United States of America v. Wells et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	) 	CASE NO. 1:19-cr-251-19
)
)
PLAINTIFF, 	) 	CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. 	)
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
BOBBI BOYLAN, 	)
)
)
DEFENDANT. 	)
On February 26, 2020, defendant Bobbi Boylan (“Boylan” or “defendant”) was sentenced
to a custody term of 144 months. (Doc. No. 552 (Judgment); see Minutes of Proceedings [non-
document], 2/26/2020.) Boylan is currently serving her sentence at Waseca FCI and has an
anticipated release date of February 9, 2030.1 Now before the Court is Boylan’s motion, as
supplemented, for compassionate release. (Doc. No. 847 (Motion); see Doc. Nos. 848, 850, 851,
853, 856, 859.) Appointed counsel filed a notice of intent to not file a supplement in support of
compassionate release. (Doc. No. 857 (Notice).) Plaintiff United States of America (the
“government”) opposes the motion. (Doc. No. 858 (Response).)
I. 	BACKGROUND
On 	April 	24, 	2019, 	Boylan 	became one 	of 	twenty-one individuals 	charged 	with
participating in a multi-year drug trafficking organization (“DTO”) that distributed fentanyl and
other controlled substances in the Cleveland, Ohio area. (Doc. No. 13 (Indictment).) In particular,
Boylan was charged with conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin,
1 See https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc// (last visited December 29, 2025).
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fentanyl, and fentanyl analogues, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B),
(b)(1)(C), and distribution of heroin, fentanyl, carfentanil, and acetylfentanyl resulting in serious
bodily injury, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). (Id.) The distribution charge related
to Boylan’s sale of fentanyl, carfentanil, heroin, and acetylfentanyl to another person resulting in
an overdose. (Doc. No. 449 (Final Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”)), at 82 ¶ 18.)
On September 25, 2019, with the benefit of a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, Boylan
entered a guilty plea to the charges against her in the indictment. (Minutes of Proceedings [non-
document], 9/25/2025; Doc. No. 399 (Plea Agreement). Prior to sentencing, the Court ordered the
preparation of a PSR. (See Doc. No. 449.) In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the Court first
determined the base level offense to be 43. (See also id. at 9 ¶ 24.) After the appropriate
adjustments were applied—namely, a 3-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility—the
resulting total offense level was 40. (See also id. at 9 ¶¶ 31–33.) Boylan had one prior drug
trafficking conviction, which scored 3 criminal history points. (See also id. at 10–11 ¶¶ 39, 41.)
With a criminal history category II and an offense level of 40, the advisory guideline range was
324 to 405 months.3 (See also id. at 11, 16 ¶¶ 42, 67.) Nevertheless, the Court accepted the parties’
negotiated sentence and imposed a custody term of 144 months. (See Doc. No. 399, at 5 ¶ 15; Doc.
No. 552.)
On June 2, 2025, Boylan filed the present motion for compassionate release, in which she
requests a sentence reduction. In support, Boylan claims that she has taken advantage of every
available opportunity to rehabilitate herself and to address her substance abuse addiction, despite
2 All page number references are to the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual document by the Court’s
electronic filing system.
3 Because the statutorily authorized minimum sentences were greater than the maximum of the applicable guideline
range, the guideline term of imprisonment became life. (See also id. at 16 ¶ 67.)
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the limited programs available at her facility. (Doc. No. 847, at 1; Doc. No. 848, at 1; Doc. No.
850, at 1.) She also underscores her desire to be released so that she can develop a relationship
with her daughter. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 848, at 1–2.) Additionally, she advises the Court that her
mother recently suffered the death of her husband and shortly thereafter the death of her own
mother, and that her mother “really needs [Boylan] to be home” to assist her “mentally[,]
physically[, and] emotionally.” (Doc. No. 859, at 2.) Finally, she complains that she received a
substantially longer sentence than one of her co-defendants, Lisa Goforth (“Goforth”), who was
sentenced on the same day. (Doc. No. 847, at 2; Doc. No. 859, at 1; see Doc. No. 554 (Goforth
Judgment); Minutes of Proceedings [non-document], 2/26/2020.)
The government believes that the motion should be denied for three reasons: (1) Boylan
has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, (2) Boylan has failed to establish the existence
of extraordinary and compelling reasons, and (3) the sentencing factors set forth at 18 U.S.C. §
3553(a) do not support early release. (Doc. No. 858, at 1.)
II. 	MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE
A. Governing Law
The sentencing court has no inherent authority to reconsider and/or modify an otherwise
valid sentence. United States v. Washington, 584 F.3d 693, 700 (6th Cir. 2009). Instead, the
authority of the Court to resentence a defendant is limited by statute. United States v. Houston,
529 F.3d 743, 748–49 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Ross, 245 F.3d 577, 585 (6th Cir.
2001)); see United States v. Alexander, 951 F.3d 706, 707 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Generally speaking,
once a court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority to change or modify that
sentence unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.”) Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), a court
may only modify a term of imprisonment under the following circumstances: (1) upon a motion
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of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) or defendant for compassionate release; (2) as
expressly permitted by statute or by Fed. R. Crim. P. 35; or (3) where a defendant has been
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been
lowered by the Sentencing Commission. § 3582(c)(1)–(2).
