Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
MELVIN OSCAR ORTIZ GUTIERREZ,
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, Field Office Director
of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Columbus Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:26-CV-69
Judge Michael R. Barrett
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Melvin Oscar Ortiz Gutierrez’s
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents have
filed a return and a response in opposition, (Doc. 17), and Ortiz Gutierrez has replied,
(Doc. 18). The petition is now ripe for review.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On January 18, 2019, an agent of the United States Border Patrol issued Ortiz
Gutierrez a notice to appear (“NTA”) for removal proceedings, alleging that he
unlawfully entered the United States near Antelope Wells, New Mexico, the day
prior. (Doc. 17, PageID 244). The NTA charged that Ortiz Gutierrez, a citizen of
Guatemala, was “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or
paroled,” and subject to removal under “[§] 212(a)(6)(i) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act.” (Id.).
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 1 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
Ortiz-Gutierrez applied for asylum and withholding of removal and received
employment authorization from DHS. (Doc. 1, PageID 15-16). And on August 31,
2021, due in part to a series of higher court rulings regarding the Department of
Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) “practice of failing to comply with the statutory
requirements under INA § 239(a),” an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) terminated removal
proceedings for Ortiz Gutierrez without prejudice. (Doc. 17, PageID 253).
The record reflects that, on December 14, 2025, Ortiz Gutierrez was arrested
by the Fairfield Police Department and charged with domestic violence. (Doc. 12,
PageID 174). He pleaded not guilty to the original charge, and on January 7, 2026,
pleaded guilty to an amended charge of disorderly conduct, a fourth-degree
misdemeanor. (Id., PageID 175). The court granted credit for time served and ordered
Ortiz Gutierrez to be released. (Id., PageID 176). In the interim, though, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) placed an immigration detainer on Ortiz
Gutierrez, meaning that he remained in custody at the Butler County Jail on behalf
of federal authorities. (Doc. 17, PageID 265).
On January 8, 2026, counsel for Ortiz Gutierrez moved for a custody
redetermination hearing before an Immigration Judge. (Id., PageID 259). In support,
Ortiz Gutierrez noted his status as the spouse of an active-duty member of the United
States Army and argued that his continued detention imposed exceptional hardship
on his family. He also asserted that he “maintains strong family and community ties
in the United States,” and is neither a flight risk nor a danger to the community. (Id.,
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 2 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
PageID 260-61). But on January 21, an IJ denied the request on the grounds that it
“does not have the authority to redetermine bond in this case.” (Doc. 12, PageID 148).1
Ortiz Gutierrez filed the instant petition on January 23, alleging that he is
being held unlawfully and denied a constitutionally adequate custody
redetermination under a misapplication of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226. He also
contends that his ongoing detention violates his constitutional due process rights.
Respondents argue that (1) the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider this petition in
the first place; (2) the issue is unripe for review because Ortiz Gutierrez has not
exhausted all available administrative remedies; and (3) Ortiz Gutierrez is properly
detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225.
II. CONTROLLING LAW & ANALYSIS
a. Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, the Court must assess the fundamental question of its
own subject matter jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, district courts possess the
authority to grant a writ of habeas corpus to any petitioner “in custody in violation of
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
Relevant here, “[a]lthough the court may not review discretionary decisions made by
immigration authorities, it may review immigration-related detentions to determine
if they comport with the demands of the Constitution.” Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455
F.Supp.3d 896, 901 (D. Minn. 2020) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)).
1 The IJ noted that she “would still deny bond as [Ortiz Gutierrez] is a danger to the community based
on her [sic] recent criminal arrest,” but the Court believes any such finding should be made with
specificity and with the benefit of the entire available record. (Doc. 12, PageID 148).
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 3 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
Respondents argue that the Court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction by
8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(b)(9), (e)(3), and (g), and accordingly move to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 17, PageID 202-07). Their argument is not
persuasive. Numerous courts, including this one, have held that federal district
judges retain jurisdiction under § 2241 to review habeas claims by noncitizen
detainees, either to challenge pre-removal detention as unconstitutional or to raise
legal questions regarding the government’s statutory authority to detain them. See
Azalyar v. Raycraft, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, No. 1:25-CV-916, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3705,
at *3-5 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2026); Alonso-Portillo v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-306, 2025 U.S.
167908, at *15-18 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 28, 2025) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Malam v.
Adducci, 452 F.Supp.3d 643, 649 (E.D. Mich. 2020); Lopez v. Barr, 458 F.Supp.2d 171,
175 (W.D.N.Y. 2020); Salvador F.-G. v. Noem, No. 25-CV-243, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
111539 (N.D. Okla. June 12, 2025); J.C.G. v. Genalo, No. 1:24-CV-8755, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8279 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2025).
