Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
BENJAMIN L.,1 	Case No. 3:25-cv-0042
Plaintiff, 	Newman, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Benjamin L. filed this Social Security appeal to challenge the Defendant’s
finding that he is not disabled. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 	Proceeding through counsel,
Plaintiff presents one claim of error, which the Defendant disputes. 	For the following
reasons, the undersigned recommends that the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
I. Summary of Administrative Record
On June 24, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Title II application for a period of disability and
disability insurance benefits. On the same date, Plaintiff also filed a Title XVI application
for 	supplemental 	security 	income. 	In 	both 	applications 	Plaintiff 	alleged 	disability
beginning 	on 	March 	1, 	2020. 	Plaintiff’s 	claims 	were 	denied 	initially 	and 	on
reconsideration.
On November 28, 2023, Plaintiff appeared with counsel and testified at a
telephonic 	hearing 	before 	Administrative 	Law 	Judge 	(“ALJ”) 	Gregory 	Kenyon. 	A
1
Because of significant privacy concerns in social security cases, the Court refers to claimants only by their
first names and last initials. See General Order 22-01.
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 1 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
vocational expert also appeared and testified. On January 19, 2024, the ALJ issued an
adverse written decision, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Appeals Council
declined 	further 	review, 	leaving 	the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	as 	the 	final 	decision 	of 	the
Commissioner. Plaintiff then filed this judicial appeal.
Plaintiff was born in 1980 and was 39 years old on the alleged disability onset date.
(Tr. 23). He has a limited education, past relevant work as a Tree Trimmer, and—at the
time of the hearing—had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the onset date.
(Tr. 17, 22, 23).
Based on the record and testimony presented at the hearing, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “residuals of right tibia and fibula fractures
and a right ankle fracture, including complex regional pain syndrome; a history of a
seizure; mild obesity; depression; and an anxiety disorder.” 	(Tr. 17). 	Considering
Plaintiff’s impairments individually and in combination, the ALJ determined that none met
or medically equaled “the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404,
Subpart P, Appendix 1.” (Tr. 18). The ALJ determined that, despite these impairments,
Plaintiff retains the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work subject to
the following exceptions:
(1) occasional crouching, crawling, kneeling, stooping, balancing, and
climbing of ramps and stairs; (2) no climbing of ladders, ropes, and
scaffolds; (3) no work around hazards such as unprotected heights or
dangerous machinery; (4) no driving of automotive equipment; (5) simple,
routine, repetitive tasks; (6) occasional superficial contact with co-workers
and supervisors (superficial contact is defined as able to receive simple
instructions, ask simple questions, and receive performance appraisals but
as 	unable 	to 	engage 	in 	more 	complex 	social 	interactions 	such 	as
persuading other people or resolving interpersonal conflicts); (7) no public
contact; (8) no fast paced work; (9) no strict production quotas; and (10)
limited to jobs which involve very little, if any, change in the job duties or the
work routine from one day to the next.
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 2 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
(Tr. 19-20). Based on the RFC and testimony from the VE, the ALJ agreed that Plaintiff
could not perform any past relevant work. 	Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform other jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy, including the representative occupations of
merchandise marker, routing clerk, and inspector/hand packager. (Tr. 23). The ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled from March 1, 2020 through the date of the
decision. (Tr. 24).
In this case, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate prior
administrative medical findings for supportability and consistency, as required by 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c. (Doc. 8).
II. Analysis
A. Judicial Standard of Review
To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability.” See 42 U.S.C.
§1382c(a). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes only physical or
mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent
the applicant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial
gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. See Bowen v. City
of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986).
When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, the court’s
first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported by
substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (additional citation and internal quotation omitted). In
conducting this review, the court should consider the record as a whole. Hephner v.
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 3 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
denial of benefits, then that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also
exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035
(6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:
The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because
substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion....
The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of
choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference from
the courts. If the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence,
a reviewing court must affirm.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct.1148, 1154 (2019) (holding
that substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion and that the threshold “is not high”).
