Ivonin v. Freden et al

- 1 -
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
___________________________________
ROLAND IVONIN,
Petitioner, 	DECISION AND ORDER
v. 	6:25-CV-06673 EAW
PHILIP RHONEY, in his official capacity
as Acting Deputy Field Office Director,
Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement, et al.,1
Respondents.
____________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Roland Ivonin (“Petitioner” or “Ivonin”) was taken into custody on
November 14, 2025, by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). He is detained
at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility (“BFDF”) in Batavia, New York.
Pending before the Court is Ivonin’s petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (Dkt. 1) and
Respondents’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. 13). For the reasons set forth below, the petition is
granted to the extent that Respondents must provide Petitioner a bond hearing before an
1 	Respondents advise that Philip Rhoney is the Acting Deputy Field Office Director
of the Buffalo Field Office of the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
and thus he is substituted as Respondent in place of Joseph Freden pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 25(d). 	(Dkt. 13-3 at 1). 	The Clerk of Court is directed to update the
docket to reflect this substitution.
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 1 of 14

- 2 -
immigration 	judge 	(“IJ”) 	in 	accordance 	with 	the procedures 	set 	forth 	herein, 	and
Respondents’ motion to dismiss is denied.
BACKGROUND
A. 	Factual Background
Ivonin is a Ukrainian national who was admitted to the United States on a visa in
2008. (Dkt. 1 at 1). He is married with a 16-year old U.S. citizen daughter. (Id. at ¶ 31).
After arriving in the United States, he applied for asylum and the immigration court
administratively closed the removal proceedings on September 8, 2016. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 31).
On or about November 19, 2017, Ivonin returned to the United States from a trip abroad,
and he was placed on advanced parole through November 18, 2018. (Id. at ¶¶ 1, 31; Dkt.
10). 	On November 14, 2025, Petitioner was taken into custody and has been held since
that time with no bond hearing. (Dkt. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 32).2
B. 	Procedural Background
Represented by counsel, Ivonin filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 on November 18, 2025. (Dkt. 1). The same day, the Court
directed Respondents to show cause as to why the Court’s prior orders finding that
noncitizens who are present in the United States without having been admitted or paroled
are subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226 and not 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), would not
direct that Ivonin be provided a bond hearing. (Dkt. 2).
2 	At oral argument, the parties confirmed that these facts are not in dispute and no
evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve any factual questions.
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 2 of 14

- 3 -
On November 20, 2025, Respondents filed a letter explaining the government’s
position that the facts in this case are distinguishable because Ivonin is being detained as
an arriving alien. (Dkt. 5). Petitioner responded and disagreed, arguing that his petition
was subject to the same framework as the Court’s prior decisions. (Dkt. 6).
On November 20, 2025, Petitioner sought a TRO to prevent his transfer outside of
the jurisdiction. (Dkt. 7). The Court temporarily enjoined Respondents from transferring
Petitioner outside of the Western District of New York. 	(Dkt. 9). 	Consistent with the
scheduling order issued by the Court at a November 21, 2025 conference with the parties
(Dkt. 11), Respondents filed a motion to dismiss (Dkt. 13), Ivonin filed papers in
opposition (Dkt. 14), and Respondents filed a reply (Dkt. 16). 	Oral argument was held
before the undersigned on December 18, 2025, at which time the Court reserved decision.
(Dkt. 18). Following argument, both parties provided additional submissions as discussed
at the argument. (Dkt. 17; Dkt. 19).
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Section 1225
Title 8 of section 1225 of the United States Code, is entitled “Inspection by
immigration officers; expedited removal of inadmissible arriving aliens; referral for
hearing.” Section 1225(a)(1) entitled “Aliens treated as applicants for admission” states as
follows:
An alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who
arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and
including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been
interdicted in international or United States waters) shall be deemed for
purposes of this chapter an applicant for admission.
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 3 of 14

