Rodriguez-Canas v. Warden, Noble Correctional Institution

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
JOSE S. RODRIGUEZ-CANAS,
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-1246
- vs - 	District Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN,
Noble Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This habeas corpus case, brought by Petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 with the assistance
of counsel, seeks relief from his conviction on one count of endangering children in violation of
Ohio Rev. Code § 2919.22. The case is ripe for decision on the Amended Petition (ECF No. 10),
the State Court Record (ECF No.12), the Return of Writ (ECF No. 13), Petitioner’s Reply (ECF
No. 18), and Respondent’s Surreply (ECF No. 21).
The Magistrate Judge reference in the case was recently transferred to the undersigned to
help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in the District.
Litigation History
On July 28, 2021, a Franklin County grand jury indicted Petitioner on two counts of illegal
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 1 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
use of a minor or impaired person in nudity-oriented material in violation of Ohio Revised Code
§ 2907.323 and two counts of voyeurism in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.08 (Indictment,
State Court Record, ECF No. 12, Ex. 1). 	On August 8, 2022, Petitioner pleaded guilty to an
amended charge of endangering children. Id. at Ex. 3. 	On October 17, 2022, Petitioner was
sentenced to an indeterminate term of six to nine years. Id. at Ex. 4. He did not appeal, but filed a
petition for post-conviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21 on November 13, 2023. Id.
at Ex. 5. The trial court denied that petition on February 26, 2024, and Petitioner, through counsel,
appealed to the Tenth District Court of Appeals which affirmed. State v. Rodriquez-Canas, 2025-
Ohio-1471 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Apr. 24, 2025). Petitioner appealed pro se to the Ohio Supreme
Court which declined to exercise jurisdiction. State v. Canas, 179 Ohio St. 3d 1439 (Aug. 5, 2025).
Once again represented by counsel, Rodriquez-Canas filed his Petition in this Court on
October 24, 20251 , and his Amended Petition on April 13, 2026 (ECF No. 10), pleading the
following grounds for relief:
Ground One: Ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to advise
of deportation consequences.
Ground 	Two: 	Due 	Process 	violation 	for 	decision 	denying
Petitioner’s Post-Conviction Petition seeking to withdraw his plea
of guilty.
Ground Three: Due Process violation for denying Petition for Post-
Conviction Relief without an evidentiary hearing.
1 That is the date of docketing. As discussed below, Petitioner has made no statement as to when he deposited the
Petition in the prison mailing system.
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 2 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
ECF No. 10.
Analysis
Statute of Limitations
Respondent seeks dismissal of the case as barred by the one-year statute of limitations
enacted in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (Pub. L. No 104-132, 110
Stat. 1214)(the "AEDPA"). The limitations period under AEDPA is codified at 28 U.S.C. §
2244(d) which provides:
(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a
writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from
the latest of —
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the
conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review;
(B) 	the 	date 	on 	which 	the 	impediment 	to 	filing 	an
application created by State action in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the
applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was
initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
claims presented could have been discovered through the
exercise of due diligence.
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 3 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-
conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period
of limitation under this subsection.
Respondent calculates the time under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(a) as beginning to run when
Petitioner failed to file a direct appeal by the thirtieth day after conviction. It then ran for 361 days
until it was statutorily tolled under § 2244(d)(2) by the proper filing of the post-conviction petition.
It resumed running, by Respondent’s calculation, when the Ohio Supreme Court declined
jurisdiction on August 5, 2025, and expired four days later on August 9, 2025. The original Petition
was not received by the Clerk and docketed until October 24, 2025 (ECF No. 1).
Petitioner’s counsel concedes Rodriquez-Canas filed outside the statutory time limit, but
claims he is entitled to equitable tolling (Reply, ECF No. 18, PageID 448). 	The Petition was
purportedly executed on August 24, 2025 (ECF No. 1 at PageID 15). 	Petitioner apparently
believed his Petition was timely because he said so in response to the question in the Standard
Form about timeliness. Id. at PageID 13. 	Incarcerated persons are entitled to a filing date for
papers sent to federal courts of the date of deposit in the prison mailing system. Houston v. Lack,
487 U.S. 266 (1988); Towns v. United States, 190 F.3d 468 (6 th Cir. 1999). However Petitioner
left blank the place on the Petition for declaring when it was placed in the prison mailing system.
