Henderson, et al v. Leopold, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
TERRY HENDERSON, et al., ) CASE NO. 5:25-cv-1079
)
)
PLAINTIFFS, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER OF REMAND
LINDSEY LEOPOLD, et al., )
)
)
DEFENDANTS. )
There are multiple motions pending before the Court. Plaintiffs, Terry Henderson
(“Terry”), Richard Henderson (“Richard”), and Midnite Oil Co., LLC (“Midnite Oil”)
(collectively, “plaintiffs”), have moved to remand this matter to state court. (Doc. No. 11.)
Defendants, Lindsey Leopold (“Leopold”), WorkforceQA, LLC (“WorkforceQA”), Quest
Diagnostics of Pennsylvania, Inc. (“Quest Diagnostics”),1 and Landstar Transportation Logistics,
Inc. (“Landstar”) (collectively, “defendants”), each seek dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). (Doc. No. 18 (WorkforceQA’s Motion to Dismiss); Doc. No. 20 (Quest Diagnostics’s
and Leopold’s Motion to Dismiss); Doc. No. 22 (Landstar’s Motion to Dismiss).) Landstar
alternatively seeks a transfer of venue. (See Doc. No. 22.)
“When confronted with a motion to remand and a motion to dismiss, the Court must decide
1 In its response to plaintiffs’ motion to remand, Quest Diagnostics indicates that it was incorrectly named and served
in this action as “LabOne of Ohio, LLC.” (Doc. No. 23, at 1 (All page number references to the record herein are to
the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual document by the Court’s electronic filing system.).) Because
the parties use “Quest Diagnostics” to refer to this defendant throughout the briefing, the Court will do the same.
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the motion to remand first.” See Open Sys. Tech. DE, Inc. v. Transguard Ins. Co. of Am., No. 1:14-
cv-312, 2014 WL 3625737, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 2014) (citation omitted); see also McNally
v. Kingdom Tr. Co., No. 5:21-cv-68, 2021 WL 4555838, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 5, 2021) (noting
that a district court should decide a motion to remand first “because if remand is appropriate, then
the state court should decide the motion to dismiss.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Accordingly, the Court turns its attention first to the motion to remand.2 Because the Court finds
that remand is appropriate in that the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain this action, the motion is
granted, and this case is remanded to state court.
I. BACKGROUND
Terry and Richard are married, and together they own and operate Midnite Oil. (Doc. No.
1-2 (Complaint) ¶¶ 1–2.) They are also truck drivers, each having earned a commercial driver’s
license, which includes certain special certifications permitting them to ship weapons and
ammunition for the United States Department of Defense (“DOD”). (Id. ¶ 7.) Through Midnite
Oil, Terry and Richard would enter into exclusive trucking relationships with large transportation
companies (including companies with DOD clearance). (Id. ¶¶ 10–11.)
In May 2024, Terry and Richard decided to enter into an exclusive trucking relationship
with Landstar. (Id. ¶ 12.) To finalize the arrangement, Landstar required Terry and Richard to take
certain actions, including severing ties with Midnite Oil’s existing exclusive trucking partner and
successfully completing “pre-employment drug screening tests that are subject to formal
Department of Transportation regulations and procedures (the ‘DOT Regulations’)[.]” (Id. ¶ 13.)
2 The motion to remand is fully briefed. (Doc. No. 23 (Quest Diagnostics’s and Leopold’s Response); Doc. No. 24
(WorkforceQA’s Response); Doc. No. 25 (Landstar’s Response); Doc. No. 27 (Plaintiffs’ Reply).)
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Landstar relies on third-party administrator WorkforceQA, who “facilitate[es] drug testing and/or
reporting of drug tests for/to individuals, employers, prospective employers and/or relevant
government agencies.” (See id. ¶¶ 5, 22.) Quest Diagnostics supplies drug testing facilities,
including one located in Akron, Ohio, and Landstar advertises that Quest Diagnostics is its
“preferred vendor” for these laboratory tests. (Id. ¶¶ 21–22; see id. ¶ 4.)
On May 3, 2024, Terry and Richard reported as directed to Quest Diagnostics’s Akron
facility to complete their pre-employment drug screening tests. (Id. ¶ 20.) Leopold, an employee
of Quest Diagnostics, was present for the tests. (See id. ¶ 3.) Richard was able to successfully
complete both of his drug tests, and Terry also successfully completed her first drug test without
incident. (Id. ¶ 23.)