A plain-language reading, in addition to a body of case law that grows larger
by the day, leads to the conclusion that the jurisdiction-stripping provisions contained
in § 1252 do not serve to deprive the Court of jurisdiction to review Ortiz Gutierrez’s
challenge to his current detention.2 See Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
2 Respondents also argue that Ortiz Gutierrez’s petition must be dismissed because he failed to
exhaust all available administrative remedies. (Doc. 17, PageID 207-10). But as Ortiz Gutierrez rightly
notes in response, the exhaustion of administrative remedies “is prudential and may be excused,” and
the due process considerations at stake here are great. (Doc. 18, PageID 312-14). The Court declines
to impose a prudential exhaustion requirement here, both as a matter of discretion and because this
petition “presents a substantial constitutional question.” Lopez, 458 F.Supp.2d at 176. In addition,
requiring Ortiz Gutierrez to exhaust his administrative remedies would likely be futile here. See
Fazzini v. Ne. Ohio Corr. Ctr., 473 F.3d 229, 235-36 (6th Cir. 2006).
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 4 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258690, at *7-16 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025).
Jurisdiction is well established under these circumstances, and no further review is
required. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 687-88; Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination
Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 482 (1999).
b. Statutory Application
The two statutes primarily at issue are 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225 and 1226, which
generally govern the civil detention of noncitizens pending removal proceedings. The
distinction between the two is critical. Respondents purport to hold Ortiz Gutierrez
pursuant to § 1225(b), arguing as a result that he is not entitled to a custody
redetermination. But that does not end the Court’s inquiry. Rather, the statutory
underpinning for Ortiz Gutierrez’s detention is reflected by Respondents’ actions and
the actual circumstances surrounding his detention, and not merely Respondents’
assertions. See Beltrand v. Mattos, No. 2:25-CV-1430, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 225346,
at *8 (D. Nev. Nov. 14, 2025) (rejecting the “revised policy interpretation” that
noncitizens lacking legal status “are subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)
regardless of their presence within the country”).
As the Supreme Court noted in Jennings v. Rodriguez, individuals falling
under § 1225(b)(1) “are normally ordered removed ‘without further hearing or review’
pursuant to an expedited removal process.” 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). And under § 1225(b)(2), an individual “‘shall be detained for a
[removal] proceeding’ if an immigration officer ‘determines that [they are] not clearly
and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted’ into the country.” Id. at 288 (quoting 8
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 5 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)) (alterations in original). Detention under § 1225(b) “is
mandatory and typically brief,” Falcon v. Florentino, No. 25-17164, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 262112, at *4 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2025), and a noncitizen detained under
§ 1225(b)(2) may be released or paroled only pursuant to the terms of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A).
On the other hand, § 1226(a) authorizes the government, in its discretion, to
detain certain noncitizens “already in the country pending the outcome of removal
proceedings.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289. “Critically, under 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(d)(1), a
noncitizen detained under § 1226 may appeal an ‘initial custody determination,’
including the setting of bond.” Benitez v. Francis, 795 F.Supp.3d 475, 484 (S.D.N.Y.
2025); cf. Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (noting that individuals detained pursuant to
§ 1226(a) must receive a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an IJ “at the
outset of detention”).
In short, the government can detain individuals “seeking admission into the
country under § 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” or it can detain individuals “already in the
country pending the outcome of removal proceedings under § 1226(a) and (c).”
Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289 (cleaned up). And to that end, Ҥ 1225 provides for
mandatory detention and § 1226[(a)] allows for the release of the noncitizen on
conditional parole or bond.” Cobix v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-CV-1669, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 257963, at *9 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 12, 2025).
The undersigned joins the overwhelming majority of fellow jurists from well
over half of the federal judicial districts in the country, see J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No.
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 6 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
1:25-CV-1354, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19191, at *6 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2026)
(collecting cases), in finding that “[d]etention under § 1226(a) attaches where DHS
encounters a noncitizen within the interior after admission or after a substantial
period of continuous presence, whereas § 1225(b) applies only where the individual
encountered is ‘seeking admission’ at the border or its functional equivalents,”
Falcon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262112, at *4; see Chuandong Han v. Noem, No. 25-
CV-10753, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25700, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 6, 2026) (collecting
cases); see also Cuyun v. Raycraft, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26924, at *26 (N.D. Ohio
Feb. 10, 2026) (noting that “[o]ther courts in the Sixth Circuit have similarly found
that a noncitizen who is present in the country for years but never tried to obtain
lawful entry (such as by applying for asylum, permanent residency, refugee status,
or other form of citizenship) . . . is not ‘seeking admission.’”).
Respondents’ argument, largely pro forma, contains extraneous and irrelevant
material, and also fails at times to address the arguments that are actually before
the Court. For instance, Respondents note that § 1226(a) “does not . . . confer the right
to release on bond,” and further observe that § 1226(c) typically always requires
detention of individuals with certain criminal histories or who pose “national security
concerns.” (Doc. 17, PageID 228). But no one here is asserting, nor is the Court
suggesting, that § 1226(a) unconditionally mandates release, and Respondents have
not even attempted to show that Ortiz Gutierrez falls under the ambit of § 1226(c).
