Gresham v. Honda Development & Manufacturing of America, LLC

Deidre Gresham,
Plaintiff,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015
V.
Honda Development &
Manufacturing of America, LLC,
Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Deavers
Defendant.
OPINION AND ORDER
Honda Development & Manufacturing of America, LLC ("Honda") moves
for summary judgment on all claims brought against it by Deidre Gresham
("Plaintiff"). ECF No. 32. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration.
See ECF Nos. 35, 36.
For the reasons below, Honda's motion is GRANTED.
I. STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Plaintiff starts a new position at Honda.
In January 2021, Plaintiff (an African American woman) accepted a full-
time position as a production associate in the Assembly Department at Honda's
Marysville Auto Plant. 1 ECF No. 32-6 at PAGEID # 504; Gresham Dep. 17:16-
20, ECFNo. 32-5; ECF No. 35-3 at PAGEID # 658. Plaintiff underwent new-hire
1 Plaintiff originally began her tenure at Honda in 2010 as a contractor. Gresham Dep.
14:7-15:12, ECF No. 32-5. She then worked at American Showa (a company under the
Honda umbrella) as a full-time quality inspector for eight to ten years before she was
hired at the Marysville Auto Plant. Id.
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 1 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

orientation, during which she reviewed and received copies of Honda's policies
and procedures. ECF No. 32-6 at PAGE! D # 504; Gresham Dep. 73:19-74:5,
ECF No. 32-5. Honda also makes its policy manual electronically available to
employees. Gresham Dep. 74:6-10, ECF No. 32-5; see ECF No. 32-7 (policy
manual excerpts).
As relevant here, one such policy that Plaintiff reviewed was Honda's
attendance policy. ECF No. 32-7 at PAGEID # 517; Gresham Dep. 89:3-15,
ECF No. 32-5. The attendance policy requires 100% attendance for all non-
exempt employees, including production associates. ECF No. 32-7 at PAGEID
# 517; Gresham Dep. 89:20-90:3, ECF No. 32-5 ("Q. All right. And it does say
Honda expects a hundred percent attendance, and that's well known within
Honda, isn't it? A. Yes. "). If an employee falls below a 99% attendance rate
(excluding approved absences), Honda engages in progressive discipline and
corrective action. ECF No. 32-7 at PAGEID # 517; see a/so id. at PAGEID #513
("Excessive absenteeism and/or patterned absences are prohibited. ").
Corrective action for attendance violations generally begins with counseling and
increases in severity, culminating in separation of employment if attendance is
not improved. Id. at PAGEID # 517; Gresham Dep. 88:19-90:13, ECF No. 32-5.
B. Plaintiff has issues with attendance and coworker interactions.
During the first month of Plaintiffs employment, her attendance percentage
dropped to 88. 5%. ECF No. 32-15 at PAGEID # 596. Because she failed to
comply with Honda's attendance policy, Plaintiff received Level I discipline
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 2 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 2 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

(counseling) for poor attendance in early March 2021. Id. Due to her discipline
status, she was "ineligible for promotion for 12 months from the date of this
counseling, " and she could not "transfer until [her] attendance [was] at or above
[Honda's] minimum attendance standard of 99%. " Id. ; Gresham Dep. 185:17-
186:11, ECFNo. 32-5.
Separately, at some point between January and March 2021, one of
Plaintiff's co-workers (who was biracial) told other co-workers, including two team
leads (who were Hispanic), that Plaintiff did not like white men. Gresham Dep.
102:11-105:18, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 35-2 at PAQGEID # 644. Plaintiff also
testified that the same co-worker instructed another employee, who was Asian, to
stay away from Plaintiff (for a reason unknown to Plaintiff). Gresham Dep. at
105:22-106:18, ECF No. 32-5. Plaintiff did not report these incidents to Honda
management or human resources. Id. at 107:23-108:17.
Plaintiffs employment continued without incident until February 2022,
when she again failed to comply with Honda's attendance policy and was moved
to Level II discipline. EOF No. 32-15 at PAGEID # 597. She consequently
remained ineligible for promotion or transfer. Id. ; Gresham Dep. 187:9-24, ECF
No. 32-5. Nevertheless, Plaintiffs poor attendance continued, leading to Level III
discipline on September 29, 2022. ECF No. 32-15 at PAGEID # 598. At that
time, her attendance percentage over the preceding twelve months was 75. 6%.
Id. ; Gresham Dep. 188:22-189:3, ECF No. 32-5 ("Q. . . . [Y]our attendance was
down to 75 percent. A. Okay. Q. Is that correct? A. Yes. "). By virtue of her
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 3 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 3 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Level III status, she was "ineligible to transfer, be promoted, job post [sic], or
participate in any special project for 12 months from the date of this counseling."
EOF No. 32-15 at PAGEID # 598.
Also during the fall of 2022. Plaintiff reported that a "clique" of three Honda
associates-Richard Cunningham (who was African American), an employee
named Brandon (who was white), and an employee named either Ernest or
Frank (who was African)2-were talking about her. Gresham Dep. 54:22-57:18,
63:4-15, 108:18-109:2, 110:5-23, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 35-1. Plaintiff
reported this to Honda's Compliance and Ethics Department ("C&E"), and her
complaint made its way to several Honda management employees, including
hleather hlarpel, Gary Erwin, and Cheryl Davies. 3 Gresham Dep. at 110:24-
111:14; Harpel Aff. Iffl 2-3, ECF No. 32-1; Erwin Aff. II 2, ECF No. 32-2; ECF No.
32-10. Ms. Davies dismissed Plaintiff and told her to speak with Mr. Erwin about
it. 4 Gresham Dep. 11 1:23-112:5, ECF No. 32-5. So, Plaintiff met with Mr. Erwin,
2 Plaintiff does not know Brandon's last name and is not certain of whether the third
associate (whose last name she also does not know) was named Frank or Ernest.
Gresham Dep. 108:18-109:2, EOF No. 32-5.
3 It is entirely unclear which positions these three management employees held during
the relevant time. For instance, Plaintifftestified that Ms. Davies was her "department
manager, " Gresham Dep. 111:11-14, ECF No. 32-5, but Mr. Erwin stated that Ms.
Davies was Plaintiff's team lead, Erwin Aff. If 2, ECF No. 32-2. Nevertheless, each of
these three management employees appears to have served in supervisory or superior
roles with respect to Plaintiff.
4 Plaintiff testified that Ms. Davies "never wanted to intervene" because "Brandon was
one of her favorites" and because "she was getting ready to retire. " Gresham Dep.
111:15-112:8, ECF No. 32-5; see a/so ECF No. 35-3 at PAGEID # 657.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 4 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 4 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