According to plaintiffs, Quest Diagnostics failed to follow the proper procedures—
including the governing DOT Regulations—on Terry’s second test. (Id.) In particular, the
complaint provides that Terry’s second test yielded an insufficient amount of specimen (identified
in the complaint as the “Incomplete Urine Sample”) for the test. (Id. ¶ 23; see id. ¶ 27(f).) Rather
than follow the DOT Regulations—“that would have permitted Terry a full three hours to complete
her urine sample drug test”—Leopold forced Terry to leave the testing facility within 30 minutes
of producing the Incomplete Urine Sample because it was 4:00 p.m. and the facility was about to
close.3 (Id. ¶ 27(e), (g).)
3 Title 49 C.F.R. 40, et seq. governs the procedures for transportation workplace drug and alcohol testing. Pursuant to
49 C.F.R. § 40.193(b)(1), when a collector fails to obtain a sufficient specimen to perform the urine drug screen, the
collector is directed to discard the insufficient specimen, urge the test subject to drink 40 ounces of fluid over a period
of three hours, and attempt another collection. Additionally, 49 C.F.R. § 40.195 provides that when an individual is
unable to provide a sufficient specimen for a pre-employment drug test, the medical evaluator administering or
overseeing the test must rule out the existence of a legitimate medical condition that may interfere with the collection
of a sufficient specimen before reporting to the employer that the subject engaged in a “refusal to test.”
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Leopold informed Terry that Quest Diagnostics would treat the failed second test as a “shy
bladder” situation—as that term is understood in the DOT Regulations—“since Terry had
[previously] been placed on legitimate medication for incontinence[.]” (Id. ¶ 27(i).) Leopold also
assured Terry that her departure from the facility that day would not result in a “refusal to test”
report being made to the national Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (“FMCSA”)
Clearinghouse. (Id. ¶ 27 (h); see id. ¶ 16.) Instead, Leopold advised Terry that she could remedy
the second failed test by scheduling and submitting to a retest the following day (May 4, 2024).
(Id. ¶ 27(j).) Terry appeared at Quest Diagnostics’s Akron facility on May 4, 2024, and was able
to successfully complete the retest. (Id.)
Leopold and Quest Diagnostics failed to properly document the failed test on May 3, 2024
as a “shy bladder” situation (id. ¶ 27(i), (k)), resulting in Landstar “prematurely and wrongly”
concluding that they were required to report the Incomplete Urine Sample as a “refusal to test” to
the FMCSA Clearinghouse. (Id. ¶ 27(o).) In the weeks and months that followed Landstar’s
allegedly erroneous report to the FMCSA Clearinghouse, Landstar conspired with Quest
Diagnostics and WorkforceQA to cover up their collective failure to follow the DOT Regulations
regarding Terry’s “shy bladder” situation and the Incomplete Urine Sample. (Id. ¶ 27(u).) Despite
receiving “verifiable and irrefutable evidence that the Incomplete Urine Sample was not the result
of a ‘[r]efusal to [t]est[,]’” Landstar also refused to retract or withdraw its reports with the FMCSA
Clearinghouse. (Id. ¶ 27(t).)
As a result of the “refusal to test” reports, Terry’s commercial driver’s license was revoked
for a period of five years, and Terry has, therefore, since been unable to perform her truck driving
duties on behalf of Midnite Oil. (Id. ¶ 28(b).) Plaintiffs have also been prevented from pursuing
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“more lucrative DOD trucking work because DOD clearance requires two actively-licensed
truckers, which no longer includes Terry[.]” (Id. ¶ 28(e).) Additionally, plaintiffs maintain that
defendants’ actions have damaged Terry’s reputation, interfered with Midnite Oil’s business
relationships, and destroyed plaintiffs’ ability to engage with companies that are subject to DOT
Regulations. (Id. ¶ 28(a), (g).)
On April 24, 2025, plaintiffs brought suit against defendants in the Summit County Court
of Common Pleas. (Doc. No. 1-2, at 3.) The complaint raises six tort claims sounding exclusively
in Ohio common law: negligence (Count I), invasion of privacy (Count II), defamation (Count III),
intentional infliction of emotional distress (Count IV), tortious interference with business
relationships (Count V), and civil conspiracy (Count VI). (See generally id. ¶¶ 31–59.) Several of
the tort claims rely, at least in part, on defendants’ failure to follow the DOT Regulations as the
tortious conduct. (See id. ¶¶ 33, 36, 41, 47, 58; see also id. ¶ 14 (defining defendants’ alleged
failure to follow the DOT Regulations as the “Negligent and Tortious Conduct”). A seventh claim
seeks injunctive relief. (See id. ¶¶ 60–64.) In their prayer for relief, plaintiffs request compensatory
and punitive damages, attorney’s fees, costs and expenses, and a “Court Order requiring
[d]efendants to remove, retract and/or correct their false statements and reports that Terry
reportedly engaged in a ‘refusal to test’ or ‘failed’ her drug test[.]” (Id., Prayer, at 21.)
