Young v. Rios et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
GEORGE SOLER YOUNG, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. CIV-15-641-G
)
HECTOR A. RIOS et al., )
)
Defendants. )
ORDER
Now before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 220) filed by
Defendant Hector A. Rios. Plaintiff George Soler Young, appearing through counsel, has
responded (Doc. No. 227).
I. Background
Plaintiff’s pro se Amended Complaint asserts federal civil rights claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 arising from events alleged to have occurred while he was incarcerated at
Lawton Correctional Facility (“LCF”) in Lawton, Oklahoma. See Am. Compl. (Doc. No.
102). Four claims remain pending:
(1) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Time, Rauch,
Wiltshire, Roody, and Jones for assault and failure to intervene;
(2) Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendants Time, Rauch,
Wiltshire, Roody, and Jones for failure to provide necessary medical care
following the assault;
(3) Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant Rios for transferring
Plaintiff from LCF protective custody in retaliation for reporting the assault;
and
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(4) Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant Robert Benoit for making
retaliatory threats that Plaintiff would never leave segregation if he reported the
assault.
See Op. & Order of Mar. 31, 2023 (Doc. No. 186) at 2.
Defendant Rios seeks summary judgment on the relevant First Amendment claim,
which is predicated upon the following verified factual allegations:
• Plaintiff was housed in the Protective Custody unit at LCF, where Defendant Rios
was the warden, at the time of the assault. Am. Compl. at 2, 10.
• On October 25, 2013, Plaintiff was locked in a disciplinary cell for a strip search,
where he was repeatedly “pushed, punched, kicked and beaten” by Defendants Time
and Wiltshire, and former defendant Hill, who were simultaneously “tearing and
cutting [his] clothes off.” Id. at 11. In the course of the assault, Defendant Time
“roughly insert[ed] his fingers in and out of [Plaintiff’s] rectum,” causing Plaintiff
“overwhelming pain.” Id. Despite Plaintiff’s screams for help, Defendants Roody
and Jones stood outside the cell and did nothing to “stop or report the assault.” Id.
• Plaintiff reported the sexual assault to an LCF official through the offender
grievance process on October 29, 2013. See id. at 12; id. Ex. 10 (Doc. No. 102-10).
• Seeking justification to transfer Plaintiff to another facility, LCF officials including
Defendant Rios fabricated and used as a basis for transfer that Plaintiff “had killed
an inmate,” raped an inmate, and caused others to overdose. Am. Compl. at 14.
Defendant Rios himself “put[] in a transfer request” after Plaintiff had reported the
assault. Id.
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• Defendant Rios “ha[d] a duty to investigate and be involved in resolving the prisoner
complaints” and “knew or should have known” about Plaintiff’s report of the assault
to LCF staff. Id.
• Defendant Rios’ submission of a transfer request was made “in retaliation” for
Plaintiff’s report of the assault and, because Plaintiff (an ex-correctional official)
was placed into the general inmate population post transfer, the transfer “put[]
[Plaintiff] [at] risk of harm or death.” Id.; see also Order of Nov. 14, 2017 (Doc.
No. 120) at 14-15; Op. & Order of Mar. 31, 2023, at 5-6 & n.3.
• On February 19, 2014, Plaintiff was transferred to Oklahoma State Penitentiary
(“OSP”). Am. Compl. at 10.
II. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is a means of testing in advance of trial whether the available
evidence would permit a reasonable jury to find in favor of the party asserting a claim. The
Court must grant summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
A party that moves for summary judgment has the burden of showing that the
undisputed material facts require judgment as a matter of law in its favor. Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). To defeat summary judgment, the nonmovant need
not convince the Court that it will prevail at trial, but it must cite sufficient evidence
admissible at trial to allow a reasonable jury to find in the nonmovant’s favor—i.e., to show
that there is a question of material fact that must be resolved by the jury. See Garrison v.
Gambro, Inc., 428 F.3d 933, 935 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court must then determine
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“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or
whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
Parties may establish the existence or nonexistence of a material disputed fact by:
• citing to “depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory
answers, or other materials” in the record; or
• demonstrating “that the materials cited do not establish the absence or
presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce
admissible evidence to support the fact.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). While the Court views the evidence and the inferences
drawn from the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, see Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 (10th Cir. 2005), “[t]he
mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [nonmovant’s] position will be
insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the
[nonmovant].” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 252.
