Sivi v. Franklin County Guardianship Service Board et al

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Meredith Sivi, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-4191
Plaintiff, 	Judge Graham
v. 	Magistrate Judge Jolson
Franklin County Guardianship Service
Board, et al.,
Defendants.
Opinion and Order
Plaintiff Meredith Sivi brings this action over issues which relate in one way or another to the
guardianship of her adult daughter, A.K, who has been found in state court to require guardianship
due to a mental impairment and developmental disabilities. 	Named as defendants are the Franklin
County Guardianship Service Board, the Franklin County Board of Developmental Disabilities, and
Upreach, LLC. The Complaint asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of Sivi’s
constitutional rights and asserts various claims under state law.
This matter is before the Court on motions filed by each of the defendants for judgment on
the pleadings. For the reasons stated below, the motions are granted.
I. 	Background
A. 	Factual Allegations
Sivi was represented by legal counsel when this suit was filed. The Complaint alleges that, at
the request of Sivi and A.K.’s father, A.K. was declared to be incompetent in March 2019 by the
Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division. Sivi and the father initially served as co-
guardians of A.K., but the probate court appointed defendant Franklin County Guardianship Service
Board (GSB) as sole guardian in December 2019. 	See O.R.C. § 2111.02(A) (empowering probate
courts to appoint guardians of a minor or incompetent). The GSB is a creation of state law and is a
political subdivision of the State. See O.R.C. § 2101.026.
A.K. lived with Sivi, who was her Independent Service Provider until April 30, 2021. 	See
O.A.C. 5123-2-09 (authorizing the Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities to certify
individuals to provide care for developmentally disabled persons). 	In May 2021, GSB engaged
defendant Upreach to be A.K.’s service provider. 	Upreach is a for-profit limited liability company
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doing business in Ohio. In May 2021, A.K. began living with her father for three days a week, with
Upreach providing care services. 	Sivi remained as A.K.’s representative Social Security payee until
December 2021. 	In January 2022, the Social Security Administration approved Upreach as A.K.’s
payee.
Upreach caused A.K. to switch cell phone providers, which resulted in a breach of contract
with the prior provider. When the prior provider sought to collect an amount still owing, Upreach
required Sivi to pay it.
Sivi alleges that she has spent thousands of dollars paying various expenses and bills for A.K..
The costs she has incurred include the cell phone bill, rent, food, clothing, and medical expenses.
Upreach allegedly promised to reimburse Sivi for all of the expenses over a two-year period but later
refused to reimburse her even after she submitted receipts.
In October 2023, “Defendant GSB and/or Defendant Upreach” filed an incident report,
called a “Major Unusual Incident” (MUI), with defendant Franklin County Board of Developmental
Disabilities (FCBDD). 	Compl., ¶ 54. 	The MUI allegedly made false accusations of Sivi having
financially exploited A.K. by including her (an incompetent person) as a contracting party on Sivi’s
lease and cell phone contact. According to the Complaint, the MUI was filed in retaliation against
Sivi because she had complained to Upreach about deficiencies in A.K.’s diet and living conditions
and about Upreach’s failure to reimburse Sivi for her out-of-pocket expenses.
FCBDD investigated the MUI and made a determination that the allegations of financial
exploitation by Sivi were substantiated. Sivi alleges that she did not receive notice of the MUI and did
not have an opportunity to defend herself against the accusations. 	As an alleged result of the
FCBDD’s determination, Sivi’s name was placed on a published “abuser” registry and her application
to renew her certification to be an Independent Service Provider was later denied by the Ohio
Department of Developmental Disabilities.
In December 2023, A.K. was moved into an apartment by GSB, with the coordination of
Upreach and FCBDD. Upreach became A.K.’s full-time caregiver.
Sivi alleges that she was not consulted prior to A.K.’s move into an apartment, and that she
was excluded from the transition process as A.K. began to live with new roommates. Sivi was not
allowed to enter A.K.’s apartment, but had to pick her up in the parking lot.