On May 27, 2025, defendants removed this action to federal court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. (Doc. No. 1 (Notice of Removal) ¶ 11).) In their removal notice, defendants represent that,
“[o]n their face, [p]laintiffs’ claims necessarily raise significant federal issues.” (Id. ¶ 12.) In
support, defendants highlight that plaintiffs’ complaint alleges violations of DOT Regulations, and
further note that Landstar’s report of Terry’s failed drug test to the FMCSA Clearinghouse as a
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“refusal to test,” as well as the consequences of that reporting decision, was governed by federal
law. (Id. (citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 382.705, 40.191).) Defendants also suggest that plaintiffs’ complaint
“directly invokes federal jurisdiction” because plaintiffs seek injunctive relief “that requires the
state court [to] overturn or set aside procedures and consequences specified by DOT regulations
regarding a refusal to submit to drug testing.” (Id. ¶ 13 (citing Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 60–64).)
II. MOTION TO REMAND
Plaintiffs insist that remand to state court is necessary because they “have merely pled state
law tort claims in their [c]omplaint.” (Doc. No. 11, at 4.) While they do not necessarily dispute
that the complaint alleges violations of federal regulations, they underscore that “[t]he Supreme
Cour[t] of the United States and the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals have repeatedly and
consistently held that the presence of a claimed violation of federal regulations or statute as an
element of a state cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question
jurisdiction.” (Id. at 5 (collecting cases).) According to plaintiffs, neither the allegations relating
to DOT Regulations violations, nor the request for injunctive relief, supplies this Court with federal
jurisdiction. (Id. at 4–6.)
A. Standard of Review
On a motion to remand, the inquiry is limited to whether the district court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction. Hart v. Gen. Electric Co., No. 1:23-cv-12, 2023 WL 6201502, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
Sept. 22, 2023) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c)). As the removing parties, defendants bear the burden
of establishing that removal was proper. Eastman v. Marine Mech. Corp., 438 F.3d 544, 549 (6th
Cir. 2006) (citing, among authority, Long v. Bando Mfg. of Am., Inc., 201 F.3d 754, 757 (6th Cir.
2000)). Because removal raises significant federalism concerns, federal courts must strictly
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construe removal statutes. Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108–09, 61 S. Ct.
868, 85 L. Ed. 1214 (1941). Accordingly, a federal court must resolve any doubt of its removal
jurisdiction in favor of finding no federal jurisdiction. Id.
B. Federal Question Jurisdiction Generally
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and possess only the power authorized by
the United States Constitution or by statutes. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.
375, 377, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994). Here, defendants do not contend that the
Court has original jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (diversity jurisdiction) (see Doc. No. 1 ¶
12; see also id. ¶¶ 2–6 (pleading allegations that would defeat a finding of complete diversity)), so
the Court’s jurisdiction over this matter must be based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question
jurisdiction).
Federal question jurisdiction exists in “all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “[T]he vast majority of cases brought under the
general federal-question jurisdiction of the federal courts are those in which federal law creates
the cause of action.” Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S. Ct. 3229,
92 L. Ed. 2d 650 (1986); see Eastman, 438 F.3d at 550 (referring to the first gateway as the “well-
worn thoroughfare” that “admits litigants whose causes of action are created by federal law, that
is, where federal law provides a right to relief” (citation omitted)). A second (far less common)
portal to federal question jurisdiction involves “state-law claims that implicate significant federal
issues.” Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312, 125 S. Ct.
2363, 162 L. Ed. 2d 257 (2005) (recognizing the existence of “another longstanding, if less
frequently encountered variety of federal ‘arising under’ jurisdiction”); see Eastman, 438 F.3d at
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550 (describing the “implicates significant federal issues” portal as the “path less traveled”).
The presence or absence of federal question jurisdiction is generally governed by the “well-
pleaded complaint rule,” which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint. Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 107 S. Ct. 2425, 96 L. Ed. 2d 318 (1987) (citation omitted). The rule
makes the plaintiff the master of his complaint, and he may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive
reliance on state law. Id.