Id. at PageID 15. The envelope in which the Petition was mailed to the Court is not postmarked
until October 21, 2025 (PageID 17).
Respondent notes that equitable tolling is available only if a petitioner “1) . . . has been
pursuing his rights diligently, and 2) . . . some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way.”
(Return, ECF No. 13, at 428 citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)). Respondent
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 4 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
asserts Petitioner did not act diligently because he filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
with only days to spare. Under Ohio law a defendant has 365 days from the date the trial transcript
is filed on direct appeal in which to file a post-conviction relief petition. Ohio Revised Code §
2953.21(a)(2)(a). The post-conviction petition was filed November 13, 2023 (State Court Record,
ECF No. 12, Ex. 5). Apparently no question was raised as to its timeliness (See Opinion, State
Court Record, ECF No. 12, Ex. 8). It is supported by the Affidavit of Attorney Charles Koenig
about his involvement in this case. He avers that he was retained by Petitioner and met with him
on February 18, 20232 to obtain an affidavit from Petitioner’s trial attorney Yass A. Benis about
deficiencies in her representation of Petitioner. He drafted an affidavit for her signature which is
attached to his Affidavit and has a blank date for April 2023 (PageID 107). According to Attorney
Koenig’s Affidavit, Attorney Benis was unwilling to sign that Affidavit as he had drafted it and
died August 12, 2023, without every providing an affidavit Attorney Koenig could use in post
conviction.
For reasons not explained to the Court, Petitioner hired new counsel, Attorney Eleina
Thomas, to file the post-conviction petition which she did on November 13, 2023. She continued
to represent him through conclusion of the post-conviction appeal, when he returned to pro se
status and timely filed an appeal to the Ohio Supreme Court (State Court Record, ECF No. 12,
Exs. 14 and 15).
The Magistrate Judge concludes Petitioner was diligent in pursuing his rights through the
2 In ¶ 12 of his Affidavit, he avers that he was retained in January, 2022. As Respondent points out, that is not likely
to be accurate because the guilty plea was not entered until August, 2022. Given a first meeting in February 2023, it
is likely Attorney Koenig made an uncorrected typographical error in ¶ 12.
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 5 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
time before the Ohio Supreme Court’s denial of review on August 5, 2025. At that point it appears
he thought he had sufficient time left to meet the statute because he claimed his filing was timely
when it was not. However, he offers no “extraordinary circumstance” which stood in his way of
filing, nor does he tell the Court why, if the Petition was in fact executed on August 24, 2025, it
was not mailed until October. Even if the Petition had been deposited in the prison mail system
on the date it was purportedly executed, it would have been untimely filed by fifteen days. Another
two months expired before it was actually mailed.
Because § 2244(d) is not jurisdictional, it is subject to equitable tolling. Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631 (2010). 	Petitioner does not claim any extraordinary circumstance prevented him
from filing and in fact he claimed in the Petition that he was timely filing. 	Although he was
incarcerated, limited access to the prison law library does not per se create an excusing
impediment. An inmate must show that limited access prevented him from timely filing. Nelson
v. Morgan, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43175 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2015)(Rice, J.), citing Lewis v.
Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351 (1996). 	Unless the restrictions rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, they do not provide a basis for statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(B). Nelson at *6,
citing Maclin v. Robinson, 74 Fed. Appx. 587, 589 (6th Cir. 2003). Nor do ordinary limitations on
a prisoner’s law library access constitute “extraordinary circumstances” justifying equitable
tolling. Nelson at *6-7, citing Ramirez v. Yates, 571 F.3d 993, 998 (9th Cir. 2009). “[T]he second
prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay
are both extraordinary and beyond its control.” Menominee Indian Tribe, 577 U.S. 250 (2016),
citing Holland (emphasis sic). 	“Equitable tolling allows courts to review time-barred habeas
petitions ‘provided that a litigant’s failure to meet a legally-mandated deadline unavoidably arose
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 6 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
from circumstances beyond that litigant’s control.’” Keeling v. Warden, 673 F.3d 452, 462 (6th
Cir. 2012), quoting Robertson v. Simpson, 624 F.3d 781, 783 (6th Cir. 2010)).