In 2024, Sivi reported her concerns about Upreach’s failure to properly care for A.K.’s health
and wellbeing to GSB. GSB allegedly retaliated against Sivi by purporting to investigate mistreatment
by Sivi and by restricting her ability to visit A.K. The restrictions included requiring that Sivi’s visits
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be supervised by Upreach staff and occur in a public space. GSB also reduced the number of hours
she could spend with A.K.
Sivi maintains that beginning in 2024 she has suffered from emotional stress and anxiety which
causes her to be unable to drive a motor vehicle, thus limiting her ability to travel to visit A.K. GSB
has allegedly denied Sivi’s requests to have visits with A.K. take place at Sivi’s home.
B. 	Causes of Action
The Complaint asserts eleven causes of action. There are five federal claims: Counts Three,
Six, Seven, Eight, and Nine. There are six state law claims: Counts One, Two, Four, Five, Ten, and
Eleven.
1. 	Federal Claims
Count Three is for violations of Sivi’s right to procedural due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution. FCBDD and GSB allegedly violated her due process
rights by investigating the MUI and reaching a determination adverse to Sivi without providing her
with her notice and an opportunity to be heard on the charge of financial exploitation.
Count Six alleges a violation of Sivi’s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment. Asserting a “class of one” theory, the Complaint alleges that defendants have treated
Sivi differently from others who are similarly situated to her because she advocated on behalf of A.K.
The discriminatory treatment consisted of GSB restricting Sivi’s access to A.K. and FCBDD
conducting an investigation against her based on the allegedly false MUI.
Count Seven asserts a conspiracy claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985. The Complaint alleges that
the defendants acted together with malicious intent, and out of retaliation against Sivi’s advocacy for
A.K., to deprive Sivi of her civil rights to due process, equal protection, and free speech.
Counts Eight and Nine are for violations of the First Amendment. 	Count Eight is labeled
“discrimination” and Count Nine is labeled “retaliation.” Both counts rest on the same allegation that
defendants retaliated against Sivi for exercising her rights to complain about the treatment A.K. was
receiving and to oppose defendants’ unlawful conduct. The retaliation included the filing of the MUI,
GSB’s restrictions on Sivi’s access to A.K., and GSB’s refusal to accommodate Sivi’s limitations in
traveling for visits with A.K.
2. 	State Law Claims
Count One asserts a claim of promissory estoppel against GSB and Upreach. It alleges that
defendants promised to reimburse Sivi for the expenses (phone, rent, food, clothing, and medical
expenses) she incurred on A.K.’s behalf, but they failed to do so.
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Count Two is for defamation. Sivi alleges that GSB and Upreach made false claims to FCBDD
that she had exploited A.K. and they later falsely accused her of taking A.K. off premises during a
supervised visit.
Count Four is for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 	Sivi claims that GSB’s and
Upreach’s false accusations of her exploitation and mistreatment of A.K. caused Sivi to experience
emotional distress with a manifestation of physical conditions, including post-traumatic stress
disorder, muscle spasms, and obsessive-compulsive personality disorder.
Count Five asserts a civil conspiracy claim, alleging that defendants conspired to deprive Sivi
of her civil rights in retaliation against her advocacy for A.K.
Counts Ten and Eleven both concern the expenses Sivi incurred to care for A.K. Count Ten
is for unjust enrichment and Count Eleven is for promissory fraud. Sivi again alleges that she paid
out-of-pocket for various costs, to the benefit of defendants, who failed to reimburse her despite
promising they would do so.
3. 	Demand for Relief
The Complaint seeks only monetary damages. It requests relief in the form of compensatory
damages, non-economic damages, punitive damages, and an award of attorney’s fees and costs.
C. 	Procedural Background
Sivi discharged her attorney soon after defendants filed their answers to the Complaint. Sivi
has since filed numerous pro se motions and miscellaneous documents. 	Her filings represent
something of a departure from the Complaint, in that she has sought to attack or undermine various
determinations made within the scope of the guardianship proceeding that is under the supervision of
the probate court.