Looking at the face of the complaint, it is clear that plaintiffs have only pleaded state law
claims. While plaintiffs allege violations of the DOT Regulations relating to pre-employment drug
testing and reporting, all claims are stated in terms of common law torts. Moreover, it is well settled
that the DOT drug testing laws and regulations do not confer a private cause of action. Parry v.
Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 307–08 (6th Cir. 2000); see Griffin-Ware v. Los
Angeles Metro. Transp. Auth., No. 2:14-cv-4493, 2015 WL 12830380, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 29,
2015) (noting that “every court to consider the question has concluded that there is no private right
of action for violations of the Department of Transportation’s drug-testing regulations” (collecting
cases)). Federal law, therefore, does not create the causes of action.
C. Implicates a Significant Federal Issue
Because the Court finds that federal law does not provide a right to relief, the Court must
consider whether this case may arrive in federal court via the less travelled throughfare of
“implicating significant federal issues.” The Supreme Court has found that, notwithstanding a
plaintiff’s characterization of his claims as arising under state law, a significant federal question is
present where claims “necessarily raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,
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which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally approved balance of
federal and state judicial responsibilities.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 314. This “doctrine captures the
commonsense notion that a federal court ought to be able to hear claims recognized under state
law that nonetheless turn on substantial questions of federal law[.]” Id. at 312.
At issue in Grable, a state-law quiet title action, was the question of whether the Internal
Revenue Service had given the plaintiff landowner sufficient notice of the sale of his property in
the manner required under federal tax law. Id. at 311. In finding the existence of federal
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court determined that this tax issue implicated strong federal interests:
the duties of federal officials in providing notices of federal tax sales, the validity of a deed from
a federal agency, and the collection and potential refund of federal taxes. Id. at 315. The Court also
determined that exercising federal jurisdiction over such a state-law property dispute was likely to
be an uncommon occurrence and would not disturb the balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities. Id. at 319 (“[I]t is the rare state quite title action that involves contested issues of
federal law . . . .”).
Grable contrasted an earlier case, Merrell Dow, in which a question of federal law
embedded in a state law claim was found insufficient to confer federal-question jurisdiction. Id. at
316–20. In Merrell Dow, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant drug company had violated federal
statutory drug labeling requirements, and that the violation constituted per se negligence under
Ohio law. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805–06. Even though the plaintiff’s state claim would require
a state court to interpret and apply federal law, the Supreme Court found that the state-claim did
not arise under federal law, especially given the fact that Congress did not provide a federal cause
of action for misbranding. Id. at 811–12. The Court in Grable explained that Merrell Dow did not
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permit federal jurisdiction for the typical state law negligence claim that merely relied on a federal
statute as the source of the duty and its violation as a breach, as such a result would have “heralded
a potentially enormous shift of traditionally state cases into federal courts.” Grable, 545 U.S. at
319 (explaining that the Supreme Court in Merrell Dow thought it entirely unlikely that “Congress,
having made no provision for a federal cause of action, would have meant to welcome any state-
law tort implicating federal law ‘solely because the violation of the federal statute is said to [create]
a rebuttable presumption [of negligence] . . . under state law’” (quoting Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
811–12)).
The Court in Grable further clarified that Merrell Dow should not be read to imply that the
absence of a federal cause of action is fatal to a finding of federal jurisdiction, noting that the case
“should be read in its entirety as treating the absence of a federal private right of action as evidence
relevant to, but not dispositive of the sensitive judgments about congressional intent that § 1331
requires.” Grable, 545 U.S. at 318 (quotation marks and citation omitted). It is, therefore, “an
important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331.”
Id.; but see Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that
even without a federal private right of action, substantial federal question jurisdiction will still lie
if the state claim “depends on the validity, construction, or effect of federal law” (citation
omitted)).
Applying the principles in Grable, “federal jurisdiction over a state law claim will lie if a
federal issue is: (1) necessarily raised, (2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.”
Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 185 L. Ed. 2d 72 (2013) (discussing the
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Grable test). “Where all four of these requirements are met, . . . jurisdiction is proper[.]” Id.; see
Estate of Cornell v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 908 F.3d 1008, 1014 (6th Cir. 2018). If any of
the four requirements are not satisfied, the exception does not apply. Bolton v. Gallatin Ctr. v.
Rehab. & Healing, LLC, 535 F. Supp. 3d 709, 717 (M.D. Tenn. Apr. 21, 2021) (citations omitted).
