Kristin N. Winans

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
Kristin N. Winans,
Debtor.
:
:
:
:
:
Case No. 25-30325
Chapter 13
Judge Crist
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION OF CREDITOR
CLOVER CIRCLE OHIO, LLC FOR EXTENSION OF TIME ONLY TO OBJECT TO
DISCHARGEABILITY OF DEBT (DOC. 31)
I. 	Introduction
This Memorandum Opinion and Order concerns unsecured creditor Clover Circle Ohio,
LLC’s (“Clover Circle”) Motion for Extension of Time to Object to Dischargeability of Debt and
Discharge (the “Motion to Extend Time”) (Doc. 31). The Motion to Extend Time purports to seek
an extension of the deadline in the above-captioned Chapter 13 case of Kristin N. Winans (the
“Debtor”) to object to dischargeability of debt and to discharge. (Doc. 31.) The Motion to Extend
Time is hereby granted with respect to objecting to the dischargeability of debt, given that the
motion was properly noticed and served, and was unopposed by the Debtor, and given that Clover
Circle filed its Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt (Adv. Pro. No. 25-03031 (the
“Adversary,” Doc. 1) (the “Dischargeability Complaint”) on August 14, 2025, within the extended
period requested. However, the Motion to Extend Time is denied insofar as it might have sought
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 6, 2026
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 1 of 17

2
an extension of time to object to the discharge of all of the Debtor’s debts, for which Clover Circle
has not timely filed a motion objecting to discharge, and there does not appear to be any basis to
do so, either. The grant of this Motion to Extend Time will likewise resolve the Debtor’s motion
to dismiss the Dischargeability Complaint, which the Court will address in a separate order entered
in the Adversary contemporaneously with this Order.
II. 	Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over the Motion to Extend Time filed by Clover Circle pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) and Amended General Order 05-02 (Amended Standing Order of
Reference) of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, entered pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) on September 16, 2016. This is a core proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 157(b)(2)(A), (I) and (O), and this Court has the constitutional authority to enter a final order.
III. Background
A. 	Debtor’s Chapter 13 Case and Claims of Clover Circle Ohio, LLC
Debtor filed her Voluntary Petition (Doc. 1) (the “Petition”) under chapter 13 of title 11 of
the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) on February 28, 2025. She did not file any
Schedules or her Statement of Financial Affairs with the Petition, but she did list Clover Circle
Ohio, LLC, c/o Madison & Rosan, LLP, 39 E. Whittier Street, Columbus, OH 43206 on the
creditor matrix. See Petition at 14. After the Notice of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case (Doc. 8) was
issued on March 4, 2025, Debtor filed her Schedules A-J and Statement of Financial Affairs (Doc.
11) on March 14, 2025. Therein, Debtor listed a civil action filed within one (1) year prior to filing
this bankruptcy, identified as Clover Circle Ohio, LLC vs. Kristin Winans, 2024 CV 00892
(Montgomery Cnty. Common Pleas), which remained pending. Statement of Fin. Affairs (Doc.
10) at 3, Part 4, item 9. Debtor also listed a connection to Clover Circle Ohio, LLC, a real estate
business, from January 2021 – June 2023. Id. at 6, Part 11, item 27. Debtor also identified a
contingent or unliquidated counterclaim against Clover Circle “for conversion of unpaid
commissions, declaratory judgment pursuant to ORC 2721.03, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of
operating agreement, fraud – See Montgomery County Common Pleas Case No. 2024 CV 00892.”
Schedule A/B (Doc. 10) at 5-6. And, finally, Debtor listed Clover Circle Ohio, LLC as holding a
contingent, unliquidated, and disputed “claim against Debtor for various claims, including Breach
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 2 of 17

3
of Contract; subject to Debtor’s counterclaim disclosed on Schedule B” in an unknown amount.
Schedule E/F (Doc. 10) at 2, item 4.3.
B. 	Motion to Extend Time and Notices
On June 16, 2025, Clover Circle Ohio, LLC, by and through its counsel, filed the Motion
to Extend Time (Doc. 31). That same day, the Creditor separately filed its Notice of Motion of
Creditor Circle Ohio, LLC for Extension of Time to Object to Dischargeability of Debt and
Discharge (the “Notice”) (Doc. 30). The Notice, however, which is required by Local Bankruptcy
Rule (“LBR”) 9013-1(a)(1)(C), had an incorrect 14-day response period, stating the deadline for
responses was June 30, 2025,1 instead of the required twenty-one (21) day notice. Id. Four days
later, on June 20, 2025, a second Notice of Motion of Creditor Circle Ohio, LLC for Extension of
Time to Object to Dischargeability of Debt and Discharge (the “Second Notice”) (Doc. 32) was
filed, setting a 21-day response period purportedly ending on July 11, 2025, though it actually
ended on July 14, 2025 for service by first-class mail2 to the Debtor, which is 21 days after service
plus 3 days for mail service. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(f) (adding 3 days “after the period would
otherwise expire under (a)” when “service is made by mail”). The Second Notice (Doc. 32)
substantially complied with the sample notice provided in LBR 9013-1(a)(2).
Each of the Motion to Extend Time, the Notice, and the Second Notice was served upon
the Debtor by first-class U.S. mail, pursuant to Bankruptcy Rules 7004(b)(9) and 9013(b), and
LBR 9013-3(b) and (d).3
1 In addition to the stated deadline being one (1) week too short, it also did not include the extra three (3) days required
by Rule 9006(f) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”) when service is made by
mail. See also Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9001(b)(8) (defining the word “mail” to mean “first-class mail, postage prepaid.”).
Pursuant to LBR 9013-3(d) and 7004-1(b) and (c), and ECF Administrative Procedure 2(e), service by the ECF system
is not authorized for initiating motions, such that that they must be served upon attorneys for debtors, debtors, attorneys
who previously filed a notice of appearance, and other parties-in-interest pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 7004, typically
by first-class mail, postage prepaid. As a result, the time period to respond typically includes three (3) more days
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(f).
2 See supra note 1.
3 Technically, service by first-class mail should also be made to the attorney for the Debtor, pursuant to Bankruptcy
Rule 7004(g); however, it is common practice that this is not enforced for motions initiating contested matters in the
main bankruptcy case, although it is enforced for service in adversary proceedings.
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 3 of 17