III. Plaintiff’s Claim for Violation of the First Amendment
Prison officials may not retaliate against an inmate on account of, or otherwise
harass an inmate in retaliation for, the inmate’s exercise of rights protected by the First
Amendment. See Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990). “This principle
applies even where the action taken in retaliation would be otherwise permissible.” Id. at
948.
Government retaliation against a plaintiff for exercising his or her First
Amendment rights may be shown by proving the following elements: (1) that
the plaintiff was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the
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defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff to suffer an injury that would chill a
person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and
(3) that the defendant’s adverse action was substantially motivated as a
response to the plaintiff’s exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.
Shero v. City of Grove, 510 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007).
It is well established that “[t]he filing of prison grievances is constitutionally
protected activity.” Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1211 (10th Cir. 2018). “[W]hile
a prisoner enjoys no constitutional right to remain in a particular institution . . . , prison
officials do not have the discretion to punish an inmate for exercising his first amendment
rights by transferring him to a different institution.” Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 561-
62 (10th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d
1178, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010); Fogle v. Pierson, 435 F.3d 1252, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2006).
Defendant Rios’ Motion does not address any relevant standards or case law.
Rather, the one-page argument seeks summary judgment on the basis that, as the LCF
Warden, Defendant Rios “had every right to transfer” Plaintiff “for any reason” “to any
other facility.” Def.’s Mot. at 2 (capitalization omitted). In support, Defendant Rios
references an Oklahoma Department of Corrections policy (not included with the Motion)
that purportedly authorized Defendant Rios to transfer Plaintiff for “[a]ny justifiable
reason” determined by security staff. Id.
Plaintiff does not contend, however, that Defendant Rios lacked the authority to
effect the transfer. Rather, as has been expressly found by the Court, Plaintiff alleges the
following elements establish that Defendant Rios violated Plaintiff’s First Amendment
rights:
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(1) constitutionally protected activity—reporting officers’ violent sexual
assault; (2) Defendant Rios personally orchestrated the transfer out of
protective custody, which would plausibly chill an ordinary person from
reporting; and (3) Rios transferred Plaintiff because of the grievance report,
justifying the transfer instead on made-up grounds.
Order of Nov. 14, 2017, at 15; see also Am. Compl. at 10-12, 14.
While Defendant Rios points to a memorandum in which he requested that Plaintiff
be placed at a maximum-security facility due to Plaintiff’s “participation in . . . the
introduction of dangerous contraband into” LCF, an internal post-transfer facility review
states that Plaintiff was placed at OSP “due to [an Internal Affairs] investigation for
offender allegation of sexual assault by staff.” Def.’s Mot. Ex. 1, Feb. 18, 2014 Mem.
(Doc. No. 220-1) at1; Pl.’s Resp. Ex. 13, Segregation Review (Doc. No. 227-13) at 1; see
also Smith, 899 F.2d at 948 (“It is well established that an act in retaliation for the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right is actionable under Section 1983 even if the act, when
take for a different reason, would have been proper.” (alterations and internal quotation
marks omitted)). Plaintiff also stated in his sworn deposition that Defendant Rios was lying
or misstating the truth in accusing Plaintiff of being part of a drug ring at LCF. See Pl.’s
Resp. Ex. 1, Pl. Dep. 140:8-18 (Doc. No. 227-1).
Where defendants’ motives are seriously at issue, trial by affidavit is
particularly inappropriate. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the
evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury
functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict. The evidence of the nonmovant is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.
Smith, 899 F.2d at 949.
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The record before the Court thus reflects a genuine dispute as to whether Defendant
Rios’ transfer of Plaintiff “was substantially motivated as a response to” Plaintiff’s exercise
of constitutionally protected activity. Shero, 510 F.3d at 1203. If Defendant Rios
“retaliated against [Plaintiff] based on his filing [an] administrative grievance[], [he] may
be liable for a violation of [Plaintiff’s] constitutional rights.” Fogle, 435 F.3d at 1264; see
also Smith, 899 F.2d at 949 (“[B]ecause the ultimate fact of retaliation turns on defendants’
state of mind, it is particularly difficult to establish by direct evidence.”). Defendant Rios
is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).1
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 220) filed
by Defendant Hector A. Rios is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 3rd day of June, 2025.
1 Defendant Rios also nominally argues that summary judgment should be entered in his
favor because Plaintiff has failed to establish Defendant Rios’ supervisory liability
regarding the sexual assault by the LCF officials. See Def.’s Mot. at 3. Plaintiff is not
bringing a claim against Defendant Rios based upon the underlying assault, however. See
Op. & Order of Mar. 31, 2023, at 2.
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