In conducting this analysis, the Court is mindful that the substantial federal question doctrine is
narrowly applied—“Grable emphasized that it takes more than a federal element to open the
‘arising under’ door.” Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 568 (citation omitted); see Empire Healthcare
Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 701, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 165 L. Ed. 2d 131 (2006) (finding
that the plaintiff’s contract law claim “cannot be squeezed into the slim category Grable
exemplifies”).
Application of the factors identified in Grable leads to the conclusion that the federal law
embedded in plaintiffs’ complaint—unlike Grable and more like Merrell Dow—merely supplies
the duties and responsibilities that serve as the predicate for traditional state law claims that cannot
provide the basis for federal question jurisdiction.
1. Necessarily Raised and Actually Disputed
The first two Grable factors support a finding of federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’ complaint
repeatedly references the DOT Regulations and relies on alleged violations of these federal
regulations by defendants. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 1-2 ¶¶ 23, 27.) Because plaintiffs must essentially
prove a violation of federal law to prevail on certain claims, and because this analysis will require
a court to apply the DOT Regulations, the Court finds that a federal issue is necessarily raised in
this case. See, e.g., McClure Tel. Co. v. AT & T Commc’ns of Ohio, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 2d 699, 708
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (finding plaintiff’s state law claims raised disputed issues of federal law where
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evaluating the claims required the court to analyze and construe federal law).
Likewise, the Court finds, for purposes of this motion, that the federal issue is actually
disputed. The existence of a disputed federal issue requires a showing that the parties “must ‘cross
swords over’ a federal issue such that two competing interpretations are asserted.” Funderwhite v.
Local 55, United Ass’n, 702 F. App’x 308, 313 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 569
(further citation omitted)). While it is unclear at this juncture what competing interpretations of
the DOT Regulations the parties intend to advance, it is clear that defendants dispute that they
violated the DOT Regulations regarding drug testing and reporting of refusals to test. (See, e.g.,
Doc. No. 23, at 5 (“Defendants dispute these allegations, all of which raise issues regarding the
roles and responsibilities of employees, employers, and DOT service agents under federal law.”
(citing 49 C.F.R. §§ 40.191, 40.355(i).) At this juncture, the Court will assume that the second
Grable factor is satisfied.
2. Substantial
The last two factors prove problematic for defendants. Courts evaluating the substantiality
prong often focus on four considerations: “(1) ‘whether the case includes a federal agency, and
particularly, whether the agency’s compliance with the federal statute is in dispute’; (2) ‘whether
the federal question is important (i.e. not trivial)’; (3) ‘whether a decision on the federal question
will resolve the case (i.e. the federal question is not merely incidental to the outcome)’; and (4)
‘whether a decision on the federal question will control many other cases (i.e. the issue is not
anomalous or isolated).’” Estate of Cornell, 908 F.3d at 1015 (quoting Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 570).
The first consideration “weighs against characterizing the federal interest as substantial
because there is no federal agency in this dispute.” Id. (citing Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 570 (further
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citation omitted)); see also Grable, 545 U.S. at 315 (explaining that a federal issue is more likely
to be substantial if “[t]he Government . . . has a direct interest in the availability of a federal forum
to vindicate its own administrative action”). Here, unlike the situation in Grable, a government
agency does not require a federal forum in which to determine the validity of its actions. While
defendants concede that there is no federal agency defendant (Doc. No. 23, at 8; Doc. No. 25, at
8), they suggest that the issue is substantial because the DOT regulations impose “a non-delegable
duty” (Doc. No. 23, at 8) upon participants that implicates “important federal questions about drug
testing regulations and the obligations of employers and service agents under those regulations.”
(Doc. No. 25, at 8.) Defendants have offered no case authority to suggest that duties placed on
private individuals and entities, or the importance of the drug testing regulations, can stand in as a
proxy for a government interest. There is no doubt that, in the abstract, the DOT regulations
governing drug testing are important to the safety of this nation’s highways, but alone this is not
enough to classify a federal issue as substantial. If it were, there would be no need to consider the
“direct[ness]” of the government’s interest in the availability of a federal forum, as the Supreme
Court did in Grable, 545 U.S. at 315, and the type and number of cases falling into this “special
and small category” of cases would expand exponentially. See Empire Healthchoice Assurance,
Inc., 547 U.S. at 699.
This leads into the second consideration, which for many of the same reasons also cuts
against finding the substantiality factor met. In Gunn, the Supreme Court clarified that the
substantiality requirement is not met simply because the resolution of the federal issue is “vitally
important to the particular parties in that case.” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 263–64. There must be
“something more, demonstrating that the question is significant to the federal system as a whole.”
