Liebel v. Robertson et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
WILLIAM E. LIEBEL, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-894-SLP
)
TERRI ROBERTSON, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
O R D E R
Before the Court are three Motions to Dismiss Theresa Framel’s Counterclaims and
Crossclaims. The first is filed by Plaintiff William Liebel [Doc. No. 76]; the second is filed
by Small Business Association (“SBA”) [Doc. No. 77]; and the third is filed by Oakdale
Meadows Estates Homeowners Association (the “HOA”) [Doc. No. 97]. 	Defendant
Framel has not filed a response to any of the Motions, and the time to do so has passed. 	In
the interests of judicial efficiency, rather than address the pending Motions, the Court sua
sponte DISMISSES Ms. Framel’s claims asserted in various pleadings [Doc. Nos. 67, 68,
70, 71] for failure to comply with Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1
1 Certainly, the parties’ Motions raise Rule 8 concerns, including Ms. Framel’s failures to identify
factual development necessary to state a plausible claim for relief as well as the allegations
consistently referring to Defendants “collectively” such that an individual defendant does not have
fair notice of the claims against it. See e.g., [Doc. No. 77] at 2–3. But the Court sua sponte raises
the issue pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). See Sladek v. Bank of Am., NA, No. 24-1181, 2024 WL
4224029 at *4 (10th Cir. Sept. 18, 2024); see also Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492
F.3d 1158, 1161 and n. 2 (10th Cir. 2007) (“And, to be sure, a failure to satisfy Rule 8 can supply
a basis for dismissal: Rule 41(b) specifically authorizes a district court to dismiss an action for
failing to comply with any aspect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”).
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I. 	Background
Defendant Theresa Framel, appearing pro se, filed numerous counterclaims and
crossclaims in conjunction with her answers to Plaintiff, the SBA, and the HOA. See [Doc.
Nos. 67, 68, 70, 71]. Despite this case being filed nearly two years ago, the action is still
at the pleading stage. This is due in no small part to repeated requests for extensions and
failures to timely comply by Ms. Framel. Indeed, the docket is littered with stricken filings
and orders admonishing Ms. Framel regarding her repeated non-compliance with this
Court’s Local Rules and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Orders [Doc. Nos.
55, 59, 62, 65, 72, 85]. Now, the Court turns to Ms. Framel’s claims asserted in her various
answers.
II. 	Governing Standard
Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Ms. Framel’s pleadings “must
contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to relief,”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with allegations that are “simple, concise, and direct,” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 “does not require detailed factual allegations, . . . [but] it demands more
than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Rule 8 serves two purposes. It gives opposing parties fair notice of the basis of the
claim(s) against them so that they may respond to the complaint. And, it apprises the court
of sufficient allegations to allow it to conclude, if the allegations are proved, that the
claimant has a legal right to relief. See Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1148 (10th Cir.
2007). As the Tenth Circuit has explained:
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Something labeled a complaint but written more as a press release, prolix in
evidentiary detail, yet without simplicity, conciseness and clarity as to whom
plaintiffs are suing for what wrongs, fails to perform the essential functions
of a complaint.
Id.
As a pro se litigant, Plaintiff is entitled to a liberal construction of her pleadings.
See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). But even so, the Court must
“disregard all conclusory statements of law and consider whether the remaining specific
factual allegations, if assumed to be true, plausibly suggest the defendant is liable.” Kan.
Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir. 2011). Furthermore, a pro
se litigant must “follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” 	Nielsen
v. Price, 17 F.3d 1276, 1277 (10th Cir. 1994). And the Court will not assume the role of
advocate on behalf of a pro se litigant. See Kincaid v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 500, 94 F.4th
936, 947 (10th Cir. 2024).
Moreover, where, as here, a plaintiff sues multiple defendants, the pleading should
“explain what each defendant did to the plaintiff; when the defendant did it; how the
defendant’s actions harmed him or her; and, what specific right the plaintiff believes the
defendant violated.” 	Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe Cnty. Just.
Ctr., 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). 	Such allegations provide each defendant
“sufficient notice to begin preparing its defense” and the court “sufficient clarity to
adjudicate the merits.” Id. “If a complaint fails to meet these basic pleading requirements,
a district court may dismiss the action sua sponte for failure to comply with Rule
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8.” 	Rodriguez 	v. 	Nationwide 	Homes, 	Inc., 	756 	F. 	App’x 	782, 	785 	(10th 	Cir.
2018) (citing Nasious, 492 F.3d at 1161, n. 2).
III. 	Discussion
Ms. Framel’s pleadings fail to comply with the requirements of Rule 8. She fails to
identify with any clarity the factual or legal bases for her claim(s). 	She also alleges
“claims” that are not cognizable causes of action such as requests for Rule 11 sanctions
and claims for “improper service.” 	See, e.g., [Doc. No. 68] at 3; [Doc. No. 70] at 3.
Moreover, Ms. Framel fails to separately identify her claims as to each defendant. Under
these circumstances, dismissal of Ms. Framel’s claims is proper. See, e.g., McNamara v.
Brauchler, 570 F. App’x 741, 743 (10th Cir. 2014) (“It is not the role of either the court or
the defendant to sort through a lengthy, poorly drafted complaint and voluminous exhibits
in order to construct plaintiff’s causes of action.”). 	The Court further finds that leave to
amend is not warranted on futility grounds.
Finally, because Ms. Framel appears pro se, she can only bring claims on behalf of
herself. See, e.g., Fymbo v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir.
2000) (“A litigant may bring [her] own claims to federal court without counsel, but not the
claims of others.”). Thus, to the extent Ms. Framel purports to brings claims on behalf of
any other person or entity, dismissal of those claims is proper.
IV. 	Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Court sua sponte DISMISSES without
prejudice the crossclaims and counterclaims asserted by Ms. Framel in her Answers [Doc.
Nos. 67, 68, 70, 71].
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 76], the
SBA’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 77], and the HOA’s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. No. 97]
are DENIED as MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 27th day of March, 2026.
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