In considering an application for supplemental security income or for disability
benefits, the Social Security Agency is guided by the following sequential benefits
analysis: at Step 1, the Commissioner asks if the claimant is still performing substantial
gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner determines if one or more of the claimant’s
impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s
impairments, 	singly 	or 	in 	combination, 	meet 	or 	equal 	a 	Listing 	in 	the 	Listing 	of
Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner determines whether the claimant can still
perform his or her past relevant work; and finally, at Step 5, if it is established that claimant
can no longer perform his or her past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the
agency to determine whether a significant number of other jobs which the claimant can
perform exist in the national economy. See Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640,
643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920.
A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is
entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). A claimant seeking benefits must
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 4 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an
impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that
left her unable to perform any job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A).
B. The ALJ Properly Evaluated the Prior Administrative Medical Findings
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to sufficiently
articulate his analysis of the “supportability” and “consistency” of the psychological
opinions offered by state agency psychologists Dr. Hill and Dr. Dietz.
Under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, an ALJ must evaluate the “persuasiveness” of each
medical 	opinion 	by 	considering 	multiple 	factors, 	including 	“supportability” 	and
“consistency.” 20 C.F.R.. §404.1520c(c). With respect to the supportability factor, “[t]he
more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by
a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) . . . the more persuasive the
medical opinions . . . will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1). Similarly, “[t]he more consistent
a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical sources and nonmedical
sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s). . . .” 	20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(c)(2).
The undersigned finds no error in the ALJ’s analysis. In formulating Plaintiff’s RFC,
the ALJ considered the opinions of Dr. Hill and Dr. Dietz, which the ALJ found to be
somewhat persuasive. Both agency psychologists reviewed Plaintiff’s file and evidence
and concluded that Plaintiff had no more than moderate limitations in any mental area,
including no limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information. (See Tr.
22. See also 74, 84). As indicated by the ALJ, this finding was consistent with Plaintiff’s
objective examinations of record which consistently indicate that Plaintiff had intact
memory function, full orientation, and good immediate recall. (Id. at 18, 21). Hill and Deitz
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 5 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
further concluded that Plaintiff was limited to one-to-four step tasks, which the ALJ noted
was vocationally vague, but incorporated in the RFC with a limitation to only simple,
routine, and repetitive tasks. (Tr. 22). The psychologists limited Plaintiff to superficial
social contacts, however—viewing the evidence in a light more favorable to Plaintiff due
to his impulsivity—the ALJ included a limitation to no public contact in the RFC. (Id.).
With respect to the moderate limitations, the ALJ decision indicates that the
opinions were consistent with Plaintiff’s objective examinations of record relating to
Plaintiff’s 	interactions 	with 	others 	(that 	he 	had 	normal 	eye 	contact, 	speech, 	and
psychomotor activity with, at times, angry mood and labile affect); concentrating,
persisting, or maintaining pace (that Plaintiff has normal attention and concentration with,
again at times, angry mood and labile affect); and adapting or managing oneself (that he
has normal impulse control with, at time, poor insight and judgment). (Tr. 19, 21-22). The
ALJ also adequately assessed the supportability of the psychologists’ opinions by citing
to specific portions of the record underlying their findings. (Id.). For example, as argued
by Defendant, the ALJ cited to Plaintiff’s treatment notes and a behavioral assessment
reviewed by the state agency psychologists. (See Doc. 10 at PageID 1084). In identifying
the evidence considered and relied on by the psychologists, as well as indicating the
consistency of those records with their opinions, the ALJ sufficiently articulated the
persuasiveness of the psychologist’s opinions. See Sasha M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 2:22-CV-2101-EAS-KAJ, 2023 WL 1793536, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2023), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 2:22-CV-2101, 2023 WL 6383450 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
29, 	2023) 	(“[T]he 	ALJ 	cited 	to 	the 	same 	records 	upon 	which 	the 	state 	agency
psychologists based their opinions.... In other words, she considered supportability and
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 6 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
the opinion's reference to diagnostic techniques, data collection procedures/analysis, and
other objective medical evidence”) (internal quotations omitted).
