Williams v. A Corporation et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL
WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
A CORPORATION D/B/A
WRITEAPRISONER.COM, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 2:25-cv-00154
District Judge James L. Graham
Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s third attempt to obtain direction
about how the prison cashier’s office should have collected, or should collect, the fees
he owes for filing this lawsuit. Plaintiff initially filed a “Motion to [Request] an Order
Specifying Requirements of 28 U.S.C. §1915(B)(2) to Cashiers Office Collecting
Funds” on February 4, 2026. (Doc. No. 26.) The Court substantively considered and
denied the motion. (Doc. No. 7.) Plaintiff revised and re-filed the motion, now titled
“Motion for an Order Clarifying Debt Collection Under 28 U.S.C. §1915(B)(2) to
Cashiers Office Collecting Funds.” (Doc. No. 28.) The Court struck the motion because
Plaintiff did not properly serve it. (Doc. No. 33.)
Now, on March 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed a “Notice of Erratum,” to which he
attaches a new revised “Motion for an Order Clarifying Debt Collection under 28
U.S.C. §1915(B)(2) to Cashiers Office Collecting Funds.” (Doc. No. 36.) The
Case: 2:25-cv-00154-JLG-CHG Doc #: 42 Filed: 04/03/26 Page: 1 of 5 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
undersigned is also aware that Plaintiff has filed the same or a very similar motion in at
least two of his other pending cases. See Williams v. Chambers-Smith, Case No. 2:26-
cv-259-MHW-CHG (Doc. No. 6, denied in Doc. No. 7); Williams v. Galloway, Case
No. 2:25-cv-1410-JLG-KAJ (Doc. No. 7, denied in Doc. No. 9).
The new Motion, like the previous motions, asserts that Plaintiff’s institution
incorrectly collected the filing fee for this case under the in forma pauperis (or IFP)
statute, 28 U.S.C. 1915. (Doc. No. 36.) The undersigned previously discussed the issue:
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Williams’ “Motion to
[Request] an Order Specifying Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(B)(2) to
Cashiers Office Collecting Funds.” (Doc. No. 26.) Plaintiff alleges that the
Cashier’s Office at Chillicothe Correctional Institution overcharged or
“double charged” him for his November 2025 payment and portion of this
Court’s filing fee. (Id.; see also Doc. No. 4 [granting Plaintiff in forma
pauperis status on October 2, 2025 and describing how the filing fee should
be collected under 28 U.S.C. § 1915].) In essence, Plaintiff argues that the
required initial partial filing fee (under § 1915(b)(1)) and the subsequent
monthly payment (under § 1915(b)(2)) should not have been collected from
him in the same month. (Doc. No. 26.)
Plaintiff does not ask the Court to correct this alleged error directly. (Doc.
No. 26 at PageID 281 [stating “it’s too late to fix now”].) Instead, Plaintiff
appears to seek a detailed advisory opinion about the procedures governing
federal filing fee collection under Section 1915. Speaking for himself and
others, he asserts that “we all are in need of a more precise direction from
this court so we may remove any undue constitutional hurdle upon an
already vulnerable population of individuals.” (Id.)
The Motion is DENIED. The Court will not opine on an issue that
apparently does not present a live controversy or cannot be remedied at this
time. See generally Safety Specialty Ins. Co. v. Genesee Cnty. Bd. of
Commissioners, 53 F.4th 1014, 1020 (6th Cir. 2022) (“Federal courts
cannot issue advisory opinions.”). Incarcerated persons are not wholly
without guidance, however. Section 1915 itself details the appropriate
procedure, and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has provided
certain guidance. See, e.g., McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 607
Case: 2:25-cv-00154-JLG-CHG Doc #: 42 Filed: 04/03/26 Page: 2 of 5 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
(6th Cir. June 11, 1997), overruled in part by Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199
(2007).
With respect to the particular calculation and collection in Plaintiff’s case,
the Sixth Circuit has noted that this task generally falls to the institutional
cashier:
Allowing the custodian of the account to make the
computation of the initial partial filing fee under § 1915(b)(1)
is in compliance with the statute and is certainly necessary in
determining the partial payments required by § 1915(b)(2).
The statute only requires the court to make the assessment. It
does not require the court to make the actual mathematical
computation.