as well as Ms. Harpel. Erwin Aff. Iffl 2, 4, ECF No. 32-2; Harpel Aff. If 4, ECF No.
32-1
The parties diverge on their accounts of what occurred during Plaintiff's
meetings with Mr. Erwin and Ms. Harpel. On one side, Plaintiff testified that she
told Mr. Erwin and Ms. Harpel that Brandon and the other two associates were
spreading rumors and telling others that Plaintiff was racist, prejudiced, and did
not like white people. Gresham Dep. 113:3-114:2, 123:3-8, ECF No. 32-5.
Plaintiff believes that Brandon started the rumor because he was jealous of her
work productivity and because she had recently filed an "indirect bullying"
complaint against him. 5 Id. at 117:10-121:2. During her meeting with Ms.
Harpel, Plaintiff indicated that she wanted Brandon to attend so that she could
ask him about his motivations for spreading the rumors, but Ms. Harpel declined
to invite Brandon because she did not want him "to feel cornered. " Id. at 112:15-
113:2. Plaintiff testified that Ms. Harpel and Mr. Erwin ultimately told her that
they "did not want to get involved" and that they "did not really meet with" Plaintiff
afterward. Id. at 97:1-98:24, 112:15-113:2, 125:18-126:17.
5 The conduct underlying Plaintiff's indirect bullying complaint was an incident on the
line when Brandon "snarled" at Plaintiff and gave her a "nasty" stare. Gresham Dep.
117:10-119:7, ECF No. 32-5. Plaintiff spoke to the assistant lead on duty (Stephanie)
and Ms. Davies before submitting a report against Brandon for "trying to indirect[ly]
bully" her. Id. Minutes later, Stephanie spoke with Brandon, and Plaintiff assumes that
Stephanie told Brandon about the complaint despite her wishes to the contrary. Id. at
120:9-123:2.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 5 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 5 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

On the other side, both Mr. Erwin and Ms. Harpel remember meeting with
Plaintiff about this incident. Harpel Aff. ^f 3-4, ECF No. 32-1; Erwin Aff. ^ 2,
ECF No. 32-2. However, when Mr. Erwin asked Plaintiff what the three
associates were saying about her, she replied that she was not sure and did not
provide any details. Erwin Aff. ^ 2, ECF No. 32-2. As a result, Mr. Erwin
instructed Ms. Davies to hold a team meeting to discourage associates from
talking about others. Id. Plaintiff similarly refused to explain further to Ms. Harpel
and simply told her that it was "irrelevant" and that she did not want to talk about
it. Harpel Aff. If 5, ECF No. 32-1. Given this lack of detail, Ms. Harpel did not
believe it would be appropriate to invite Brandon to the meeting, considering that
it may result in confrontation. Id. ^ 7. Mr. Erwin and Ms. Harpel both aver that at
no point during their meetings with Plaintiff did she ever claim that anyone had
reportedly called her a "racist. " Id. If 8; Erwin Aff. If 5, ECF No. 32-2.
C. Plaintiff is injured, enters Honda's restricted work program, and
continues to have poor attendance and complain about coworker
interactions.
On December 5, 2022, Plaintiff suffered an injury to her left knee at work.
Gresham Dep. 19:2-9, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 32-9. Plaintiff was sent to
Honda's plant physician, who opined that Plaintiff had probably just "pulled
something" and refused to approve her for an MRI. 6 Gresham Dep. 21:21-22:12,
6 Although Plaintiff testified that the Honda medical team told her that she had likely just
pulled a muscle, the only usage of that term in the record is on a form that Plaintiff
herself filled out, within a section asking for a narrative description of what had harmed
her. See ECF No. 32-8 at PAGEID# 524. Additionally, the record indicates that
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 6 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 6 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

