Jenkins v. Chambers-Smith

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LEONARD JENKINS,
Petitioner,
v.
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH
Respondent.
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CASE NO. 1:25-CV-00254-JRK
JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JENNIFER DOWDELL
ARMSTRONG
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins (“Mr. Jenkins”), filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (ECF No. 5). This matter was referred to me on April 14, 2025 under
Local Rule 72.2 to prepare a report and recommendation on Mr. Jenkins’ petition. (See ECF non-
document entry dated April 1, 2025).
Currently before me is the motion of Respondent, Warden Malcolm Heard (“Warden”),1
to transfer Mr. Jenkins’ petition to the Sixth Circuit as a second or successive petition pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §§ 1631 and 2244(b)(3)(A), or, alternatively, to dismiss the petition as time-barred.
(ECF No. 10). For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the Court GRANT the Warden’s
motion and transfer Mr. Jenkins’ petition to the Sixth Circuit.
1 Mr. Jenkins named Annette Chambers-Smith, the Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections,
as the respondent. Respondent notes that Mr. Jenkins is currently incarcerated at Franklin Medical Center, and that
Warden Malcolm Heard is the warden of that institution, and thus the proper respondent in this proceeding. (ECF No.
10, PageID # 20, n.1); see https://appgateway.drc.ohio.gov/OffenderSearch/Search/Details/A167706 (last accessed
Nov. 24, 2025). I therefore recommend that the Court substitute Warden Heard for Director Chambers-Smith as the
respondent.
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II. 	PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. State Court Conviction and Direct Appeal
On October 23, 1981, Mr. Jenkins was indicted in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common
Pleas on one count of aggravated murder, eight counts of aggravated robbery, two counts of
attempted murder, eight counts of kidnapping, one count of having weapons while under disability,
and one count of possession of criminal tools. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 1).
The case proceeded to trial. On March 26, 1982, the jury convicted Mr. Jenkins of one
count of aggravated murder, eight counts of aggravated robbery, one count of attempted murder,
five counts of kidnapping, and one count of possession of criminal tools. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit
12, PageID # 327-28). On April 12, 1982, the jury recommended that Mr. Jenkins be sentenced to
death. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 2). On April 16, 1982, the trial court imposed a death sentence with
respect to the aggravated murder count. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 12, PageID # 329). The court also
sentenced Mr. Jenkins to an aggregate term of seven to twenty-five years on each of the aggravated
robbery counts; seven to twenty-five years on the attempted murder count; five to fifteen years on
each of the kidnapping counts; and two to five years on the possession of criminal tools count. Id.
The trial court furthered ordered that Mr. Jenkins would serve his sentence on each count
consecutively to his sentences on each other count. Id.
Mr. Jenkins, through counsel, timely appealed to the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Judicial District, raising 24 assignments of error. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 3). On February 24,
1984, the Ohio Court of Appeals for the Eighth District reversed Mr. Jenkins’ conviction for
possession of criminal tools but affirmed the remaining convictions and corresponding sentences.
Id. Mr. Jenkins appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court, which affirmed. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 4).
Mr. Jenkins filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which
denied the petition on June 24, 1985. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 5).
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B. First Federal Habeas Petition
On December 9, 1985, Mr. Jenkins filed his first § 2254 habeas petition in this Court, in a
case captioned Jenkins v. Morris, Case Number 1:85-cv-03707-GWW. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit
13). On August 4, 1995, the court dismissed Mr. Jenkins’ petition with prejudice. Id. at PageID #
334. Upon my inquiry, the Clerk’s Office advised that the only record in the Court’s possession in
this case is the docket. Specifically, the Clerk’s Office advised that all documents from Mr.
Jenkins’ first federal habeas petition were transferred to the Archives in 2011 and subsequently
destroyed.