In her motion for a preliminary injunction, for instance, Sivi sought unrestricted visitation
rights with A.K. and other similar relief. 	The Court denied her motion upon finding that it ran
“squarely into the probate exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction.” Doc. 87 at PAGEID 998.
In the same ruling, the Court noted that plaintiff’s motion had made numerous unsupported factual
allegations which were outside of the Complaint and had purported to raise legal claims which were
not asserted in the Complaint. The Court found that even considering the newly-raised matters, Sivi
had not demonstrated a likelihood of success which would justify preliminary injunctive relief.
Each of the three defendants have filed motions for judgment on the pleadings under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Sivi responded with briefs in opposition to the motions filed by GSB
and FCBDD. She did not respond to the motion filed by Upreach.
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II. 	Standard of Review
“After the pleadings are closed – but early enough not to delay trial – a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). The standard applied to motions for judgment on
the pleadings is the same standard applicable to motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Hindel v.
Husted, 875 F.3d 344, 346 (6th Cir. 2017). “For purposes of a motion for judgment on the pleadings,
all well-pleaded material allegations of the pleadings of the opposing party must be taken as true, and
the motion may be granted only if the moving party is nevertheless clearly entitled to judgment.”
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Winget, 510 F.3d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual
inferences. Id. (citing Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999)).
To withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain direct or
inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable legal theory.” Commercial
Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). “The factual allegations in
the complaint need to be sufficient to give notice to the defendant as to what claims are alleged, and
the plaintiff must plead ‘sufficient factual matter’ to render the legal claim plausible, i.e., more than
merely possible.” 	Fritz v. Charter Township of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
III. 	Discussion
A. 	The Probate Exception and the
Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Under the probate exception to federal subject matter jurisdiction, a federal court lacks
jurisdiction to interfere with probate proceedings or to assume control over the property or person in
custody of the state court. See Markham v. Allen, 326 U.S. 490, 494 (1946); Marshall v. Marshall, 547
U.S. 293, 311–12 (2006); Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, 803 F.3d 789, 801–802 (6th Cir. 2015). A federal
court cannot “elbow its way” into a dispute over “property or a person in the [probate] court’s
control.” Struck v. Cook Cnty Pub. Guardian, 508 F.3d 858, 860 (7th Cir. 2007); accord Chevalier, 803 F.3d
at 802.
Each of the motions for judgment on the pleadings argue that the probate exception prevents
the Court from hearing this case. The Court is inclined to agree with defendants. Plaintiff’s overall
litigation efforts, including her pro se filings, mirror her motion for a preliminary injunction in
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challenging various aspects of the administration of A.K.’s guardianship, such as A.K.’s diet and the
hours and locations for which Sivi can visit A.K. See Struck, 508 F.3d at 860 (“The res—the plaintiff’s
mother—is in the control of the guardian appointed by the state court, and decisions concerning the
plaintiff’s right of access to his mother and to her assets, her records, and her mail are at the heart of
the guardian’s responsibilities and are supervised by the court that appointed him. . . . [O]ur plaintiff
is seeking to remove into the federal court the res over which a state court is exercising control. That
is the sort of maneuver that the probate/domestic-relations exception is intended to prevent.”).
This case appears to be the kind of case the United States Supreme Court had in mind when
it affirmed the existence of a closely-related exception – the domestic-relations exception – to federal
jurisdiction in Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992). 	The Supreme Court explained that the
exception was rooted in the understanding that federal courts lack the authority and expertise to issue
decrees which would require the retention of jurisdiction and deployment of social workers to monitor
compliance with such matters as child custody. See Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703–704 (“[S]tate courts
are more eminently suited to work of this type than are federal courts, which lack the close association
with state and local government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts
over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees.”). 	That same concern is present here, with Sivi
seeking this Court’s intervention in the administration of A.K.’s guardianship. 	Granting relief and
monitoring compliance would necessarily entail oversight of the interactions Sivi has with A.K. and
with defendants’ staff members. It would also entail to some degree “judicial supervision of a volatile
family situation,” a task for which “federal courts are not well suited.” Lloyd v. Loeffler, 694 F.2d 489,
492 (7th Cir. 1982).
