Williams v. Hamilton County et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
CHRISTOPHER-MICHAEL WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
HAMILTON COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:25-cv-861
District Judge Douglas R. Cole
Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, an inmate at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution, in Chillicothe, Ohio, brings
this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ohio state law against defendants Hamilton
County, Ohio, Hamilton County Clerk of Courts Pavan Parikh, and two unidentified Hamilton
County Clerk’s Office Deputies for alleged violations of his rights in connection with the initiation
of a lawsuit in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. (Doc. 1-1). By separate order, the
Court has granted plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 1).
This matter is now before the Court for a sua sponte review of the complaint to determine
whether the complaint or any portion of it should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b).
I. 	Screening of Complaint
A. 	Legal Standard
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant whose
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filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic
incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton v. Hernandez,
504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To prevent such
abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint
if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. §§
1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff
cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S.
319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has
no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a violation
of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable
factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the level of the irrational or “wholly
incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The Court need not accept as true
factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill
v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A complaint
filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the complaint
“must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on
its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and
Twombly 	governs 	dismissals 	for 	failure 	to 	state 	a 	claim” 	under 	§§ 	1915A(b)(1) 	and
1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
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“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a
complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned,
the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of
a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders
“naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give
the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551
U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
B. 	Plaintiff’s Complaint
In the complaint, plaintiff alleges that he made two attempts—in September 2022 and January
2023—to file an action against the Ohio Job and Family Services in the Hamilton Court of Common
Pleas. According to plaintiff, he mailed his documents on both occasions from the Ohio Department
of Rehabilitation and Correction to the Court via certified mail. Plaintiff alleges that the defendants
John and Jane Doe Hamilton County Court Deputies signed for his mailings, but he never received
any correspondence assigning him a case number. Plaintiff further alleges that when he called the
court after sending the first mailing, the clerk’s office employee he spoke with, who is not named as
a defendant, informed him that she could not find it and to refile it. Plaintiff speculates that the John
and Jane Doe Hamilton County Court Deputies discarded his mailings. (Doc. 1-1, at Page ID 21-22).
Based on the above allegations, plaintiff asserts that defendants violated his First Amendment
right to access the courts (Claim One); violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and
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equal protection (Claim Two); and conspired against him to violate his constitutional rights (Claim
Three).1 	(Doc. 1-1, at PageID 32-36). Plaintiff also brings various state law claims against
defendants. (Id. at PageID 25-30).
Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief and damages. (Id. at PageID 37).
C. 	Analysis
Res judicata
The Court first addresses whether plaintiff’s instant complaint is barred by res judicata. Res
judicata or claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that have been decided in a prior
action. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., 590 U.S. 405, 412 (2020). Parties
may not “relitigat[e] the same ‘claim’ or ‘cause of action,’ even if certain issues were not litigated in
the prior action.” Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 215 n.3 (2021). “Suits involve the same claim
or cause of action if the later suit arises from the same transaction or involves a common nucleus of
operative facts.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Res judicata bars claims if four elements are
satisfied:
(1) a final decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a
subsequent action between the same parties or their privies; (3) an issue in the
subsequent action which was litigated or which should have been litigated in the
prior action; and (4) an identity of the causes of action.
Trs. of Operating Eng’rs Loc. 324 Pension Fund v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc., 919 F.3d 368, 380
(6th Cir. 2019) (cleaned up).
“If a claim is barred by the doctrine of res judicata, ‘[t]he weight of authority supports
dismissal for failure to state a claim.’” Turner v. DeJoy, No. 2:21-cv-2223, 2022 WL 1817752, at
*4-5 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 15, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 1813910 (W.D.
Tenn. June 2, 2022). Courts are “empowered to raise res judicata sua sponte . . . in the interests of,
1Although plaintiff references a “Claim Number 4” in his complaint (see Doc. 1-1, at PageID 25), no Claim Four
appears in the complaint (see id. at PageID 32-36).