C. Petition for Postconviction Relief
On June 30, 1986, Mr. Jenkins filed a petition to vacate or set aside his judgment of
conviction and sentence. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 12, PageID # 330). On August 1, 1986, the trial
court denied Mr. Jenkins’ petition. Id. Mr. Jenkins appealed to the Eighth Appellate District, which
affirmed on November 23, 1987. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 7). Mr. Jenkins appealed to the Ohio
Supreme Court, which dismissed the appeal sua sponte. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 14, PageID #
335).
D. Clemency
On January 11, 1991, then-Ohio Governor Richard Celeste commuted Mr. Jenkins’
sentence to life without the possibility of parole. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 8). The Director of the
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections and the Chief of the Ohio Adult Parole
Authority filed a declaratory judgment action challenging the constitutionality of the Governor’s
action with respect to Mr. Jenkins and other inmates, and the trial court held that the commutations
were void. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 9, PageID # 249). On April 8, 1993, the Tenth Appellate District
reversed, holding that Governor Celeste had the power under the Ohio Constitution to commute
the sentence of Mr. Jenkins and other inmates. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 9). On September 20, 1994,
the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed in relevant part. (ECF No. 10-1, Exhibit 11).
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E. Second Federal Habeas Petition
On or about January 31, 2025, Mr. Jenkins, acting pro se, filed the present § 2254 habeas
petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio. (ECF No. 1-1). Mr.
Jenkins asserts four grounds for relief:
1. 	Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins, went into the Courtroom 182 days fighting for his life
after he was shot in the arm pit laying in the hospital on a Prescribed Medication that
was mind altering and interfering with my mental condition, and my thinking ability
to understand what was going on in the trial. With the bullet being in my right
shoulder it caused me to have more pain where I could not function at all. This bullet
caused me to become paralyzed from the waist down and damaging my spinal cord.
Since than I have become a double amputee, both of my legs were cut off above the
knees. During trial I was in a lot of pain. For forty three years I have been receiving
inadequate medical care period when I took my medication it pretty much wiped me
out, I had no energy, dizziness, I could not remember anything. Petitioner, Leonard
Jenkins, reference in any even, the record showed that the Petitioner, Leonard
Jenkins, had side effects from his injured neck from the gunshot wound that had
increased pain in my neck. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97. Petitioner, Leonard
Jenkins, wasn't disruptive while in a Courtroom, and he was urinating through his
clothing on the way in the Courtroom and while sitting in the Courtroom parallel to
my case. United States v. Dial, 694 F.2d app. 368. Was allowed to change his clothing
when he urinated on himself in the Courtroom. Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins, was made
to set in his own urine all through trial. My Plea wasn't knowingly and intelligently
because of the prescribed medication that I was on which altered my thinking. A
judge cannot take your plea if you are on a prescribed medication. The trial was a
surreal.
Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins, initially during my trial in April of 1982, in open court
room of the Court of Common Pleas, Cuyahoga County, it was made known to the
jury that I was intellectually disable, there was a Psychology Doctor who took this
stand on my behalf explaining my situation far as my mentally retarded. My IQ score
of roughly 63 approximately two standard deviation below the main score roughly 70
or lower when adjusted for the measurement. Its Cruel and Unusual Punishment to
Execute a person that's intellectually Disable. Upon consideration three core
elements: Intellectually Disable - Functioning Deficits. State v. Ford 158 Ohio St.3d
139.
The sentence of death was inferential and contrary to law because I Petitioner,
Leonard Jenkins, could not read or write, or understand any of the court proceedings.
Outline The United States Supreme Court has held that imposing the death penalty
on a Mentally Retarded person, criminals amounts to contrary to the law.
The U.S. 11th Circuit Court of Appeals on Friday Ruled Alabama Cannot Execute A
Death Row Prisoner Joseph Cliford Smith, Because of His Intellectual Disability This
Decision Effective Smith’s Death Sentence The U.S. District Court’s Decision.
