Urell v. Colgate-Palmolive Company et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
SUSAN F. URELL,
Plaintiff,
v.
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., et
al.,
Defendants.
:
:
:
Case No. 2:23-cv-3652
Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.
Vascura
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Susan Urell’s Rule 39(b) Motion
to Grant Jury Trial. (Mot., ECF No. 61.) For the reasons below, the Motion is
DENIED.
I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Urell commenced this suit in November 2023. (ECF No. 1.) Her
Complaint asserts one claim for copyright infringement, and concludes: “Plaintiff
seeks a bench trial.” (ECF No. 5, PAGEID # 172.) Ms. Urell was granted leave to file
an amended complaint in January 2024. (ECF No. 14.) Her Amended Complaint
also asserts one claim for copyright infringement, and also concludes: “Plaintiff
seeks a bench trial.” (ECF No. 15, PAGEID # 1170.) Thirteen months later, in
February 2025, Ms. Urell was granted leave to file yet another amended complaint.
(ECF No. 48.) Her Second Amended Complaint asserts one claim for copyright
infringement, and concludes: “Plaintiff seeks a bench trial.” (ECF No. 50, PAGEID
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# 1441.) Defendants Colgate-Palmolive Company and Hecho Studios LLC filed their
answer on March 14, 2025. (ECF No. 51.)
The parties filed their joint Rule 26(f) Report on April 16, 2025. (ECF No. 58.)
In Section 6 (where the parties are required to jointly provide a brief description of
the case, including whether there is a jury demand), the parties state: “Plaintiff has
requested a bench trial.” (Id., PAGEID # 1477.)
A preliminary pre-trial conference before the Magistrate Judge was set for
the following week. (See ECF No. 57.) The morning of the conference, Ms. Urell
emailed Defendants’ counsel:
Oh I wanted to let you know that I’m going to be asking for a trial by
jury and not a bench trial. I’ve been on the fence about it for a while now,
but I think it’s better for me to have a jury of my peers. Big undertaking,
I know! Ughh. Didn’t want to blindside you so I’m letting you know. Ok
talk soon.
(ECF No. 64-1, PAGEID # 1520.)
Three days later, on April 25, 2025, Ms. Urell filed the instant Motion asking
the Court, for the first time in eighteen months, for a trial by jury. (Mot.)
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a party may demand a jury
trial” by serving the other party with a written jury demand “no later than 14 days
after the last pleading directed to the issue is served.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(b). “[A]
party waives a trial by jury in a civil case by failing to file timely and serve a jury
demand.” Cook v. Cleveland State Univ., 13 F. App’x 320, 322 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 38(d)). Still, “a district court in its discretion and upon motion may
order a jury trial as to any issue even if the motion is late.” Kitchen v. Chippewa
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Valley Sch., 825 F.2d 1004, 1013 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 39(b)). The
court has “broad discretion in ruling on” such a motion. Id. (citing Misco, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp., 784 F.2d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 1986)). Unless “strong and
compelling reasons” exist, the “court’s discretion should be exercised in favor of
granting a jury trial.” Id. (quoting Local 783 v. General Elec. Co., 471 F.2d 751, 755
(6th Cir. 1973)). Still, “a district court will not abuse its discretion in denying a Rule
39(b) motion if the only justification is mere inadvertence.” Misco, Inc., 874 F.2d at
205. See also Cook, 13 F. App’x at 322 (explaining that “a waiver is complete and
binding even though it may have been inadvertent and unintended”).
III. ANALYSIS
Ms. Urell acknowledges that she “did not file a timely jury demand within
the 14-day period prescribed by Rule 38(b)[.]” (Mot., PAGID # 1490.) But she argues
that any delay should be excused because it was the result of “extraordinary
personal circumstances: specifically, [her] 87 year old mother suffered a major
stroke as well as a stroke recrudescence during the relevant period, and [Ms. Urell]
was responsible for her care and medical coordination.” Id. Ms. Urell provides
documentation showing that her mother suffered a stroke on February 21, 2025,
and then received medical services through at least April 24, 2025. But this
circumstance, unfortunate as it is, does not account for the timing. Instead, Ms.
Urell’s own words reflect that she simply changed her litigation strategy. “[C]ourts
have frequently rejected late jury demands that seem to be based on merely on a
change in litigation strategy.” Davidson Pipe Co., Inc. v. Laventhol & Horwath, 125
F.R.D. 363, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (collecting cases).
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Thus, in the language of the relevant caselaw, Ms. Urell’s conduct was not
mere inadvertence. Instead, it was a conscious decision to request a bench trial—not
a jury trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ms. Urell’s Motion to Grant Jury Trial (ECF No. 61) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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