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Id. at 264. While there is no doubt that resolution of the federal issue regarding whether defendants
violated the DOT Regulations is important to the parties, there is no indication that application of
the facts of this case to the DOT Regulations will be important to the federal system as a whole.
In Empire, the Court explained that a federal issue is more likely to be present if a “pure issue of
[federal] law” is “dispositive of the case”; “fact-bound and situation-specific” disputes typically
do not implicate substantial federal issues. 547 U.S. at 700–01; see Burkett v. SE Indep. Delivery
Servs., Inc., No. 2:17-cv-786, 2018 WL 1093320, at *3 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 28, 2018) (finding no
federal-question jurisdiction because whether defendant violated a federal law is “a classically
fact-specific inquiry[,]” the resolution of which will not govern federal cases prospectively). Here,
there is no “pure issue of federal law” to resolve. Rather, the case presents a fact-bound and
situation-specific dispute regarding whether defendants violated the DOT Regulations during
Terry’s second drug test on May 3, 2024, and in the subsequent reporting of the results as a “failure
to test.”
Quest Diagnostics and Leopold’s reliance on H.R. ex rel. Reuter v. Medtronic, Inc., 996 F.
Supp. 2d 671 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (Black, J.) is misplaced. (See Doc. No. 25, at 7–8.) In Reuter, the
plaintiff alleged that defendants illegally promoted an off-label use of a liquid bone graft product,
known as “Infuse,” in violation of federal regulations. 996 F. Supp. 2d at 675. Despite the fact that
the complaint raised only state law claims, the district court found that federal question jurisdiction
was present, noting that “[t]here is no state-law equivalent of ‘off label’ . . . [t]he concept is entirely
federal [so the state claims] necessarily raise substantial federal questions by requiring the Court
to interpret the meaning of the FDCA and its implementing regulations[.]” Id. at 679 n.6 (quotation
marks and citation omitted).
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The decision in Reuter, however, has been roundly rejected by subsequent cases involving
the Infuse medical product because it failed to consider the clarification in Gunn that the disputed
federal issue must be “significant to the federal system as a whole[.]” Gunn, 568 U.S. at 264. “The
vast majority of relevant federal court opinions post-Gunn have held that a state claim revolving
around liability for the misuse of Infuse does not raise a substantial federal issue despite the claim’s
reliance on FDCA regulations.” Middendorf v. W. Chester Hosp., LLC, 233 F. Supp. 3d 615, 620
(S.D. Ohio 2017) (Black, J.) (collecting cases); see, e.g., Roden v. Medtronic, Inc., 41 F. Supp. 3d
593, 603 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (rejecting Reuter for failing to consider Gunn’s emphasis that “only a
limited subset of cases should fit within the scope of the substantial federal question doctrine”);
Waitz v. Yoon, No. 1:14-cv-2875, 2015 WL 11511577, at *4 (N.D. Ga. June 30, 2015) (rejecting
Reuter for similar reasons and collecting cases). Even the jurist who penned the decision in Reuter
has since questioned it’s finding of federal jurisdiction for its failure to “take into account the
United States Supreme Court’s holding in Gunn.” Middendorf, 233 F. Supp. 3d at 619–20 (“This
Court joins with the prevailing consensus in holding that there is no substantial federal issue raised
in this civil action.”).
As for the third consideration, the interpretation and application of the DOT Regulations
will not necessarily resolve the case. While a finding that defendants did not violate the DOT
Regulations may largely resolve the claims, a finding of federal regulatory violations would not.
If the state court determines that the DOT Regulations were violated, it would also need to
determine whether defendants conspired to coverup their violations and whether they tortiously
interfered with plaintiffs’ business relationships in the process. Additionally, it would need to
determine whether the DOT Regulation violations constitute intentional infliction of emotional
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distress, invasion of privacy, and/or defamation under Ohio law, as well as whether the federal
regulatory violations proximately caused plaintiffs’ damages.
Finally, defendants have not demonstrated that the resolution of the federal issues presented
in this case will control “numerous other cases.” Empire, 547 U.S. at 700 (citing Grable, 545 U.S.
at 313). Quest Diagnostics and Leopold speculate that any decision regarding whether the DOT
Regulations were violated “could have a broad impact because other entities may seek to set aside
those determinations in a non-Federal forum.” (Doc. No. 23, at 8–9; see also Doc. No. 25, at 8
(suggesting, without support, that a “state court ruling could undermine the integrity of the federal
regulatory framework and create inconsistent standards”).)4 This Court fails to see how the state
court’s interpretation and application of the DOT Regulations to the facts as presented in this case
would be dispositive or controlling in numerous other cases, especially given the fact-specific
nature of the inquiry.