Although, 	as 	argued 	by 	Plaintiff, 	the 	ALJ 	did 	not 	explicitly 	use 	the 	terms
supportability and consistency, an ALJ need not use the precise words so long as he or
she has explained how those two “most important” factors were considered in determining
the persuasiveness of each opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(b)(2); see also Hardy v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-cv-4097-CMV-JLG, 2021 WL 4059310, at *2 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 7, 2021) (use of words “supportability” and “consistency” not required where opinion
adequately addressed both issues). The undersigned finds no reversible error because
the ALJ’s mental RFC findings as determined are both adequately explained and
substantially supported. The ALJ’s analysis builds “an accurate and logical bridge
between the evidence and the result.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F.Supp.2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011). In fact, most of the ALJ’s mental RFC findings can be traced to the reviewing
psychologists’ opinions, which the ALJ found to be somewhat persuasive, in large part,
on account of the ALJ’s finding that a more restrictive limitation was warranted with
respect to social contacts.
Additionally, reversal is not appropriate here because Plaintiff can show no
prejudice. 	A 	comparison 	of 	the 	ALJ’s 	mental 	RFC 	findings 	with 	the 	consulting
psychological opinions shows few differences and Plaintiff has presented no medical
opinion that his impairments imposed greater limitations than those identified by the state
agency psychologists or the ALJ.2 See Elaine S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 3:22-
2 Plaintiff argues that there are other psychological medical opinions in the record, which documents serious
persistent symptoms of daily depression, severe anxiety with feelings of dread, severe restlessness,
suicidal ideation and seizure-like activity. Plaintiff further points to his having been admitted to the hospital
based on these conditions. 	(See Doc. 8 at PageID 1069-70; Doc. 12 at PageID 1094-95). 	However,
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 7 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
cv-240, 2023 WL 6290070, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 27, 2023) (Newman, D.J.) (finding a
supportability-analysis error was harmless where the plaintiff did not point to evidence
contrary to the ALJ’s conclusion regarding the state agency opinion). Courts “will not
remand for further administrative proceedings unless the claimant has been prejudiced
on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the agency’s procedural lapses.”
See Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 654 (6th Cir. 2009). Plaintiff does
not allege a deprivation of substantial rights and has not shown he was prejudiced by the
ALJ’s articulation regarding the persuasiveness of the psychologists’ opinions.
Accordingly, 	the 	undersigned 	finds 	that 	ALJ 	properly 	evaluated 	the 	prior
administrative medical findings of Dr. Hill and Dr. Deitz and the decision is otherwise
supported by substantial evidence.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
Because the Commissioner’s decision reflects no reversible error and is supported
by substantial evidence, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT the decision be AFFIRMED and
that this case be CLOSED.
s/Stephanie K. Bowman__________
Stephanie K. Bowman
United States Chief Magistrate Judge
Plaintiff’s symptoms and hospital admissions were identified and assessed by the ALJ (See Tr. 17, 21).
And, as here, if the ALJ supports his RFC with a “combination of objective medical evidence and non-
medical evidence,” decisions are upheld “even where there is no medical opinion that corresponds precisely
to the RFC found by the ALJ.” See Naddra v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:16-CV-340, 2016 WL 11268204,
at *8 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016) (Bowman, M.J.) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted,
No. 1:16-CV-340, 2017 WL 1194708 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2017) (Barrett, D.J.).
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 8 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
BENJAMIN L., 	Case No. 3:25-cv-0042
Plaintiff, 	Newman, J.
Bowman, M.J.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of
the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of
the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of
the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.
140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case: 3:25-cv-00042-MJN-SKB Doc #: 13 Filed: 02/13/26 Page: 9 of 9 PAGEID #: <pageID>