USA v. Steinmetz

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
v.
6:25-CR-06033 FPG CDH
PATRICK J. STEINMETZ,
Defendant.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant 	Patrick 	J. 	Steinmetz 	(“Steinmetz”) 	is 	charged 	by 	indictment
returned on February 25, 2025, with two counts of production of child pornography
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Counts 1 and 2), and one count of possession
of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Count 3). (Dkt. 42).
This matter has been referred to me to address all pre-trial matters, “including
all pre-trial matters that a Magistrate Judge may hear and determine pursuant to 28
U.S.C. Section 636(b)(1)(A), and those which a Magistrate Judge may hear and
thereafter file a report and recommendation for disposition pursuant to Section
636(b)(1)(B).” (Dkt. 44). Steinmetz has filed pre-trial motions seeking: (1) suppression
of statements; (2) disclosure of Brady1 material; (3) disclosure of witness statements;
(4) disclosure of evidence pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 608, and 609;
(5) preservation of rough notes; and (6) suppression of evidence derived from the
1 	Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
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search and seizure of his cell phones. (Dkt. 57; Dkt. 70). 2 The government opposes
these motions. (Dkt. 60). On June 23, 2025, I granted Steinmetz leave to file
supplemental motions. (Dkt. 64). He thereafter filed a supplemental motion for
suppression of evidence derived from execution of a search warrant on his cell phone.
(Dkt. 65). The government also opposes this supplemental motion. (Dkt. 66).
I 	held oral argument 	on 	Steinmetz’s 	motions 	on 	August 13, 2025, and
determined that an evidentiary hearing was required with respect to Steinmetz’s
motion for suppression of statements. (See Dkt. 71). An evidentiary hearing on
Steinmetz’s motion to suppress statements was held on September 11, 2025. (Dkt.
74). Post-hearing briefing was filed by Steinmetz on October 23, 2025, and by the
government on November 5, 2025. (Dkt. 79; Dkt. 80).
For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that the District Judge deny
Steinmetz’s motions for suppression. 3
BACKGROUND
I. 	Initial Investigation
On March 30, 2024, deputies from the Livingston County Sheriff’s Office
(“LCSO”) were dispatched to investigate reports that a minor (“MV1”) had been
sexually assaulted by Steinmetz. (Dkt. 70-1 at ¶ 4). MV1 provided a written
statement alleging that Steinmetz had sexually assaulted her on March 28, 2024, and
2 	Steinmetz’s unredacted motion papers contain identifying victim information
and have accordingly been sealed. (See Dkt. 58). A redacted version has been publicly
filed at Docket No. 70.
3 	My 	resolution 	of 	Steinmetz’s 	remaining 	motions 	is 	set 	forth 	in 	a
contemporaneously issued Decision and Order.
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that he had done the same thing on approximately ten occasions since the previous
summer. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 1). 4 Also on March 30, 2024, Steinmetz’s wife, Carrie
Steinmetz (“Carrie”), gave law enforcement permission to search the residence she
shared with Steinmetz. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 2).
On April 1, 2024, LCSO investigators went to Steinmetz’s residence seeking to
conduct an interview with him. (See Dkt. 76 at 42). Initially informed by a family
member 	that 	Steinmetz 	was 	not 	there, 	the 	investigators 	later 	returned 	and
discovered that Steinmetz had cut both of his wrists. (Id. at 42-43). Emergency
medical services were called and transported Steinmetz to Strong Memorial Hospital.
(Id. at 44, 70).
II. 	Recovery and Search of Cell Phones
Also on April 1, 2024, LCSO investigators learned that Steinmetz had used a
cell phone to take sexual photos and recordings of MV1. (Id. at 3). Meagan Pike
(“Pike”), a relative of MV1, provided a written statement on April 1, 2024, in which
she reported that she was with MV1 at Steinmetz’s residence when MV1 remembered
that Steinmetz had given her a cell phone to hide because it contained recordings and
photographs of what 	Steinmetz had done to MV1. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 3).
According to Pike’s written statement, MV1 then went into Steinmetz’s and Carrie’s
bedroom and located five cell phones, which she gave to Pike to turn over to law
enforcement. (Id.).
MV1 also provided a written statement on April 1, 2024, in which—consistent
with Pike’s statement—she reported that she was at Steinmetz’s residence with Pike
4 	The government submitted exhibits both in connection with its opposition
papers and at the evidentiary hearing. For clarity, I refer to the former as “Gov’t
Briefing Exhibits” and the latter as “Gov’t Hearing Exhibits.”
