Aquino v. Huntington National Bank et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RAFAEL AQUINO, III,
Plaintiff,
v.
HUNTINGTON NATIONAL BANK,
et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 1:25-cv-1871
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
Jonathan D. Greenberg
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Raphael Aquino, III filed this action without a lawyer to challenge a
foreclosure judgment entered against him in State court. He asserts claims for breach
of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and “Ultra Vires Acts.” 	He seeks to void the
State court foreclosure judgment and the sheriff’s sale, discharge his obligation under
the mortgage, and quiet title to the property. Defendants moved to dismiss, asserting
that the Court lacks federal subject-matter jurisdiction over this case, that the case
is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and by res judicata and that the complaint
fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
According to the complaint, which the Court takes as true and construes in
Plaintiff’s favor in the current procedural posture, Mr. Aquino entered into a
mortgage with Huntington National Bank on December 8, 2021. 	Huntington
initiated a foreclosure proceeding against Mr. Aquino in State court on April 4, 2025.
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Plaintiff challenged the foreclosure claiming it was not valid because he submitted
various forms of “tender” to satisfy the debt, including a “special deposit” sent to the
court on February 6, 2025, and a one-dollar bill with a specific serial number sent to
Huntington’s chief executive officer. 	Also, he argued that Huntington could not
foreclosure on the property without providing him with an accounting. 	The State
trial court granted judgment in favor of Huntington on April 30, 2025. The property
was sold at a sheriff’s sale on June 23, 2025, and the sale was confirmed by the court
on September 29, 2025.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff filed his first case in federal court contesting the foreclosure on June
26, 2025, just three days after the State trial court confirmed the sale of the property.
He 	brought 	that 	action 	against 	Huntington, 	the 	law 	firm 	that 	represented
Huntington in the foreclosure action, the State trial court, the judge and magistrate
who presided over the foreclosure, the clerk of the court, the sheriff’s department
and the sheriff’s deputy who conducted the sale. Again, he contested the validity of
the foreclosure, claiming that he made a “special deposit” in the court on February
6, 2025 and delivered the one-dollar bill to Huntington’s chief executive officer. See
Aquino v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. 1:25-cv-1332 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 27, 2025). The
Court dismissed the case on August 27, 2025, stating that the complaint failed to
meet the minimum pleading requirements of Rule 8 and was barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and res judicata. Id.
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Undeterred, Plaintiff filed this action two weeks later on September 9, 2025,
asserting the same claims against substantially the same Defendants. 	Again, he
asserts that the foreclosure is not valid because he tendered a “special deposit” sent
to the court and sent a one-dollar bill with a specific serial number to Huntington’s
chief executive officer as payment of his debt. He adds that the foreclosure could not
proceed once he demanded a full accounting. 	He seeks an order voiding the State
court judgments and quieting title to the property in his name.
ANALYSIS
Rule 12(b)(1) allows dismissal for “lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter”
of claims asserted in the complaint. 	Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). 	Generally, motions
under Rule 12(b)(1) fall into two categories: facial attacks and factual attacks. See,
e.g., United States v. Richie, 15 F.3d 592, 598 (6th Cir.1994). 	A facial attack
challenges the sufficiency of the pleading itself. 	In contrast, a factual attack
challenges the factual existence of subject matter jurisdiction. See In re Title Ins.
Antitrust Cases, 702 F. Supp. 2d 840, 884–85 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (citing Ohio Hosp.
Ass’n v. Shalala, 978 F. Supp. 735, 739 (N.D. Ohio. 1997)). Here, Defendants bring
a facial attack on the Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court must
accept Plaintiff's allegations in the complaint as true. 	Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 598.
Plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction to survive a motion to
dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). Madison-Hughes v. Shalala, 80 F.3d 1121, 1130
(6th Cir.1996). 	Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable, fatal defect.
Von Dunser v. Aronoff, 915 F.2d 1071, 1074 (6th Cir. 1990).
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Defendants maintain that Plaintiff’s complaint does not establish a basis for
federal subject-matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 5, PageID #82–85.) Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction. 	Unlike State trial courts, they do not have general
jurisdiction to review all questions of law. See Ohio ex rel. Skaggs v. Brunner, 549
F.3d 468, 474 (6th Cir. 2008). 	Instead, federal courts have only the authority to
decide cases that the Constitution and Congress have empowered them to resolve.
Id. 	Consequently, “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited
jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party
asserting jurisdiction.” 	Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
377 (1994) (internal citation omitted).
Generally speaking, the Constitution and Congress have given federal courts
authority to hear a case only where diversity of citizenship exists between the
parties or where the case raises a federal question. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482
U.S. 386, 392 (1987). 	The first type of federal jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship,
applies to cases of sufficient value between “citizens of different states.” 	28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a)(1). 	To establish diversity of citizenship, the plaintiff must establish that
he is a citizen of one State and all defendants are citizens of another. 	The second
type of federal jurisdiction relies on the presence of a federal question. This type of
jurisdiction arises where a “well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal
law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily
depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Franchise Tax Bd.
v. Construction Laborers Vacation Tr., 463 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1983).
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Diversity of citizenship does not exist in this case. 	Plaintiff does not plead
facts to establish the State of his domicile; however, he lists an address in Cleveland,
Ohio as his residence, suggesting his citizenship is in Ohio. 	At least five of the
Defendants are also citizens of Ohio, including the law firm, the judge and
magistrate, the clerk of court, and the sheriff. 	Diversity of citizenship is not
complete and cannot be the basis for federal court jurisdiction.
Nor does the complaint plead a federal cause of action. Plaintiff’s claims for
breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, and “ultra vires acts” arise, if at all,
under State law. 	Plaintiff does not refer to a substantive federal statute or
constitutional provision that would plausibly provide a cause of action in this case.
His assertion of “Article III judicial power in equity” as a basis for federal jurisdiction
is meritless. 	(ECF No. 1, PageID #1.) 	Therefore, the Court lacks subject-matter
jurisdiction and must dismiss the case.
Federal courts do not have jurisdiction to overturn State court decisions even
if the request to reverse the State court judgment is based on an allegation that the
State court’s action was unconstitutional. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005). Federal appellate review of state court judgments
can only occur in the United States Supreme Court, by appeal or by writ of certiorari.
Id. Here, Plaintiff seeks relief from the State court foreclosure judgment. He asks
the Court to void the judgement of foreclosure, void the order of sale, and enjoin any
eviction proceedings that may be initiated. He asks the Court to reverse the State
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court judgment and grant him title to the property, unencumbered by the mortgage.
The Court lacks the jurisdiction to grant such relief in this case.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motions to
dismiss. (ECF No. 3; ECF No. 5.) Therefore, the Court DENIES AS MOOT
Plaintiff’s motion for an injunction. (ECF No. 8.) Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
the Court certifies that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in
good faith. Further, Mr. Aquino has now filed multiple lawsuits making the
same arguments about the same facts. The Court admonishes advises Mr. Aquino
that, if he persists in making frivolous filings, the Court will restrict his ability to
file papers in the Northern District of Ohio.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 12, 2025
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
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