Petitioner reminds the Court that its equitable powers are not to be applied “mechanically”
(Reply, ECF No. 18, PageID 449, citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 396 (1946)). That
certainly is a valid principle in equity and allows the Court to weigh against Petitioner his lack of
candor about why he thought his Petition was timely on August 24, 2025; when he actually
deposited it in the prison mail system; and why actual mailing did not occur until two months after
the Petition was signed.
Petitioner argues
the length of Canas’s delay was only two months. This was not
outside the realm of reasonableness. The Sixth Circuit granted
equitable tolling for a comparable delay in Solomon v. United States,
467 F.3d 928, 935 (6th Cir. 2006) (granting equitable tolling where
the habeas petition was filed more than sixty days after the AEDPA
deadline).
(Reply, ECF No. 18, PageID 450). In Solomon in contrast to this case the government imposed
substantial burdens on the defendant by transferring him between prisons without his legal papers,
an 	extraordinary 	circumstance 	beyond 	his 	control. 	Rodriquez-Canas 	points 	to 	no 	such
extraordinary circumstance.
The burden of establishing entitlement to equitable tolling is on the petitioner. Rodriquez-
Canas has not met that burden and therefore his Amended Petition should be dismissed as time-
barred.
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 7 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
Merits
Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
In his First Ground for Relief, Rodriquez-Canas claims that he received ineffective
assistance of trial counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment when Attorney
Benis advised him to plead guilty to the endangering children count without advising him that the
conviction would require him to register as a sex offender and thus be subject to deportation
(Amended Petition, ECF No. 10, PageID 39).
Respondent defends this ground on the merits, conceding that Rodriquez-Canas fairly
presented it to the Ohio courts (Return, ECF No. 13, PageID 433). The Tenth District Court of
Appeals decided this claim3 on appeal from denial of post-conviction relief and applied the
controlling Supreme Court precedent, Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
When a state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a
federal habeas court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is
contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the
United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011);
Cunningham v. Shoop, 23 F.4th 636, 650 (6th Cir. 2022); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140
(2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002); Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379
(2000) Hendrix v. Palmer, 893 F.3d 906, 917 (6th Cir. 2018).
Petitioner’s claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel was initially heard by Common
3 Petitioner’s sole assignment of error on appeal was “[t]he Trial Court abused its discretion when it denied Appellant
Mr. Canas’ timely filed petition for postconviction relief pursuant to R.C. 2953.21 where he presented substantive
grounds for relief that required an evidentiary hearing.” In the course of overruling this Assignment of Error, the
Tenth District squarely considered Rodriquez’s ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim and rejected it on both the
deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 8 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
Pleas Judge Karen Held Phipps who had been assigned to this case since its inception. In denying
the Petition, she observed that Rodriquez-Canas had both spoken and agreed that he understood
matters spoken to him in English. That finding of fact, based on repeated observation, contradicts
claims made by Rodriquez-Canas about this lack of ability in English and is entitled to deference
in this Court. She noted that the plea colloquy advised Rodriquez-Canas of possible deportation
consequences of his conviction and that the plea agreement made no promise of probation. She
found, correctly, that the unsigned affidavit from Yass Benis had no evidentiary value and that of
Attorney Koenig very little. In all, she spent nine pages thoroughly analyzing the Post-Conviction
Petition before denying it.
The Tenth District’s rejection of the ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim was no
less thorough. 	That court too applied Strickland in a seven-page decision. 	As to the deficient
performance prong of Strickland, it concluded
However, Canas has not produced any evidence that independently
establishes that attorney Benis did not inform him of deportation
risks. This is not the situation where trial counsel admitted in court
that they failed to properly advise. State v. Yapp, 2015-Ohio-1654,
32 N.E.3d 996 (8th Dist.). See State v. Cardenas, 2016-Ohio-5537,
61 N.E.3d 20 (2d Dist.) (in a hearing to withdraw guilty plea because
of ineffective assistance, trial attorney submitted an affidavit stating
he did not discuss deportation with defendant). There is no support
above and beyond the information provided in the petition.