ECF No. 32-5. So, Plaintiff worked with an injured knee for several weeks before
she went to the emergency room for an x-ray examination. 7 Id. She found a
private physician and was subsequently scheduled for surgery in February 2023.
Gresham Dep. 22:13-14, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 529.
Meanwhile, Honda assigned Plaintiff to a position in a different department
(the paint department) that met her medical restrictions throughits Transitional
Work Assignment ("TWA") program. Gresham Dep. 160:3-7, ECF No. 32-5;
ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 528. The TWA program "is designed to provide
temporary, not permanent, accommodation for associate[s] with conditions
currently preventing them from performing their normal work assignment, but
improvement is expected. " ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 528. Program length "is
determined on a case by case basis, " and if an employee takes a leave of
absence during their TWA, that same assignment "may not be available" upon
their return to work. Id. Similarly, a TWA could end if, inter alia, an employee is
assigned to another TWA position, placed off work, or assigned to another work
recovery program. Id. ; see also Gresham Dep. 161:13-162:24, ECF No. 32-5.
On Plaintiffs first day in the paint department, Plaintiff overheard an
African American coworker named Shawna gossip to another employee about
Plaintiff "denied further needs and returned to work" after meeting with the Honda
physician. ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID# 527.
7 Contrary to Plaintiffs testimony, the Honda injury report and associate statement of
incident both reflect that Plaintiff went to the emergency room sometime before
December 14, 2022. ECF No. 32-8 at PAGEID ## 523, 525.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 7 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 7 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Plaintiff, saying that Plaintiff could not be trusted, was racist and prejudiced, and
did not like white people. Gresham Dep. 140:16-141:4, 142:20-143:9, ECF No.
32-5. Plaintiff testified that she filed a written report of the incident with Honda
Human Resources ("HR") and attached a recording. Id. at 141 :5-24. For its
part, Honda represents that it has no record of this complaint or the recording.
ECF No. 36 at PAGEID ## 673-74.
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff requested to take medical leave. Gresham
Dep. 144:2-6, 163:11-19, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 529.
Plaintiff had surgery for a tear in her meniscus in early February 2023. Gresham
Dep. 22:15-23:5, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 530. On February
21, 2023, Plaintiff texted the Honda medical team that she was ready to return to
work. ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 531. Her private physician authorized her to
return to work "doing sit down work only at this time. " Id. at PAGEID # 532.
Although there were no sit-down TWA positions available at that time, the Honda
medical team advised Plaintiff that the availability of assignments "can change
daily. " Id. at PAGEID # 531. Indeed, when Plaintiff returned to work on February
27, 2023, she was assigned to a sit-down position that involved sorting parts for
door assembly. Id. at PAGEID ## 534-35; Gresham Dep. 166:2-167:21, ECF
No. 32-5.
Plaintiffs sorting assignment was to end on March 6, 2023, but Honda
extended the end date to March 20, following a letter from Plaintiffs physician
that continued her sitting restrictions. ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID ## 535-36. On
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 8 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 8 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

March 14, Plaintiff met with Honda's medical team about moving to a different
program, called the Work Recovery ("WR") program. Id. at PAGEID # 537. The
WR program is "an on-site return to work program" that encourages employees
"to perform modified or alternative work, which is within their current functional
abilities, while they recover. " Id. at PAGEID# 538. After working with Plaintiff's
physician, hlonda advised Plaintiff that her placement in the WR program "would
be based on therapy recommendations and manpower needs. " Id. at PAGEID
# 540. Ultimately, though, Honda's physical therapist evaluated Plaintiff and
found that she was not ready to participate in the WR program "due to pain,
significant strength deficits .. . and impaired gait and functional activities. " Id. at
PAGEID # 541; Gresham Dep. 172:2-12, ECF No. 32-5.
Plaintiff was frustrated that she failed to qualify for the WR program. ECF
No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 542. So, in early April 2023, she asked her private
physician to "write her off work" (i. e., recommend that she take medical leave).
Id. at PAGEID # 543; Gresham Dep. 173:23-174:3, ECF No. 32-5. Plaintiff's
physician declined to do so and instead released her to "return to work full duty"
with no restrictions. ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID ## 544-45, 548. Consequently,
Honda placed Plaintiff in a position on an assembly line. Id. at PAGEID # 549.
But Plaintiff was "unhappy with the decision regarding placement and stated it
was unfair. " Id. ; see also Gresham Dep. 176:3-10, ECF No. 32-5 ("It's a line
where you have to crawl. They wanted me to crawl inside a frame, and that was
where I should not have been doing [sic]. ").
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 9 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 9 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