- 4 -
8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 	Section 1225(b)(1) entitled “Inspection of aliens arriving in the
United States and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled” applies to
noncitizens initially determined to be inadmissible based on fraud, misrepresentation, or
lack of valid documentation, as well as certain other noncitizens designated in the
discretion of the Attorney General. Section 1225(b)(2) entitled “Inspection of other aliens”
is a “catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not covered by
§ 1225(b)(1),” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287 (2018), and states as follows in
subparagraph (A):
Subject to subparagraphs (B) and (C), in the case of an alien who is an
applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that
an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be
admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of
this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).
Further, pursuant to § 1182(d)(5)(A), noncitizens detained following inspection
under § 1225 can be paroled into the United States “for urgent humanitarian reasons or
significant public benefit,” based on a “case-by-case” assessment by DHS. Parole under §
1182(d)(5)(A) may terminate “automatically” upon the noncitizen’s “departure from the
United States” or “at the expiration of the time for which parole was authorized,” see 8
C.F.R. § 212.5(e)(1), or “upon written notice to the [noncitizen],” § 212.5(e)(2)(i).
“[W]hen the purposes of such parole shall, in the opinion of the Secretary of Homeland
Security, have been served the alien shall forthwith return or be returned to the custody
from which he was paroled and thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 4 of 14

- 5 -
same manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United States.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5)(A).
Section 1226
Title 8 of section 1226 of the United States Code is entitled “Apprehension and
detention of aliens.” Section 1226(a) “sets out the default rule,” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 288,
and states as follows:
On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and
detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the
United States. 	Except as provided in subsection (c) and pending such
decision, the Attorney General—
(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and
(2) may release the alien on--
(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by, and containing
conditions prescribed by, the Attorney General; or
(B) conditional parole; but
(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization (including an
“employment authorized” endorsement or other appropriate work permit),
unless the alien is lawfully admitted for permanent residence or otherwise
would 	(without 	regard 	to 	removal 	proceedings) 	be 	provided 	such
authorization.
Section 1226(c) “carves out a statutory category of aliens who may not be released under
§ 1226(a)” and addresses “several enumerated categories involving criminal offenses and
terrorist activities.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 289.
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 5 of 14

- 6 -
ANALYSIS
A. 	Jurisdiction
At the outset, Respondents argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the petition
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1252(g) and 1252(b)(9). Because the Court has already addressed
this argument in Lieogo v. Freden, et al., No. 6:25-CV-06615 EAW, 2025 WL 3290694,
at *2-4 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025), it relies on the reasoning set forth in that decision to
support the conclusion that it possesses jurisdiction over the matters raised in Petitioner’s
petition and will not repeat the analysis here.
B. 	Merits of Petition
As detailed in the decisions issued by the undersigned in Quituizaca Quituisaca v.
Bondi, et al., No. 25-cv-6527, 2025 WL 3264440 (W.D.N.Y Nov. 24, 2025) and Lieogo,
2025 WL 3290694, a “change in policy” by the current executive administration has led to
noncitizens residing in this country to be held in custody without bond based on a law
historically used to detain noncitizens stopped at the border (8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)). This
Court, like most to have considered the issue, concluded that the law does not allow for
what Respondents claim, and that noncitizens who are present in the United States without
having been admitted or paroled are not subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2) but instead are subject to detention under § 1226, and thus entitled to a bond
hearing.
Respondents argue that because Ivonin was inspected at a port of entry and paroled
into the United States, the facts of his case materially differ from those individuals
encountered within the interior of the United States after entering without inspection. They
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 6 of 14

