USA v. Hamilton, et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CASE NO. 1:01-cr-58-8
)
)
PLAINTIFF, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
TARA A. MOORE, )
)
)
DEFENDANT. )
Before the Court is a motion filed by defendant Tara A. Moore (“Moore”) seeking relief
from her federal firearms disability. (Doc. No. 273.) Because the Court is without jurisdiction to
grant the requested relief, Moore’s motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 17, 2001, Moore entered a guilty plea to one count of wire fraud. (Doc. No. 154
(Minutes of Guilty Plea); see Doc. No. 155 (Plea Agreement).) On October 19, 2001, the Court
sentenced Moore to a custody term of 1 day, followed by 3 years of supervised release. (Doc. No.
202 (Judgment); Doc. No. 201 (Minutes of Sentencing Hearing).) Moore served her custody term,
and she was released from her period of supervised release on October 23, 2004. (See Doc. No.
237 (Order).)1
On October 8, 2025, the Court received correspondence from Moore in which she requests
“relief from the barriers that [her] conviction has placed on [her] ability to move forward.” (Doc.
1 The case was assigned to the Honorable Peter C. Economus. On February 23, 2012, following the retirement of
Judge Economus, the matter was reassigned to the undersigned. (Staff Notes (Court Only), 2/23/2012.)
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No. 273, at 1.) Specifically, she seeks “the opportunity to gain employment without restrictions
and to lawfully carry a weapon in pursuit of [her] career in criminal justice.” (Id. at 1–2.)
Accordingly, the Court construes Moore’s correspondence as a motion for relief from her federal
firearms disability.
In support of her request, Moore insists that she “take[s] full responsibility for the actions
that led” to her conviction. (Id. at 1.) Moreover, since her conviction, she underscores that she has
“committed [herself] to growth, accountability, and service.” (Id.) She is currently pursuing a
bachelor’s degree in criminal justice, “with the goal of working in law enforcement and creating
programs that bridge the gap between the community and the police.” (Id.) She explains that
through her tenure as a committee member for the Akron City Council, she discovered a passion
for public service, and that she is especially interested in serving “vulnerable and underprivileged
populations, particularly missing and exploited children[.]” (Id.)
II. DISCUSSION
Once an individual has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term
exceeding one year, it is unlawful for that person to possess any firearm. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).
Moore became subject to § 922(g)’s prohibition upon her conviction for wire fraud, a crime
punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Moore does not challenge the validity
of her conviction, and, in fact, she readily accepts responsibility for the actions that led to her
conviction. (Doc. No. 273, at 1.) Because Moore merely challenges the collateral consequences
flowing from her conviction, and not the underlying conviction, the Court lacks jurisdiction to
entertain her motion. Challenges to such collateral consequences must be filed in a separate civil
rights action. See also United States v. Miller, No. 24-3254, 2025 WL 101272, at *5 n.4 (6th Cir.
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Mar. 31, 2025) (noting that “there are many state and federal consequences that flow from a felony
conviction—most of which implicate important civil rights . . . [b]ut because they are not part of
the felony conviction, challenges to these restrictions occur in separate civil suits not in direct
criminal appeals”).
Additionally, 18 U.S.C. §§ 925(c) and 921(a)(20) arguably afford limited avenues for relief
from the federal firearms disability. Section 925(c) provides that an individual who is prohibited
from possessing a firearm may apply to the Attorney General for relief from the disability, and any
individual whose application is denied by the Attorney General may file a habeas petition with the
district court. 18 U.S.C. § 925(c). The Attorney General has delegated authority to act on those
application to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (“ATF”). See United States v. Bean,
537 U.S. 71, 74, 123 S. Ct. 584, 154 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2002). Since 1992, however, the ATF has been
prevented by an appropriations bar from using appropriated funds “to investigate or act upon
applications for relief from Federal firearms disabilities[.]” Id. (quotation marks and citation
omitted). By defunding this administrative mechanism for restoring the right to bear arms,
Congress also foreclosed access to judicial review. Id. at 76.
Convicted felons may also qualify for the restoration of their firearms rights by
demonstrating that their conviction falls within the “exemption clause” of § 921(a)(20), which
exempts convictions which have been “expunged, or set aside or for which a person has been
pardoned or has had his civil rights restored[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(2)); see Walker v. United States,
800 F.3d 720, 729–30 (6th Cir. 2015) (“Of course [the] appropriations measures blocking § 925(c)
cannot entirely prevent felons from having their firearms rights restored because they could obtain
a pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil rights from the convicting jurisdiction under §
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921(a)(20)”).