While this was going on, Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and the Ohio Civil Rights
Commission on March 31, 2023. ECF No. 1-1. Therein, Plaintiff claimed that
she was discriminated against because of her race, 8 that she "was subjected to
different terms and conditions of employment, including, but not limited to, false
accusations and rumors, " and that she had "complained multiple times to
[Honda], to no avail. " Id. at PAGEID # 7. She also noted that she "returned from
medical leave" but that Honda did not allow her to "return to [her] position. " Id.
Between April 2023 and December 2023 (when Plaintiff filed the instant
action), Plaintiff continued to rotate between extended periods of medical leave
and working with restrictions. Gresham Dep. 177:8-20, ECF No. 32-5. Honda
placed Plaintiff in several different positions during this time to comply with her
restrictions. Id. at 19:21-20:1, 157:1-8, 180:19-181:20 ("I was moved around
several times. "). Additionally, Plaintiff's attendance continued to suffer during
those periods she was working, causing Honda to issue Plaintiff an Attendance
Improvement Plan ("AIP") on June 7, 2023. ECF No. 32-15 at PAGEID # 601.
Plaintiff's attendance rate as of that date was 90. 23%. Id. The AIP warned that
this was Plaintiff's "final opportunity to correct [her] attendance issues" and that
"failure to comply .. . may result in separation of employment. " Id.
8 Plaintiff also asserted age discrimination, disability discrimination, and retaliation in her
charge of discrimination, but she only asserts race-based claims in her Complaint.
Compare ECF No. 1-1 at PAGEID # 8 w/Y/7 Compl., ECF No. 1.
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 10 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 10 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Plaintiff also reported to Honda management at least four separate
incidents involving interactions with her coworkers during the period between
April and December 2023. First, Plaintiff complained that another African
American associate named Velvet pushed Plaintiff's leg out of the way to reach a
file cabinet and told other associates that Plaintiff was racist. Gresham Dep.
130:10-131:20, 133:9-134:17, ECF No. 32-5; EOF No. 35-1 at PAGEID#623,
ECF No. 32-11 at PAGEID # 551 ("[Plaintiff] also reported there being a clique in
the area, whose leader was an associate named Velvet, and Velvet has told
people that [Plaintiff] is racist against white people and is generally mean. ").
Plaintiff reported this incident-which occurred on Plaintiff's first day in a new
department-to Honda HR, including Simon Lumby, an HR Operations
Specialist. ECF No. 32-11 at PAGEID # 551; Lumby Aff. im 1, 3, ECF No. 32-3.
Honda HR investigated Plaintiff's complaint but found that her allegations were
not substantiated. Lumby Aff. If 5, ECF No. 32-3; ECF No. 32-11 at PAGEID
m554-58.
Second. Plaintiff reported that two white associates, Kristi Turner and
Dakota Shankes-Downing, had placed the wrong part on a vehicle and blamed
Plaintiff to sabotage her. ECF No. 32-11 at PAGEID # 551. Honda HR
investigated these complaints, and the investigation revealed that Kristi had
accidentally placed the wrong part on the line, for which Kristi took responsibility.
Id. at PAGEID # 563. Plaintiff also reported that Dakota had stepped on
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 11 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 11 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Plaintiff's foot on purpose, id. at PAGEID # 551, but hlonda HR was not able to
substantiate Plaintiff's allegations, see, e. g., id. at PAGEID # 563.
Third, Plaintiff complained again about Dakota a few months later, in
September 2023. ECF No. 32-12. Plaintiff claimed that Dakota was creating a
"hostile work environment" by "intentionally walking in front of her" and by lying
about Plaintiff not shutting her line down. 9 Id. Because it was common for
associates to migrate into each other's areas while working on the line, though,
Honda did not investigate Plaintiff's complaint. Lumby Aff. IT 6, ECF No. 32-3;
Mayes Aff. If 3, ECF No. 32-4.
Finally, in October 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint with Honda C&E,
asserting that another associate named Mustafa Alassawi (who is Middle
Eastern) told someone that Plaintiff was a racist and prejudiced. Gresham Dep.
145:21-146:12, ECF No. 32-5; ECF No. 35-1 at PAGEID # 623; Mayes Aff. If 4,
ECF No. 32-4. Honda investigated the complaint and spoke to Mustafa. Mayes
Aff. ^ 6. Because Mustafa denied calling Plaintiff a racist, Honda was unable to
substantiate Plaintiffs complaint. Id. ^ 7.
As far as the Court is aware, Plaintiff is still employed at Honda. Since
being placed on herAIP in June 2023, however, Plaintiff has had around six
unexcused absences in violation thereof. Gresham Dep. 199:19-200:6, ECF No.
9 Plaintiff testified during her deposition that she had also heard Dakota tell others that
Plaintiff is racist, but Plaintiff confirmed that she never reported this to Honda HR.
Gresham Dep. 291:12-294:18, ECF No. 32-5.
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 12 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 12 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

32-5. And as of the date of Plaintiff's deposition (June 2025), she had not yet
been released by her medical providers to perform her regular duties at Honda
without restrictions. Id. at 47:17-20. Plaintiff's current physicians have advised
her that she likely will never be able to continue in the same line of work (at
hlonda or elsewhere) without permanent functional restrictions and that she
should look for a different job. 10 Id. at 48:17-49:10.
10The parties' summary judgment briefing also focuses on factual events occurring after
Plaintiffcommenced this lawsuit in December 2023. See Compl., ECF No. 1. The
parties discuss, for example, an incident in January 2024 that involved Plaintiff hitting
another associate with a cart and an incident in November 2024 that involved Plaintiff
complaining to Honda HR that an Asian employee was not training her correctly. See
ECF No. 32 at PAGEID ## 87-88; ECF No. 35 at PAGEID ## 610-11, 615-16.
But these post-Complaint facts cannot support either party on summary judgment
because "[t]he filing of an action fixes the controversy. " Rodgers v. Hawley, 14 F. App'x
403, 408 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, when a plaintiff files a complaint, she cannot later "rely
on evidence of an event that occurred after [s]he filed [her] claim as support for that
claim" when faced with a motion for summary judgment. Id. ; see also Blick v. Ann Arbor
Public School Dist., 105 F. 4th 868, 876 (6th Cir. 2024) ("The filing of the operative
complaint 'fixes the controversy' as of that date, and federal courts will not consider
post-complaint factual developments. " (citation omitted)). Instead, if a plaintiff "desire[s]
to litigate events occurring after [s]he filed [her]. . . claim, [the plaintiff] need[s] to file
a supplemental pleading under" Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(d). Rodgers, 14 F.
App'x at 408; see a/so, e. g., EI-Khali v. Usen, No. 21-1140, 2021 WL 4621828, at *4
(6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2021) ("In the absence of a supplemental pleading under Fed. R. Civ. P
15(d), EI-Khalil cannot predicate his allegations on events occurring after the [first
amended complaint]. ").
Because Plaintiff did not file such a supplemental pleading in this case, the post-
Complaint events referenced above are not properly part of this action, and the Court
will not consider them on summary judgment. See EI-Khali, 2021 WL 4621828, at
*4 ("[The plaintifFs] failure to file a supplemental pleading leads us to conclude that
those events that occurred after he filed the [first amended complaint] are not properly
part of this action. While it is true ... that the district court should consider all record
evidence, that does not extend to acts that occurred after the [first amended complaint]
and were never made part of the allegations for relief. " (citations omitted)).
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 13 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 13 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In September 2023, the EEOC sent Plaintiff notice of her right to sue. ECF
No. 1-2. Plaintiff timely instituted this case and filed her Complaint against
Defendant in December 2023. See Compl., ECF No. 1. She alleges two claims
therein: (1) racial harassment and discrimination, in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1 964; and (2) racial harassment and discrimination, in violation
of 42 U. S. C. § 1981. Id. at ^T 10-23. Plaintiff seeks relief in the form of
"instatement to a proper position, " back and front pay and benefits,
compensatory and punitive damages for emotional distress, attorneys' fees,
costs, and interest. Id. at PAGE! D # 6.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard governing summary judgment is set forth in Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 56(a): "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant
shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
The Court must grant summary judgment if the opposing party "fails to
make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to
that party's case" and "on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial."
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U. S. 317, 322 (1986). When reviewing a summary
judgment motion, the Court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, who must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine
dispute of material fact for trial, and the Court must refrain from making credibility
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 14 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 14 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