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that afternoon when she recalled that Steinmetz had used a cell phone to take
recordings while engaging in sexual activity with her and to take photographs and
recordings of her naked body. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 4). MV1 stated that Steinmetz
had given her the cell phone “to hide” and that this information had “completely
slipped [her] mind” when she spoke to law enforcement on March 30, 2024. (Id.). MVI
stated that she went into Steinmetz’s and Carrie’s bedroom and located five cell
phones, which she left with Pike. (Id.).
On April 2, 2024, Carrie provided a written statement in which she indicated
that any phone recovered from her bedroom was “owned by” her, that she was the
“bill payer and purchaser for all the devices used and owned” by her family members,
and that she gave LCSO Investigators Connor Sanford (“Investigator Sanford”) and
James Merrick (“Investigator Merrick”) permission to search all the devices that were
found in her bedroom. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 5). Carrie also signed consent forms for
searches of four cell phones in which she stated that she was the “owner and bill
payer” of the devices, had been advised of her right to refuse consent, and voluntarily
gave permission for law enforcement to perform a complete search of the devices.
(Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 6). The four cell phones were: (1) a Samsung SM-A146U; (2) a
TCL 30z T602DL; (3) an Ans Artia ACK2326; and (4) a Max West Astro 55R (the
“Max West Astro”). (Id.). 5 Carrie able to unlock all of the phones (including the Max
West Astro) with a PIN or fingerprint. (See Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 5; Gov’t Briefing
Exhibit 7 at ¶ 13). On April 2, 2024, Investigator Sanford performed a forensic
examination of the Max West Astro and recovered video files depicting MV1’s naked
body and Steinmetz committing a sexual assault on MV1. (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 16).
5 	The fifth cell phone had been factory reset. (Dkt. 60 at 4).
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On March 28, 2025, United States Magistrate Judge Mark W. Pedersen signed
a search warrant authorizing a forensic examination of the four cell phones. (Gov’t
Briefing Exhibit 7). The affidavit in support of the search warrant application states
that Investigator Sanford conducted data extraction and forensic examination of the
cell phones using a basic forensic examination tool but explains that more advanced
tools used by a forensic examiner “could yield additional evidence and information
not revealed by the original extraction done with the basic tool.” (Id. at ¶ 14). The
affidavit does not, however, provide any information regarding what evidence and
information was uncovered during the original search.
III. 	Interview of Steinmetz
Steinmetz was interviewed by Investigator Sanford on April 4, 2024. At the
evidentiary hearing, the government admitted a compact disc containing video- and
audiotape of this interview. (Gov’t Hearing Exhibit 4). A summary of these recordings
follows.
Investigator 	Sanford 	and 	Steinmetz 	enter 	the 	interview 	room 	together.
Steinmetz’s left forearm, wrist, and hand are covered in a bandage. He sits in a chair
in the corner of the room and Investigator Sanford sits at a desk on which there is a
written form. Investigator Sanford asks if Steinmetz would like water or anything to
drink and Steinmetz replies that he has had three energy drinks and is “good.”
Investigator Sanford notes that he and Steinmetz have developed a rapport because
they just “shot the shit” for the last roughly 30 minutes and reminds Steinmetz that
he is conducting a joint investigation with Child Protective Services. Steinmetz
makes a comment about the FBI and Investigator Sanford states that there are rules
that he, as an investigator, has to follow. Steinmetz says that he has never been
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through “this type” of investigation before but that he has been through homicide
investigations. Investigator Sanford says that Steinmetz has “been through it all” and
“lived a hell of a life,” to which Steinmetz agrees. Steinmetz states that he feels like
this investigation is going to “take [him] out” but that he did not do anything.
Investigator Sanford says that law enforcement has MV1’s side of the story and that
he is there to talk to Steinmetz about his side of the story. Investigator Sanford starts
to explain the procedures that will occur before they speak about the facts and about
the questions that he needs to ask Steinmetz, and Steinmetz interjects that he has a
bad memory and may struggle with dates and other details.
Investigator Sanford then advises Steinmetz that he is not under arrest and
Steinmetz interrupts to confirm that he is already aware of this fact. Investigator
Sanford says that he knows but that he needs to provide Steinmetz with Miranda6
warnings, referring to a form that is on the desk. Steinmetz says, “You’ve gotta read
that there?” and Investigator Sanford replies, “Before we ask any questions.”