McGore, 114 F.3d at 607. Cf. Shine-Johnson v. Chambers-Smith, No. 2:22-
cv-3236, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 180761, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2023)
(calling this “a ministerial and routine accounting task” but requiring the
institution to provide its calculation). Here, it appears that the institution
has made this calculation. Documentation submitted with the instant motion
includes a “Staff Response” to Plaintiff’s inquiry explaining that: “The
$46.83 was your initial partial filing fee. The $75 was payment towards
your remaining balance.” (Doc. No. 26 at PageID 288.) Other
documentation suggests that the initial partial filing fee was collected from
Plaintiff’s account in October 2025, while the monthly payment was
collected in November 2025,1 which would address the concern underlying
Plaintiff’s motion.
1 A footnote in this Order said:
Plaintiff filed his inmate trust account statement for this time period in a separate case:
Christopher-Michael Williams v. ODRC Director Annette Chambers-Smith, et al., Case
No. 2:25-cv-01508-ALM-CHG (S.D. Ohio.) While not entirely clear, it appears from the
transaction history that the initial partial filing fee of $46.83 was collected from
Plaintiff’s account on October 29, 2025. (See Doc. No. 1 at PageID 21 in Case No. 2:25-
cv-01508.) It appears that the monthly payment of $75.00 was collected on November 21,
2025, and that both payments were sent to this Court on that date. (See Doc. No. 1 at
PageID 22 in Case No. 2:25-cv-01508.)
(Doc. No. 36 at PageID 295, n.1.) The undersigned notes that since the date of Plaintiff’s initial motion in
this case, he filed another inmate trust account statement in a different case confirming that the initial
partial filing fee was collected in October 2025, rather than in November as Plaintiff alleges. That
Case: 2:25-cv-00154-JLG-CHG Doc #: 42 Filed: 04/03/26 Page: 3 of 5 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
(Doc. No. 36 at PageID 293-295.)
In the instant motion, Plaintiff asks the Court “to determine what the words
‘after payment’ [in the IFP statute2] means for the ODRC” so that the ODRC does not
“overly charge the poor for bringing actions in the federal court.” (Id. at PageID 402.)
“If this debt collection practice . . . is not supported by the federal statute,” Plaintiff
suggests, “then an undue chill is being placed upon all pro se inmate litigants.” (Id. at
PageID 400-401.) Plaintiff states that a determination by this Court “will serve as a
correction for future litigation and actions that [he] must file to remove undue violations
to his constitutional right.” (Id. at PageID 402.)
Plaintiff’s new Motion is DENIED. (Doc. No. 36.) Again, to the extent that
Plaintiff seeks an advisory opinion for future cases, his request is not well-taken. See
Gilstrap v. Sushinati LLC, 734 F. Supp. 3d 710, 722 (S.D. Ohio 2024) (noting that an
advisory opinion “flies in the face of Article III and the separation of powers it
transaction is documented in the “Outstanding Debts” section of his account statement:
(Doc. No. 8-1 at PageID 163 in Case No. 2:26-cv-259.)
2 For context, the relevant part of the IFP statute provides:
After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner shall be required to make
monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to the
prisoner’s account. The agency having custody of the prisoner shall forward payments
from the prisoner’s account to the clerk of the court each time the amount in the account
exceeds $10 until the filing fees are paid.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2) (emphasis added). It appears that Plaintiff would like the Court to construe the
phrase “[a]fter payment” to mean “the next month after payment.” (See id. at PageID 401.)
Case: 2:25-cv-00154-JLG-CHG Doc #: 42 Filed: 04/03/26 Page: 4 of 5 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
preserves”). To the extent Plaintiff seeks to protect the rights of “all pro se inmate
litigants,” he lacks standing to do so. See Jones-Bey v. Caruso, No. 1:07-cv-392, 2009
WL 3644801, at *6 (W.D. Mich. Oct. 30, 2009) (“Plaintiff lacks standing to assert the
claim that another individual has suffered a violation of his right to access the courts”).
In addition, the factual premise on which Plaintiff’s argument rests—that the
prison cashier improperly took two payments from his account in November 2025—is
belied by Plaintiff’s inmate statement as discussed above. The Court need not reach the
statutory construction issue because it is not currently before the Court.
For all these reasons, the Third Motion for Clarification, attached to Plaintiff’s
Notice of Erratum, is DENIED. (Doc. No. 36.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Caroline H. Gentry
Caroline H. Gentry
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Notice Regarding Objections
If any party objects to this Order, the party may serve and file objections to it
within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a). The
Court may extend the fourteen-day objections period if a motion for an extension of time
is filed before the period expires. Failure to object may operate as a waiver of the issues
on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d
947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Case: 2:25-cv-00154-JLG-CHG Doc #: 42 Filed: 04/03/26 Page: 5 of 5 PAGEID #: <pageID>