- 7 -
contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in Department of Homeland Security v.
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), holding that an alien who “is detained shortly after
unlawful entry” is not treated, for due process purposes, as having “effected an entry” into
the United States, but is instead treated as “on the threshold,” just like “an alien detained
after arriving at a port of entry,” applies to Ivonin. Id. at 140. In other words, they contend
that Ivonin is and has always been an arriving alien and § 1225(b) provides no bond
mechanism, and therefore his detention is mandated with no right to a bond hearing.
Ivonin challenges Respondents’ argument, in no small part due to the incongruency
between the current position Respondents take and their prior conduct, including when he
was detained on November 14, 2025, and provided a Notice to Appear reflecting that he
was being detained not as an arriving alien but rather as someone “admitted to the United
States.” (Dkt. 13-2 at 7). Only after the instant petition was filed did Respondents issue a
superseding Notice to Appear (id. at 10) identifying Ivonin as an arriving alien, an exercise
that Ivonin argues would have been unnecessary had he simply been re-detained as a
paroled arriving alien. Ruedo Torres v. Francis, 25 Civ. 8408 (DEH), 2025 WL 3168759,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2025) (“Respondents have, for three years, consistently treated
Ms. Rueda Torres as subject to detention only as a matter of discretion under § 1226(a).
They cannot reverse course now and claim that she is an arriving alien ‘seeking admission’
[to] the United States who is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b).”); see also
Alberto R.C. v. Murray, No. 1:25-CV-01618-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3648143, at *4
(E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (“Here, the government itself treated petitioner as a person who
had entered and was already present in the country when they detained and released him.
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 7 of 14

- 8 -
This fact undermines respondents’ attempt to apply the entry fiction doctrine. 	The
government’s actions in releasing petitioner subject to § 1226(a) are inconsistent with their
claim that petitioner is subject to the entry fiction doctrine.”).
But even more fundamentally, this Court agrees with other courts who have looked
at this issue and concluded that in instances, as here, where a petitioner’s re-arrest was not
a continuation of the initial border encounter, but an independent decision to detain the
individual after the expiration of his parole, the detention pursuant to that re-arrest arises
under § 1226. In other words, suggesting that Ivonin is still on the threshold of entry into
this country, based on his re-entry into the United States through parole which expired over
seven years ago, stretches the “legal fiction” beyond reason.
For example, in Campbell v. Almodovar, No. 1:25-CV-09509 (JLR), 2025 WL
3538351, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2025), the district court noted that mandatory detention
under § 1225 is only be justified where “a noncitizen is: (1) an ‘applicant for admission’;
(2) ‘seeking admission’; and (3) ‘not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted.’”
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)). 	It concluded that upon the expiration of his parole,
Campbell remained an “applicant for admission” despite having been paroled, but was no
longer “seeking admission” at the time of his 2025 re-arrest and detention. Id. (“In sum,
when DHS agents detained Campbell in 2025, he was no longer seeking to enter the
country. He was already in — and had been for several years.”). Accordingly, the district
court determined that “Campbell’s actual presence within the United States at the time of
his 2025 re-arrest” renders his detention to be pursuant the provisions of § 1226(a), and not
§ 1225. Id. at *9.
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 8 of 14

- 9 -
Likewise, in a recent case from this district, United States District Judge Lawence
J. Vilardo noted that “[t]here is little question that when Cabrera Martinez first arrived at
the border in March 2023, he was ‘seeking admission’. . . [and] then was paroled into the
country, which allowed him to remain here under parole’s ‘entry fiction.’” 	Cabrera
Martinez v. Marich, No. 25-CV-1110-LJV, 2025 WL 3771228, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 31,
2025). Judge Vilardo concluded, however, that the “entry fiction” ends once a person has
been living in the country after parole expires. 	Id. at *6. 	He reasoned that “most of the
cases upon which the government relies hold that being paroled into the country, or
spending years here without any authority, does not entitle a noncitizen to any additional
process in connection with an application to enter or legally remain here,” “[b]ut that says
nothing about whether the noncitizen might be entitled to be released while the application
is pending, an issue of liberty far different from immigration status.” Id., at *8. The court
ultimately held that “after careful consideration of this close question, this Court joins those
courts that have found that an individual who has been living in the United States outside
parole and is later apprehended is detained under section 1226.” Id., at *13.
Other courts within this Circuit have concluded similarly. 	See e.g., Iza by Iza v.
Larocco, No. 2:25-CV-6915 (NJC), 2026 WL 31378, at *11-12 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2026)
(“Mr. Iza [who was previously released on humanitarian parole pursuant to Section
1182(d)(5)(A)] is an applicant for admission, but clearly he is not presenting himself at the
border and was not recently apprehended just after entering, and thereby is not ‘seeking
admission’ as required for mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)”); Qasemi v.
Francis, No. 25-CV-10029 (LJL), 2025 WL 3654098, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025)
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 9 of 14