Moore has not established that she has been pardoned, nor has she filed a civil rights action
to restore her rights. Even though she may still be able to pursue these avenues, such relief is not
available from this Court. In limited circumstances, a district court does enjoy the authority to
expunge a conviction, but Moore has failed to demonstrate an entitlement to such relief. Certain
statutes explicitly permit the sealing or expunging2 of criminal records. United States v. Lucido,
612 F.3d 871, 874 (6th Cir. 2010). For instance, 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) and 21 U.S.C. § 844a(j) grant
courts the power to expunge convictions for certain violations of the Controlled Substances Act.
Id. Other statutes, such as 34 U.S.C. § 12592 (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C. § 14132) and 10 U.S.C.
§ 1565(e), authorize the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secretary of
Defense, respectively, to expunge certain DNA records. Id. None of these statutes apply to the
instant case, and there is no federal statute that supplies district courts with general authority to
seal valid criminal convictions. See United States v. Welch, No. 1:05-cr-158, 2007 WL 4465256,
at *1 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 18, 2007).
The only other means by which this Court may expunge a conviction is under ancillary
jurisdiction. Federal courts have “ancillary” jurisdiction over proceedings that are related to, but
technically separate from, the original case over which the court has subject-matter jurisdiction
over a proceeding if doing so serves one of two purposes. First, a court may exercise ancillary
jurisdiction over two or more claims that are factually interdependent when doing so would permit
disposition of those claims by a single court. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375,
2 For a federal district court, “‘there is no distinction between sealing and expunging a criminal record.’” United States
v. Townsend, No. 2:09-cr-118, 2014 WL 1884229, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 9, 2014) (quoting Cline v. United States, No.
2:93-cr-94, 2009 WL 2475264, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2009)).
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379, 114 S. Ct. 1673, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1994) (citations omitted). Second, exercising ancillary
jurisdiction is appropriate if doing so enables a court “to manage its proceedings, vindicate its
authority, and effectuate its decrees[.]” Id. at 380 (citations omitted). The power to expunge or seal
a conviction may only be exercised if doing so would serve the second purpose. See United States
v. Smith, No. 1:05-cr-286, 2010 WL 2802274, at *1 (W.D. Mich. July 15, 2010). Unlike
“supplemental or “pendant” jurisdiction, which are dictated by 28 U.S.C. § 1367, ancillary
jurisdiction is governed by case law. United States v. Field, 756 F.3d 911, 914 (6th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
A district court’s ancillary expungement power is rarely exercised, and courts “have most
readily invoked [this] power with respect to illegal convictions, convictions under statutes later
deemed unconstitutional, and convictions obtained through governmental misconduct.” United
States v. Robinson, 79 F.3d 1149 (Table), 1996 WL 107129, at *2 (6th Cir. Mar. 8, 1996).
In Field, the Sixth Circuit held that district courts may exercise ancillary jurisdiction over
motions to expunge unconstitutional convictions but not motions based on purely equitable
considerations. Field, 756 F.3d at 916; see, e.g., United States v. Deer, 249 F. Supp. 3d 876, 877
(N.D. Ohio 2017). Thus, in order to expunge or seal a conviction under ancillary jurisdiction, the
district court must find that (1) the motion raises a valid constitutional claim, and (2) granting the
motion enables the court to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, or effectuate its
decrees. Deer, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 877 (citing Field, 756 F.3d at 916).
Moore has not raised a constitutional challenge to the Court’s judgment. Furthermore,
expunging a 24-year-old conviction would not serve the second purpose of ancillary jurisdiction
identified in Kokkonen. Expunging a conviction years after the closing of the case does not manage
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this case, vindicate this Court’s power, or help effectuate the Court’s orders. See Lucido, 612 F.3d
at 874–75 (finding that the court had no authority to expunge a conviction 16 years later because
it would not serve the purposes of ancillary jurisdiction identified in Kokkonen). Consequently,
this Court does not have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge Moore’s valid conviction. See United
States v. Flagg, 178 F. Supp. 2d 903, 905 (S.D. Ohio 2001) (“The view among the federal courts
is that records of valid arrests, indictments or convictions ordinarily many not be expunged.”
(collecting cases)).
While this Court commends Moore for the positive changes she has made in the years
following her release from prison, and it is sympathetic to the difficulties that convicted felons
often face in the workplace, these are equitable considerations that cannot invoke ancillary
jurisdiction. See Field, 756 F.3d at 916; see, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 1:11-cr-02, 2022 WL
2163838, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. May 18, 2022); United States v. Tippie, No. 3:08-cr-288, 2013 WL
4782370, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 21, 2013). Her conviction was and remains valid. Accordingly,
to the extent Moore seeks to expunge or seal her conviction, the request is denied.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, Moore’s motion for relief from her federal firearms disability
is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 12, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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