State v. Canas, supra, at ¶ 18.
Regarding the prejudice prong of Strickland, the Tenth District held:
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 9 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

10
{¶ 22} Canas stated in his petition that a deciding factor in taking
the plea deal was receiving probation and obtaining custody of A.R.
However, the plea deal did not contain a joint recommendation for
probation, but rather that the plaintiff-appellee, State of Ohio, would
make no recommendation as to sentencing. Canas does not indicate
the portion of the record where attorney Benis promised him
probation or even implied as much. State v. Cardona, 2001 WL
931655, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3626 (8th Dist. Aug. 7, 2001).
Canas wanted probation, but it may have been any reliance on
receiving probation was a “case of hope over reality.” (Internal
quotations marks deleted.) Bozso at ¶ 13. The trial court had the
discretion to sentence Canas to probation but chose not to. This
factor weighs against a finding of prejudice.
{¶ 23} Regarding the importance placed on deportation, Canas
focused on his quest to obtain custody of A.R. However, deportation
or incarceration would impact custody. It is unclear if Canas faced
certain deportation, and the record does not reflect that deportation
proceedings 	had 	commenced. 	Attorney 	Benis 	advocated 	for
probation at sentencing, but the trial court imposed prison time.
{¶ 24} A defendant's concern indicated by multiple questions of his
counsel regarding deportation and his confusion during the plea
colloquy were evidence of the paramount importance the defendant
placed on avoiding deportation. Lee, 582 U.S. 357, 137 S.Ct. 1958,
198 L.Ed.2d 476. The only evidence regarding Canas’ motives for
entering his guilty plea were his own self-serving statements. Such
conclusionary statements have little impact without supporting
testimony or evidence, and we must “conclude that [Canas] has not
met his burden of demonstrating that but for his counsel's erroneous
advice ... he would not have pleaded guilty.” Bozso at ¶ 35. In sum,
there is no contemporaneous evidence that indicates avoiding
deportation was the determinative factor in pleading guilty. Lee.
{¶ 25} R.C. 2943.031 requires a trial court to advise a noncitizen
defendant of the possibilities of deportation. State v. Sow, 2018-
Ohio-4186 (10th Dist.). The trial court read Canas the proper
advisement in open court, and he indicated that he understood it and
had no questions. Said advisement will not act to cure a counsel's
failure to give an advisement, but it will weigh against a finding of
prejudice from counsel's failure to advise. State v. Galdamez, 2015-
Ohio-3681, 41 N.E.3d 467 (10th Dist.). See also State v. Ikharo,
2011-Ohio-2746, ¶ 19 (10th Dist.) (defendant who received trial
court's R.C. 2943.031(A) advisement “cannot satisfy the prejudice
portion of the Strickland test”).
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 10 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

11
{¶ 26} If we assume that attorney Benis did not provide any
deportation advice, under these circumstances, the trial court's
advisement weighs against a finding of prejudice. State v. Yazici,
2011-Ohio-583 (5th Dist.).
{¶ 27} Regarding Canas’ connections to the United States, his
young son, A.R., who is in the custody of his ex-wife, N.R., is
specifically referenced by Canas. He does mention other relatives
that live in the United States, but never explained why deportation
was a particularly severe consequence for him. Canas has been in
the United States for over 20 years and works as a painter. There is
no evidence regarding connections to his native El Salvador. A
defendant with significant family ties may risk going to trial instead
of pleading guilty to a charge and facing certain deportation.
Romero, 2019-Ohio-1839, 156 Ohio St.3d 468, 129 N.E.3d 404.
While Canas may be able to demonstrate that his connections to the
United States support this factor, it is outweighed by several other
factors.
{¶ 28} Other contemporaneous evidence refutes Canas’ assertion
that he would not have pleaded guilty had he been aware of the
deportation risks. Canas acknowledged on the record that he
discussed his case, including possible defenses, with counsel, and
was satisfied with counsel's representation. He confirmed that he
understood he would have to register as a sex offender and could be
deported. 	He 	identified 	his 	signature 	on 	the 	plea 	form 	and
acknowledged 	reviewing 	the 	form 	with 	counsel 	and 	that 	he
understood it. Such contemporaneous evidence weighs against a
finding of prejudice. State v. Muscroft, 2021-Ohio-3342 (10th
Dist.).