Cannot Execute Joseph C. Smith Due To His Mental Disability. Cruel and Unusual
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Punishment prohibited by U.S. Const. amend VIII. The Clinical term “Mentally
Retardation” has since been changed to intellectual disable. When I was in Court I
was just like a child far as my comprehension went and I was illiterate at this time
period when I was going through school the whole time I was always in special
Classes, because my mind did not function the way others function. When I graduated
from high school, I was still in special classes so I have been dealing with this all of
my life. Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins, was never disruptive while in the Courtroom
and urinated through his clothing on the way into the Courtroom, while sitting in the
Courtroom parallel to my case Plaintiff, Shaundelle Dial was allowed to change his
clothing when he urinated on himself in the Courtroom. Petitioner, Mr. Jenkins was
made to set in his own urine all through trial.
2. 	2017 U.S. Lexis 217632. Halstead v. Comm’r of soc.,
Twice I was on death row, Gov. Richard F. Celeste gave me a commutation in January
of 1991, I transferred to Marion Correctional Institution. In Feb. of 1992, I was put
back on death row. When the staff locked me up a psychologist came to see me, and
asked me did I know why I was locked up and said no, she stated that I was locked
up because I was put back on death row, Central Office sent her to make sure that I
wasn't suicidal. I have been incarcerated for 43 years and I have never received the
proper medical treatment, the medical treatment has been inadequate.
3. 	“Nonsecured status” means any unsupervised, off grounds movement or to trial visit
from a hospital or institution, or any conditional release, that is granted to a person
who is found incompetent to stand trial and is committed pursuant to section 2945.39
of the R.C. or to a person who is found not guilty by reason of insanity and is
committed pursuant to section 2945.40 of the R.C. and ORC ANN 2945.37.
Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant who is
legally incompetent may not be tried. Where the issue of a defendant’s competency
in accordance with R.C. 2945.37 and State v. Collins,2002-Ohio-1018.
Regina A. Collins, appeal the Trial Court’s Judgment finding Collins incompetent to
Stand Trial and ordering her to undergo treatment at summit behavioral services. We
Reverse the trial Court’s Judgment because the Court clinic report on competency
relied on by the Court was not properly admitted into evidence, and therefore, there
was not sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of competence.
Requires a Court to conduct a hearing when the issue of the defendant’s competency
is 	raised 	before 	the 	trial-Court 	of 	Appeals 	Judgment 	Reversed, 	defendant’s
convictions Vacated, and cause remanded. Criminal Law R.C. 2945.37-2945-37(B).
Procedural Due Process, Scope of Protection. It has long been recognized that a
person who lacks the capacity to understand the nature and object of the proceedings
against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing for his defense may
not be subjected to a trial.
Fundamental principles of due process require that a criminal defendant who is
legally incompetent may not be tried. Whether a defendant is competent depends on
whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyers with a reasonable
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degree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him. Pretrial Motions & Procedures,
Competency to Stand Trial.
A hearing under R.C. 2945.37(B) mandatory a trial Court must hold a competency
hearing if a request is made before trial period if the issue of the defendant by a
psychiatrist for a licensed clinical psychologist, who is required to file a report
addressing certain specified topics with the Court under seal. R.C. 2945.37(A)(2);
R.C. 2945.37(A)(H). State v. Hough, 169 Ohio St.3d 769 April 26, 2022 submitted,
Dec. 13, 2022.
During my second death penalty trial Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins, was not present, in
the absence of petitioner, Jenkins, during trial the court had no jurisdiction period we
began with a simple general rule: a void judgment is one that has been imposed by a
Court that lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the case or lacks the authority to act.
The majority expands the void sentence doctrine by declaring Petitioner, Leonard
Jenkins, sentence void. Today's majority decision brings new life into claims that a
technical mistake in a trial courts judgment injury makes a sentence void, and it is
incongruent without precedent. And when we held that a court did act without
jurisdiction, we unanimously held that the sentence imposed was void and that the
Petitioner, Leonard Jenkins, is entitled to release in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding. In re Lockhart, 157 Ohio St. 192, 193, 105 N.E.2d 35 (1952). Petitioner,
Leonard Jenkins, serving a truly void sentence is entitled to be released through a
Writ of Habeas Corpus. State v. Williams, 148 Ohio St. 3d 403. In the absence of a
statutory remedy, those sentences are void.
