Grim v. Warden Belmont Correctional Institution

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
ETHAN GRIM,
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cv-00258
- vs - 	District Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz
WARDEN, Belmont Correctional
Institution,
:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION
This habeas corpus case, brought pro se by Petitioner Ethan Grim, is before the Court on
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 35) which seeks reconsideration of the Court’s
Decision and Order of January 6, 2026 (ECF No. 33) which overruled Petitioner’s Objections
(ECF No. 31) to the Magistrate Judge’s Decision and Order of December 1, 2025 (ECF No. 27)
which in turn had denied several pre-trial Motions of the Petitioner.
Despite having prepared and filed this seven-page Motion for Reconsideration, Petitioner
has not yet filed a reply to the Return of Writ; the reply was due to be filed not later than January
5, 2026 (See ECF No. 34).
Petitioner purports to bring his Motion for Reconsideration under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). That
rule governs post-judgment motions for reconsideration and no judgment has been filed in this
case as yet. Nevertheless, a federal district court has plenary authority to reconsider interlocutory
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orders until judgment is entered. Moore’s Federal Practice at ¶0.404. However, courts disfavor
motions for reconsideration because they consume a court’s scarce time for attention to a matter
that has already been decided. They are subject to limitations based on that disfavor.
As a general principle, motions for reconsideration are looked upon
with disfavor unless the moving party demonstrates: (1) a manifest
error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence which was not available
previously to the parties; or (3) intervening authority. Harsco Corp.
v. Zlotnicki, 779 F.2d 906, 909 (3 rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1171 (1986).
Meekison v. Ohio Dep't of Rehabilitation & Correction, 181 F.R.D. 571, 572 (S.D. Ohio
1998)(Marbley, J.). 	Indeed, another judge of this Court has held the law of the case doctrine
precludes reconsideration of an issue already decided in a previous stage of litigation, either
explicitly or by necessary inference from the disposition. Miller v. City of Cincinnati, 870 F. Supp.
2d 534, 539 (S.D. Ohio 2012)(Barrett, J.)(citing United States v. Moored, 38 F.3d 1419, 1421-22
(6th Cir. 1994)).
In seeking reconsideration, Petitioner does not claim any intervening authority or newly
discovered evidence. That would be improbable since the decision in question was only entered
ten days ago.
Instead to obtain a change in the prior Decision, Petitioner must show a “manifest error of
law.” Petitioner cites the standard for a District Judge’s review of a Magistrate Judge’s decision,
but that review has already happened here: the Decision sought to be changed was already made
on review of the Magistrate Judge’s decision denying a number of Petitioner’s Motions.
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Petitioner Was Not a Juvenile Throughout the State Court Process
Petitioner claimed that that he was a juvenile throughout the state court process. The Court
disagreed, finding that the murder in suit happened November 27, 2019, and Petitioner turned
eighteen on December 15, 2019. Those dates are undisputed. On that basis the Magistrate Judge
and the Court found he was not a juvenile throughout the state court process.
Grim begins his argument on this point by reminding us that this Court must follow Ohio
law on this question. However, he cites no decision of one of the Ohio courts adjudicating this
case to the effect that he remained a juvenile throughout the state court process. Instead he cites
Ohio Revised Code § 2152.02(C)(1), but that statute provides that “child” means a person who is
“under eighteen years of age except as provided in divisions (C)(2) to (8) of this section.” He cites
Ohio Revised Code § 2952.021, but makes no argument as to how that statute applies to him. He
cites State v. Hanning, 89 Ohio St.3d 86 (2000), but that case interprets the mandatory juvenile
bindover statute, which was not relied on by the State here.
Petitioner also cites Ohio Revised Code § 2923.111 which he says requires a “qualifying
adult” eligible to carry a firearm without a permit under Ohio’s carry concealed law must be
twenty-one years of age. The fact that the General Assembly set a higher age for this particular
privilege is not shown to apply to this case in any way. Finally the provision that the juvenile court
will continue to exercise jurisdiction over a person adjudicated a delinquent child until that person
is twenty-one has not application in this case where Petitioner was not adjudicated a delinquent,
but was bound over to adult court.
Petitioner has not shown any manifest error of law in this Court’s finding that he did not
remain a juvenile throughout the state court process.
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Petitioner’s Claim of Actual Innocence is Unpersuasive
Petitioner asserts the Court failed to consider his actual innocence claim as it applies to
asserted procedural defaults and failure to file the Petition within the one-year statute of
limitations. To the contrary, the Court did consider that claim and found it to be unpersuasive.
Petitioner asserts his competency evaluation shows he was incompetent to stand trial, but
so far as the undersigned can find, no competency evaluation was conducted after the bindover1 .
Petitioner also asserts he was not guilty by reason of insanity, but that claim was also not raised in
the state courts. Assuming that evidence that Petitioner was insane at the time of the crime would
satisfy the actual innocence standard of Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), Petitioner has
presented no such evidence, but merely speculates it is in his juvenile records, which are not
available to him.
Conclusion
Having reconsidered the prior decision on Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that no change be made in the prior Decision.
January 20, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
1 At one point Petitioner’s counsel sought a second forensic evaluation which was denied.
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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is received. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal.
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