Graham v. Watts

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DISEAN GRAHAM,
Plaintiff,
v.
LT. A. WATTS,
Defendant.
Civil Action 1:26-cv-908
Judge Susan J. Dlott
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, DiSean Graham, an Ohio inmate proceeding without the assistance of counsel,
sues Lieutenant A. Watts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Eighth
Amendment and for issuance of a false conduct report. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.) This matter is
before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and
1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or
any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.
1997). Having performed the initial screen, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff MAY
PROCEED on his individual-capacity excessive force claim for damages against Defendant
Watts; however, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be
DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim on which
relief may be granted.
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This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF
Nos. 1, 5.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $0.28 in his prison
account, which is insufficient to pay the filing fee.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts
(Inmate ID Number A796148) at the Southern Ohio Correctional Facility is DIRECTED to
submit to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an
initial partial payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate
trust account or the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six months
immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks
should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of
fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs
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had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and
the prison cashier’s office.
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”).
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Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See Hill v.
Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not
“suffice if it tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).
Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial
plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
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asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges that on March 1, 2026, Defendant Lieutenant A. Watts punched Plaintiff
several times in the face and delivered several knee strikes to Plaintiff’s body while Plaintiff was
restrained. As a result, Plaintiff experienced severe pain and swelling in his face. Plaintiff further
alleges that an unknown corrections officer also held and applied painful pressure to Plaintiff’s
ankles that caused swelling severe enough to prevent Plaintiff from walking. Plaintiff does not
name this unknown corrections officer as a Defendant. Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant
Watts falsely asserted in a conduct report that Plaintiff was intoxicated during the incident, even
though medical staff later concluded that Plaintiff had not been intoxicated. As relief, Plaintiff
seeks $1.75 million in damages and injunctive relief in the form of a transfer to another prison to
avoid retaliation. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1.)
The undersigned construes Plaintiff’s Complaint to advance claims against Defendant
Watts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment and for
issuance of a false conduct report. Having performed the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint
under §§ 1915 and 1915A, the undersigned concludes that Plaintiff may proceed on his
individual-capacity excessive force claim for damages against Defendant Watts. The
undersigned recommends, however, that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be dismissed.
Plaintiff does not specify whether Watts is sued in his official or individual capacity. But
to the extent that Plaintiff advances any official capacity claims against Watts, those claims must
be dismissed. A suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is “not a suit against the
official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” and is therefore “no different from a suit
against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). And any
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claims against the State are barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The Eleventh
Amendment operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction when a private citizen sues a state or
its instrumentalities unless the state has given express consent. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Lawson v. Shelby Cty., 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2000).
“There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the state has waived immunity by
consenting to the suit, (2) when Congress has expressly abrogated the states’ sovereign
immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52
L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted).
None of these exceptions apply to Plaintiff’s Complaint. First, “Ohio has not waived sovereign
immunity in federal court.” Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Second,
“Section 1983 does not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 410 (citing
Will, 491 U.S. at 66). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a plaintiff brings
“claims for prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent
future federal constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. And although
Plaintiff seeks forward-looking injunctive relief in the form of a transfer to avoid future
retaliation, Plaintiff also states that Watts no longer works at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility, such that any request for injunctive relief is moot. Plaintiff therefore fails to state any
official-capacity claims against Watts.
Next, to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims rely on Watts’s issuance of a false conduct
report, he has failed to state a claim. “[A] prisoner has no constitutional right to be free from
false accusations of misconduct.” Jackson v. Hamlin, 61 F. App’x 131, 132 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Freeman v. Rideout, 808 F.2d 949, 951 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Jones v. McKinney, No.
97-6424, 1998 WL 940242, at *1 (6th Cir. Dec. 23, 1998) (district court properly dismissed a
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complaint alleging that prison officials “deliberately issued a false disciplinary report” against
the plaintiff as frivolous because “even if the disciplinary report was false, . . . a prisoner has no
constitutionally protected immunity from being wrongly accused”); Lee v. Pauldine, No. 1:12–
cv–077, 2013 WL 65111, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 4, 2013) (“Accepting as true plaintiff’s allegation
that defendant . . . filed a false conduct report against him, ‘[t]he act of filing false disciplinary
charges does not itself violate a prisoner’s constitutional rights.’”) (quoting Spencer v. Wilson,
No. 6:11–00128–KSI, 2012 WL 2069658, at *6 (E.D. Ky. June 8, 2012)), adopted, 2013 WL
646775 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2013); Reeves v. Mohr, No. 4:11-cv-2062, 2012 WL 275166, at *2
(N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2012) (“Erroneous allegations of misconduct by an inmate do not constitute
a deprivation of a constitutional right.”). And although Plaintiff suggests that this false conduct
report constitutes “retaliation” by Watts, Plaintiff does not allege that he engaged in any activity
protected by the First Amendment as required to state a First Amendment retaliation claim. See
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). Any claims arising out of the allegedly
false conduct report must therefore be dismissed.
III. 	DISPOSITION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (ECF Nos. 1, 5) is
GRANTED. In addition, for the reasons above, Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on his individual-
capacity excessive force claim for damages against Defendant Watts; however, the undersigned
RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
Plaintiff notes that Defendant Watts no longer works at the Southern Ohio Correctional
Facility and lacks an address at which Watts may be served with the Complaint. The Ohio
Attorney General, which represents the State of Ohio and its employees in similar matters, is
ORDERED to file a notice on the docket, WITHIN 30 DAYS of the date of this Order,
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disclosing the last known mailing address of Defendant Lieutenant A. Watts. The Clerk is
DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Order and Report and Recommendation on the Ohio
Attorney General at 30 E. Broad Street, 23rd Floor, Columbus, OH 43215.
Once Watts’s address is obtained, in light of Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, Plaintiff
is entitled to have the United States Marshal effect service of process over Watts. If Plaintiff
wishes to have the United States Marshal effect service, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to file a
completed summons form (Form AO-440), a service of process by U.S. Marshal form (Form
USM-285), and a service copy of the Complaint with the Clerk of Court. If Plaintiff does so, the
Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summons and the United States Marshal is DIRECTED to
serve by certified mail upon Defendant Watts the issued summons, a copy of the Complaint, and
a copy of this Order and Report and Recommendation.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
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The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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