USA v. Sosna

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	Case No. 1:24-cr-6
Plaintiff, 	Judge Matthew W. McFarland
V.
HAROLD SOSNA,
Defendant.
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Harold Sosna's Motion for Early
Termination of Supervised Release (Doc. 3). The Government filed a Response (Doc. 14),
to which Defendant filed a Request for Ruling on the Papers (Doc. 15). Thus, this matter
is ripe for the Court's review. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's
Request for Ruling on the Papers (Doc. 15) and DENIES Defendant's Motion for Early
Termination of Supervised Release (Doc. 3).
BACKGROUND
Defendant Harold Sosna was sentenced to 42 months of imprisonment and three
years of supervised release after pleading guilty to one count of bank fraud in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania. He was further ordered to
pay restitution in the amount of $58,868,584.06. Defendant was released from the Bureau
of Prisons' custody on June 27, 2023. Jurisdiction over Defendant as a supervised releasee
was subsequently transferred to this Court. (Transfer of Jurisdiction, Doc. 1.) Then, on
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April 10, 2025, Defendant moved for early termination of supervised release. (See Motion,
Doc. 3.) Additional filings and briefing followed. (See Docs. 5, 6, 12, 14.) This matter is
now ripe for the Court's review.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
"A district court may, after considering a subset of the sentencing factors set forth
in§ 3553(a), terminate a term of supervised release' at any time after the expiration of one
year of supervised release ... if it is satisfied that such action is warranted by the conduct
of the defendant released and the interest of justice."' United States v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638,
640 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(l)). The particular subset of statutorily
relevant§ 3553(a) factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the 	offense and 	the history and
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established ... ;
(5) any pertinent policy statement . . . ;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.
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18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). As confirmed by the Sixth Circuit, a
district court "exercis[es] its broad discretion to resolve motions for early termination of
supervised release." Hale, 127 F.4th at 641.
Defendant requests for the Court to rule on this matter without holding a hearing.
(See Defendant's Request, Doc. 15.) Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.l(c) requires a
hearing before modifying a term of supervised release unless-as is the case here-the
relief sought is favorable to the defendant and is unopposed by the government. (See
Response, Doc. 14, Pg. ID 72 (deferring to the discretion of the Court in determining
whether the motion should be granted)). Additionally, courts routinely dispose of
motions to modify supervised release without a hearing when no modification results.
See, e.g., United States v. Laughton, 658 F. Supp. 3d 540,543 (E.D. Mich. 2023); United States
1,1. Thorson, No. 5:16-CR-17, 2022 WL 875225, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 23, 2022). A defendant
may also waive the hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)(2)(A). Accordingly, the Court
does not find a hearing necessary in this matter.
Since Defendant has served at least one year of supervised release, he meets this
threshold hurdle for eligibility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). The Court therefore turns to the
relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. To begin, Defendant pled guilty to one count of bank
fraud. As reflected by the $58,868,584.06 ordered in restitution, the scale of Defendant's
deceit was egregious. The Court also acknowledges Defendant's representations that he
had "voluntarily turned himself in prior to any formal investigation" and provided
specific information. (Supp. Briefing, Doc. 5, Pg. ID 47.) In light of this offense conduct,
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as well as accounting for Defendant's specific history and characteristics, the Court finds
these considerations to support Defendant serving his full three years of supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(l). Doing so would also "afford adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct" and serve the relevant considerations under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B)-
(D). In terms of the kinds of sentence and sentencing range established, Defendant's
sentence of 42 months of imprisonment fell below the 63-to-78-month range established
by the United States Sentencing Guidelines. (Presentence Investigation Report, Pg. 19.)
Similarly, early termination of Defendant's term of supervised release would not comport
with "the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar
records who have been found guilty of similar conduct." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6); see also
United States v. Vary, 683 F. Supp. 3d 666,671 (E.D. Mich. 2023). The Court is unaware of
any pertinent policy statements, so 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(5) is a neutral factor.
Finally, the Court considers "the need to provide restitution to any victims of the
offense." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(7). According to the Government, Defendant has since paid
$6,516.27 towards his $58,868,584.06 restitution obligation. (Response, Doc. 14, Pg. ID 71;
see also Supp. Briefing, Doc. 5, Pg. ID 49 (recounting amount paid as of June 2025)).
Judicial policy provides that "[t]he existence of an outstanding financial penalty does not
adversely affect early termination eligibility, as long as the person under supervision is
in compliance with the payment plan for the prior 12 months." Guide to Judiciary Policy,
Vol. 8, § 360.20(e) (July 2, 2018); see also United States v. Zai, No. 22-3371, 2022 WL
17832201, at *6 (6th Cir. Dec. 21, 2022). The Government has confirmed that Defendant
has been making monthly restitution payments, and Defendant submits that he will
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remain responsible for making restitution payments even if his supervised release is
terminated early. (Response, Doc. 14, Pg. ID 72; Supp. Memo, Doc. 12, Pg. ID 64.) That
being said, even acknowledging that the outstanding restitution does not II
adversely
affect early termination eligibility," 	the relevant § 3553(a) factors 	discussed above
decidedly weigh against granting such relief.
In making his request for early termination, Defendant highlights his II
exemplary"
conduct, compliance with his conditions of supervised release, low-risk offender status,
and rehabilitation. (Motion, Doc. 3, Pg. ID 40-42.) The Court certainly commends this
trajectory. 	On the whole, 	however, 	the Court does not find 	early termination of
supervised release to be warranted by Defendant's conduct, the interests of justice, or
after accounting for the relevant§ 3553(a) factors.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Request for Ruling on
the 	Papers 	(Doc. 	15) 	and 	DENIES 	Defendant's 	Motion for 	Early 	Termination of
Supervised Release (Doc. 3).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
By ~~rlv{~~
JUDGE MATTHEWW. McFARLAND
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