4
In the Motion to Extend Time, Clover Circle requested an extension of the Deadline (as
defined therein4) “by which Clover Circle is permitted to file an objection to the discharge[e]ability
of debt under Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code” by sixty (60) days, from June 16, 2025, to
August 15, 2025. Mot. to Ext. Time at 2, ¶ 8. The only Bankruptcy Rule cited within the Motion
to Extend Time is 4007(c), and the only provision of the Bankruptcy Code cited is 11 U.S.C. § 523.
Id. at 1, ¶¶ 3, 6. In other words, neither Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b) nor 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f),
regarding a motion to object to discharge, was mentioned in the Motion to Extend Time. Further,
Clover Circle focuses on an unsecured debt it was pursuing “in Case No. 2024 CV 892 in the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas” that it stated had not yet been adjudicated “due to
the automatic stay in this case.” Id. at 1, ¶ 4. And Clover Circle asserts “that the Claim is likely
nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523.” Id. at 1, ¶ 6. There are a couple of places in the body of
the Motion to Extend Time, and in the caption, that contain language suggesting that Clover Circle
might have also been seeking to extend a deadline to object to Debtor’s discharge, but again neither
11 U.S.C. § 1328 nor Bankruptcy Rule 4004 were referenced in the Motion to Extend Time, and
it appears this may simply have been a mixing of terminology. For example, there is a reference
to “the filing of a complaint objecting to the discharge of the Debtor[,]” but in a chapter 13 case
Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a)(3) provides that an objection “to a discharge under § 1328(f)” is pursued
by a motion filed in the main case. Moreover, 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) would not apply to Debtor’s
chapter 13 case, as further discussed in the analysis below.
C. 	Dischargeability Complaint
On August 14, 2025, Clover Circle, as Plaintiff, filed its Dischargeability Complaint (Doc.
1) against the Debtor, as Defendant, initiating the Adversary. Therein, Clover Circle asserted
claims for relief under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6)5, to except Debtor’s obligation to Clover
Circle from discharge.
4 The Motion to Extend Time defined the “Deadline” as meaning “[t]he last date for the filing of a complaint objecting
to the discharge of the Debtor[;]” however, the very next sentence stated that “[t]his motion is filed on or before the
Deadline, complying with Rule 4007(c).”
5 The extension of time to pursue an action under § 523(a)(6) may be of little moment. Debts that could be determined
non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) in Chapter 7 are typically subject to the so-called super-discharge in Chapter 13,
absent a Chapter 13 debtor seeking a hardship discharge, as discussed below. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2). Congress, as
part of making the Chapter 13 discharge somewhat less “super” under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), enacted a more limited provision that excepts from the standard
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 4 of 17

