Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ALEXANDER GARCIA GONZALES,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, in his official
capacity as Acting Field Office Director
of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Detroit Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:26-CV-112
Judge Michael R. Barrett
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the status report and notice filed by
Respondents, (Doc. 7, 8), and the status report filed by Petitioner Alexander Garcia
Gonzales, (Doc. 9). Petitioner, a citizen of Cuba, sought habeas corpus relief before
the Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). On February 20, 2026, following
Respondents’ return of writ and Petitioner’s reply, the Court granted the writ of
habeas corpus and ordered Respondents to release Petitioner from custody or provide
Petitioner a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) within seven days, “at
which the government shall bear the burden of persuasion of justifying his continued
detention.” (Doc. 6, PageID 152).
Petitioner appeared before the IJ for a hearing on February 27, prior to which
Respondents provided the IJ with a copy of the Court’s order granting habeas relief.
(Doc. 7, PageID 153). The IJ issued an opinion on the same day, holding that he “does
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not have authority and jurisdiction over bond as [Petitioner] is charged as an arriving
alien in the I-261 filed by DHS on 2/10/26.” (Id., PageID 156). In the alternative, the
IJ concluded that he “would deny the request for bond as [Petitioner] has failed to
show that he is not a danger to the community.” (Id.).
To their credit, Respondents subsequently informed the IJ that “the burden of
persuasion was not properly assigned to DHS as ordered by the District Court.”1 (Id.,
PageID 159). Respondents accordingly asked the IJ to either conduct another bond
hearing or reissue an opinion that apportions the burden of persuasion as the Court
initially ordered. (Id., PageID 160). On March 1, the IJ amended his order, concluding
again that he lacked authority and jurisdiction over the matter, and finding in the
alternative that he “would deny the request for bond as [DHS] per District Court
order has met their burden and demonstrated that [Petitioner] is a danger to the
community.” (Doc. 8, PageID 165).
Following this development, Petitioner filed a status report contending first
that Respondents impermissibly continued to argue the issue of jurisdiction, and also
arguing that the IJ’s decision “is not compliant with this Court’s order and does not
offer [a] detailed explanation about how the government met its burden of proof for
[justifying] Petitioner’s continued detention.” (Doc. 9, PageID 168). Specifically,
Petitioner contends that the IJ did not conduct an individualized assessment under
1 However, the Court does take issue with Respondents’ representation that “the District Court altered
the standard burden of proof in an immigration detention hearing.” (Doc. 7, PageID 159). There exists
no automatic presumption of flight risk or danger to the community assigned to a Petitioner held
pursuant to § 1226(a), and “[i]n general, the Supreme Court has held that the clear and convincing
standard applies to civil detention where liberty is at stake.” L.G. v. Choate, 744 F.Supp.3d 1172, 1186
(D. Colo. 2024); see Aleman Gonzales v. Barr, 955 F.3d 762, 781 (9th Cir. 2020), rev’d on other grounds,
596 U.S. 543 (2022).
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Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37 (BIA 2006), and the IJ’s amended order amounted
to a summary denial in violation of Petitioner’s due process rights.2
From the record before the Court, it is exceedingly difficult to see how
Petitioner’s bond proceedings could have comported with the Court’s order when the
hearing was conducted under the specter of an improperly apportioned burden of
persuasion. Even if the IJ later reconsidered all of the evidence and testimony under
the appropriate standard, the hearing itself still ran afoul of that standard. See, e.g.,
Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1205 (9th Cir. 2011). As Petitioner notes, “[i]t is not
clear from the IJ’s decision just how the government’s burden of proof was fulfilled,
especially in light of favorable evidence presented by Petitioner’s bond counsel.” (Doc.
9, PageID 171-72). And although it may not be “obvious that the IJ would come to a
different conclusion” upon a proper apportionment of the burden, “the evidence
presented does not foreclose the possibility that the government failed to meet its
burden.” Al-Sadeai v. United States Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 540 F.Supp.3d
983, 992 (S.D. Cal. 2021).
Accordingly, on or before March 10, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. EDT, Respondents shall
either provide Petitioner with a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an IJ
or release Petitioner from custody. In the event of the former, (1) Respondents shall
provide a copy of this order to the IJ prior to any hearing; (2) the IJ shall have
jurisdiction over the matter and be empowered to grant bond. See Ortiz Gutierrez v.
2 The Court retained jurisdiction over this matter to enforce its initial grant of habeas relief, see Gall
v. Scroggy, 603 F.3d 346, 352 (6th Cir. 2010), and adjudicate timely petitions filed under the Equal
Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.
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Raycraft, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, No. 1:26-CV-69, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32801, at *5-9
(S.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2026); (3) Respondents shall bear the burden of persuasion of
justifying Petitioner’s continued detention and adduce clear and convincing evidence
that Petitioner is a danger to the community. See Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 155
(1st Cir. 2024), reh’g en banc denied; Soto-Medina v. Lynch, No. 1:25-CV-1704, 2026
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11113, at *12-27 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 21, 2026); and (4) the IJ shall
consider whether less restrictive alternatives to detention can reasonably address the
government’s interest, as well as Petitioner’s “ability to pay when setting any bond
amount.” M.P.L. v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-5307, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204541, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2025).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Michael R. Barrett
Michael R. Barrett
United States District Judge
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