Applying the four guiding considerations, the Court finds that the federal issue embedded
in the plaintiffs’ state law claims is not substantial.
3. Federal/State Balance
Even if a state-created claim includes a contested and substantial federal issue, the exercise
of federal jurisdiction is not necessarily appropriate; the federal issue will “qualify for a federal
forum only if federal jurisdiction is consistent with congressional judgment about the sound
division of labor between state and federal courts governing application of § 1331.” Grable, 545
4 Defendants’ concerns regarding inconsistent court rulings and those who are subject to the DOT Regulations seeking
alternative forums in which to challenge DOT-regulated drug tests, would be present regardless of whether the
alternative forum was a state or federal court. Further, neither the superior experience and expertise federal courts may
have interpreting and applying federal regulations, nor the possibility that a state court might incorrectly resolve the
issue, is sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 263.
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U.S. at 313–14. As noted, Congress has not created a private right of action for an alleged violation
of the DOT regulations governing drug testing. See Parry, 236 F.3d at 307–08; Griffin-Ware, 2015
WL 12830380, at *2. Not only does the text of the federal regulations fail to include an explicit
private right of action, see Griffin-Ware, 2015 WL 12830380, at *1 (citing Hall v. United Labs,
Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1042 (N.D. Ohio 1998)), “there are no indicia that Congress intended
to create an implicit private right of action . . . , [as such a right] is unnecessary to the regulations’
underlying purpose because the [DOT] has its own administrative remedial scheme[.]” Id. (citing,
among authority, Hall, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 1042).
While “the absence of a federal private right of action does not entirely decide the issue of
congressional intent[,] . . . it is persuasive evidence that Congress did not intend to set out a
‘welcome mat’ inviting state court claims with embedded federal issues like this one into federal
court.” Fochtman v. Rhino Energy, LLC, No. 13-cv-104, 2013 WL 5701468, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Oct.
17, 2013) (citing Grable, 545 U.S. at 317–18; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810–12). Additionally,
unlike other areas of federal transportation law,5 Congress did not see fit to preempt state remedies.
The lack of a private right of action, when combined with no preemption of state remedies, is “an
important clue to Congress’s conception of the scope of jurisdiction to be exercised under § 1331.”
Grable, 545 U.S. at 318.
These considerations lead to the conclusion that allowing federal jurisdiction over these
state claims would be inconsistent with congressional judgment about the sound division between
5 For example, the Carmack Amendment completely preempts a shipper's state common law and statutory causes of
action. See Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 505–06, 33 S. Ct. 148, 57 L. Ed. 314 (1913) (observing
that, “[a]lmost every detail of the [shipper-interstate carrier relationship] is covered so completely that there can be no
rational doubt but that Congress intended to take possession of the subject, and superseded all state regulation with
reference to it”).
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state and federal courts governing the application of § 1331. Plaintiffs’ pleaded federal regulation
violations fit into their state claims in the way that is consistent with the state law claims addressed
in Merrell Dow: as a fact tending to satisfy an element of the state claim. See Merrell Dow, 478
U.S. at 805–06; see, e.g., Hampton v. R.J. Corman R.R. Switching Co. LLC, 683 F.3d 708, 712
(6th Cir. 2012) (“Hampton’s claim is a garden-variety state tort claim” that alleges that defendants
were presumptively negligent under Kentucky law for violating federal regulations governing
railroad crossings, and it did not confer federal question jurisdiction.) Indeed, the language of the
complaint makes this clear. (Doc. No. 1-2 ¶ 14 (defining the DOT Regulation violations as the
“Negligent and Tortious Conduct”); see id. ¶¶ 33, 36, 41, 47, 58.) Allowing garden-variety state
law claims premised on breach of some federal standard of care to proceed in federal court would
essentially federalize an entire category of cases that Congress has intentionally not federalized. It
would also circumvent the administrative remedies of these federal regulations established by
Congress, greatly disturbing the balance between federal and state judicial responsibilities.