5
D. 	Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum Contra
On October 16, 2025, the Debtor, as Defendant, filed her Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
and Notice (Doc. 10) (the “Motion to Dismiss”) in which she asserted that the Court must dismiss
the Dischargeability Complaint because it was filed “without an order granting extension of time”
and therefore was not timely filed.6 Mot. to Dismiss at 2. Debtor also, belatedly (given that she
had not timely responded to the Motion to Extend Time in the main case), argued that the Motion
to Extend Time should be denied because no “hearing [has] been held as required by Fed. R. Bankr.
P. 4004(b)” and because Clover Circle did not ask any questions at the meeting of creditors and
did not request to take a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination of the Debtor; in other words, because
it was “a last-minute extension of time to file objections to discharge without doing any discovery
by way of document request or 2004 exam.” Mot. to Dismiss at 2 (citing Huntington Nat’l Bank
v. Lewis (In re Lewis), 224 B.R. 619 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1997) and In re Vinson, 509 B.R. 128
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2013)).7 And absent an extension of time, Debtor argues the Dischargeability
Complaint should be dismissed.
On October 30, 2025, Clover Circle filed its Memorandum Contra to Defendant Kristin
Winans Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 11) (the “Memorandum Contra”) in the Adversary. Therein,
Clover Circle argued that “[s]ince Plaintiff’s claims are brought under § 523(a)(4) and (6), the
Chapter 13 discharge debts “for restitution, or damages, awarded in a civil action against the debtor as a result of
willful or malicious injury by the debtor that caused personal injury to an individual or the death of an individual.”
11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(4) (emphasis added). But both the listing of Clover Circle’s claim by the Debtor in her Schedules
and SOFA, as well as the Dischargeability Complaint, indicate that § 1328(a)(4) is not applicable. See, e.g.,
MarketGraphics Rsch. Grp., Inc. v. Berge (In re Berge), 953 F.3d 907, 914-15 (6th Cir. 2020) (describing the
difference in the language of §§ 523(a)(6) and 1328(a)(4)); Jennings v. Bodrick (In re Bodrick), 509 B.R. 843, 858-
59 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2014) (similar) (Buchanan, J.).
6 As will be addressed in a separate order entered in the Adversary, Debtor argues that the Dischargeability Complaint
is untimely because the Court had not yet ruled on the Motion to Extend Time. See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 10), Adv.
Pro. No. 25-03031 at 2. But this Memorandum Opinion and Order moots that argument. Debtor’s other argument is
that the Motion to Extend Time should be denied, but Debtor did not timely oppose the Motion to Extend Time such
that under LBR 9013-1(d), as well as Bankruptcy Rule 9001(a) and the rules of construction set forth in 11 U.S.C.
§ 102, which apply to the Bankruptcy Rules, no hearing was required to be held as further analyzed herein.
7 Notably, both Lewis and Vinson involved Chapter 7 cases and are distinguishable from this case. In Lewis, the debtor
opposed the motion for extension of time to file a nondischargeability complaint, “[t]he Huntington National Bank
did not appear at the hearing” and “the Debtor’s attorney was present for the hearing.” 224 B.R. at 620. Moreover, in
that case the creditor merely asserted that it was “engaged in negotiations” with the debtor and needed “more time to
conclude their discussions” which the debtor disputed. Id. at 621. In Vinson, the Chapter 7 debtor also opposed the
extension of time sought and the only basis asserted by CFBank was that “Debtors’ testimony at the § 341 Meeting of
Creditors raised questions whether Debtors properly scheduled their assets, and thus engendered concerns about their
entitlement to a discharge.” 509 B.R. at 130.
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 5 of 17

6
complaint is timely regardless of any other deadline purported by Defendant.” Memo. Contra at 2,
§ I. Although bleeding into analysis, the Court will quickly comment here that this is incorrect.
Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) sets the applicable deadline to file “a complaint to determine whether a
debt is dischargeable under § 523(c)” because § 523(c)(1) provides that a debtor “shall be
discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of subsection (a) of this
section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is owed, and after notice and a
hearing, the court determines such debt to be excepted from discharge . . . .” Thus, the deadline to
file a complaint under § 523(c) is the deadline to file claims under § 523(a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(6),
and therefore the Motion to Extend Time was necessary in this situation.
Substantively, Clover Circle argued in its Memo Contra that Debtor is not prejudiced by
the extension of time given that she failed to timely respond to the Motion to Extend Time; the
Dischargeability Complaint should be determined on its merits and the case law cited by Debtor
in its Motion to Dismiss does not apply; and because discovery had been exchanged in the state
court litigation before this chapter 13 case was filed “Plaintiff’s grounds for exception are apparent
and 	well 	within 	Defendant’s 	knowledge, 	making 	preliminary 	discovery 	or 	2004 	exam
unnecessary.” Memo Contra at 3, § III.
IV. 	Analysis
A. 	Deadline at Issue – Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) – Failure of Debtor to Respond,
and Basis to Extend the Time
Pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), the original time to file a complaint under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(c) to determine whether a debt is dischargeable was “60 days after the first date set for the
§ 341(a) meeting of creditors.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). As the meeting of creditors was
originally scheduled for (and ultimately held on8) April 15, 2025 (see Notice of Chp. 13
Bankruptcy Case (Doc. 8) at 2, ¶ 7), 60 days from that date was Saturday, June 14, 2025; however,
pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 9006(a)(1)(C), the period to file a complaint continued to run until
Monday June 16, 2025, as Debtor concedes9 and as was stated in the Notice of Chapter 13
8 See Docket for Case No. 25-30325, Apr. 15, 2025 (“Meeting of Creditors Held (Jansing, John)”).
9 Debtor, in her Motion to Dismiss filed in the Adversary, agrees that Clover Circle timely filed the Motion for
Extension of Time by the deadline of June 16, 2025. See Mot. to Dismiss (Doc. 10), Adv. Pro. No. 25-03031 at 2
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 6 of 17