Boylan does not seek relief under Rule 35, nor does she claim that she was sentenced to a
term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that was subsequently lowered. Instead, she
claims that she is entitled to a compassionate release. Under § 3582(c)(1)(A), a district court may
grant a sentence reduction “only if it finds that the defendant satisfies three requirements: (1)
‘extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction’; (2) the ‘reduction is consistent
with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission’; and (3) the relevant §
3553(a) factors support the reduction.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2021)
(quoting § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); United States v Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 518 (6th Cir. 2021)); see United
States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101 (6th Cir. 2020). Additionally, exhaustion of administrative
remedies is a mandatory claims-processing rule that must be satisfied before a defendant may seek
compassionate release. United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833–34 (6th Cir. 2020) (citations
omitted).
The policy statement applicable to compassionate release motions, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, was
amended effective November 1, 2023, and describes six categories of extraordinary and
compelling reasons that individually, or in combination, may support a request for compassionate
release. These categories are: (1) medical circumstances of the defendant; (2) the age of the
defendant; (3) a defendant’s family circumstances; (4) sexual or physical abuse suffered by the
defendant while in custody involving a “sexual act” or “serious bodily injury”; (5) “other reasons”
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similar in gravity as those articulated in (1)–(4); and (6) an “unusually long sentence.”4 U.S.S.G.
§ 1B1.13(b).
B. Exhaustion
At the outset, the government correctly observes that there is no evidence that Boylan has
exhausted her administrative remedies. In particular, there is nothing in the record to suggest that
Boylan has requested a compassionate release from the warden of her facility and that request has
been denied or that 30 days has passed without a decision on the request. See 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(A). As the party seeking a compassionate release, it is Boylan’s burden to show that
she is entitled to relief, including that she has properly exhausted her administrative remedies. See
United States v. Williams, 458 F. Supp. 3d 939, 943 (W.D. Tenn. 2020) (“The defendant bears the
burden of showing he has exhausted his administrative remedies and is entitled to compassionate
release.” (citations omitted)). In the absence of any evidence in the record that Boylan has
exhausted her administrative remedies, the Court must deny Boylan’s motion for this reason alone.
C. Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons
But even if Boylan had properly exhausted, she would still have to demonstrate that she
was entitled to relief under the compassionate release statute (18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)) and the
relevant BOP policy statement. The Court, therefore, turns to a consideration of whether defendant
has 	demonstrated 	the 	existence of 	extraordinary 	and 	compelling 	reasons 	identified 	in 	§
3582(c)(1)(A)(i), and discussed in detail in § 1B1.13(b), as amended.
4 To extent that Boylan relies on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6)—unusually long sentence—the Court notes that the Sixth
Circuit has recently determined that particular subsection to be invalid. See United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427,
430 (6th Cir. 2025) (holding that the United States Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating §
1B1.13(b)(6)). In any event, Boylan would not have been able to meet the requirements of this subsection as it required
service of at least 10 years imprisonment and a change in the law, neither of which Boylan can demonstrate.
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1. 	Rehabilitation
Much of Boylan’s motion and her supplements are devoted to an on-going discussion of
her attempts to rehabilitate and her plans to pursue a career should she be released early. While
Boylan’s undocumented rehabilitative efforts and future plans are commendable, alone they do
not amount to an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(d)
(stating that “rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, an extraordinary and compelling
reason”); United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 1004, 1009 (6th Cir. 2020) (stating that
“[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling
reason” for compassionate release (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t))); see also United States v. Jethrow,
No. 4:08-cr-520, 2025 WL 461800, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 11, 2025) (“[T]hough rehabilitation is
to be encouraged and applauded, it is also part of what is expected from all inmates.”).
2. 	Family Circumstances
Boylan also appears to invoke U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(3)—family circumstances of the
defendant—as a basis for compassionate release. Section 1B1.13(b)(3)(C) provides that the
“incapacitation” of the defendant’s parent may qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason
for early release where “the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the parent.” She
indicates the death of her mother’s spouse and own mother in rapid succession has left her mother
with a “double broken heart[,]” and has caused her to struggle “mentally[,] physically[, and]
emotionally.” (Doc. No. 859, at 2.) Understandably, Boylan would like to be released early so that
she can “take care of [her] mom.” (Id.)
But Boylan has not demonstrated that the situation with her mother meets the policy
statement’s definition of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for compassionate release.
Specifically, Boylan has not alleged, let alone documented, that her mother suffers from any
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medical or physical condition that has rendered her incapacitated. She has also failed to
demonstrate that, if her mother were incapacitated and required a caregiver, Boylan would be the
only available caregiver for her. In fact, the record reflects that Boylan has a brother who lives in
the area. (See Doc. No. 449, at 13 ¶ 46.) This family situation, though unfortunate, does not meet
the requirements of § 1B1.13(b)(3). See, e.g., United States v. Raymore, No. 1:19-cr-81, 2025 WL
2323560, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2025) (denying compassionate release motion where
defendant failed “to provide any information regarding his mother’s specific health conditions or
that would show he is the only available caretaker as required under § 1B1.13(b)(3)(C)”); see also
United States v. Villasenor, No. 21-3477, 2021 WL 5356032, at *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 17, 2021)
(recognizing that prisoners often have aging and sick parents and that this fact does not necessarily
establish an extraordinary and compelling reason).
