Moore Jr v. U.S. Xpress, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
MICHAEL A. MOORE JR.,
Plaintiff, Case No. 3:26-cv-265
vs.
U.S. XPRESS LEASING, INC., District Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
Defendant.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION
AND STAY THIS CASE (Doc. No. 6); (2) STAYING THIS CASE PENDING
ARBITRATION; (3) REQUIRING THE PARTIES TO FILE JOINT STATUS REPORTS
EVERY NINETY DAYS AND WITHIN SEVEN DAYS OF THE ARBITRATION’S
CONCLUSION; (4) DIRECTING THE CLERK OF COURT TO ADMINISTRATIVELY
CLOSE THIS CASE; AND (5) ADVISING PLAINTIFF THAT, IF HE DESIRES TO
CONTINUE WITH THIS CASE AFTER ARBITRATION, HE MUST REQUEST THE
STAY TO BE LIFTED WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS OF THE ARBITRATION’S
CONCLUSION
______________________________________________________________________________
In this civil case, Plaintiff Michael A. Moore Jr., through counsel, brings claims under the
Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq. and the Ohio Civil Rights Act, R.C.
§ 4112, et. seq., against Defendant U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc.1 This case is before the Court upon
Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. Doc. No. 6. Plaintiff
responded in opposition (Doc. No. 7), and Defendant replied. Doc. No. 10. The motion is now
ripe for review.
1 Defendant notes that Plaintiff names U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc., as the sole defendant in his complaint.
Doc No. 6 at PageID 47. However, Plaintiff apparently never worked for U.S. Xpress Leasing Inc., which
according to Defendant, is an asset-holding company. Id. Instead, Plaintiff was an employee of U.S.
Xpress, Inc., an affiliate of U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc. Id. However, this does not affect the Defendant’s
motion to compel arbitration, because the parties’ arbitration agreement (the “Agreement”) binds Plaintiff,
U.S. Xpress Enterprises, Inc., and its affiliates—which includes both U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc. and U.S.
Xpress, Inc. Doc. No. 6-1 at PageID 60.
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I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff is an Ohio resident who was hired by Defendant, a Tennessee corporation, as a
Dedicated Account Supervisor on April 19, 2021. Doc. No. 6-1 at PageID 58. Plaintiff worked
remotely for Defendant, from his home in Ohio, until his employment was terminated on February
28, 2025. Doc. No. 6 at PageID 47, 49.
As part of his application and onboarding process, Plaintiff electronically signed an
arbitration agreement (the “Agreement”) prepared by Defendant. Id. at 50. The Agreement
contains the following language:
ARBITRATION PROGRAM AGREEMENT: In particular, and without
limitation, I confirm my understanding and agreement that work disputes in
which I am involved that fall within the Program’s definition of “Legal
Dispute” will be resolved exclusively through final and binding arbitration
rather than before a judge or jury in court or before an administrative
adjudicative body.
Doc. No. 6-1 at PageID 64. Defendant contends that Plaintiff is therefore bound to arbitrate the
employment claims he raises in his complaint. Doc. No. 6 at PageID 55.
Defendant maintains that the Agreement is valid and enforceable, and that the Court must
stay this action pending the resolution of Plaintiff’s claims in arbitration. Id. Plaintiff responds
that his claims are not arbitrable because he signed the Agreement at an “anomalous hour,” and
the Agreement has not been properly authenticated. Doc. No. 7 at PageID 70. Plaintiff also claims
that the Agreement is procedurally and substantively unconscionable under Ohio law. Id. at
PageID 66.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Validity
A district court faced with a motion to compel arbitration of a dispute must first determine
whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. Mitsubishi Motors Corp v. Soler Chrysler-
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Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985). If the formation of the arbitration agreement is “in
issue,” a district court must proceed to trial to resolve that question. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (“If the
making of an arbitration agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial
thereof.”). However, “[i]f the district court is satisfied that the agreement to arbitrate is not ‘in
issue,’ it must compel arbitration.” Great Earth Cos., Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir.
2022). “[T]o show that the validity of the agreement is ‘in issue,’ the party opposing arbitration
must show a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the agreement to arbitrate.” Id.
(cleaned up). One’s inability to “remember” signing an arbitration agreement does not create a
genuine dispute of material fact as to its validity. See Boykin v. Fam. Dollar Stores of Mich., LLC,
3 F.4th 832, 839-40 (6th Cir. 2021) (“[C]onvenient memory lapses do not create factual disputes
that are genuine”). As set forth below, the Court concludes that there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to the Agreement’s validity, and arbitration of the parties’ dispute is warranted.
Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Agreement covers the claims raised in his
complaint. See generally Doc. No. 7. Instead, Plaintiff challenges the formation of the Agreement,
suggesting that it is invalid. Id. It is Plaintiff’s burden to show a genuine dispute of material fact
as to the validity of the Agreement. Great Earth Cos., 288 F.3d at 889. Plaintiff claims that he
“does not recall signing” the Agreement. Doc. No. 7 at PageID 66. Plaintiff further argues that
because the Agreement was signed at 11:27 p.m., an “anomalous hour,” this creates doubt as to
whether he signed it in the first place. Id. at PageID 70. However, this does not create a genuine
dispute of material fact as to the Agreement’s validity. Boykin, 3 F.4th at 840.2
2 Plaintiff has not submitted any evidence or legal authority suggesting that an arbitration agreement signed
late at night creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to its validity. Nor, in its research, has the Court
found any support for that proposition of law.