Yet, defendants insist that the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Wullschleger v. Royal Canin
U.S.A., Inc., 953 F.3d 519 (8th Cir. 2020), compels a different result. Relying on this non-binding
authority, defendants argue that plaintiffs cannot ignore that their state-law claims are “‘so
dependent upon federal law that they cannot ‘be adjudicated without reliance on and explication
of federal law.’” (Doc. No. 25, at 7 (quoting Wullschleger, 953 F.3d at 522); see Doc. No. 23, at 5
(similar).) In Wullschleger, the plaintiffs sought “to represent a class of Missouri plaintiffs who
purchased prescription pet foods at premium prices from” the defendants. 953 F.3d at 520. Though
the plaintiffs alleged only state claims, the Eighth Circuit observed that the “[p]laintiffs
dependence on federal law permeates the allegations such that the antitrust and unjust enrichment
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claims cannot be adjudicated without reliance on and explication of federal law.” Id. at 522. At the
same time, the court recognized that “Merrell Dow forecloses removal of state law claims that
merely include a violation of federal law as an element of the offense, without other reliance on
federal law.” Id. at 521. This case is materially different from Wullschleger. As previously noted,
plaintiffs’ claims fall squarely within the category of claims “that merely include a violation of
federal law as an element of the offense[.]” Wullschleger, 953 F.3d at 521.
4. Injunctive Relief
Defendants also lean on Wullschleger to posit that plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief
supplies federal jurisdiction. (See Doc. No. 25, at 7 (“Plaintiffs cannot downplay the relief they
seek to avoid federal jurisdiction.”).) Once again, Wullschleger is inapposite. In Wullschleger,
plaintiffs sought, among other things, to “enjoin[] Defendants from engaging in further violations
of federal law[.]” Wullschleger, 953 F.3d at 522. Here, plaintiffs “do not seek injunctive relief in
the form of the enforcement of [] federal laws[.]” See, e.g., Marshall v. Conway Reg’l Med. Ctr.,
No. 4:20-cv-933, 2020 WL 5746839, at *2 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 25, 2025) (distinguishing Wullschleger
on similar grounds and finding no federal jurisdiction). Moreover, contrary to defendants’
representations, plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief does not seek to “overturn and nullify
consequences required by DOT drug testing regulations[.]” (Doc. No. 23, at 10; see Doc. No. 1 ¶
13 (suggesting that the complaint seeks to “overturn or set aside procedures and consequences
specified by DOT regulations regarding a refusal to submit to drug testing”).) Rather than calling
upon a state court to overturn a federal administrative decision, the complaint merely requests an
order compelling defendants to correct any inaccurate or untruthful statements made to the
FMCSA Clearinghouse in their report. (Doc. No. 1-2, Prayer, D.) The DOT remains free to
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determine how Terry’s administrative appeal of the suspension of her commercial license will be
resolved. (See Doc. No. 27, at 2–3.)
Of course, to the extent plaintiffs have requested relief that is beyond the powers of a state
court, the state court would be “capable of considering such arguments and respecting the limits
of its jurisdiction, and such limits [would] not give rise to a necessary federal issue—except
perhaps a federal defense, which is insufficient to confer [federal] jurisdiction.” Molina
Healthcare, Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 21-cv-5483, 2022 WL 161894, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 18,
2022) (“That some relief Molina seeks might not be available in state court does not in itself grant
Defendants the right to remove the case to a federal court potentially more capable of entering
broader judgment against them.”); see also Hickey v. Duffy, 827 F.2d 234, 240 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A
party should not be able to obtain federal jurisdiction by adding, to a complaint that does not
establish such jurisdiction, a request for a remedy the court is forbidden to give.”); Lawrence v.
Wilson, No. 1:22-cv-136, 2023 WL 3443255, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 12, 2023) (“‘Rule 65
[governing requests for injunctive relief] does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts. Instead, it
restricts the power of the federal court to act in those cases in which it already has jurisdiction.’”
(quoting Lake Lansing Special Assessment Protest Ass’n v. Ingham Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 488 F.
Supp. 767, 771 (W.D. Mich. 1980))); Healthcare Ventures of Ohio, LLC v. HVO Operations
Windup LLC, No. 20-cv-4991, 2020 WL 6688994, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2020) (citing, among
authority, Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 808 (“A defense that raises a federal question is inadequate to
confer federal jurisdiction.”)). The request for injunctive relief does not confer federal question
jurisdiction.
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III. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, with only two of the four Grable factors satisfied, it is clear that this case is not
among the “special and small category” of cases that implicates a significant federal issue. See
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc., 547 U.S. at 699. Because this case cannot “pass through
[this narrow] alternative federal-question-jurisdiction portal[,]” see Hampton, 683 F.3d at 712,
remand for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction is warranted.
Accordingly, plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Doc. No. 20) is granted. The Clerk is directed
to remand this case to the Summit County Court of Common Pleas.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 14, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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