Wiltz et al v. Yost et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CASSANDRA R. WILTZ, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
DAVE YOST, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-4000
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Vascura
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Cassandra Wiltz, a prolific pro se litigant, brought this lawsuit
alleging that the forty-four named Defendants harmed her in myriad ways. (See
generally Compl., Doc. 1). In a June 16, 2025, Opinion and Order, the Court granted
most of the Defendants’ motions for judgment on the pleadings and motions to
dismiss, and warned Wiltz that any attempt to either relitigate the dismissed claims
or file new frivolous lawsuits would result in her designation as a vexatious litigant
in the federal courts. (See Doc. 128, #4012). Thereafter, the Court granted late-served
Defendant 	Nickolas 	McCoy’s 	motion 	to 	dismiss. 	(Doc. 	140). 	A 	subset 	of 	the
Defendants, those associated with Defendant OhioHealth Physician Group, now
moves the Court for monetary sanctions against Wiltz. (Doc. 132). For the reasons
stated below, the Court DENIES the motion.
The Court will not rehash this case’s background at length. Suffice to say that
Wiltz filed her 101-page Complaint on behalf of herself and her now-deceased
partner, Dan Burnett. (Doc. 128, #4012–13). Her factual allegations fell into three
categories. First, Wiltz asserted healthcare-related claims against various healthcare
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entities and their employees on her behalf. (Id. at #4013). Second, Wiltz asserted
various claims against the same healthcare entities and employees on Burnett’s
behalf as “executor” of his Estate. (Id. at #4013–14). Finally, Wiltz alleged numerous
non-healthcare claims on her behalf. (Id. at #4014). Specifically, Wiltz claimed that
some of the Defendants noted above conspired with “numerous state-court judges,
judicial staff, state officials, and private attorneys” to retaliate against her for filing
lawsuits to redress the “injuries she and Burnett apparently incurred.” (Id.).
But that’s only part of the story. “Wiltz has filed no less than forty-one lawsuits
in Ohio state courts”—conduct that led those courts to declare Wiltz a vexatious
litigant. (Id. at #4015). Wiltz also filed three other federal lawsuits (Id.). The first,
which named seventy-seven defendants, was dismissed after a year of litigation. (Id.).
“The second named twenty-five defendants and didn’t make it past the magistrate
judge’s screening.” (Id. at #4016). And the third named eight defendants; the case was
ultimately dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. (Id. at #4016). As
described above, Wiltz’s Complaint in this case fared no better.
Now Defendant OhioHealth and related individual Defendants seek sanctions
against Wiltz, invoking (1) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, (2) 28 U.S.C. § 1927,
and (3) the Court’s inherent authority to sanction parties for litigation misconduct.
(Doc. 132, #4053). Those Defendants assert that, if Wiltz’s conduct goes unsanctioned,
the “practical result” will be that Wiltz remains “free to file litigation against” the
Defendants, “or anyone else for that matter.” (Id. at #4056). They explain that “[a]t
present, OhioHealth has expended approximately [$170,000] defending against
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Wiltz’s wasteful attacks.” (Id.). They support that figure with nearly 70 pages of
invoices from their attorneys. (See Doc. 132-1).
Wiltz responds by essentially denying that she has done anything wrong. For
example, she asserts that she has “not ever made any ‘wasteful attacks’ against any
of the defendants.” (Doc. 138, #4188). She claims that she has never sued certain
Defendants prior to this action, such as Steve Marcovich and Karen Clouse. (Id. at
#4189). And she says that she has “only” previously sued certain Defendants once.
(Id.). Thus, in her view, these Defendants are “not ‘victims’” and have never been the
object of her litigation misconduct. (Id.).
The body of Wiltz’s response goes on for twelve pages, and she uses each page
to explain that, in one way or another, she is simply not at fault for her litigation
tactics. (Id. at #4186–98). She asserts that her various lawsuits were not frivolous
because she “knew that they were not frivolous when [she] filed them.” (Id. at #4195).