Despite these overall concerns, there is a way for this Court to take a more restrictive view of
the probate exception and of plaintiff’s claims so as to allow the exercise of federal jurisdiction. In
Chevalier v. Est. of Barnhart, the Sixth Circuit stated that the probate exception has “questionable
origins” and emphasized that it should be “narrowly limited to three circumstances”: (1) where the
plaintiff seeks to probate a will, (2) where plaintiff seeks to annul a will, and (3) where plaintiff seeks
to reach the res over which the state court has custody. 	803 F.3d at 800–01. 	The Sixth Circuit
instructed courts to examine whether the legal claims are in personam or in rem actions. Id. If a claim is
an in personam action – brought against a person for a violation of rights, rather than an in rem action
brought to determine rights to a person or property subject to a court’s control – then the claim does
not fall within the probate exception. See id. at 801–02.
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In examining whether plaintiff’s federal causes of action are in personam or in rem, the Court
will confine itself to the four corners of the Complaint. It asserts causes of action under § 1983 for
violations of Sivi’s rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and under the First
Amendment. The alleged wrongful conduct includes the issuance of the MUI decision without Sivi
receiving notice and acts of discrimination and retaliation taken against Sivi because she exercised her
First Amendment rights. 	Though the conduct may have occurred against the backdrop of the
administration of A.K.’s guardianship, the claims themselves are in personam. Should plaintiff prevail
on the merits of her claims, the Court could grant her the monetary relief demanded in the Complaint
without taking action which would interfere with or extend oversight into the administration of the
guardianship. Applying Chevalier, the Court thus finds that the probate exception does not prevent
the consideration of Sivi’s federal claims.
Defendants also argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the Court from considering
plaintiff’s claims because she is asking for review of decisions made by the probate court. The Rooker-
Feldman prevents a district court from entertaining a case brought by a state-court loser complaining
of injuries caused by a state-court judgment and seeking federal court review and rejection of the
judgment. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Rooker v. Fid. Tr.
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). Again, the Court will
confine its review to the Complaint itself, and the Court finds that the Complaint does not assert
claims or seek relief which would run afoul of Rooker-Feldman.
B. 	GSB’s and FCBDD’s Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings
1.	
Monell Liability
The Complaint brings suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for monetary damages against GSB and
FCBDD, which are municipal entities. See O.R.C. §§ 2101.026, 5126. When suing a municipal entity
for alleged constitutional violations, plaintiff must show that the municipal entity was “the moving
force behind the injury alleged.” Alman v. Reed, 703 F.3d 887, 903 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation
marks omitted). 	The municipality becomes the “moving force” when it ratifies unconstitutional
policies or has a custom of action, or inaction, which causes the constitutional violation. See Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
“A plaintiff can make a showing of an illegal policy or custom by demonstrating one of the
following: (1) the existence of an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2) that an official with
final decision making authority ratified illegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequate
training or supervision; or (4) the existence of a custom of tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights
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violations.” 	Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). 	A municipality “may not be sued
under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694.
2. 	Equal Protection and First Amendment Claims
The Complaint alleges that defendants discriminated against Sivi in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause by treating her differently because she advocated on behalf of A.K. GSB allegedly
discriminated against Sivi by restricting her access to A.K. 	FCBDD allegedly discriminated against
her by investigating the false accusations of the MUI.