determinations or weighing the evidence. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U. S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation omitted); Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U. S. 242, 248-49, 255 (1986). The Court disregards "all
evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury would not be required to
believe. " Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U. S. 133, 150-51
(2000) (citation omitted). Summary judgment will "not lie if the dispute about a
material fact is 'genuine, ' that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. " Anderson, 477 U. S. at 248
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Court is not "obligated to wade through and search the entire record
for some specific facts that might support the nonmoving party's claim"
InterRoyal Corp. v. Sponseller, 889 F. 2d 108, 111 (6th Cir. 1989). The Court
may rely on the parties to call attention to the specific portions of the record that
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact. Wells Fargo Bank, N. A. v. LaSalle
Bank N. A., 643 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1022 (S. D. Ohio 2009).
IV. ANALYSIS
At bottom, Plaintiff alleges that she was the victim of a pattern of racial
harassment and discrimination perpetuated by her employer, hlonda. ECF No.
35 at PAGEID # 608. Plaintiff asserts that her coworkers discriminated against
her based on her race by spreading false accusations and rumors that she was
racist and prejudiced and that Honda did nothing to stop it. Gresham Dep. 50:3-
11, 61:15-24, 238:8-18, ECF No. 32-5. Plaintiff maintains that she was unable
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page15of29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 15 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

to be promoted at Honda as a result. Id. at 183:10-19. In addition, Plaintiff
contends that Honda management continuously moved her around between
various positions and departments instead of assigning her a permanent job,
placed her in positions that she could not handle, and denied her training or
instructed a minority associate (as opposed to a white associate) to train her. Id.
at 153:24-154:16; ECF No. 35 at PAGEID ##615, 618. Plaintiff contends that
Honda's conduct-namely, fostering racially based harassment and treating
Plaintiff differently in training and job placement-amounts to intentional
discrimination on the basis of her race and has resulted in a hostile work
environment. ECF No. 35 at PAGEID ## 618-19.
The Court begins with Plaintiff's allegations of disparate treatment before
turning to her hostile work environment allegations. Ultimately, neither are
successful.
A. Disparate Treatment
Title VII makes it "an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to
discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race[. ]" 42
U. S. C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Section 1981 also prohibits employment discrimination,
stating, in relevant part, that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts ... asis enjoyed by white citizens. " 42 U. S. C. § 1981 (a). Courts use
the same standards to evaluate race discrimination claims under both Title VII
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 16 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 16 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

and Section 1981. Johnson v. Bender Mgmt., LLC, No. 25-1374, 2025 WL
2742524, at *2 (6th Cir. Sept. 26, 2025) (citing Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191
F. 3d 647, 658 (6th dr. 1999)). The Court will thus conduct a single analysis of
Plaintiff's two discrimination claims. See, e. g., Goggins v. ALM Printers, LLC,
No. 3:24-CV-00321, 2026 WL 66981, at *6 (M. D. Tenn. Jan. 8, 2026).
At the summary judgment stage, "a plaintiff must adduce either direct or
circumstantial evidence [of discrimination] to prevail on a Title VII [or Section
1981] race-discrimination claim. " Rogers v. Henry Ford Health Sys., 897 F. 3d
763, 771 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F. 3d 576, 584
(6th Cir. 2009)). "Direct evidence is that evidence which, if believed, requires the
conclusion that unlawful discrimination was at least a motivating factor in the
employer's actions. " Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F. 3d 350, 359 (6th Cir. 2006).
In this case, Plaintiff does not put forth direct evidence of race discrimination.
Where, as here, a plaintiff offers only circumstantial or indirect evidence of
racial discrimination, the burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973), applies. 11 Rogers, 897 F. 3d at
11 Plaintiff urges the Court to reject McDonnell Douglas as "the only means of
establishing a prima facie case" and instead consider "the mosaic of circumstantial
evidence. " ECF No. 35 at PAGEID##618-19. She points to a case in which the
Eleventh Circuit held that "[a] plaintiff who cannot satisfy [the McDonnell Douglas]
framework may still be able to prove her case with ... a convincing mosaic of
circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination[. ]"
Tynes v. Florida Dep't of Juvenile Justice, 88 F. 4th 939, 946 (11th Cir. 2023) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted); see a/so Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F. 3d
734, 737 (7th dr. 1994) (considering "pieces of evidence none conclusive in itself but
together composing a convincing mosaic of discrimination against the plaintiff").
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 17 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 17 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