- 10 -
(“Putting these pieces together, the termination by expiration of Qasemi’s parole returned
him to the ‘custody’ of DHS pursuant to the INA. Because he was paroled, and because
he is not an arriving alien, he is no longer subject to the mandatory detention provision of
Section 1225(b)(1). 	The outcome of this textual analysis is ultimately simple: absent
ongoing parole status, Section 1182 mandates that Qasemi be treated just as the INA would
treat any noncitizen previously granted parole and living in the United States. Every court
that this Court is aware of that has considered the question has determined the same.”
(collecting cases)); Rodriguez-Acurio v. Almodovar, __, F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL
3314420, at *18 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 28, 2025) (concluding that “[s]ection 1182(d)(5)(A) may
permit the petitioner to be returned to ICE custody, but her case, which necessarily includes
the procedures required before detention, ‘shall continue to be dealt with in the same
manner as that of any other applicant for admission,’ 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and any
other applicant for admission residing in the United States for more than three years would
be detained under [s]ection 1226” (citation modified)); see also Daza v. Albarran, No. 25-
CV-10214-RFL, 2026 WL 81518, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2026) (“At the time of her
November 2025 detention, [following expiration of her parole] Petitioner was not an
arriving noncitizen seeking entry into the country and had been living here for one year.
Accordingly, she was not seeking admission at the time of her detention, so Section
1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention provision does not apply.”); Abdirashid v. Noem, No.
25-4779 (JRT/EMB), 2026 WL 127698, at *3 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2026) (“[T]he Court
concludes that § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which provides for the initial mandatory detention of
noncitizens subject to § 1225(b)(1) who are found to have a credible fear of persecution in
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 10 of 14

- 11 -
their home country, does not authorize the mandatory detention of that noncitizen once
they have been paroled into the country and released. To the extent that Petitioner’s present
detention is authorized by federal statute, it is pursuant to the discretionary detention
scheme under § 1226(a).”); Montiel v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-CV-1610, 2026 WL 32076, at
*2 (W.D. Mich. Jan. 6, 2026) (rejecting argument that petitioner was detained pursuant to
§ 1225(b)(2) despite the expiration of prior parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)
because “while § 1182(d)(5)(A) may permit Petitioner to be returned to ICE custody, there
is ‘nothing in this text that affirmatively authorizes. . . indefinite detention. . . [t]o the
contrary, it provides that, when parole is revoked, ‘the alien shall. . . be returned to the
custody from which he was paroled and thereafter “his case shall continue to be dealt with
in the same manner as that of any other applicant for admission.”’ Clark v. Martinez, 543
U.S. 371, 386 (2005). 	For the reasons previously set forth in detail, the Court has
concluded that § 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), governs “any other applicant for admission”
who has resided in the United States and was already within the United States when
apprehended and arrested.” (citation modified)); Francois v. Noem, No. CV 25-7334, 2026
WL 27565, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 5, 2026) (“Courts around the country have also found
noncitizens who were paroled under § 1182(d)(5) are not subject to mandatory detention if
they have been residing within the country for years. . . . The fact Francois had [Temporary
Protected Status] which then expired also does not impact his petition. 	Courts in this
district and around the country have found a petitioner’s TPS status does not materially
impact their right to habeas relief under similar circumstances.”).
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 11 of 14