Relatedly, the Complaint alleges that defendants discriminated and retaliated against Sivi in
violation of the First Amendment. 	In response to Sivi’s advocacy for A.K. and her opposition to
defendants’ treatment of A.K., GSB allegedly filed the false MUI against Sivi, imposed restrictions on
her access to A.K., and refused to accommodate Sivi’s limitations in being able to travel for visits with
A.K.
a. 	GSB
GSB argues that the Complaint fails to identify a municipal policy or custom which was the
moving force behind the alleged violations of Sivi’s rights. The Court agrees. The Complaint does
not allege that any policy or custom was at work in how Sivi was treated. Though no individuals are
named, it appears from the Complaint that the alleged wrongful actions were the result of
individualized, discretionary decisions and not of municipal policy or custom. 	For instance, the
Complaint alleges that in retaliation against complaints Sivi made about A.K.’s living conditions and
diet, an employee of GSB filed the MUI against her. See Compl., ¶¶ 54, 56, 58. Similarly, one or more
individuals at GSB decided to restrict Sivi’s ability to visit A.K. and reduce the number of hours she
could spend with A.K. 	See id., ¶¶ 68–70. 	And someone with GSB allegedly denied Sivi’s request
concerning where the visitations took place when Sivi was unable to drive. See id., ¶¶ 75–76.
The Complaint does not allege that GSB’s alleged conduct occurred pursuant to a policy or
custom. 	Nor does the Complaint support an inference that an official with final decision making
authority ratified the allegedly unlawful actions. Rather, the Complaint attempts to hold GSB liable
for the actions of its employees, which is not a permissible way of establishing municipal liability under
Monell.
In response to GSB’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, Sivi concedes that there was no
policy by which GSB was acting and confirms that she is complaining of “unreviewed ad hoc decision-
making.” See Doc. 78 at PAGEID 939. But seeking to salvage her Monell claim, Sivi contends that
GSB employees engaged in a pattern of “targeting” her and that GSB tolerated the violations of her
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rights. Id. Sivi faults GSB’s Director for failing to “establish constitutional protocols” which would
have prevented the violations of her rights. Id.
In order to prevail on a theory that a municipal entity had a custom of tolerance or
acquiescence to federal violations, plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a clear and persistent
pattern of violating federal rights . . .; (2) notice or constructive notice on the part of defendants; (3)
the defendants’ tacit approval of the unconstitutional conduct, such that their deliberate indifference
in failing to act can be said to amount to an official policy of inaction; and (4) that the defendants’
custom was the ‘moving force,’ or direct causal link for the constitutional deprivation.” 	Powers v.
Hamilton Cnty. Pub. Def. Comm’n, 501 F.3d 592, 607 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Doe v. Claiborne Cnty., 103
F.3d 495, 508 (6th Cir. 1996)).
The Complaint does not contain allegations which would support Sivi’s current theory of
tolerance or acquiescence. While the Complaint alleges that GSB employees took a handful of illegal
actions against Sivi, it does not allege the existence of the type of “widespread pattern” of violating
federal rights necessary to support an inaction claim under Monell. Doe, 103 F.3d at 513. For example,
there are no allegations of a prevalent practice among GSB employees of retaliating against parents
who advocated on behalf of their developmentally disabled children. Further, the Complaint contains
no allegations showing that GSB’s Director knew or should have known of the alleged violations of
Sivi’s rights and tacitly approved them.
Thus, the Court finds that GSB is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s Equal
Protection and First Amendment claims.
b. 	FCBDD
The only conduct which the Complaint alleges that FCBDD took in violation of plaintiff’s
Equal Protection and First Amendment rights is that of initiating an investigation of the MUI. The
Complaint alleges that FCBDD chose to investigate the MUI out of discriminatory and retaliatory
motives. See, e.g., ¶¶ 51, 151.
Here too the Complaint fails to allege a municipal policy or custom by which the constitutional
violations occurred. To be sure, there is a policy in play regarding the investigation of an MUI, but
the policy is external to FCBDD and that fact is fatal to plaintiff’s claims. Ohio law requires all county
boards of developmental disabilities to conduct investigations when a report of a major unusual
incident is made. 	See O.R.C. § 5126.313; O.A.C. § 5123-17-02(I). 	Because there was no policy or
custom belonging to FCBDD at work in its initiating an investigation, FCBDD could not have been
the moving force causing the alleged constitutional violation.