771 (citation omitted). Under this framework, the plaintiff bears the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 772 (citing Upshaw,
576 F. 3d at 584); see a/so Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U. S. at 358 ("The
importance of McDonnell Douglas lies ... in its recognition of the general
principle that any Title VII plaintiff must carry the initial burden of offering
evidence adequate to create an inference that an employment decision was
based on a discriminatory criterion[. ]"). Then, "the burden shifts to the employer
to proffer a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. " Rogers, 897
F. 3d at 771 (citing Upshaw, 576 F. 3d at 584). If the employer does so, "the
It does not appear, however, that the Sixth Circuit utilizes this "convincing
mosaic" framework. Cf. Kuklinski v. Mnuchin, 829 F. App'x 78, 82 (6th Cir. 2020)
(analyzing Title VII retaliation claim under McDonnell Douglas despite plaintiff's
argument that district court erred by not considering "mosaic of retaliation evidence").
Moreover, the Seventh Circuit, which first developed the convincing mosaic framework,
has since opined that "[i]nstead of simplifying analysis, the 'mosaic' metaphor has
produced a form of legal kudzu. " Ortiz v. Wemer Enters., Inc., 834 F. 3d 760, 765 (7th
Cir. 2016). The correct standard, the Seventh Circuit recognized, "is simply whether the
evidence would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that the plaintiff's race ...
caused the discharge or other adverse employment action, " and "all evidence belongs
in a single pile and must be evaluated as a whole. " Id. at 765-66. And "[t]hat
conclusion is consistent with McDonnell Douglas[.]" Id.
Plaintiffalso cites to International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. U. S., 431 U. S.
324, 358 (1977), in which the Supreme Court noted that McDonnell Douglas is not the
only means of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. But that case is
distinguishable. In Teamsters, the plaintiff brought a "pattern-or-practice" case and
alleged a systemwide policy of discrimination. Id. at 357-58. This is a specific theory of
Title VII liability that requires a different prima facie showing than that contemplated by
McDonnell Douglas. Id. Although Plaintiff alleges a "continuing pattern of harassment"
against her, see Compl. ^f 15, 22, ECF No. 1, she does not argue, for instance, that
discrimination was Honda's standard operating procedure, nor has Plaintiff offered
evidence of such a procedure or company-wide policy.
With these points in mind, the Court will not abandon the McDonnell Douglas
framework as Plaintiffsuggests.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 18 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 18 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons
offered by the employer were pretextual. " Id. (citing Upshaw, 576 F. 3d at 584).
Plaintiff alleges that Honda discriminated against her by (1) failing to
promote her; and (2) denying her adequate training and moving her between
different positions (some of which she could not handle). The prima facie
showings for these categories differ slightly, so the Court begins with Plaintiff's
failure-to-promote theory.
1. Failure to Promote
To establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination based upon a
failure to promote, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she is a member of a
protected class; (2) she applied for and was qualified for a promotion; (3) she
was considered for and denied the promotion; and (4) other employees of similar
qualifications who were not members of the protected class received promotions
at the time her request for promotion was denied. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland,
229 F. 3d 559, 562-63 (6th Cir. 2000).
hlere, no one disputes that Plaintiff is a member of a protected class. Her
claim nevertheless fails because she cannot establish the other three elements.
Most problematically, Plaintiff never applied for a promotion at Honda. Gresham
Dep. 70:6-10, 183:20-184:9, ECF No. 32-5. Because she never applied for a
promotion, Honda never considered her for or denied her the same.
Plaintiff's argument to the contrary is unavailing. Plaintiff acknowledges
that her discipline for poor attendance prevented her from being eligible for a
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page19of29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 19 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

promotion, but she challenges the accuracy of Honda's attendance records,
presumably to show that she did, in fact, qualify for a promotion. ECF No. 35 at
PAGEID # 619. But Plaintiff's admissions during her deposition belie this
argument. See, e. g., Gresham Dep. 191:18-192:2, ECF No. 32-5 ("Q. . .. [Y]ou
were disciplined at your level 1 in March of 2021 , you got your level 2 in February
of 2022, and then level 3 in September of 2022, and you just went through those
and agreed with those, right? A. Yes. " (emphasis added)). Other than her
subjective belief, Plaintiff has not offered any evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact about the accuracy of Honda's records.
In any event, even assuming Plaintiff would have qualified for a promotion,
she never sought one, which means that her claim of race discrimination on a
failure-to-promote theory cannot succeed. 12 See, e. g., Hall v. Michigan State
Police Dep't, 290 F. App'x 913, 918 (6th Cir. 2008) ("This failure to apply means
that Hall was unable to establish the second element of his prima facie case. ").
Therefore, Honda is entitled to summary judgment on this theory of
Plaintiffs race discrimination claims.
12 The Sixth Circuit has previously recognized an exception to the general rule that an
individual must apply for a position before she can bring a failure-to-promote claim. See
Dews v. A. B. Dick Co., 231 F. 3d 1016, 1022 (6th Cir. 2000). However, that exception
exists only when "the employer does not notify its employees of the available promotion
or does not provide a formal mechanism for expressing interest in the promotion. " Id.
That was not the case here.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 20 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 20 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2. Training and Job Placement
Plaintiff also takes aim at Honda's failure to place her in a permanent
position and afford her adequate training. To succeed under this theory of
liability, Plaintiff must show that she was (1)a member of a protected class;
(2) qualified for her position; (3) subject to an adverse employment action; and
(4) replaced by a person outside of her protected class or treated differently than
similarly situated non-minority employees. Tennial v. United Parcel Sen/., Inc.,
840 F. 3d 292, 303 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F. 2d 577,
582 (6th Cir. 1992)).
Again, it is clear that Plaintiff has met the first element by virtue of her
status as an African American woman. But, as with her failure-to-promote
theory, Plaintiff has not offered sufficient evidence as to the remaining elements,
so her claim fails.
At the outset, Plaintiff does not offer evidence to raise a genuine issue of
material fact about whether she was denied training or whether she was placed
in positions that she could not handle. Plaintiff points to only one specific
instance of being denied training, and that occurred in late 2024-after Plaintiff
commenced this case. 13 See Gresham Dep. 224:8-226:14, ECF No. 32-5; see
supra Section I. C. n. 10. Indeed, Plaintiff admits that she kept "getting trained in
13 In any event, Plaintiff admitted in her deposition that she did receive training at this
time and agreed that her issue was actually that the training was going too slowly.
Gresham Dep. 227:5-21, EOF No. 32-5.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 Page 21 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 21 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