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inter alia, the promotion of judicial economy.” Holloway Const. Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 891
F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1989). Finally, under § 1915(e)(2), res judicata is an appropriate basis to
dismiss for failure to state a claim during the initial screening of a complaint. Smith v. Morgan, 75
F.App’x 505, 506 (6th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff alleged nearly identical facts and claims in Williams v. Parikh, No. 1:23-cv-167,
2023 WL 4398489 (S.D. Ohio July 7, 2023) (report and recommendation), adopted, 708 F. Supp. 3d
1345 (S.D. Ohio 2023), aff’d, Williams v. Parikh, No. 24-3059, 2024 WL 5355086, at *1 (6th Cir.
Sept. 4, 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2713 (2025). In that case, plaintiff named as defendants Clerk
of Courts Parikh and “All Clerk Staff of the Hamilton County Court.” Case No. 1:23-cv-167 (Doc.
3). 	Plaintiff alleged that on two occasions, he attempted to file a lawsuit in the Hamilton County
Court of Common Pleas but his cases were never filed on the court’s docket. He alleged violations
of the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, and state law. The district court
dismissed plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims with prejudice and dismissed all other claims raised
in the complaint without prejudice. 	Id. (Doc. 11). 	On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal. 	The Court of Appeals noted that while it was not entirely clear from the face of the
complaint the capacity in which plaintiff sued the defendants, i.e., in their individual or official
capacities, the Court concluded that “the defendants were sued only in their official capacities.”
Williams, 2024 WL 5355086, at *2 n.2.
In this case, plaintiff names defendant Parikh in his individual capacity only. Plaintiff does
not specify the capacity in which he is suing the two unidentified Hamilton County Clerk’s Office
Deputies. To the extent the defendants in the instant case are sued in their individual capacities,
and the defendants in Case No. 1:23-cv-167 were sued in their official capacities, res judicata does
not bar the instant complaint. The rule of differing capacities provides that “[a] party appearing in
an action in one capacity, individual or representative, is not thereby bound by or entitled to the
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benefits of the rules of res judicata in a subsequent action in which he appears in another capacity.”
Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 823 (6th Cir. 2003). Moreover, res judicata does not apply to
claims previously dismissed without prejudice.2 See Guzowski v. Hartman, 849 F.2d 252, 255 (6th
Cir. 1988). See also Wallace v. United States, 81 F.3d 162 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Guzowski);
United States v. Howard, No. 3:17-cr-163, 2021 WL 2952781, at *2 (S.D. Ohio July 14, 2021)
(“Dismissal without prejudice indicates a particular judgment ‘is not on the merits and will have no
preclusive effect.’”) (quoting Jet, Inc. v. Sewage Aeration Sys., 223 F.3d 1360, 1364 (Fed. Cir.
2000) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396 (1990)). Nevertheless, the
complaint should be dismissed as to all defendants as explained below.
Quasi-judicial immunity
“Quasi-judicial immunity extends to those persons performing tasks so integral or
intertwined with the judicial process that these persons are considered an arm of the judicial officer
who is immune.” Bush v. Rauch, 38 F.3d 842, 847 (6th Cir. 1994). As our sister court has
explained:
The processing of court papers is, in general, a quasi-judicial function. See Wojnicz
v. Davis, 80 F. App’x 382, 383–84 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1152, 124
S.Ct. 1151, 157 L.Ed.2d 1046 (2004) (ruling that the Clerk of the Michigan Supreme
Court was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for act of rejecting a habeas petition
that did not meet certain court rules); Lyle v. Jackson, 49 F. App’x 492, 494 (6th Cir.
2002) (court clerks entitled to quasi-judicial immunity for alleged failure to provide
plaintiff with copies of previous filings and transcripts); Harris v. Suter, 3 F. App’x
365, 366 (6th Cir. 2001) (Supreme Court Clerk who refused to file writ of certiorari
that failed to comply with court rules entitled to quasi-judicial immunity).