Steinmetz expresses concern about Carrie being provided with Miranda warnings
and the possibility that she will be scared, and Investigator Sanford reiterates that
he and Steinmetz need to read the warnings before they talk. Steinmetz says that he
knows how it works but that Carrie has not read the warnings before. Investigator
Sanford tells him not to worry about Carrie and Steinmetz replies that he is “worried
about all this shit.”
Investigator Sanford notes the time and then provides Steinmetz with the
Miranda warnings. He asks, “Do you understand these rights?” and Steinmetz
replies, “Yes.” He then says, “I’m stupid but I’m not that stupid.” Investigator Sanford
6 	See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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asks Steinmetz if he is still willing to answer questions after having been read his
rights and Steinmetz says, “Yes.” Investigator Sanford asks Steinmetz to print and
sign his name on the written form and Steinmetz does so. Investigator Sanford also
signs the form. A copy of the signed Miranda warning form was admitted at the
evidentiary hearing. (Gov’t Hearing Exhibit 1).
Steinmetz and Investigator Sanford discuss Steinmetz’s wrist injury and
whether he is right- or left-handed. They then begin discussing the investigation and
MV1’s allegations. Early in the discussion, Investigator Sanford tells Steinmetz to let
him know at any time if he needs a drink or to use the restroom and states that he
will keep Steinmetz as comfortable as possible. Steinmetz and Investigator Sanford
discuss Steinmetz’s family, history, and relationship with Carrie. Steinmetz is lucid
and able to provide detailed information about these topics. For example, he provides
a list of five different streets on which he and Carrie previously lived. He also explains
the meaning behind certain of his tattoos.
Investigator Sanford moves onto asking Steinmetz about his daily life and his
responsibilities at home. They begin discussing the events of March 28, 2024, which
Steinmetz recalls in detail, including the times that particular events occurred. They
discuss MV1, MV1’s boyfriend, and their relationship.
Investigator Sanford and Steinmetz discuss Steinmetz’s history and the fact
that he has taken responsibility for his conduct in the past. Investigator Sanford asks
Steinmetz about MV1 and Steinmetz denies having engaged in sexual conduct with
her. Investigator Sanford tells Steinmetz that a video was recovered of Steinmetz and
MV1. 	Investigator 	Sanford 	asks 	Steinmetz 	to 	tell 	him 	why 	it 	happened, 	and
Steinmetz says that he has a “problem in [his] brain” and personality disorders and
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that he did not do it. Steinmetz says he does not know what happens and that he does
not know “half the shit” he does. Investigator Sanford asks if he has a mental illness
and Steinmetz says that he has “mental problems, period.” He says that when he has
“attacks” he blacks out for days and does not know who he is for that time period. He
also states that another personality named “James” comes out and that “whatever
happens, happens.”
Steinmetz continues to state that he did not do anything to MV1 and says he
wants to take a lie detector test. Investigator Sanford begins to describe the contents
of the video. There is continued discussion about whether it was Steinmetz or “James”
who engaged in the conduct depicted on the video. Steinmetz then provides details on
sexual activity between “James” and MV1 while also claiming that he does not
remember what happened. The discussion continues in this vein.
Investigator Sanford says that he needs a drink and asks Steinmetz if he needs
a drink; Steinmetz declines. Investigator Sanford says he is going to step out of the
room and Steinmetz asks him what’s going to happen next. Investigator Sanford says
he has to talk to his boss. Steinmetz expresses his desire to go home and Investigator
Sanford says that is not going to happen. Steinmetz asks if he is going to jail and if
he will get bail, and Investigator Sanford says that it will be up to a judge and that
Steinmetz will be arraigned at 7:00 o’clock. Steinmetz asks what time it is and
Investigator Sanford says that it is 1:30 and tells Steinmetz to “sit tight.” They
discuss the booking process and Steinmetz’s need for surgery and Investigator
Sanford leaves the room. While Investigator Sanford is out of the room, it appears
that Steinmetz uses a green vape device.
Investigator Sanford re-enters the room and offers Steinmetz a beverage. He
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observes the green vape device and says, “Is that just a vape?” Steinmetz says, “This
one is, yeah.” He states that he was “hitting on” it and Investigator Sanford repeats,
“Just a vape?” Steinmetz says yes and Investigator Sanford says Steinmetz can “hit”
it. Investigator Sanford asks again if Steinmetz wants a drink and Steinmetz
declines. Investigator Sanford leaves for approximately 20 minutes, during which
time Steinmetz continues to occasionally use the green vape device.
