USA v. Griffin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	:
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	Case No. 2:13-cr-241
:
v. 	: 	Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
JASON L. GRIFFIN, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jason L. Griffin’s pro se Letter Motion, which
the Court construes as Griffin’s Third Motion for Compassionate Release. (ECF No. 36 at 1–2).
For the reasons set forth below, Griffin’s Motion for Compassionate Release is DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On November 18, 2013, Jason Griffin pleaded guilty to one count of possession with intent
to distribute more than 28 grams of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
841(b)(1)(B)(iii), and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). (ECF No. 17 at 1). On March 14, 2014, this Court sentenced him to a
term of 188 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ supervised release. 	(Id. at 2–3).
Thereafter, this Court denied Griffin’s first and second motions for compassionate release on
November 27, 2023. 	(ECF No. 35 at 8). 	This Court also previously denied Griffin’s motion to
vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, when Griffin argued that he should
no longer be considered a career offender in light of intervening case law. (ECF No. 26 at 1–2).
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In June 2025, this Court received a two-page handwritten letter from Griffin. Although not
in the form of a motion, and although it did not specify precisely what relief was requested, Griffin
appeared again to request compassionate release based on his participation in the “Challenge
Program” and his mentoring of other inmates “for years.” (ECF No. 36 at 1 –2 (“I would’ve been
home [May 16, 2025,] and or [November 24, 2024]. . . . Please consider giving me the time that I’ve
earned. . . . I’m ready to return to society.”)). He also cited his continued accrual of good days as
supporting his release. (Id. at 1, 4).
The Government opposed Griffin’s Motion, arguing in part that if Griffin’s Motion were
construed as a motion for compassionate release, Griffin had failed to show that he had exhausted
his administrative remedies. (ECF No. 37 at 2). The Government also noted that there was some
uncertainty as to whether Griffin also sought to challenge the execution of his sentence via habeas
relief, arguing in the alternative that Griffin’s letter would fail if construed as a 28 U.S.C. § 2241
petition. (Id. at 3–4).
Griffin’s reply makes clear that his letter Motion sought compassionate release. (ECF No.
38 at 1). Griffin attaches the Warden’s July 2023 response to his request for a reduction in sentence
and compassionate release to argue that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. (Id. at 3).
He also “enclosed a motion challenging [his] sentence” within his reply, which he styled as a
“Request for Permission to do a successive Compassionate Release based on intervening change of
[] law,” in which he seeks leave of the court to file “a successive compassionate release” motion.
(Id. at 1, 7, 16).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A sentencing court “may reduce the term of imprisonment” by granting compassionate
release. A motion for compassionate release may be made by the Bureau of Prisons. It may also
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be made by the defendant, after the defendant’s full exhaustion of all administrative rights to appeal
the failure of the Bureau of Prisons to seek compassionate release, or “the lapse of 30 days from the
receipt of [defendant’s] request by the warden of the defendant’s facility.” 	18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A).
When a defendant under age 70 brings a motion and has administratively exhausted his
remedies, see United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 832 (6th Cir. 2020), the court must: (1) find that
“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” in the term of imprisonment; (2)
consider the applicable sentencing factors that are set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and (3) determine
that “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427, 433 (6th Cir.
2025). These requirements are necessary prerequisites, and the defendant’s failure to satisfy any of
the three is alone sufficient for denial. Where the defendant fails to satisfy a prerequisite, the court
“do[es] not need to address the others.” United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021).
And even when all conditions are met, the district court maintains discretion to grant or deny
compassionate release. 	United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101–02, 1106 (6th Cir. 2020)
(“[T]he compassionate release decision is discretionary, not mandatory.”).
III. 	LAW & ANALYSIS
This Court first considers whether Griffin has exhausted his administrative remedies and
may properly seek compassionate release by judicial order. For the reasons set forth below, Griffin
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has not satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement. He also may not challenge the validity
of his criminal sentence through a motion for compassionate release.
A. Administrative Exhaustion
Griffin must first exhaust his administrative remedies before requesting compassionate
release from this Court. 	He has not done so. 	Although he has provided proof that he
administratively requested a reduction in sentence and compassionate release in July 2023 in support
of his present Motion, (see ECF No. 38 at 3), his prior administrative request satisfied the
administrative exhaustion requirement for his prior compassionate release request. (ECF Nos. 34
at 1, 4; 35 at 4; see ECF No. 32 at 1). The Warden’s denial of administrative relief in 2023 “already
served as the predicate” for Griffin’s prior compassionate release requests, and “[i]t cannot also
serve as the predicate for this [new] motion.” United States v. Binney, 2023 WL 1929947, at *1–2
(N.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 2023); United States v. Anderson, 2023 WL 4353546, at *3 (S.D. Ohio July 5,
2023) (same); see United States v. Cain, 2021 WL 388436, at *4 (D. Me. Feb. 3, 2021) (collecting
cases). In other words, Griffin must again exhaust his administrative remedies whenever he wants
to file another motion for compassionate release. United States v. Morris, 2022 WL 1213960, at *2
(W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2022).
To Griffin, it may feel futile that he must first reiterate an administrative request that has
previously been denied. But federal courts cannot “divine whether the Bureau of Prisons may wish
to act on any given petition,” and Griffin’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies is “a
glaring roadblock foreclosing compassionate release.” Alam, 960 F.3d at 835 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Here, approximately two years have passed since Griffin’s last motion
for compassionate release, yet Griffin has not provided the Bureau of Prisons with the opportunity
to consider his argument that his further accumulation of “good days” supports the relief he seeks.
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Griffin 	was 	required 	to 	exhaust 	his 	administrative 	remedies 	again 	before 	he 	could 	seek
compassionate release. Therefore, his Motion is denied without prejudice.
B. Permission to Challenge Sentence or Seek Compassionate Release
This Court turns to consider Griffin’s motion contained within his reply brief. In that motion,
Griffin appears to challenge the lawfulness of his criminal sentence under both the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments to the Constitution. 	(ECF No. 38 at 7). 	His motion seeks “to do a successive
compassionate release [sic] based on his 5th and 6th Amendment[] rights being violated.” (Id. at
15). It appears that Griffin had originally planned to request leave of this Court to file a successive
habeas motion per 28 U.S.C. § 2255, before crossing out the habeas request and instead seeking
permission to request compassionate release.
Motions for compassionate release and habeas attacks on the validity of convictions are
different. Arguments that challenge the validity of convictions “do not constitute extraordinary and
compelling reasons for compassionate release.” United States v. Johnson, 2023 WL 7103104, at *1
(6th Cir. June 9, 2023); see United States v. McCall, 56 F.4th 1048, 1058 (6th Cir. 2022) (en banc)
(observing that a habeas motion is the “appropriate” way to “challenge the lawfulness of a
sentence”); United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 567 (6th Cir. 2021) (“If a claim demands
immediate release or a shorter period of detention, it attacks the very duration of physical
confinement, and thus lies at the core of habeas corpus.”) (cleaned up).
Thus, to the extent that Griffin requests leave of this Court to move for compassionate release
so that he can again attack the validity of his conviction under § 2255, his request is improper and
is denied. Griffin may request compassionate release again after he has satisfied the administrative
exhaustion requirement for his new request. However, he may not use compassionate release as a
habeas vehicle to challenge the lawfulness of his imprisonment.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
Griffin has failed to demonstrate that he has exhausted his administrative remedies, and
therefore he cannot request compassionate release. 	Moreover, he cannot attempt to shoehorn a
challenge to his sentence or conviction into a compassionate release motion. His present Motion is
DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______________________
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: January 15, 2026
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