4. 	A person who lacks the capacity to understand the nature and objective of the
proceedings against him, to consult with counsel, and to assist in preparing his
defense may not stand trial period fundamental principles of due process require that
a criminal defendant who is legally incompetent shall not be subjected to trial. State
v. 	Flanagan, 	2017-Ohio-955. 	Petitioner, 	Leonard 	Jenkins, 	comes 	before 	this
honorable court asking that he be made Whole again.
Id.
On February 10, 2025, Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr. of the Southern District of
Ohio transferred Mr. Jenkins’ petition to this Court. (ECF No. 3).
On May 2, 2025, the Warden filed a motion to transfer Mr. Jenkins’ petition to the Sixth
Circuit as a second or successive petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1631 and 2244(b)(3)(A), or,
alternatively, to dismiss Mr. Jenkins’ petition as time-barred. (ECF No. 10). On May 30, 2025,
Mr. Jenkins filed a motion requesting a 45-day extension of his deadline to respond to the
Warden’s motion. (ECF No. 11). I granted Mr. Jenkins’ motion on the same day. (See ECF non-
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document entry dated May 30, 2025).
Mr. Jenkins did not file a response by the extended deadline of July 14, 2025. On August
6, 2025, I entered an order advising him that, if he did not file a response on or before August 20,
2025, I would proceed to rule on the Warden’s motion. (See ECF non-document entry dated
August 6, 2025). On August 20, 2025, Mr. Jenkins filed a motion for an additional 60-day
extension of his deadline to respond to the Warden’s motion. (ECF No. 12). On the same day, I
granted Mr. Jenkins motion and gave him until October 20, 2025 to file a response. (See ECF non-
document entry dated August 20, 2025). I also warned him that I would not grant any further
extensions of the deadline and that if he did not file a response by October 20, 2025, I would
proceed to rule on the Warden’s motion. Id. Mr. Jenkins did not file a response by October 20,
2025 and has not filed a response to date.
III. 	ANALYSIS
§ 2244(b)(2), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) (“AEDPA”), provides that a claim presented in a “second or
successive” habeas petition that was not presented in a prior petition “shall be dismissed” unless:
(1) the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the Supreme Court; or (2) the petitioner could not have discovered the factual predicate
for the claim previously through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the claim,
if proven, would establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would
have found the petitioner guilty absent the constitutional error. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B).
§ 2244(b)(3) further provides that, before a petitioner may file a second or successive
petition in the district court, he or she must file a motion in the court of appeals for that district for
an order authorizing the district court to consider the petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). “When
a petitioner ignores this provision and files a ‘second or successive’ application in the district court
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without authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s claims.” Askew
v. Bradshaw, 636 F. App’x 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 149
(2007) (per curiam)). Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit has held that, “when a prisoner has sought §
2244(b)(3) permission from the district court, or when a second or successive petition for habeas
corpus relief . . . is filed in the district court without § 2244(b)(3) authorization from this court, the
district court shall transfer the document to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631.” In re Sims,
111 F.3d 45, 47 (6th Cir. 1997).
This is Mr. Jenkins’ second habeas petition, as he previously filed a habeas petition in
1985. That does not mean that the present petition necessarily is second or successive, however,
as it is “well settled” that the phrase “second or successive” “does not simply ‘refe[r] to all § 2254
applications filed second or successively in time[.]’” Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 332
(2010) (quoting Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 944 (2007)). Rather, “the Supreme Court
has carved out three circumstances when a petition is second in time but isn’t ‘second or
successive.’” In re Hill, 81 F.4th 560, 568 (6th Cir. 2023) (en banc). “First, when a second petition
raises a claim that challenges a new state-court judgment—that is, not the one challenged in the
first petition—the petition is not ‘second or successive.’” Id. (citing Magwood, 561 U.S. at 339).
“Second, a second petition containing a claim—whether presented or not in the first petition—that
would have been unripe at the time of the filing of the first petition is not ‘second or successive.’”