7
Bankruptcy Case (Doc. 8) (the “Notice of Bankruptcy”) issued on March 4, 2025. Therefore, the
Motion to Extend Time was timely filed in compliance with Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), “before the
time expires,” which therefore permits this Court “after notice and a hearing and for cause” to
“extend the time to file.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c).
Even though the Motion to Extend Time was timely filed and appropriately served, Debtor
did not ever file a response memorandum in the main case, timely or not, as required by LBR
9013-1(b) (stating that “a response memorandum must be filed if the relief sought by a
motion . . . is opposed.”), such that the Court may grant the Motion to Extend Time without a
hearing. In this situation, LBR 9013-1(d) provides that “cause” may exist for the Court “to grant
the motion . . . as filed without further notice to the extent such action would not conflict with any
Rule or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.” There is no conflict, as further discussed below. In fact,
the rules of construction section of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 102, which is specifically
made applicable to the Bankruptcy Rules such as 4007(c), through Bankruptcy Rule 9001(a),
provides as follows:
In this title—
(1) “after notice and a hearing”, or a similar phrase—
(A) means after such notice as is appropriate in the
particular circumstances, and such opportunity for a hearing
as is appropriate in the particular circumstances; but
(B) authorizes an act without an actual hearing if such
notice is given properly and if—
(ii) 	such a hearing is not requested timely by a party
in interest . . . .
11 U.S.C. § 102(1). And, as noted above, presuming a timely motion is filed, Bankruptcy Rule
4007(c) permits this Court to extend the time to file a complaint to determine whether a debt is
dischargeable “after notice and hearing and for cause[.]” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(c). Thus, when
Debtor did not timely respond to the Motion to Extend, the Court was authorized to grant the
Motion to Extend without a hearing, consistent with LBR 9013-1(d). However, Clover Circle’s
counsel did not upload a proposed order until October 17, 2025, which appears to have been
(stating, in part, “Plaintiff timely filed a Motion for Extension of Time to Object to Dischargeability of Debt and
Discharge (‘Motion’) on June 16, 2025”).
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 7 of 17

8
prompted by Debtor filing the Motion to Dismiss in the Adversary the day before, on October 16,
2025, as further discussed below.
B. 	Inapplicability of Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b)
With respect to the issue of which deadline Clover Circle sought to extend, as noted above,
there was no mention in the Motion to Extend Time of either Bankruptcy Rule 4004 nor 11 U.S.C.
§ 1328(f), and Clover Circle did not file a motion to object to the Debtor’s chapter 13 discharge
by the extended deadline sought, August 15, 2025 (or since then). Accordingly, to the extent that
Clover Circle ever contemplated moving to extend the deadline under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b)(1)
to file such a motion under Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a)(3), as suggested by the caption to the Motion
to Extend Time, they can be deemed to have waived that request by not stating that argument or a
basis for that request within the body of the Motion to Extend Time. See Grange Ins. Co. v. US
Framing Inc., No. 3:22-CV-167-CHB, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54974, 2023 WL 2731045, at *6
(W.D. Ky. Mar. 30, 2023) (citing Slater v. Potter, 28 F. App’x 512, 513 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding
undeveloped arguments “are deemed waived”)). Moreover, given that the docket in this case
reflects that Debtor has not previously filed any bankruptcies, neither of the factual bases for
denying a discharge of all debts in a Chapter 13 case, as recited in § 1328(f)(1) or (f)(2), exist in
this case.10 Further, in the Memorandum Contra to Motion to Dismiss that Clover Circle filed on
October 30, 2025 in the Adversary, Clover Circle focused solely on Bankruptcy Rule 4007(b) and
its claims asserted in the Dischargeability Complaint based on 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) and (a)(6).
Accordingly, the Court need not address any extension of the time to object to the discharge of all
debts pursuant to Bankruptcy Rule 4004(a)(3) and (b).
Although the foregoing more than sufficiently establishes that only the deadline to file a
complaint objecting to dischargeability of debt is presently at issue, it is also worth noting that the
Notice of Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Case (Doc. 8) (the “Notice of Bankruptcy”) issued on March 4,
2025, which was mailed to Clover Circle’s counsel (see Certificate of Notice (Doc. 9) at 3) put
Clover Circle on notice, albeit through their counsel (though counsel to active litigation) that there
was a June 16, 2025 deadline “to file a complaint to challenge dischargeability of certain debts[.]”
10 In this same vein, Debtor’s belated assertion, in her Motion to Dismiss, that the Motion to Extend Time should be
denied, in part, because “a hearing [has not] been held as required by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4004(b)[,]” is of no moment
to this analysis.
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 8 of 17