Neither the relevant caselaw, nor the applicable statutory framework, nor the
accompanying regulations “give the government the authority and mandate to detain
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 7 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
all noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States without bond.” Buenrostro-
Mendez v. Bondi, ___ F.4th ___, No. 25-20496, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3899, at *40
(5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026) (Douglas, J. dissenting); see Benitez, 795 F.Supp.3d at 484
(S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“a proper understanding of the relevant statutes, in light of their
plain text, overall structure, and uniform case law interpreting them, compels the
conclusion that § 1225's provision for mandatory detention of noncitizens ‘seeking
admission’ does not apply to someone . . . who has been residing in the United States
for more than two years.”). “Applying § 1225(b) to an individual apprehended in the
interior after years of continuous presence stretches the statutory text beyond its
permissible bounds. Indeed, nothing in § 1225(b) or its interpretive case law permits
DHS to treat Petitioner as an arriving alien engaged in inspection.” Falcon, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 262112, at *6; see also, e.g., Benitez, 795 F.Supp.3d at 486-92
(undertaking a painstaking and exhaustive statutory analysis finding the same).
c. Due Process
As it concluded in Azalyar after examining whether Respondents’
interpretation and application of § 1225(b)(2) had deprived the petitioner of his due
process rights under the Fifth Amendment, the Court reiterates that “[n]on-punitive
detention in the immigration context violates the Due Process Clause,” Padilla v.
United States Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F.Supp.3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash.
2023), absent “adequate procedural protections” or “a special justification”
outweighing a petitioner’s liberty interest, Zadvyas, 533 U.S. at 690; see Ariza v.
Noem, No. 4:25-CV-165, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265012, at *28 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 23,
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 8 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
2025) (noting that “[t]he Due Process Clause extends to all persons regardless of
status,” including noncitizens). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690.
Respondents here did not detain Ortiz Gutierrez under § 1225(b)(1) or (b)(2),
nor does Ortiz Gutierrez fall into the category of “criminal aliens” defined in § 1226(c).
As already discussed, that leaves § 1226(a), under which “detention is discretionary
and constitutionally constrained by due process.”3 Falcon, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
262112, at *4. Although Respondents argue that Ortiz Gutierrez already appeared
before an IJ and “has received a constitutionally required bond hearing,” (Doc. 17,
PageID 230), the IJ felt bound by agency determinations and guidance purporting to
strip away jurisdiction, see Azalyar, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3705, at *2 n.4.
As a result, any such hearing was not constitutionally adequate because the IJ
was functionally unable to “make an individualized assessment of the [alleged] need
to re-detain him.” Hernandez-Fernandez v. Lyons, No. 5:25-CV-773, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 206751, at *20 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2025). Respondents’ subsequent
misapplication of Jennings is unconvincing, and the Court notes—not for the first
time—that Respondents mischaracterize the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Martinez v.
Larose, 968 F.3d 555, 564 (6th Cir. 2020). Indeed, it appears “the Government returns
again and again to push the same theory uphill, only for courts to send it rolling back
3 This is reinforced by the DHS Form I-286 issued to Ortiz Gutierrez on January 7, which notes that
DHS was detaining him “[p]ursuant to the authority contained in section 236 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act,” codified as § 1226. (Doc. 18, PageID 325).
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 9 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

10
down again.” Rios Porras v. O’Neill, No. 25-6801, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 263464, at
*5 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 2025); see Castañon-Nava v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161
F.4th 1048, 1062 (concluding that the government “are not likely to succeed on the
merits of their arguments.”).
For the same reasons elucidated by the Court in Azalyar, the balance of
considerations weighs in favor of Ortiz Gutierrez. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976). His continued detention without a constitutionally adequate custody
redetermination stands in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Respondents must
therefore provide a custody redetermination hearing at which the government bears
the burden of justifying continued detention and the IJ is empowered to consider both
“alternatives to detention” and Ortiz Gutierrez’s “ability to pay when setting any bond
amount.” M.P.L. v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-5307, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 204541, at *20
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2025).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Ortiz Gutierrez’s detention is
governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and his continued detention without an
individualized, constitutionally adequate custody redetermination is unlawful. The
petition for a writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. 1), is therefore GRANTED. Respondents’
motion to dismiss, (Doc. 17), is DENIED, and the motion to dismiss by Respondent
Jones, (Doc. 15), is DENIED as moot.
IT IS ORDERED that, on or before February 25, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. EST,
Respondents shall either (1) provide Ortiz Gutierrez with a bond hearing before an
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 10 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>

11
IJ, at which the government shall bear the burden of persuasion of justifying his
continued detention; or (2) release Ortiz Gutierrez from custody, under reasonable
conditions of supervision.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall inform the Court
whether and when a bond hearing was held in accordance with this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Michael R. Barrett
United States District Judge
Case: 1:26-cv-00069-MRB-KAJ Doc #: 19 Filed: 02/18/26 Page: 11 of 11 PAGEID #: <pageID>