Id. (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943-45). “Third, when a second petition contains a claim that,
though raised in the first petition, was unexhausted at that time and not decided on the merits, the
petition is not ‘second or successive.’” Id. at 568-69 (citing Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 486-
87 (2000)). “And when a ‘numerically second petition’ is not ‘second or successive,’ it isn’t
‘subject to the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).’” Id. at 568 (quoting In re Bowen, 436 F.3d
699, 705-06 (6th Cir. 2006)).
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In Hill, the Sixth Circuit set forth a series of steps that a court should follow to determine
whether a petition is second or successive. First, a court should ask if “the second petition [is]
challenging a new judgment or an old judgment[.]” Hill, 81 F.4th at 569. “If it’s a new judgment,
then the petition is not ‘second or successive,’ and [the court] turn[s] to the merits of the petition.”
Id. If the petition involves an old judgment, the courts asks whether “the claim presented is an old
claim or a new claim[.]” Id. “If it’s an old claim—that is, one that was presented in the first
petition—then it’s a ‘second or successive’ petition that must be dismissed under § 2244(b)(1).”
Id. If the petition involves a new claim, the court asks whether the claim was “either unripe or
ruled unexhausted at the time of the first habeas filing.” Id. If the petition was not unripe or ruled
unexhausted, “the petition is ‘second or successive,’ and the claim must meet the gatekeeping
provisions under § 2244(b)(2)(B) to survive.” Id.
Mr. Jenkins’ petition is second or successive under that test. As an initial matter, he is
challenging his original judgment of conviction, the same judgment at issue in his first habeas
petition in 1985. That the Governor of Ohio commuted Mr. Jenkins’ death sentence after he filed
his first habeas petition does not change that fact, as a limited resentencing that benefits the
petitioner does not constitute a new judgment. See Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673, 678 (6th Cir.
2016); Freeman v. Wainwright, 959 F.3d 226, 230 (6th Cir. 2020) (“Crangle makes clear that
limited resentencings that benefit the prisoner do not disturb the underlying judgment, which
continues to constitute a final judgment.”) (quotations omitted).
Here, the only effect of the Governor’s commutation order was to convert Mr. Jenkins’
death sentence into a sentence of life without the possibility of parole, an unquestioned benefit to
Mr. Jenkins. Because the commutation order was, at most, a limited resentencing that benefitted
Mr. Jenkins, it does not constitute a new judgment for federal habeas purposes. See Freeman, 959
F.3d at 230 (holding that nunc pro tunc order vacating original sentencing order and removing
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post-release 	control 	provision 	did 	not 	constitute 	new 	judgment); 	Peace 	v. 	LaRose, 	No.
3:19CV1034, 	2020 	WL 	822067, 	at 	*5 	(N.D. 	Ohio 	Jan. 	23, 	2020) 	(same), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 821492 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 18, 2020); Smith v. May, No. 4:20-
CV-02387, 2022 WL 20403437, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 1, 2022) (holding that order reducing
sentence from 80 years to 75 years did not constitute new judgment under Crangle), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom., 2023 WL 4706813 (N.D. Ohio July 24, 2023).
Turning to the remaining steps under Hill, it is unclear whether Mr. Jenkins’ grounds for
relief constitute old or new claims. The Warden did not include Mr. Jenkins’ prior habeas petition
in the record filed with the Court, and as discussed above those records are no longer available.
However, even if Mr. Jenkins did not actually raise his present grounds for relief in his prior habeas
application, his claims were ripe at the time of the first petition. Grounds One, Three, and Four are
based on the events that occurred at trial, as Mr. Jenkins asserts that he did not comprehend the
proceedings, was made to sit in his own urine, and was incompetent to stand trial. Because those
claims challenge the events of the trial, they have “always been ripe.” Hill, 81 F.4th at 572.
Mr. Jenkins’ second ground for relief is more difficult to interpret. However, he appears to
assert that he has not received adequate medical treatment while incarcerated. That is a not a proper
basis for habeas relief. See Caudill v. Hickey, No. 12-7-KKC, 2012 WL 2524234, at *2 (E.D. Ky.