9
Notice of Bankr. at 2, § 8.11 Under that section heading of “Deadlines[,]” the Notice of Bankruptcy
advised as follows:
You must file:
• 	a motion if you assert that the debtors are not entitled to receive
a discharge under [sic] U.S.C. § 1328(f) or
• 	a complaint if you want to have a particular debt excepted from
discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) or (4).[12]
Accordingly, Clover Circle was on notice that there was a deadline, as applicable, to object to the
discharge of all debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f),13 as well as a deadline to object to the
dischargeability of a debt pursuant to § 523(a)(2) and (a)(4). And Clover Circle only filed the
Dischargeability Complaint objecting to the discharge of a debt.
C. 	Failure to Timely Submit a Proposed Order
Although the Debtor failed to respond to the Motion to Extend Time by the deadline of
July 14, 2025, established by LBR 9013-1(b), Clover Circle did not timely submit a proposed
order, which was due by July 21, 2025, pursuant to LBR 9072-1(e). Under Rule 9072-1(e), titled
“Submission of Proposed Order When No Response is Filed to Motion[,]” an order was required
to be submitted to the court “granting the relief requested” within seven (7) days of the “expiration
of the applicable time period[.]” But the proposed order was not uploaded until October 17, 2025.
In addition, that proposed order did not include “a 4” top margin on the first page to accommodate
the judge’s electronic signature[,]” as required by LBR 9072-1(c), and a second order was
uploaded later that same day.
11 To the uninitiated, the term “complaint” as used in this part of the Notice of Bankruptcy can be misleading as it is
contradicted by the bullet point below advising that a party in interest would need to file a motion to object to the
discharge of all debts under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f).
12 The reason that § 523(a)(6) is not identified here is that, as further analyzed below, in a chapter 13 case debts of the
kind specified in § 523(a)(6) are not excepted from discharge; whereas debts of the kind specified in § 523(a)(2) and
(a)(4) can be excepted from discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(2) (excepting from discharge debt “of the kind
specified in . . . paragraph . . . (2) . . . [or] (4) . . . of section 523(a).”).
13 The other basis to object to a discharge of all debts in a chapter 13 case does not arise unless the debtor seeks to
obtain a discharge prior to completion of payments under the plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b), referred to as a
“hardship discharge.” In that event, § 1328(c) provides that debts “of a kind specified in section 523(a) of this title”
may be excepted from discharge, which is a categorical exception of all sub-parts of § 523(a), not the more limited
exceptions set forth in § 1328(a)(2). In conjunction, Bankruptcy Rule 4007(d), which is titled “Chapter 13—Time to
File a Complaint Under § 523(a)(6); Notice of Time; Extension[,]” and is not applicable to the present circumstance,
provides that “[w]hen a debtor files a motion for discharge under § 1328(b), the court must set a time to file a complaint
under § 523(a)(6) to determine whether the debt is dischargeable.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 4007(d).
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 9 of 17

10
It appears that the belated uploading of the proposed order granting the Motion to Extend
Time was prompted by the Motion to Dismiss the Dischargeability Complaint, which was filed by
Debtor on October 16, 2025. The very next day the proposed order to grant the Motion to Extend
Time was uploaded.
With respect to the belated uploading of the proposed order, the question is whether this
delay should result in the denial of the Motion to Extend Time for Clover Circle’s failure to comply
with LBR 9072-1(e). Although the Court expects counsel to submit orders promptly in accordance
with LBR 9072-1(e), the general policy of the federal courts is to determine matters on the merits
rather than based upon a procedural rule violation. See, e.g., Livonia Pub. Schs. v. Selective Ins.
Co., 443 F. Supp. 3d 815, 861 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (explaining that the Federal Rules “encourage”
determinations on the merits “rather than on procedural technicalities” (cleaned up)). Further,
Clover Circle appears to be represented by counsel who might not frequently appear in this Court.
Accordingly, in this particular situation in which a strict enforcement of LBR 9072-1(e) would
have a harsh result, and given that LBR 9072-1(e) does not provide what should happen when a
party fails to timely upload a proposed order, the Court will not deny the Motion to Extend Time
on this basis. Still, had Clover Circle timely submitted the proposed order in compliance with LBR
9072-1(e), perhaps this procedural kerfuffle could have been avoided.
D. 	Automatic Extension Pursuant to LBR 9006-1
To the extent Debtor argues that the Dischargeability Complaint was untimely because the
Court did not previously grant the Motion to Extend Time, that argument is not well-taken. There
is no dispute that the Motion to Extend Time was timely filed. Thus, LBR 9006-1 kicked in, which
provides that:
If a motion to extend the time to take any action is filed before
the expiration of the period presumed by the Code, the Rules, the
Local Rules, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or court order, the
time shall be automatically extended until the court acts on the
motion, without the necessity of a bridge order.
Accordingly, Clover Circle’s time to file the Dischargeability Complaint was automatically
extended, at least until the new deadline requested, with which Clover Circle complied, subject
only to the Court’s ruling on its Motion to Extend Time. Therefore, if the Court grants the Motion
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 10 of 17