different areas. " ECF No. 35-2 at PAGEID # 648. Thus, no facts support that
Plaintiff was denied training at all during the relevant time, let alone that she was
denied training due to her race.
Moreover, Plaintiff presents three examples of positions in which she was
placed that she could not handle, two of which occurred before she filed her
Complaint: a position installing bumper beams and a position on an assembly
line that required crawling. Gresham Dep. 175:24-176:10, 213:22-216:7, ECF
No. 32-5. As to the former, Plaintiff testified only that installing bumper beams
was a "heavy process"-not that it was against any medical restrictions or
otherwise too difficult for Plaintiff to complete. Id. at 216:3-7. As to the latter,
hlonda assigned Plaintiff to the assembly line immediately after her physician
released her to work without restrictions. ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID ## 544^5,
548-49; Gresham Dep. 176:22-177:7, ECF No. 32-5. Plaintiff offers no
evidence that Honda placed her in either of these positions because of her race,
and her subjective belief that she should not be crawling or engaging in a "heavy
process" because of her knee injury is insufficient to create an issue of fact
preventing summary judgment on her race discrimination claim.
Nor has Plaintiff shown that occupying temporary positions in different
departments or being trained by minority employees constitute adverse
employment actions. An employee challenging a transfer under Title VII (or
Section 1981) must show that the transfer left her "worse off. " Muldrow v. City of
St. Louis, Missouri, 601 U. S. 346, 359 (2024). Courts find that transfers to
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 22 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 22 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

positions at a more difficult job site, positions involving nighttime work, and
positions with changes in supervising duties or overtime pay opportunities are
harms that suffice to show an adverse action. See id. at 975; Milczak v. Gen.
Motors, LLC, 102 F. 4th 772, 787 (6th Cir. 2024). In this case, Plaintiff does not
explain how frequently moving positions left her "worse off. " That is not
surprising, given that she did not experience a loss of pay or change in work
hours, and her positions were light-duty roles that accommodated her medical
restrictions. Cf. Gresham Dep. 27:11-20, ECF No. 32-5 ("Q. . . . Whenever you
would return back to work from your doctor, [hlonda] then [tried] to find a program
that meets your restrictions, find a process for you ... right? A. Yes. "). She
was also aware that position changes could occur, by virtue of her participation in
the TWA program. See ECF No. 32-9 at PAGEID # 528; see also Gresham Dep.
19:13-20, ECF No. 35-2 ("Q. . . . [l]t's not unusual, would you agree, for Honda
associates to be cross-trained and trained to do other processes and move
around within their department, right? A. Yes, it's not unusual. "): id. at 23:13-17
("Q. When you are on restrictions and working with Honda medical, you aren't
assigned a department. That's normal, right? A. When I was on restrictions,
correct. "). Simply because Plaintiff was not transferred to "the area of [her]
choice" does not mean that she was worse off. ECF No. 35-3 at PAGEID # 658.
The same goes for Plaintiffs allegations that she was trained only by minority
employees-nowhere does Plaintiff argue that this left her in a worse position
than if she were trained by white employees.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 23 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 23 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Finally, if this were not enough, Plaintiff has not supplied evidence that she
was treated differently than her similarly situated coworkers, as required by the
fourth prong of the prima facie case. Plaintiff argues that she was disparately
treated during an incident that occurred in 2024, see ECF No. 35 at PAGEID
# 618, but again, that was after she filed this case, see supra Section I. C. n. 10.
And Plaintiff points to Brandon, a white employee, see ECF No. 35 at PAGEID
#618, but she does not set forth any facts or argument as to how he is similarly
situated to her (besides his status as a Honda associate). Otherwise, Plaintiff
offers no other comparators whom Honda treated differently or better. Without
any comparators, Plaintiff's race discrimination claim "can't get off the ground."
Wargo </. MJR Partridge Creek Digital Cinema 14, No. 25-1143, 2025 WL
3285639, at *5 (6th Cir. Nov. 25, 2025).
Honda is accordingly entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's race
discrimination claim based on these theories of liability.
B. Hostile Work Environment
Along with claims of disparate treatment, a hostile work environment claim
based on workplace harassment is also actionable under both Title VII and
Section 1981. See, e. g., Williams v. CSX Transp. Co., 643 F. 3d 502, 511 (6th
Cir. 2011) (Section 1981); Grace v. USCAR, 521 F. 3d 655. 678 (6th Cir. 2008)
(Title VII). In this case, Plaintiff claims that her coworkers harassed her because
of her race and that hlonda failed to adequately redress the harassment, which
created a hostile work environment. ECF No. 35 at PAGEID # 619.
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 24 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 24 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