June 29, 2012) (holding that claim challenging sufficiency of medical care “does not implicate the
core concerns of habeas by challenging the fact of . . . confinement”); Baxter v. Parris, No. 1:13-
cv-01306-JDB-egb, 2015 WL 7587367, at *6 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 25, 2015) (“Petitioner’s challenge
to the conditions of his confinement is not a proper subject for a habeas petition.”).
Regardless, Mr. Jenkins asserts that he has “never” received adequate medical treatment
during his 43 years of confinement. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID # 17). Because the factual predicate of
his claim—the alleged inadequate medical treatment—had already occurred before Mr. Jenkins
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filed his initial habeas petition, his claim was ripe at the time of that petition. See In re Tibbetts,
869 F.3d 403, 406 (6th Cir. 2017) (“A claim is unripe when ‘the events giving rise to the claim
had not yet occurred.’”) (quoting In re Jones, 652 F.3d 603, 605 (6th Cir. 2010)). Moreover, there
is no indication that the district court previously dismissed any of Mr. Jenkins’ claims as
unexhausted. Nor has Mr. Jenkins—who did not file an opposition to the Warden’s motion despite
multiple extensions—argued otherwise. Accordingly, Mr. Jenkins’ petition is a second or
successive petition, and I recommend that the Court transfer the petition to the Sixth Circuit
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. 2
IV. 	RECOMMENDATION
Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT the Warden’s motion
and transfer Mr. Jenkins’ petition to the Sixth Circuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1631 and
2244(b)(3)(A).
Dated: November 25, 2025 	/s Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
Jennifer Dowdell Armstrong
U.S. Magistrate Judge
NOTICE TO PARTIES REGARDING OBJECTIONS
Local Rule 72.3(b) of this Court provides:
Any 	party 	may 	object 	to 	a 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	proposed 	findings,
recommendations or report made pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) within
fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof, and failure to file
timely objections within the fourteen (14) day period shall constitute a
waiver of subsequent review, absent a showing of good cause for such
failure. Such party shall file with the Clerk of Court, and serve on the
Magistrate Judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically
identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to
which objection is made and the basis for such objections. Any party may
respond to another party’s objections within fourteen (14) days after being
2 Because I conclude that the petition is second or successive, I do not address the Warden’s alternative argument that
the Court should dismiss the petition on statute of limitations grounds.
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served with a copy thereof. The District Judge to whom the case was assigned
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations
made by the Magistrate Judge. The District Judge need conduct a new hearing
only in such District Judge’s discretion or where required by law, and may
consider 	the 	record 	developed 	before 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge, 	making 	a
determination on the basis of the record. The District Judge may also receive
further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the Magistrate
Judge with instructions.
Id. (emphasis added).
Failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the forfeiture or waiver of
the right to raise the issue on appeal either to the district judge or in a subsequent appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals, depending on how or whether the party responds to the report and
recommendation. Berkshire v. Dahl, 928 F.3d 520, 530 (6th Cir. 2019). Objections must be
specific 	and 	not 	merely 	indicate 	a 	general 	objection 	to 	the 	entirety 	of 	the 	report 	and
recommendation; a general objection has the same effect as would a failure to object. Howard v.
Sec’y of Health and Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991).
Stated differently, objections should focus on specific concerns and not merely restate the
arguments in briefs submitted to the magistrate judge. “A reexamination of the exact same
argument that was presented to the Magistrate Judge without specific objections ‘wastes judicial
resources rather than saving them, and runs contrary to the purpose of the Magistrates
Act.’” Overholt v. Green, No. 1:17-CV-00186, 2018 WL 3018175, *2 (W.D. Ky. June 15, 2018)
(quoting Howard). The failure to assert specific objections may in rare cases be excused in the
interest of justice. See United States v. Wandahsega, 924 F.3d 868, 878-79 (6th Cir. 2019).
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