3. 	Sentencing Disparities
Boylan’s remaining reason for release—a perceived sentencing disparity with a co-
defendant—likewise fails to satisfy the threshold requirement for compassionate release. While
she complains that she received a much longer sentence than co-defendant GoForth, who was
sentenced on the same day as Boylan, any alleged disparity between Boylan and her co-defendant
does not qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason. Both women were sentenced
according to their separately negotiated plea agreements. Moreover, it is well settled that “facts
that existed at sentencing cannot later be construed as ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ to
reduce a final sentence.” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 570–72 (6th Cir. 2021) (explaining
that “even if the sentence disparity did not exist at the time [the defendant] was sentenced,
subsequent leniency in another defendant’s case says nothing about how [the defendant’s] personal
circumstances have changed since he was sentenced”); United States v. Lemons, 15 F.4th 747, 750
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(6th Cir. 2021) (similar); see also United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 522 (6th Cir. 2008)
(recognizing that there can be a number of “valid reasons” for disparities in sentences between
coconspirators); United States v. Wright, No. 17-cr-20328, 2024 WL 1417504 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 2,
2024) (“district courts may not rely on facts that existed at the time of sentencing when determining
whether extraordinary and compelling grounds for release presently are shown” (citations
omitted)).
4. 	Conclusion
None of the stated reasons for release considered separately or in combination—even when
considered in further combination with Boylan’s claims of rehabilitation—constitute extraordinary
and compelling reasons. Because Boylan has failed to demonstrate the existence of extraordinary
and compelling reasons, her motion for compassionate release must be denied for this additional
reason.
D. Sentencing Factors
But even if Boylan had cleared the hurdles of exhausting her remedies and establishing
extraordinary and compelling reasons, the Court would still have denied her motion because the
sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) do not favor release. The nature and circumstances of
the charged offenses were serious. The trafficking of controlled substances is certainly dangerous,
as evidenced by the fact that one of Boylan’s drug sales resulted in an overdose that caused serious
bodily harm. See United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939, 947 n.6 (6th Cir 2010) (“To be sure, drug
trafficking is a serious offense, that, in itself, poses a danger to the community.” (citations
omitted)). Additionally, the convictions in the present case were not Boylan’s first drug-related
convictions. She was previously convicted in state court of drug trafficking, and a prior custody
sentence for drug trafficking failed to discourage her from returning to this dangerous and
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destructive behavior. (See Doc. No. 449, at 10 ¶ 39.)
The Court has also considered Boylan’s stated release plan, her rehabilitation efforts and
attempts, her desire to reconnect with her daughter, and her willingness to provide support for her
mother. But after considering all of the § 3353(a) factors, the Court finds that a reduction in
sentence would undermine the need for the sentence imposed to reflect the seriousness of the
offenses, promote respect for the law, provide just punishment for the offenses, afford adequate
deterrence, and protect the public from further crimes of the defendant. Based on these same facts,
the Court also finds that defendant continues to pose a danger to the community.5
III. 	RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DRUG TREATMENT
While Boylan has failed to demonstrate an entitlement to a sentence reduction at this time,
the Court is concerned regarding her claims that she has been denied substance abuse treatment.
(See Doc. No. 847, at 1.) Consistent with the Court’s recommendation at the time of sentencing,
the Court continues to believe that Boylan would benefit from participation in the 500 hour
intensive drug treatment program (RDAP) or other similar drug-treatment program. (See Doc. No.
552, at 2.) Accordingly, the Court renews its recommendation that Boylan be permitted to
participate in the RDAP, or any other drug treatment program for which she qualifies.
Additionally, while the Court recognizes that the authority to place a prisoner in a residential
reentry center (“RRC”) rests with the Bureau of Prisons, see 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), it recommends
that Boylan be considered for transfer to an RRC that provides drug addiction rehabilitation
services at the earliest possible time and for the longest possible time provided by law. See also
Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319, 331, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 180 L. Ed. 2d 357 (2011) (“A
5 To the extent that Boylan seeks assistance with an open state case she has in Cuyahoga County, Ohio (see Doc. No.
847, at 4), the Court is without authority or jurisdiction to offer any relief or assistance in that separate matter.
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sentencing court can recommend that the BOP place an offender in a particular facility or program.
But the decision-making authority rests with the BOP.” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (emphasis in
original)).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies defendant’s motion, as supplemented, for a
compassionate release. The Court recommends that defendant be permitted to participate in any
drug treatment programs for which she qualifies at the appropriate time. Additionally, the Court
recommends that the defendant be considered for transfer to an RRC that provides drug addiction
rehabilitation services at the earliest possible time and for the longest possible time provided by
law.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 30, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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