Wiltz also asserts, without further explanation, that the Court erred in applying the
doctrine of res judicata to her case. (Id. at #4197). And at certain points, she uses
language that one could reasonably interpret as indicating that she intends to
continue pursuing her litigation activities. (See, e.g., id. at #4195–96 (“I believe that
the defendants and the State of Ohio should be held accountable/liable for their
crimes and other unlawful behavior.”)).
Troubling as Wiltz’s response is, though, the Court, for the reasons more fully
discussed below, elects not to impose sanctions at this time.
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1. 	The Court Declines to Impose Sanctions Under Rule 11.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, when “an attorney or unrepresented
party” presents papers to a court, that person “certifies that to the best of the person’s
knowledge, information, and belief” that (1) the filing is “not being presented for any
improper purpose,” (2) the assertions contained in the filing are either “warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing
existing law or for establishing new law,” (3) the “factual contentions” either “have
evidentiary support” or “will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable
opportunity for further investigation or discovery,” and (4) the “denials of factual
contentions” are either “warranted on the evidence” or “reasonably based on belief or
a lack of information.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
The Court may impose sanctions for violations of Rule 11, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
11(c), and the OhioHealth Defendants contend that the Court should rely on this
authority to do so here, (see Doc. 132, #4057–59). Crucially, though, Rule 11 contains
a safe-harbor provision, which provides that a party “must not” file a motion for
sanctions under Rule 11 with the Court unless, “within 21 days after service” of the
motion upon the opposing party, “the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, or
denial is [not] withdrawn or appropriately corrected.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2). As the
Sixth Circuit has explained, this provision contemplates a “two-step process: first,
serve the Rule 11 motion on the opposing party for a designated period (at least
twenty-one days); and then file the motion.” Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d
288, 294 (6th Cir. 1997). Complying with the safe-harbor provision is an “absolute
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requirement” for obtaining relief under the Rule. Id. at 296 (collecting cases). Failure
to do so “precludes imposing sanctions on the party’s motion,” Penn, LLC v. Prosper
Bus. 	Dev. 	Corp., 	773 	F.3d 	764, 	767 	(6th 	Cir. 	2014) 	(citation 	omitted), 	and
“[n]o … exceptions exist,” Annabel v. Erichsen, No. 2:15-cv-10345, 2018 WL 3751445,
at *2 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 8, 2018).
Here, the OhioHealth Defendants have not complied with the safe-harbor
provision—or, at least, there is no reason to believe that they have. There is simply
no evidence in the record of their compliance.1 That is sufficient for denial. See, e.g.,
Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying a Rule
11 motion in part because “there [was] no evidence in the record indicating that [the
defendant] served [the plaintiff] with the request for sanctions 21 days before
presenting it to the court”).
2. 	The Court Declines to Impose Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.
The OhioHealth Defendants also rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1927 in support of their
sanctions request. (See Doc. 132, #4059–60). That statute provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required
by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and
attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927.
1 The motion’s certificate of service says that the motion was served on June 26, 2025—the
day the OhioHealth Defendants filed the motion. (Doc. 132, #4064). Other than that, there
appears to be no evidence of service in the record.
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The OhioHealth Defendants contend that the Court may rely on this provision
to impose sanctions on pro se litigants like Wiltz. (See Doc. 132, #4059–60). But the
Court has doubts. True, as the OhioHealth Defendants point out, there is a Sixth
Circuit decision that affirms an award of sanctions against a pro se litigant under
this section. See In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., Nos. 17-3361, 17-3548,
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 25352, at *8 (6th Cir. Dec. 14, 2017). But two points there.
First, the decision is unpublished, and it therefore does not bind the Court. See, e.g.,
Sheets v. Moore, 97 F.3d 164, 167 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[T]hese decisions are unpublished
and therefore carry no precedential weight. They have no binding effect on anyone
other than the parties to the action.”). Second, the case’s persuasive value is limited.