11
to Extend Time, the interim automatic extension of time essentially converts into a permanent
extension of time, such that the Dischargeability Complaint will have been timely filed.
E. 	“Cause” to Extend the Time to File the Dischargeability Complaint
The ultimate question before the Court is whether to grant the Motion to Extend Time. It
is clear, as discussed above, that the Court may do so without a hearing on the basis that Debtor
did not timely oppose the Motion to Extend Time. The only remaining question is whether there
is “cause.” LBR 9013-1(d) likewise provides that Debtor’s failure to timely respond “may be
cause . . . to the extent such action would not conflict with any Rule or Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure.” As previewed above, the Court finds that in this circumstance there is no conflict and
“cause” has been established.
Unlike some situations in which a creditor comes out of the blue to attempt to assert a
dischargeability claim, in this case Clover Circle was squarely on Debtor’s radar, as evidenced by
Debtor listing them four different times in her Schedules and SOFA. Perhaps the situation with
Clover Circle was even a precipitating factor in Debtor filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy.
The basis stated by Clover Circle in its Motion to Extend Time was that: (1) “its unsecured
debt arises from claims in Case No. 2024 CV 892 in the Montgomery County Court of Common
Pleas that remain unadjudicated due to the automatic stay in this case. Discovery was ongoing at
the time this case caused a stay, and it is necessary to assess discharge[e]ability in this case
reasonably[;]” (2) “[f]or additional cause, this Court by Order dated June 10, 2025, rescheduled
the Confirmation Hearing to July 10, 2025[;]” and (3) “the Claim is likely nondischargeable under
11 U.S.C. § 523.” Mot. to Ext. Time at 1, ¶¶ 4, 5, and 6.
The more granular question before the Court is whether these bases for cause are sufficient,
in the circumstance in which the Debtor did not timely respond to the Motion to Extend Time.
Ultimately, while these bases, alone, might not have been sufficient if the Debtor had objected, in
that situation Clover Circle would then have had the opportunity to present evidence and make
arguments at hearing. But this did not occur because the Debtor did not respond. Accordingly, this
situation is distinguishable from cases in which the debtor opposes the extension of time and the
exact standard is of lesser importance, whatever it may exactly be. See, e.g., In re Riggs, No. 22-
30575, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400, at *8, n.3, 2023 WL 1998547, at *4, n.3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Feb.
14, 2023) (Gustafson, J.) (denying a motion to extend time filed in a Chapter 7 case that the debtors
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 11 of 17

12
opposed and citing In re Motil, No. 22-10571, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS, at *4-5, 2022 WL 2761042, at
*2 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 14, 2022) (Harris, J.) as discussing “an apparent discrepancy in the
standards applied in the Sixth Circuit used to determine whether to extend time for ‘cause’ under
Rules 4004(b) and 4007(c).”). “In In re Brady, the Sixth Circuit embraced a low threshold to show
sufficient cause.” In re Motil, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS, at *4-5, 2022 WL 2761042, at *2 (quoted in In
re Riggs, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400, at *10, 2023 WL 1998547, at *5). But “in In re St. George, the
Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel [(“B.A.P.”)] adopted what seems to be a heightened ‘for
cause’ standard using a five-factor test.” In re Motil, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS, at *4-5, 2022 WL
2761042, at *2. Yet in In re Sheppard, the B.A.P. concluded that extension of the deadline “should
be liberally granted when the circumstances merit such a finding.” 532 B.R. 672, 680 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2015).
The B.A.P. noted that while cause requires a “case-by-case” analysis, “there is precedent
that suggests the threshold for granting such motions should be set low.” Id. at 677. In doing so,
the Sheppard Panel quoted from Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 F.3d 1165, 1171 (6th Cir.
1996), in stating “parties requesting such an extension still must demonstrate some minimally
sufficient showing of cause for the extension.” However, the Brady decision did not specifically
define what constitutes cause because that was not an issue in that appeal. 101 F.3d at 1171, n.1.
Years later, the B.A.P. appeared to provide a somewhat heightened standard for establishing cause.
See In re Motil, No. 22-10571, 2022 WL 2761042, at *2-3 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio July 14, 2022) (citing
a five-factor test for establishing cause from the unreported decision in McDermott v. St. George
(In re St. George), Nos. 16-8017/8018, 2017 WL 1379321, at *4 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2017)).14
Curiously, St. George does not cite Sheppard, which is a reported decision. Perhaps this difference
is because St. George addressed Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b), extending the time to object to a
14 The five-factor test to consider in St. George is
(1) whether the creditor has received sufficient notice of the deadline and the information to file an
objection;
(2) the complexity of the case;
(3) whether the creditor has exercised diligence;
(4) whether the debtor has refused in bad faith to cooperate with the creditor; and
(5) the possibility that proceedings pending in another forum will result in collateral estoppel of the relevant
issues.
2017 WL 1379321 at *4.
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 12 of 17