Anthony v. Sabaugh, No. 13-CV-12264, 2013 WL 4747344, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 4, 2013)
(extending absolute quasi-judicial immunity to court clerk). See also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d
416, 417 (6th Cir. 1988) (extending absolute quasi-judicial immunity to court clerk and explaining,
2 The only claim that was dismissed with prejudice in the previous case was plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment due process
claim, which he does not re-assert in the instant case.
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“[w]hether an act is judicial in character does not depend on whether it is discretionary.”); Huffer v.
Bogen, 503 F. App’x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2012) (same). Because the alleged actions in the handling
of submissions by plaintiff to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas were quasi-judicial in
nature, defendant Parikh is entitled to absolute immunity from plaintiff’s claims.
To the extent the individual Clerk of Court employees are named in their individual
capacities, these defendants are likewise immune from suit. Absolute quasi-judicial immunity
extends to individual staff members of the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts’ Office charged with
filing pleadings. See Johnson, 2005 WL 2210074, at *3 (“The receipt and filing of a complaint is a
quasi-judicial act.”).
Sovereign immunity
To the extent the individual Clerk of Court employees are sued in their official capacities,
the complaint is subject to dismissal. As the Sixth Circuit explained:
[C]laims against clerks in their official capacity would be barred by sovereign
immunity, just like claims against the office itself. Williams asserted claims against
Parikh and his staff members in their official capacities as employees of the
Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, and “an official-capacity suit is, in all respects
other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham,
473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985). Thus, Williams’s official-capacity claims for monetary
damages are treated as claims against the Hamilton County Clerk of Courts, which
is considered an arm of the state for purposes of § 1983 and sovereign immunity.
See Laborers’ Int’l Union of N. Am., Loc. 860 v. Neff, 29 F.4th 325, 330–31 (6th
Cir. 2022) (explaining that Ohio state courts and their subdivisions are treated
“as segments of state government”).
Williams, 2024 WL 5355086, at *2.
Hamilton County
To assert a plausible claim against Hamilton County, plaintiff must show that the alleged
failure to file his lawsuit was caused by a Hamilton County policy or custom. See Monell v. New
York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff makes only conclusory
allegations in his complaint that the alleged failure to file his lawsuit was caused by a county policy
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or custom. Additionally, his allegations that Hamilton County had a widespread practice of not
filing pro se plaintiffs’ submissions because its staff members were improperly trained is
insufficient. See Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013). See Koren v. Neil, No.
1:21-CV-9, 2022 WL 974340, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 31, 2022) (“[A]llegations ‘assum[ing] that
[unlawful behavior] must be the result of [an entity’s] failure to train or [its] policies or procedures’
are plainly insufficient.”) (quoting Rowland v. City of Memphis, Tenn., No. 2:13-CV-02040-JPM,
2013 WL 2147457, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. May 15, 2013)) (alterations in original). Plaintiff’s claims
against Hamilton County are thus subject to dismissal for failure to state a claim for relief..
Supplemental Jurisdiction
Finally, having found that the Court should dismiss plaintiff’s federal claims, the undersigned
further recommends that the Court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff’s state-
law claims and dismiss such claims without prejudice. See Harper v. AutoAlliance Int’l, Inc., 392
F.3d 195, 210 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating that although the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1367 is a matter of discretion, when a court dismisses all federal claims before trial, it
generally should dismiss the state law claims as well).
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. 	Plaintiff’s federal claims against the defendants be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1).
2. 	The Court DECLINE to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)
over plaintiff’s state-law claims and DISMISS such claims without prejudice.
3. 	The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an appeal
of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith.
See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds,
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 203 (2007).
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) any party may serve and file specific, written objections to this Report
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& Recommendation (R&R) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy
thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely motion by either side for an
extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be
accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party shall respond to an
opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those
objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on
appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.
1981).
Date: 	_______________ 	_______________________________
KAREN L. LITKOVITZ
United States Magistrate Judge
3/6/2026
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