- 12 -
To be sure, some courts—at least outside this Circuit—have reached contrary
conclusions. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Soto, No. CV 25-19082 (SDW), 2026 WL 125576, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 16, 2026) (“The record of this matter makes it clear that Petitioner was detained
at the border as an ‘arriving alien’ under § 1225(b)(2). 	Her release on parole does not
change that because Petitioner is treated legally as if she remained at the border for the
duration of that parole. Petitioner thus remained subject to both the removal procedures,
and accompanying mandatory detention, which applies to noncitizens detained under §
1225(b)(2) . . . . Petitioner’s current detention is thus lawful, and Petitioner is not entitled
to a bond hearing under the statute that governs [her] detention.” (citation modified));
Tenemasa-Lema v. Hyde, No. CV 25-13029-BEM, 2025 WL 3280555, at *4 (D. Mass.
Nov. 25, 2025) (concluding that expiration of parole did not preclude re-detention under
section 1225 “because DHS’s statutory power to ‘return’ Petitioner to custody under
section 1225 at the expiration of his parole, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), was not lost
through DHS’ inaction, [and] that remains a proper authority for his current detention”);
Chanaguano Caiza v. Scott, No. 1:25-CV-00500-JAW, 2025 WL 3013081, at *7 (D. Me.
Oct. 28, 2025) (“The Court concludes that Mr. Chanaguano Caiza was initially detained
pursuant to § 1225(b)(2) and therefore, upon expiration of his parole, his status is restored
to detention under that same statute.”).
The undersigned acknowledges that this is a close issue. But after having carefully
studied the matter, this Court finds the in-Circuit cases more persuasive. 	Thus, the
undersigned concludes that neither the relevant statutes, Supreme Court or Second Circuit
precedent, nor basic common sense, justify treating an individual like Ivonin who is present
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 12 of 14

- 13 -
in the United States after expiration of parole, any differently than an individual who
entered the country without parole. Once Ivonin’s parole expired and he remained in the
United States, with no action by the government to remove him or otherwise take him into
custody, the legal fiction treating him as at the threshold of entry no longer applied. And
Respondents themselves endorsed that principle when they initially took him into custody,
providing a Notice to Appear reflecting that he was detained not as an arriving alien but as
someone “admitted to the United States.” (Dkt. 13-2 at 7).
Therefore, this Court joins the majority of courts in concluding that petitioners such
as Ivonin are subject to detention pursuant to § 1226. 	Accordingly, for this reason, the
petition is granted to the extent that Petitioner seeks a bond hearing, and a bond hearing
shall be conducted in accordance with the following terms:
1. 	Petitioner shall be granted a bond hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”)
on or before February 5, 2026. If Petitioner requests a continuance that results in a bond
hearing date outside this deadline, such a continuance will comply with this Order as long
as the new date falls within a reasonable time period.
2. 	At this bond hearing, and consistent with this Court’s prior determinations
and applying the factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), to
Petitioner’s situation, see Lieogo v. Freden, No. 6:25-CV-06615 EAW, 2025 WL 3290694,
at *4-6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025), the government will have the burden to demonstrate
dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence. 	In deciding whether the
government has met its burden of proof, the IJ must consider whether less-restrictive
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 13 of 14

- 14 -
alternatives to detention can reasonably address the government’s interest in Petitioner’s
continued detention.
3. 	If the IJ finds that the government has not met its burden, then in setting any
bond the IJ must consider Petitioner’s ability to pay and alternative conditions of release.
4. 	Thus, in order to continue Petitioner’s detention after any bond hearing, the
IJ must find by clear and convincing evidence and make findings that no condition or
combination of conditions of release can reasonably ensure Petitioner’s appearance and the
safety of the community—that is, even with conditions, Petitioner presents an identified
and articulable risk of flight or a threat to another person or the community.
5. 	Respondents are directed to file a status update with the Court on or before
February 7, 2026.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is granted to the extent that Petitioner seeks
a bond hearing in accordance with the terms set forth herein, and Respondents’ motion to
dismiss (Dkt. 13) is denied.
SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD
Chief Judge
United States District Court
Dated: 	January 26, 2026
Rochester, New York
Case 6:25-cv-06673-EAW Document 21 Filed 01/26/26 Page 14 of 14