating Defendants’ Rule 11 motion.
As for the culpability of the litigant, Mr. McBride was notified on January
30, 2026, by Defendants’ counsel’s letter, Doc. 161, Ex. 1, at 2, that the medical
records contradicted Plaintiff’s claims towards Defendants. Mr. McBride has
also had the Turn Key records since August 2025. Yet, Mr. McBride made no
effort to amend his pleading or to even respond to the allegations in Defendants’
Rule 11 motion. In short, three of the Ehrenhaus weigh in favor of issuing
sanctions under Rule 11.
As to the fourth Ehrenhaus factor, Mr. McBride was not warned that
dismissal was a possible sanction. But the undersigned does not find dismissal
to be an appropriate sanction, and lesser sanctions are appropriate here. Grady,
2015 WL 1384371, at *4.
The 	undersigned 	recommends 	the 	Court 	order 	Mr. 	McBride 	to 	pay
Defendant Winchester’s attorneys’ fees incurred for the costs of litigating the
Rule 11 motion.
II. 	Recommendation and notice of right to object.
The undersigned certifies the above facts and recommends that the Court
move forward with finding Mr. McBride in contempt of the Court’s order, Doc.
143. The undersigned recommends granting Defendants’ motion for Rule 11
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sanctions, 	Doc. 	166, 	in 	part, 	and 	order 	Mr. 	McBride 	to 	pay 	Defendant
Winchester’s reasonable attorney fees incurred for the filing of the Rule 11
motion.9
The undersigned advises Plaintiff and his counsel, Mr. McBride, of their
right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Any such objection must be filed with the Clerk of
the Court on or before June 11, 2026. Plaintiff and his counsel are further
advised 	that 	failure 	to 	make 	timely 	objection 	to 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation waives their right to appellate review of the factual and legal
issues addressed herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.
1991).
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues and does
not terminate the referral to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned
matter.
ENTERED this 21st day of May, 2026.
9 	The Court should require Defendants’ counsel to submit to the Court a
full accounting of their attorney’s fees and costs associated with litigating the
Rule 11 motion to the Court.
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