{¶ 29} Canas submitted affidavits with his petition. “[I]n reviewing
a petition for postconviction relief filed pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, a
trial court should give due deference to affidavits sworn to under
oath and filed in support of the petition, but may, in the sound
exercise of discretion, judge their credibility in determining whether
to accept the affidavits as true statements of fact.” State v. Calhoun,
86 Ohio St.3d 279, 284, 714 N.E.2d 905 (1999).
{¶ 30} A trial court should consider all relevant factors in assessing
the credibility of affidavit testimony, including: “(1) whether the
judge reviewing the postconviction relief petition also presided at
the trial, (2) whether multiple affidavits contain nearly identical
language, or otherwise appear to have been drafted by the same
person, (3) whether the affidavits contain or rely on hearsay, (4)
whether the affiants are relatives of the petitioner, or otherwise
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 11 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

12
interested in the success of the petitioner's efforts, and (5) whether
the affidavits contradict evidence proffered by the defense at trial.”
Id. at 285, 714 N.E.2d 905. A trial court has the discretion to apply
any of these or other factors to conclude that the information
contained in the affidavits lacks credibility and an evidentiary
hearing is not required. State v. Little, 2022-Ohio-1295, 188 N.E.3d
1116 (10th Dist.).
State v. Canas, supra.
The Magistrate Judge concludes the Tenth District’s decision of Petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim is an objectively reasonable application of Strickland entitled to
deference by this Court. Petitioner’s First Ground for Relief should be dismissed on the merits.
Ground Two: Violation of Due Process Rights by Not Allowing Withdrawal of Guilty Plea
In his Second Ground for Relief, Rodriquez-Canas asserts he was deprived of due process
of law when he was not allowed to withdraw his guilty plea. Respondent concedes this claim was
fairly presented to the Ohio courts, but asserts it does not state a claim under the Constitution
(Return, ECF No. 13, PageID 439). Petitioner replies
Respondent relies on Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986),
and Cress v. Palmer, 484 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 2007), for the general
proposition that constitutional deficiencies arising in state post-
conviction proceedings are not cognizable in federal habeas. While
this proposition is true, it does not apply here.
Reply, ECF No. 18, PageID 459. As the Magistrate Judge reads Petitioner’s argument, it is not
that somehow Ohio’s post-conviction process is unconstitutional, but that the result – denial of
Petitioner’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea – is unconstitutional. The Magistrate Judge agrees
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 12 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

13
that this states a claim cognizable under the federal Constitution in that Petitioner claims he is in
custody pursuant to a guilty plea he should have been permitted to withdraw.
When Rodriquez-Canas filed his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, his sole constitutional
premise for voiding the conviction and withdrawing the guilty plea was that he had received
ineffective assistance of trial counsel (See Petition, State Court Record, ECF No. 12, Ex. 5,
particularly PageID 87 and Conclusion and Prayer for Relief at PageID 89). Neither Judge Phipps
nor the Tenth District understood him to be raising any due process claim separate from his Sixth
Amendment claim.
Because the undersigned concludes that the Tenth District’s decision is entitled to
deference, that result leaves Ground Two without support and it should also be denied on the
merits.
Ground Three: 	Due Process Violation by Denying Post-Conviction Petition Without an
Evidentiary Hearing
In his Third Ground for Relief Petitioner asserts he was denied due process when his Post-
Conviction Petition was denied without an evidentiary hearing.
The Magistrate Judge concludes Ground Three fails to state a claim on which federal
habeas corpus relief is available. Petitioner has not cited and the Court is unaware of any holding
of the United States Supreme Court that would require an evidentiary hearing in a state post-
conviction proceeding as a matter of due process.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the
Amended Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 	Because reasonable jurists would not disagree
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 13 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>

14
with this conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability
and that the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and
should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
October 15, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond
to another party’s objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure
to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. 
Case: 2:25-cv-01246-MHW-MRM Doc #: 22 Filed: 10/15/26 Page: 14 of 14 PAGEID #: <pageID>