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The Court thus finds that FCBDD is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff’s Equal
Protection and First Amendment claims.
3. 	Due Process
The Complaint asserts a Due Process claim against GSB and FCBDD. It alleges that once
the MUI was filed, FCBDD investigated the claim of financial exploitation and sought GSB’s input
during the investigation. FCBDD made a finding that Sivi exploited A.K., but allegedly did so without
giving Sivi notice and opportunity to respond to the MUI.
With respect to GSB, the Complaint fails to allege that it acted pursuant to a policy or custom.
Indeed the Complaint alleges that the involvement of GSB employees in the investigation “was outside
Defendant GSB’s authority, scope of designated duties, and/or responsibilities.” 	Compl., ¶ 	113.
Because GSB employees allegedly acted beyond the scope of their authority in assisting with FCBDD’s
investigation, GSB as a municipal entity was not the moving force behind the alleged due process
violations.
Turning to FCBDD, once again Ohio law dictated FCBDD’s handling of the MUI. When an
MUI is filed, FCBDD must comply with certain notification requirements. 	It must, for instance,
notify the disabled individual’s guardian (who was GSB) and “providers of services as necessary to
ensure continuity of care and support for the individual.” See O.A.C. § 5123-17-02(H)(1)(a). Not only
was Sivi not among the persons entitled to notice of the filing of the MUI, but Ohio law affirmatively
prohibited FCBDD from notifying her because she was “the primary person involved” in the alleged
financial exploitation of A.K. Id. at § 5123-17-02(H)(1)(e)(i) (mandating that the “provider will not
make notification” to the primary person involved); id. at § 5123-17-02(C)(19) (defining the primary
person involved as the person “alleged to have committed or to have been responsible for the . . .
exploitation”). 	Likewise, Ohio law mandated that FCBDD issue its written decision (including its
factual findings and determination as to whether the MUI was substantiated) without providing notice
and an opportunity to be heard by the “primary person involved,” who was Sivi. Id. at § 5123-17-
02(K)(3).
This suit does not challenge the constitutionality of Ohio law governing the handling of MUIs
filed as to developmentally disabled individuals. 	Instead it alleges that FCBDD violated Sivi’s due
process rights by not providing her with notice and an opportunity to be heard before issuing its
written decision. Because Ohio law, and not any municipal policy or custom, was the moving force
behind the alleged constitutional violation, Monell liability cannot be established as to FCBDD.
The Court thus finds that the Due Process claims against GSB and FCBDD fail.
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4. 	Section 1985 Conspiracy
The Complaint’s final federal claim against GSB and FCBDD is for an unlawful conspiracy
under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Plaintiff asserts that defendants (along with Upreach) conspired to deprive
Sivi of her rights to due process, equal protection, and free speech.
To bring a civil conspiracy claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must show “that (1) a single plan
existed, (2) the conspirators shared a conspiratorial objective to deprive the plaintiffs of their
constitutional rights, and (3) an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused
the injury.” Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 622 (6th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
The conspiracy claim fails for two primary reasons. First, the Complaint does not allege that
an agreement or plan existed among the defendants. “A civil conspiracy is an agreement between two
or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 943–44 (6th
Cir. 1985). 	While an “[e]xpress agreement among all the conspirators is not necessary to find the
existence of a civil conspiracy,” plaintiff must show “that there was a single plan.” Id. at 944. Here,
the Complaint merely alleges that defendants “conspired” without providing factual content to
support an inference that they had a plan or agreement to cooperate in depriving Sivi of her rights.
Compl., ¶ 156. This deficiency alone causes the conspiracy claim to fail. See Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826
F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding that “vague and conclusory allegations” are insufficient to
state a conspiracy claim); In re Flint Water Cases, 384 F. Supp. 3d 802, 851 (E.D. Mich. 2019) (“In the
context of § 1985(3), plaintiffs shoulder a heavy pleading burden. ‘Conspiracy claims must be pled
with some degree of specificity[.]’”) (quoting Gutierrez, 826 F.2d at 1538–39).