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B. Authenticity
An item is properly authenticated when there is sufficient evidence to “support a finding
that the item is what [Defendant] claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Here, Defendant submitted
an affidavit from its records custodian attesting that Plaintiff signed the agreement as part of his
employment application and onboarding process. Doc. No. 6–1 at PageID 57–59. Defendant’s
custodian affirmed that he had personal knowledge of the facts in the affidavit; that he reviewed
Plaintiff’s personal records; and that those records were made at, or near, the time of the events in
question. Id.; see Vaillancourt v. IBEX Glob. Sols., Inc., No. 4:24-CV-605, 2024 WL 3345492 at
*5 (N.D. Ohio July 9, 2024) (determining that an employer properly authenticated its arbitration
agreement with its employee under these exact circumstances).
C. Unconscionability
While the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts state law involving arbitration, state
law governs “generally applicable contract defenses [to an arbitration clause], such as fraud, duress
or unconscionability.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1984); Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996); Jones v. U-Haul Co. of Mass. & Ohio, 16 F. Supp.
3d 922, 932 (S.D. Ohio 2014). The party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving that an
arbitration agreement is unconscionable under applicable state law. Hayes v. Oakridge Home, 122
Ohio St.3d 63, 67-68 (2009). The Court “examine[s] arbitration language in a contract in light of
the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration, resolving any doubts . . . in favor of arbitration.”
See Albert M. Higley Co. v. N/S Corp., 445 F.3d 861, 863 (6th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff contends that the Agreement is unconscionable under Ohio law for three reasons.
First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant improperly conditioned his employment on his agreement to
arbitrate. Doc. No. 7 at PageID 71. Second, Plaintiff contends the Agreement improperly applies
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Tennessee law to the resolution of disputes. Id. at PageID 72. Finally, Plaintiff insists that the
Agreement’s requirement—that arbitration take place in Tennessee—is unreasonable and
oppressive. Id. at PageID 75.
Notwithstanding these arguments, the Court must compel arbitration. First, Ohio
employers may condition an individual’s employment on their willingness to arbitrate disputes.
Thomas v. Hyundai, 2020-Ohio-3030, ¶ 31 (8th Dist. 2020) (“Nevertheless, the case law is clear
that in an at-will employment situation, Ohio employers may condition employment on the
employee’s agreement to arbitrate disputes.”). Second, the mere fact that Plaintiff might have had
less bargaining power than Defendant when he signed the Agreement does not make the
Agreement unconscionable. See e.g., Rudolph v. Wright Patt Credit Union, 2021-Ohio-2215, ¶
71 (2d Dist. 2021) (noting that mere inequality in bargaining power between an employee and his
employer is insufficient under Ohio law to invalidate an otherwise enforceable arbitration
agreement) (collecting cases).
Furthermore, the potential application of Tennessee law in a future arbitration does not
make arbitration improper. Where there is disagreement about the choice of law an arbitrator
might apply, the Court must compel arbitration. See DeOrnellas v. Aspen Square Mgmt, Inc., 295
F. Supp. 2d 753, 761 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (“[T]he proper course is to compel arbitration and address
the issues relating to the abrogation of substantive rights on judicial review of the arbitration award
. . .”) (citing PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 (2003)). Plaintiff must raise
these arguments before an arbitrator, not before the Court. See Hines v. Nat’l Ent. Grp., LLC, 140
F.4th 322, 332 (6th Cir. 2025) (“Under the severability principle, separate arguments unrelated to
the arbitration clause itself are considered by the arbitrator in the first instance”) (cleaned up).
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Similarly, the requirement that Plaintiff travel to Tennessee for future arbitration
proceedings is a question that an arbitrator, not the Court, should decide, because it is unrelated to
the validity of the Agreement itself. See Great Earth Cos., 288 F.3d at 889 (explaining that in
deciding whether to compel arbitration, a district court may only consider whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate); accord Hines, 140 F.4th at 332.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, and for good cause shown, the Court GRANTS
Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration and stay the proceedings. Accordingly, the parties are
hereby ORDERED to participate in arbitration pursuant to the terms of the executed Agreement,
and this case is STAYED pending the results of the parties’ arbitration proceedings.
The parties are ORDERED to keep the Court appraised of any updates to the case by filing
joint status reports every ninety (90) days and also within seven (7) days of the arbitration’s
conclusion. The Court also DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to administratively close this case.3
Plaintiff is ADVISED that, if he desires to continue with this case after arbitration, he must request
the stay to be lifted within thirty (30) days of the arbitration’s conclusion.
Finally, no appeal is presently available in this case because this Order is not a final
appealable order. See 28 U.S.C. § 1291; cf. Sultaana v. Jerman, No. 1:15-cv-382, 2020 WL
13889761, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 7, 2020) (quoting Cleaver v. Elias, 852 F.2d 266, 267 (7th Cir.
1988) (“An appeal is possible in the absence of [a Rule 58 final judgment] only if the district court
has clearly disposed of all pending matters”)).
3 This administrative closing of the case is for statistical purposes only and does not limit Plaintiff’s right
to request that the stay be lifted as directed above.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
October 16, 2026 s/Michael J. Newman
Hon. Michael J. Newman
United States District Judge
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