13
debtor’s discharge, whereas Sheppard addressed dischargeability under Rule 4007(c). And given
that objections to discharge and dischargeability have different impacts, perhaps there is reason to
view the standards slightly differently. In re Motil, 2002 Bankr. LEXIS, at 4 (observing that “[t]he
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sixth Circuit [B.A.P.] appear to apply different standards
when deciding whether to extend time for cause under Bankruptcy Rules 4004 and 4007.”)
In any event, considering the Creditor was seeking a first-time extension for 60 days, and
the lack of any timely response from the Debtor, as well as the fact that this is a Chapter 13 case
(not a Chapter 7 case), the Court finds sufficient cause to grant the Motion to Extend Time.
Although the Brady court did not define specifically what constitutes cause, as Sheppard suggests,
extensions should be liberally granted, particularly when there is no response from the Debtor.
Both explanations support the extension. First, the Creditor was evaluating partial discovery from
unadjudicated state court litigation. If the Debtor had responded, the Court may well have
considered the alleged lack of questioning at the meeting of creditors and Clover Circle not seeking
a Bankruptcy Rule 2004 examination. The Court cannot speculate as to why Cover Circle did not
take that approach, but nor can the Debtor raise these issues months later. Thus, even if St. George
represents a heightened standard that differs from Sheppard (an issue the Court need not decide
today), the Creditor’s efforts to obtain an extension coupled with the Debtors lack of opposition
weighs strongly in favor of granting the extension, particularly given that this Court’s Local
Bankruptcy Rules (“LBR”), particularly LBR 4007-1(a), permits stipulations with creditors “to
extend the deadline for filing a complaint to determine the dischargeability of a debt.” A failure to
oppose a motion to extend time, while not a stipulation, likewise evidences a lack of opposition
and it is notable that here the Debtor continues to be represented by an attorney.
The second 	explanation perhaps justifies the extension even more than the first.
Fundamentally, it is because this is a Chapter 13 case in which it will likely be years before the
Debtor becomes entitled to a discharge, unlike a Chapter 7 case in which a complaint objecting to
dischargeability of debt or the discharge itself holds up a debtor’s fresh start. See In re Hansen,
No. 25-20416, 2025 WL 2990647, at *2, 2025 Bankr. LEXIS 2741, at *5 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Oct.
23, 2025) (Lutz, J.) (ruling on an opposed motion to extend time to object to discharge in a Chapter
7 case and citing St. George, 2017 WL 1379321, at *4, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1065, at *8 for the
proposition that “ ‘[b]ecause discharge is the most important element of a debtor’s ‘fresh start,’ a
debtor has an interest in the prompt resolution of discharge issues.”); see also In re Lewis, 224
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 13 of 17

14
B.R. at 621 (noting that “[b]ankruptcy courts around the country have carefully scrutinized
motions by creditors for enlargements of time to file adversary complaints object to discharge in
Chapter 7 cases.”) (emphasis added). Moreover, when seeking to object to only discharge of a
debt, as opposed to the discharge of all debts, the full discharge is obviously not at issue.
Nevertheless, to the extent the five-factor test stated in St. George were applied, the overall
circumstances would still appear to weigh in favor of granting a one-time extension in this case,
by which the Dischargeability Complaint already on file will be deemed timely.15 Moreover, as
noted above, St. George involved analysis of Bankruptcy Rule 4004(b), not Bankruptcy Rule
4007(c), and it also involved the U.S. Trustee’s request for a second extension of time after the
U.S. Trustee had not acted during its “first 60-day extension.” In re Motil, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS, at
*7-8 (citing In re St. George, 2017 Bankr. LEXIS, at *5-7).
Notably, all the case law reviewed by this Court in analyzing the standard for a motion to
extend time under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) appears to involve Chapter 7 cases, not Chapter 13
cases. In other words, the rational for setting a high bar in a Chapter 7 case to obtain an extension
of time under Bankruptcy Rules 4004(a) and 4007(c), well-stated as “promot[ing] the prompt
resolution of bankruptcy cases and discharge issues, providing a debtor their discharge—the
cornerstone of a debtor’s fresh start” does not necessarily apply with the same immediacy to a
Chapter 13 case in which a discharge is years away. In re Riggs, 2023 Bankr. LEXIS 400, at *8.
That is not to say there is no standard, but in this particular situation, precisely defining the standard
is less important as the “cause” need not be as narrowly construed because denying the Motion to
Extend Time would not appear to result in a prompt fresh start, and, as construed by the Court
herein, does not concern the discharge of all debts.
15 It appears that Clover Circle received sufficient notice and had information to file its Dischargeability Complaint,
and that Debtor’s case is not complex, such that the first two factors would not be in favor. But Clover Circle, which
appears to be represented by counsel who might not frequently practice in bankruptcy court, did diligently request a
first extension of time that was unopposed. The Court does not know whether the debtor “has refused in bad faith to
cooperate with the creditor.” But there is, in this situation, the Civil Action that was pending prepetition and is
referenced in the Nonstandard Provision (¶ 13) of the Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan (Doc. 33), which provides
that “Debtor will provide annual status reports on pending litigation (Clover Circle Ohio, LLC vs. Kristin Winans –
Montgomery County Common Pleas Case No. 2024 CV 00892)[.]” Overall, a close call if it were analyzed under this
framework, but one in which the balance still tips in favor of a one-time 60-day extension, as was granted in St. George
prior to denial of the second requested extension (and even though the second extension was denied for 60 days in St.
George, it was still granted for 10 days – a total of 70 days). 2017 Bankr. LEXIS 1065, at *7.
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 14 of 17