Investigator Sanford re-enters the interview room and tells Steinmetz that he
is going to use a laptop to type up a statement regarding what they talked about and
that he will read it out loud to Steinmetz and then have Steinmetz sign it. Steinmetz
asks if law enforcement is going to “tell [his] wife,” and Investigator Sanford says no
and that Steinmetz will be given an opportunity to talk to her. Steinmetz asks if he’s
going to see a lawyer and Investigator Sanford says he will at his arraignment.
Steinmetz inquires about his odds of getting bail and Investigator Sanford says that
issue is not for him to decide.
Investigator Sanford says he will keep the statement “short and sweet” and
Steinmetz says Investigator Sanford does not have to read it back to him. Investigator
Sanford says he is going to because Steinmetz reported difficulty reading. After some
additional discussion about the events involving MV1, Investigator Sanford has
Steinmetz 	tell 	him 	again 	what 	happened 	and 	types 	up 	a 	written 	statement.
Investigator Sanford reads the statement to Steinmetz twice, once from the laptop
and once from a printout. He asks Steinmetz if everything in the statement is true
and accurate and Steinmetz indicates that it is. Steinmetz signs and dates the
statement and Investigator Sanford signs it as a witness. A copy of this statement
was admitted at the evidentiary hearing. (Gov’t Hearing Exhibit 2).
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Steinmetz asks to speak with Carrie and Investigator Sanford says she will be
brought up. Investigator Sanford leaves. He returns and asks Steinmetz about his
cell phone. Another law enforcement officer enters and discusses some technological
issues with Investigator Sanford. The three men discuss having Carrie brought up to
speak with Steinmetz and then Investigator Sanford and the other officer leave.
Steinmetz makes a phone call to Carrie in which he says “they” are going to book him
into jail and “have you come up to talk to me” and that he is “not facing 20 years for
this bitch” and is “copping out to whatever the fuck they give [him].” He reiterates
that he will talk to Carrie when she is brought up and discusses being arraigned and
his ability to pay for bail. An officer enters and tells Steinmetz he cannot be on his
phone and Steinmetz apologizes. The officer moves the cell phone to the other side of
the desk and leaves. Steinmetz again appears to use the green vape device while alone
in the interview room.
Investigator Sanford reenters and reads Steinmetz a form consenting to a
search of his cell phone. Steinmetz signs and dates the form. Investigator Sanford
leaves with Steinmetz’s cell phone and Steinmetz uses the green vape device.
Investigator Sanford comes back and performs a pat down of Steinmetz. He
takes the green vape device. Shortly thereafter, he returns with Carrie, who sits in a
chair in the interview room. Carrie and Steinmetz discuss what is going to happen
and what Carrie is going to do. Investigator Sanford stands in the doorway and he,
Steinmetz, 	and 	Carrie 	discuss 	the 	arraignment, 	the 	possibility 	of 	bail, 	and
Steinmetz’s need for surgery. Steinmetz gives Carrie a hug and a kiss and she and
Investigator Sanford leave.
Steinmetz remains in the interview room until Investigator Sanford returns
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and tells him that he is under arrest and is being charged with “a handful of counts”
for “criminal sex act” and a count for “possessing and promoting” and that he needs
to step into Investigator Sanford’s office. Investigator Sanford turns off the lights and
he and Steinmetz leave the interview room.
IV. 	Steinmetz’s Declarations
Steinmetz has submitted two sworn declarations in connection with these
motions. (Dkt. 57-2; Dkt. 65-2; Dkt 70-2). In his first declaration, which is dated May
16, 2025, Steinmetz states that on April 4, 2024, he had been using cocaine and THC
prior to attending an appointment with his doctor at Strong Memorial Hospital. (Dkt.
70-2 at ¶¶ 8-9). Steinmetz claims that he was “extremely high on THC and cocaine”
and that he continued to use a THC vape pen in the waiting room. (Id. at ¶ 10).
According to Steinmetz’s declaration, while he and Carrie were in the waiting room,
Carrie received a phone call from an LCSO investigator who arranged to pick them
up and drive them to Geneseo for an interview after the appointment. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-
13). Steinmetz claims that he continued using the vape pen on the way to the LCSO,
that he was “extremely high on cocaine and THC” during his interview with law
enforcement, and that he was “not in [his] right mind” and does not “recall any of the
statements allegedly made by [him]” during the interview. (Id. at ¶ 14). Steinmetz
further states that “[t]he investigators never asked [him] if [he] was under the
influence of any drugs.” (Id.).
