Ratliff v. Warden, Belmont Correctional Institution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
TEVIN RATLIFF,
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-1170
- vs - 	District Judge Douglas R. Cole
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
SHELBIE SMITH, Warden,
Belmont Correctional Institution,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This is an action brought pro se by Petitioner Tevin Ratliff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254
for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain release from confinement imposed as part of the judgment of
the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas upon his conviction for murder with a firearm
specification. The case is ripe for decision on the Petition (ECF No. 1), the State Court Record
(ECF No. 4) and the Warden’s Return of Writ (ECF No. 5). Although reminded by the Court of
his opportunity to file a reply to the Return by December 29, 2025 (ECF No. 6), Petitioner has not
done so.
Litigation History
Ratliff was indicted by a Cuyahoga County grand jury on one count of aggravated murder
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in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2903.01(A) with one-year and three-year firearm
specifications. One count of felony murder, one count of murder in violation of Ohio Revised Code
§ 2903.02(B) with parallel specifications, and one count of felonious assault in violation of Ohio
Revised Code § 2903.11(A)(1), again with parallel firearm specifications (Indictment, State Court
Record, ECF No. 4, Ex. 1). 	He pleaded not guilty and the case was tried to a jury which found
him not guilty of aggravated murder but guilty of the other two counts and of the specifications,
despite his own testimony at trial. After relevant mergers under Ohio Revised Code § 2941.25, he
was sentenced to eighteen years to life imprisonment.
Ratliff appealed to the Ohio Eighth District Court of Appeals asserting the trial court erred
when it refused to instruct on self-defense and involuntary manslaughter (Appellant’s Brief, State
Court Record, ECF No. 4, Ex. 15). 	The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. at Ex. 17. 	The Ohio
Supreme Court allowed a delayed appeal but declines to exercise jurisdiction. Id. at Ex. 27.
Petitioner then filed his Petition in this Court, pleading the following grounds for relief:
Ground One: Petitioner was denied due process of law and a fair
trial where the trial court usurp[ed] the province of the jury as finder
of fact.
Supporting Facts: The trial court weighed evidence instead of
performing a sufficiency analysis when making a decision on self-
defense instruction. At the presentation of evidence, the defense
asked for a self-defense instruction. Despite the forensic evidence
and petitioner’s testimony, the trial court declined, stating that “it is
not enough that the evidence in favor generate only a mere
stipulation 	of 	possible 	doubt. 	On 	appeal, 	counsel 	presented
Petitioner’s version 	of 	events 	and 	the 	forensic 	evidence 	that
supported his claim of self-defense. Rather than consider this
evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, or analyze the
trial court’s failure to do the same, the Court of Appeals held that
the defendant has the initial burden of production and engaged in its
own weighing of the evidence to find that no juror could have
reasonably concluded he acted in self-defense. Like in Palmer, the
trial court and the Eighth District assumed the role of the factfinder,
found that the defendant did not act in self-defense, and refused to
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endorse the appropriate action. The trial court weighed the state's
evidence and the petitioner's evidence and determined that the
defense had not proven their case beyond a reasonable doubt and
declined to give the instruction.
Ground Two: Petitioner Asserts That The State Law Violation
Relating to the Self-defense instruction and sufficiency/weight of
evidence claim, Amounts To A Fundamental Miscarriage Of Justice
And A Violation Of The Right To Due Process In Violation Of The
United States Constitution. Floyd V. Alexander, 148 F.3d 615, 619,
(6th Cir.), Cert. Denied, 525 U.S. 1025, 119 S. Ct. 557, 142 L. Ed.
2d 464 (1998).
1. 	Denial of Equal Application of State Law.
Supporting Facts: The Petitioner presented the exact same issue to
the court of appeals and Ohio Supreme Court as presented in State
v. Palmer, and his case should have been decided according to
Palmer, 	however, 	both 	court 	went 	against 	its 	own 	clearly
established law.
Ground Three: Where there is conflicting evidence on a self-
defense claim factor, the jury should decide that factor. Where the
trial court declines to instruct the jury on self-defense based on their
own weighing of evidence’s credibility, they usurp the province of
the jury as finder of fact, in derogation of a defendant’s right to a
trial by jury in violation of due process and right to a trial.
Supporting Facts: The trial court and court of appeal looked at the
persuasiveness of evidence rather than the adequacy of the evidence,
as was done in State v. Palmer. The tow [sic] court’s acted as if they
needed to be definitively shown that Petitioner acted in self-defense
before a self-defense instruction was warranted. This goes beyond
mere error correction as a result, much like Palmer, two court
fundamentally misunderstood the law surrounding self-defense
instruction.
(Petition, ECF No. 1).
The Warden concedes that the Petition was timely filed (Return, ECF No. 5, PageID 1626).
However, the Warden asserts that Ratliff’s claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus.
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Analysis
Federal habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 	28
U.S.C. § 2254(a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780
(1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). 	"[I]t is
not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law
questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,
67-68 (1991); see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825)(Marshall C. J.);
Bickham v. Winn, 888 F.3d 248 (6 th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018)(Thapar, J. concurring).
Taken together, Ratliff’s three grounds for relief argue that he was entitled to a self-defense
jury instruction as a matter of due process of law and therefore failure to give that instruction
violated his right to due process and a fair trial under the United States Constitution. However, a
habeas petitioner is entitled to relief only if he can show the State court’s decision violated clearly
established federal law by being contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of holdings
of the United States Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
To show that jury instructions are contrary to federal law is “not easy because ‘instructional
errors of state law generally may not form the basis for federal habeas relief.’” Keahey v. Marquis,
978 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2020), citing Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 344 (1993). To prevail, a
habeas petitioner “must show that such a botched interpretation violated clearly established United
States Supreme Court decisions. And even then, he still must show that the mistake violated
concrete Supreme Court holdings,” Id. citing Marshall v. Rodgers, 569 U.S. 58, 61 (2013), not
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generalized principles, citing Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312, 318 (2015).
The Ohio General Assembly has recently made several significant changes to the defense
of self-defense in Ohio. Self-defense remains an affirmative defense. Previously it was required
to be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Now Ohio law provides that if the defendant
produces sufficient evidence “tending to prove self-defense,” the burden shifts to the State to
disprove at least one element of self-defense by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. But the recent
statutory changes do not change the role of the trial judge in deciding whether sufficient evidence
has been produced to justify giving a self-defense instruction.
Furthermore, and more importantly, changes in state court process, even if mandatory, do
not become part of the “due process” commanded by the Fourteenth Amendment. “A state cannot
be said to have a federal due process obligation to follow all of its procedures; such a system would
result in the constitutionalizing of every state rule, and would not be administrable.” 	Levine v.
Torvik, 986 F.2d 1506, 1515 (6th Cir. 1993).
Accordingly, 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	agrees 	with 	Respondent 	that 	Petitioner’s 	jury
instruction claims do not state a claim cognizable in habeas corpus.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends that the
Petition be dismissed with prejudice. 	Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this
conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that
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the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not
be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
January 13, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.
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