Second, the conspiracy must be based on “some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’ action.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88,
102 (1971); Smith v. Martin, 542 F.2d 688, 690 (6th Cir. 1976) (explaining that a § 1985(3) claim “must
be founded on a class-based invidious discrimination.”). The Complaint does not identify any class-
based animus which motivated defendants’ alleged conduct. 	For instance, the Complaint does not
allege that defendants’ actions were motivated by Sivi’s gender or race. Instead, the Complaint asserts
that defendants acted in retaliation against Sivi for her advocacy on A.K.’s behalf and their “general
disdain for Ms. Sivi as an individual.” Compl., ¶ 156. Such an alleged motivation does not support a
§ 1985 conspiracy claim. See Haverstick Enters., Inc. v. Fin. Fed. Credit, Inc., 32 F.3d 989, 994 (6th Cir.
1994) (“A class protected by section 1985(3) must possess the characteristics of a discrete and insular
minority, such as race, national origin, or gender.”).
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In response to defendants’ motions, Sivi asserts that defendants were motivated by animus
against her status as a disabled individual. See Doc. 78 at PAGEID 940. Sivi contends that she has
several mental health conditions, including anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. This is not the
first time she has made reference to being disabled in her pro se filings. As the Court explained in its
decision denying plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction, the Complaint does not assert a claim
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, nor has plaintiff provided sufficient factual allegations
concerning the nature of her mental conditions or her limitations, so as to support an inference that
she meets the definition of being disabled under the ADA. See Doc. 87 at PAGEID 998. And as they
concern the conspiracy claim, Sivi’s new allegations are too vague and conclusory to support an
inference that her alleged disability was a motivating factor behind defendants’ conduct.
C. 	Upreach’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
The Complaint names Upreach as a defendant on her Equal Protection and First Amendment
claims. 	Nearly all of the factual allegations against Upreach appear to relate to plaintiff’s state law
claims. Of the allegations made in support of Counts Six, Eight, and Nine (the Equal Protection and
First Amendment claims), the only conduct by Upreach mentioned is its possible filing of the MUI.
See Compl., ¶ 162. The Complaint alleges that “Defendant GSB and/or Defendant Upreach” filed
the MUI. Id., ¶ 54.
Upreach argues that it is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983 liability. 	The Complaint
alleges that Upreach is a “for-profit limited liability company” doing business in Ohio – an allegation
to which Upreach admitted in its Answer. See Compl., ¶ 4; Doc. 4, ¶ 4.
A § 1983 plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivation was caused by a person acting under
color of state law. 	See Ellison v. Garbarino, 48 F.3d 192, 194 (6th Cir. 1995). 	“A plaintiff may not
proceed under § 1983 against a private party ‘no matter how discriminatory or wrongful’ the party’s
conduct.” Tahfs v. Proctor, 316 F.3d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan,
526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999)).
The Sixth Circuit recognizes three limited circumstances in which conduct by a private actor
can be fairly attributed to the state for purposes of § 1983 liability: the public function test, the state
compulsion test, and the nexus test. Ellison, 48 F.3d at 195. “The public function test requires that
the private entity exercise powers which are traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted) (noting the examples of running elections and eminent domain). “The state
compulsion test requires proof that the state significantly encouraged or somehow coerced the private
party, either overtly or covertly, to take a particular action so that the choice is really that of the state.”
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Id. “Finally, the nexus test requires a sufficiently close relationship (i.e., through state regulation or
contract) between the state and the private actor so that the action taken may be attributed to the
state.” Id.
The Complaint does not make reference to any of these tests, and the Court finds that none
of the tests are satisfied by the alleged circumstances. Regarding the public function test, the filing of
an MUI does not represent the exercise of a power traditionally reserved to the state. The right to file
an MUI gives persons with knowledge of an instance of abuse, exploitation, or neglect of a
developmentally disabled individual the opportunity to bring the matter to local authorities. See O.A.C.