"A hostile work environment occurs when the workplace is permeated with
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment!. ]" Williams v
Memphis Light, Gas & Water, No. 23-5616, 2024 WL 3427171, at *7 (6th Cir.
July 16, 2024) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To succeed on a
claim of a racially hostile work environment, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) she belonged to a protected group; (2) she was subject to unwelcome
harassment; (3) the harassment was based on race; (4) the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create
an abusive working environment; and (5) the defendant knew or should have
known about the harassment and failed to act. Williams, 643 F. 3d at 511. The
harassment must meet both an objective and a subjective test-"in other words,
the conduct must be so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile or abusive
working environment both to the reasonable person and the actual victim."
Randolph v. Ohio Dep't of Youth Servs., 453 F. 3d 724, 733 (6th Cir. 2006).
Plaintiff has satisfied the first two elements-she is a member of a
protected group, and she was subjected to harassment in the form of the
comments and rumors that her coworkers spread. Plaintiff's case falls apart,
however, when the Court looks to the third element.
A plaintiff may show that unwelcome harassment was based on race by
adducing direct evidence of the use of race-specific and derogatory terms or
comparative evidence of how the alleged harassers treated members of both
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 25 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 25 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

races in a mixed-race workplace. See Smith v. P. A. M. Transp., Inc., 154 F. 4th
375, 383 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Plaintiff points to direct evidence-
namely, terms used by her coworkers like "racist" and "prejudiced"-and
comparative evidence-namely, the unfavorable employment-related actions to
which she was subjected that the Court discussed above. See supra Sections
A. 1., A. 2. Neither of these avenues are fruitful.
First, harassing someone for being a racist is not harassment "based on"
their race. See, e. g., Byrnes v. City of Hattiesburg, 662 F. App'x 288, 291 (5th
Cir. 2016) ("Harassing someone because he is a racist (or the son of one) is not
the same as harassing someone because of his race .... Byrnes failed to show
that the alleged harassment based on racism had anything to do with Byrnes's
race. "). As Plaintiff admits, a person of any race can be racist. See Gresham
Dep. 52:22-54:5, ECF No. 32-5 ("Q. So my question to you is calling someone a
racist, that isn't saying you're racist because you're white or you're racist
because you're black. It's saying you're racist because there's a belief that that
person who's being called that term holds a view that is believed to be negative
towards other races. Is that correct? A. Yes. "); see, e. g., Benitez v. Tyson
Fresh Meats, Inc., No. 3:18-CV-00491, 2022 WL 1283087, at*16 (M. D. Tenn.
Apr. 28, 2022) ("[C]olor discrimination can occur between persons of different
races or ethnicities, or between persons of the same race or ethnicity. " (citation
omitted)). Notwithstanding this point, Plaintiff maintains that her coworkers'
conduct "targeted her, " an African American, as "being prejudiced and not liking
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 26 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 26 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

white people, " such that "[t]he rumors, then, were based on race[. ]" ECF No. 35
at PAGEID # 620. Merely observing that Plaintiff is African American, however,
is not enough to make the connection necessary for a claim of race-based
harassment. See, e. g., Marshall v. Wayne Cnty., Michigan, No. 22-1499, 2023
WL 2707222, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) ("[T]he mere fact that Marshall is
African American and someone pulled a prank on him isn't enough to raise an
inference of racial animus. "); Lindsay v. Yates, 578 F. 3d 407, 417 (6th Cir. 2009)
(explaining that something undesirable happening to a member of a protected
class, without more, does not give rise to an inference that it happened because
he was a member of a protected class).
Furthermore, conduct that is merely based on personal animus or jealousy
does not constitute harassment "based on race. " See, e. g., Wade v. Automation
Pers. Servs., Inc., 612 F. App'x 291, 300 (6th Cir. 2015) (affirming summary
judgment where plaintiff failed to show that alleged harassment was based on
race rather than personality conflicts). In this case, Plaintiff herself argues that
her coworkers were calling her racist and prejudiced because they were "jealous
of [her] work productivity. " Gresham Dep. 50:12-17, ECF No. 32-5; see also,
e. g., id. at 56:10-23 ("And when I started to get a lot of attention from
management to where I believe I was going to get a promotion, the team
members got jealous. And I remember those three guys started this nasty
rumor. "); id. at 64:4-8 (Q. Okay. And, again, you state in your own complaint
here that you believe the main reason [for] this is out of jealousy, correct, for your
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 27 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 27 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

high productivity? A. Yes. "); Compl. 118, ECF No. 1 ("Plaintiff says that these
rumors were chiefly propagated by two co-workers who were jealous of Plaintiff's
high productivity. "). This completely undermines Plaintiffs argument that the
comments were made because of her race.
Second, as to comparative evidence, Plaintiff asserts that the comments
and rumors that she was a racist, combined with her lack of proper training,
movement between positions, and placement in positions she could not handle,
created a hostile work environment. ECF No. 35 at PAGEID # 619. It is true that
the Court can consider "discrete, separately actionable adverse employment
actions as evidence contributing to a hostile work environment. " Kellar v. Yunion,
Inc., 157 F. 4th 855, 871 (6th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted). Plaintiff, however, fails
to submit evidence creating a genuine issue of fact that non-African American
individuals were not subjected to the harassment she alleges. Nor has she
presented evidence that the challenged actions "would not have occurred but
for the fact that [she] was African American. " Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F. 3d
647, 662 (6th dr. 1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
Plaintiff accordingly has not established the third element of her prima
facie case for her hostile work environment claim. Because she cannot meet her
"initial burden of offering evidence adequate to create an inference that an
employment decision was based on a discriminatory criterion, " Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters, 431 U. S. at 358, Honda is entitled summary judgment on this claim.
CaseNo. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 28 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 28 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>

.^
V. CONCLUSION
There is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could find that Honda
discriminated against Plaintiff because of her race. So, Honda's motion for
summary judgment, ECF No. 32, is GRANTED. The Clerk shall enter judgment
for Honda and terminate this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED. ,
~^....
/. '^ZL^PL
M HAELH. ATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Case No. 2:23-cv-4015 	Page 29 of 29
Case: 2:23-cv-04015-MHW-EPD Doc #: 37 Filed: 03/09/26 Page: 29 of 29 PAGEID #: <pageID>