To the extent that the Polyurethane court engaged with the issue, it did so in a single
sentence: “Section 1927 applies to counsel as well as other individuals.” In re
Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 25352, at *8 (citation
omitted). And in support, it cited Moore v. Lafayette Life Insurance Company, which
stands for the distinguishable proposition that a party may be held jointly and
severally liable with its attorney for fees imposed against the attorney under § 1927.
458 F.3d 416, 446–47 (6th Cir. 2006). And while some district court decisions from
within the Sixth Circuit have concluded that the statute applies to pro se litigants,
others have gone the other way. Compare Gitler v. Ohio, 632 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (“[C]ourts in the Sixth Circuit can sanction pro se litigants under
[§ 1927].” (italics omitted)), with Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty., No. 1:15-cv-540, 2017 WL
35445, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2017) (“Sanctions under § 1927 are not warranted in
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this case because plaintiff is proceeding pro se and § 1927 does not apply to pro se
litigants.”), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 366364 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 25,
2017). So the precedent on this question is mixed at best.
More 	importantly, 	though, 	there 	are 	reasons 	to 	doubt 	the 	OhioHealth
Defendants’ position as an initial matter of statutory interpretation. As the Second
Circuit has explained, “the word ‘admitted’ in this context suggests application to
those who, like attorneys, gain approval to appear in a lawyerlike capacity.” Sassower
v. Field, 973 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1992). That conclusion is borne out by the provision’s
statutory (as opposed to legislative) history. “The prior version of the statute read
‘any attorney, proctor, or other person admitted.’” Id. (quoting Motion Picture Patents
Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63, 64 (2d Cir. 1912)). At that time, the term “proctor” referred
to “an officer of the admiralty … courts whose duties and business correspond exactly
to those of an attorney at law or solicitor in chancery.” Proctor, Black’s Law Dictionary
(2d ed. 1910); see also Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty & Maritime Law  3:2 (7th
ed. 2026) (explaining that, at one time in admiralty practice, “[p]laintiffs were called
‘libellants’; defendants were ‘respondents;’ complaints were ‘libels’; and lawyers were
‘proctors in admiralty’”); The Baltimore, 75 U.S. 377, 392 (1869) (discussing, as a
group, “[a]ttorneys, solicitors, and proctors”). “[A] word is known by the company it
keeps.” Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 543 (2015); see also United States v.
Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 294 (2008) (“[A] word is given more precise content by the
neighboring words with which it is associated.”). So the phrase “other person
admitted,” as it appears in the prior version of the statute, is best read as referring
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to those who had credentials that are on par with those of a lawyer or proctor. And
who might these “other person[s]” be? As the Seventh Circuit has explained when
interpreting that same phrase in the current version of the statute, it may include,
for example, “non-attorneys” admitted to practice in patent proceedings under certain
circumstances or “law students [who] receive special permission to conduct cases
before they are admitted to the bar.” Claiborne v. Wilson, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted). So the statute as originally written is best read as extending
to attorneys, attorneys by another name, and various categories of non-attorneys who
may be admitted to practice in special circumstances. It’s unlikely that Congress’s
revision—removing “proctor” and leaving "any attorney or other person admitted to
conduct cases”—was intended to capture those who appear in court without formal,
lawyerly credentials.
Moreover, pro se litigants are not “admitted” in any meaningful sense.
“Admitted,” after all, typically means admitted to the court’s bar (the list of attorneys
who are authorized to practice before the court). See Admission, Black’s Law
Dictionary (12th ed. 2024). Pro se litigants by contrast, just “generally have a right
to appear pro se.” Sassower, 973 F.2d at 80 (italics omitted) (first citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 (“In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.”); and then citing O’Reilly v. N.Y.
Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Meadowbriar Home for Child.,
Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 535 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Under § 1927, expenses, costs, and
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attorneys’ fees may only be awarded against attorneys or those admitted to practice
before the court.”); In re Micron Devices, Inc., No. 24-11215, 2025 WL 2449469, at *3
(11th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (“[S]ection 1927 cannot support sanctions against a non-
attorney pro se litigant.”); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 41 (1991)
(reiterating, without objection, the district court’s view that § 1927 “applies only to
attorneys”). But see Wages v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235–36 (9th Cir. 1990) (“Section
1927 sanctions may be imposed upon a pro se plaintiff.”).
Finally, to the extent that the text is ambiguous, the Court finds the statute’s
title—“[c]ounsel’s liability for excessive costs,” 28 U.S.C. § 1927—instructive. To be
sure, a title “cannot substitute for the operative text of the statute.” Fla. Dep't of
Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 554 U.S. 33, 47 (2008) (citation omitted). But
“the title of a statute or section can aid in resolving an ambiguity in the legislation’s
text.” I.N.S. v. Nat’l Ctr. For Immigrants’ Rts., Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 189 (1991). And
here, we have what is arguably a paradigmatic case of ambiguity—the term “other
person” in § 1927 could refer to anybody who appears in court for the purpose of
conducting a case (including pro se litigants), or it could refer to those who appear for
that 	purpose 	with 	the 	requisite 	formal 	credentials. 	And 	the 	use 	of 	the 	term
“[c]ounsel[]” in the title suggests that the latter reading is correct.
For the reasons stated, the Court agrees as a matter of statutory interpretation
with the majority view among the circuits on this issue. Thus, the Court rejects the
OhioHealth Defendants’ § 1927 argument.
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3. 	The Court Declines to Use its Inherent Authority to Sanction
Wiltz.
Finally, the OhioHealth Defendants contend that the Court should use its
inherent authority to manage the litigation process as a basis for sanctioning Wiltz.
While the Court has sympathy for the Defendants’ position, it declines to take this
course. True, a “district court has the inherent authority to award fees when a party
litigates in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.” First Bank of
Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307 F.3d 501, 512 (6th Cir. 2002) (citation
modified). And the Court agrees that there are reasons to believe that Wiltz’s conduct
clears that hurdle. Nonetheless, while the Court has previously warned Wiltz that
“filing any new complaints that either attempt to relitigate” her dismissed claims or
“that raise frivolous allegations or otherwise fail to state a claim will result in her
designation as a vexatious litigator,” (Doc. 128, #4036), it has not expressly warned
her of the possibility of monetary sanctions, see McKenna v. Nestle Purina PetCare
Co., No. C2-05-976, 2011 WL 14418, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 3, 2011) (“In this case, it is
not clear that McKenna, as a pro se plaintiff, was given adequate notice before filing
the present motion that further action on his part might result in the imposition of
fees.” (italics omitted)). Against that backdrop, the Court declines to exercise its
inherent authority to impose sanctions here.
In sum, for the reasons stated, the Court DENIES the OhioHealth Defendants’
Motion for Sanctions (Doc. 132).
The Court acknowledges that this is an unwelcome result for the OhioHealth
Defendants, who have many legitimate complaints about the propriety of Wiltz’s
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litigation conduct. But, at least at this juncture, the Court concludes that this is the
best course. That said, the Court again FORMALLY WARNS Wiltz that future
litigation misconduct, including filing frivolous complaints involving the claims or
Defendants at issue in this case will result in a vexatious litigant designation.
Likewise, it FORMALLY WARNS Wiltz that such conduct could result in the Court
ordering monetary sanctions against her. And on that front, the Court notes that
Wiltz’s Response (Doc. 138) is not at all encouraging. Accordingly, the Court is doing
its level best to impress upon Wiltz that strict compliance with the Court’s prior
Opinion & Order (Doc. 128), as well as this Order, will be necessary to avoid the Court
imposing sanctions.
SO ORDERED.
March 18, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UGLAS R. COLE
TED STATES DISTRICT J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	J	JU	U	U	U
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