§ 5123-17-02(D)(1). While the investigation and any determination about wrongful conduct may be
an exercise of traditional state power, the filing of the MUI is a type of reporting mechanism for which
the state relies on both private and public actors to provide information. To that end, the scope of
persons whom Ohio law allows to file an MUI is not limited to individuals working for a state or local
governmental entity. See id., § 5123-17-02(C)(9), (D)(1) (providing that private persons who give care
or services to the disabled individual may file an MUI).
With respect to the state compulsion test, the Complaint does not contain allegations that
GSB compelled or coerced Upreach to file the MUI. The Complaint expresses uncertainty about who
filed the MUI. To the extent that the Complaint could be construed to allege that GSB was supportive
of the MUI (if filed by Upreach), such an allegation would be insufficient to establish compulsion. See
Wolotsky v. Huhn, 960 F.2d 1331, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) (compulsion requires “[m]ore than mere
approval”); Lansing v. City of Memphis, 202 F.3d 821, 829 (6th Cir. 2000) (compulsion requires more
than a state’s positive response to a private party’s proposed action).
As for the nexus test, neither the existence of a contract between GSB and Upreach nor the
existence of regulations governing Upreach’s conduct in providing services to A.K. are sufficient to
treat Upreach as a state actor. Partin v. Davis, 675 Fed. App’x 575, 587 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that
there must be “pervasive entwinement between the two entities surpassing that of a mere contractual
relationship”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Lansing, 202 F.3d at 830 (“[S]tate regulation, even
when extensive, is not sufficient to justify a finding of a close nexus between the state and the regulated
entity.”). See also Wolotsky, 960 F.2d at 1335 (private entity contracted by a county board to provide
mental health services was not a state actor under the nexus test).
Rather the rely on any of the standard three tests for establishing Upreach as a state actor, the
Complaint instead alleges that Upreach is liable because it conspired with state officials. See Compl.,
¶ 161. The Sixth Circuit has recognized that a private actor “can be liable under § 1983 if he conspired
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with a state actor to deprive [plaintiff] of his First Amendment rights.” Blackwell v. Chisholm, No. 24-
1947, 2025 WL 3091125, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 5, 2025) (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,
150–52 (1970)). Thus, an “adequately alleged . . . conspiracy claim involving private and state actors
generally suffices to establish state action on the part of the private actors for the purpose of deciding
a motion to dismiss.” Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
The Court finds that the Complaint does not adequately allege a conspiracy claim against
Upreach, for the reasons explained above with respect to GSB and FCBDD. The Complaint does
not allege the existence of a single plan of which Upreach was a part, nor does it allege that Upreach
was motivated by class-based animus. 	Because the conspiracy claim fails, plaintiff’s attempt to
establish state action on the part of Upreach under § 1983 also fails.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Upreach is entitled to judgment on the pleadings on
plaintiff’s Equal Protection, First Amendment, and § 1985 claims.
D. 	State Law Claims
“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not
reach state law claims.” Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007). See also
Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus Inc., 423 Fed. App’x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that
“[c]omity to state courts is considered a substantial interest” and thus a federal court “applies a strong
presumption against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have been
dismissed—retaining residual jurisdiction ‘only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law
issues’”) (quoting Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)). In determining
whether to retain jurisdiction, a court should “consider and weigh several factors, including the ‘values
of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951–
52 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988)).
Here, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims because
the federal claims have been dismissed at an early stage and because the Court has not given
consideration to the merits of any of plaintiff’s state law claims See Packard, 423 Fed. App’x at 585
(noting that “no dispositive rulings had been issued”); Gamel, 625 F.3d at 952 (considering whether
the federal court had already “invested significant time in the litigation”).
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IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings (Docs. 50,
77, 104) are granted as to plaintiff’s federal claims. 	The state law claims are dismissed without
prejudice.
Plaintiff’s motions for judicial notice and to strike (Docs. 80, 94) are denied.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: March 9, 2026
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