15
The Debtor’s discharge in this Chapter 13 case is likely years away. Before the original
deadline to file a dischargeability adversary proceeding under § 523(c), as set forth in Bankruptcy
Rule 4007(c), the Debtor had proposed its First Amended Chapter 13 Plan (Doc. 20) (the “First
Amended Plan”) on April 25, 2025. The First Amended Plan proposed an 18% dividend to
unsecured non-priority creditors and added a Nonstandard Provision (¶ 13), which states that
“Debtor will provide annual status reports on pending litigation (Clover Circle Ohio, LLC v.
Kristin Winans – Montgomery County Common Pleas Case No. 2024 CV 00892)[.]” The
Proposed Plan was objected to by PHH Mortgage Corporation, Wright Patt Credit Union, and also
the Chapter 13 Trustee (Docs. 22, 25, 26). The PHH Mortgage Corporation objection was
withdrawn (Doc. 24) on May 12, 2025; however, the other objections remained pending. The
Second Amended Chapter 13 Plan (Doc. 33) (the “Second Amended Plan”), which was likewise
subject to objections (Docs. 35 and 36), was only confirmed on January 16, 2026. See Order
Confirming Chp. 13 Plan (Doc. 33) and Awarding Att’y Fees (Doc. 45). And it contains the same
Nonstandard Provision concerning the pending litigation with Clover Circle. Second Am. Plan at
9, ¶ 13. Dischargeability of debt creates an exception to a debtor’s discharge, but only becomes
relevant in chapter 13 if and when the Debtor ultimately receives a discharge upon completion of
the plan payments. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
The final basis asserted by Clover Circle as “cause” is self-serving. In particular, Clover
Circle “avers that the Claim is likely nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523.” Were this a bald
statement without any context, it would be wholly insufficient as a basis. However, there does
appear to be a substantial amount of history between Clover Circle and Debtor as detailed in
Debtor’s Schedules and SOFA, as well as the state court litigation that preceded Debtor’s chapter
13 case, as alleged by Clover Circle in its pending Memorandum Contra filed in the Adversary.
Moreover, Debtor identified the pending litigation in both her First Amended and Second
Amended Plans. Thus, Clover Circle asserts that it did not ask questions at the meeting of creditors
or seek an examination under Bankruptcy Rule 2004 due to the discovery already conducted in the
state court litigation. This does beg the question as to why Clover Circle did not proceed to file its
Dischargeability Complaint by the original deadline under Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c) and makes
this a very close call. But conversely, there is the ultimate question of whether a creditor, who
timely files a motion to extend this time, which is not opposed by the Debtor, should be denied
even one extension of time. This the Court declines to do. Denying the unopposed Motion to
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 15 of 17

16
Extend Time in this context would work a harsh result that, no matter what the precise standard is
would set a bar that is too high in this particular instance. Debtor, represented by an attorney, did
not timely oppose the Motion to Extend Time, and only raised arguments in opposition after the
Dischargeability Complaint had been filed, even though filed within the extended time sought by
Clover Circle. Although the Motion to Extend Time does not contain the most robust bases for
“cause,” it would be inequitable to find that Clover Circle did not support its Motion to Extend
Time with sufficient evidence when no hearing occurred because the Debtor did not oppose the
Motion to Extend Time.
Finally, although not mentioned by either Clover Circle or the Debtor, Clover Circle’s
timely proof of claim, filed on March 27, 2025, attached a copy of the Verified Complaint with
Jury Demand filed in Case No. 2024 CV 00892 in the Montgomery County, Ohio Court of
Common Pleas on February 15, 2024, just over a year before Debtor filed her chapter 13 case. It
includes claims – Counts III and IV – for breaches of fiduciary duties, as well as a claim – Count
IX – relating to theft. While it is obviously far too early to reach any conclusions regarding the
validity of these claims, the claims as stated at least appear to fit within the categories of matters
covered by 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4), such that it would be better to let the Adversary proceed in this
situation than to deny a timely filed and unopposed request for a first extension of time. Moreover,
the four-page Motion to Dismiss filed by the Debtor in the Adversary, which is based on Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), focuses solely on the timeliness of the Dischargeability
Complaint, a procedural issue, and does not address the substance. Again, this result is particularly
warranted when the Chapter 13 case remains only about one year old, the Chapter 13 Plan was
recently confirmed, and the dischargeability of this debt is only relevant if the Debtor ultimately
receives a statutory discharge. See Order Confirming Chapter 13 Plan and Awarding Attorney
Fees (entered Jan. 16, 2026). It does not appear that the Debtor’s “fresh start” will be delayed in
this circumstance.
For all these reasons, the Motion to Extend Time is hereby GRANTED, but only with
respect to the deadline to file a complaint objecting to the dischargeability of debt (not to the
discharge of all debt), such that the deadline for Clover Circle to file a complaint objecting to the
dischargeability of debt, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(c), is hereby extended until and including
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 16 of 17

17
August 15, 2025, and the Dischargeability Complaint filed on August 14, 2025 is hereby deemed
to have been timely filed.16
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to:
All Creditors and Parties in Interest
16 Based upon this Memorandum Opinion and Order, the Dischargeability Complaint was timely filed, and the Court
will enter a separate order denying the pending Motion to Dismiss in the related Adversary, No. 25-03031.
Case 3:25-bk-30325 Doc 48 Filed 03/06/26 Entered 03/09/26 11:11:28 Desc Main
Document Page 17 of 17