With respect to cell phones, Steinmetz states that in 2024 he owned two cell
phones, both of which he paid for. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17). Steinmetz states that one of the
phones was on his person when he was arrested and that he used this phone for
making calls. (Id. at ¶ 16). He states that he used the other phone for “Facebook,
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games, emails, YouTube[,] etc.” and that he “did not carry this phone out of the house
except on rare occasions.” (Id. at ¶ 17). Steinmetz states that Carrie had her own
phones and that he “never had a reason to use [Carrie’s] phones, and she never had
a reason to use [his phones].” (Id. at ¶ 19). 7 Steinmetz acknowledges that Carrie
knew his passwords and would have been able to access his phones. (Id. at ¶ 24). He
states that he does not know if Carrie “monitored [his] phone” but that he does not
think she did. (Id. at ¶ 21).
In his second declaration, which is dated July 7, 2025, Steinmetz clarifies that
the cell phone that he owned that was recovered from his residence was the Max West
Astro. (Dkt. 65-2 at ¶ 5). Steinmetz states that this phone “was purchased by [him]
and belonged to [him]” and that “[a]t no time did [he] give anyone . . . permission to
take or digitally search this phone.” (Id. at ¶¶ 6-7).
V. 	Investigator Sanford’s Hearing Testimony
The 	government 	called 	Investigator 	Sanford 	as 	its 	sole 	witness 	at 	the
evidentiary hearing held on September 11, 2025. (Dkt. 76). Investigator Sanford
testified that he has been employed by the LCSO since June of 2014 and that he was
promoted to criminal investigator in September of 2019. (Id. at 5). He described his
training, including training at the police academy to determine if someone is impaired
or intoxicated. (Id. at 5-6). Investigator Sanford explained that he had subsequently
attended an advanced training known as “Advanced Roadside Impairment Detection
7 	Contrary to this representation, when asked for his phone number during his
interview on April 4, 2024, Steinmetz stated that he did not know his phone number
because he “use[s] hers.” He then gave the phone number for the TCL 30z T602DL
cell phone recovered from his and Carrie’s shared bedroom, not the phone number for
the Max West Astro or the phone he had on his person. (Compare Gov’t Briefing
Exhibit 6 with Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 9).
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Enforcement” where he learned to do additional tests to determine if someone was
impaired or intoxicated by alcohol or drugs. (Id. at 7). He then underwent training to
become a “Drug Recognition Expert,” meaning that he was specially trained to
determine if someone was impaired or under the influence of drugs. (Id. at 7-9). He
testified that as a result of this training, he is familiar with identifying individuals
who are under the influence of cocaine and THC. (Id. at 9).
Investigator Sanford testified about his interactions with Steinmetz on April
4, 2024. (Id. at 11). He testified that he learned that Steinmetz was at a medical
appointment in Henrietta and reached out to Carrie to ask if she could advise him
and Investigator Merrick when the appointment was over. (Id. at 11-13). Steinmetz
and Carrie were waiting for a MediCab but agreed to ride back to the LCSO with
Investigator 	Sanford 	and 	Investigator 	Merrick 	to 	be 	interviewed. 	(Id. 	at 	13).
According to Investigator Sanford, Steinmetz was “eager to talk” and said that he
wanted to “take a polygraph” and “fight for [his] innocence.” (Id.). Investigator
Sanford testified that Steinmetz “[a]bsolutely” did not appear intoxicated but rather
was “standing on his feet,” “walking around,” “communicating . . . fine,” and seemed
“completely normal.” (Id. at 14).
Investigator Sanford further testified that he drove the vehicle from Henrietta
to Geneseo, that Investigator Merrick was in the front passenger seat, and that
Carrie and Steinmetz were in the rear seat. (Id. at 15). Investigator Sanford was not
able to observe Steinmetz during the drive and did not see if he was smoking, but he
did not smell anything that smelled like smoke. (Id.).
Investigator Sanford recounted his interview of Steinmetz and testified that
Steinmetz did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the
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beginning of the interview, including when Investigator Sanford advised him of his
Miranda rights. (Id. at 17). Investigator Sanford further testified that, based on
Steinmetz’s “physical and clinical indicators,” he did not appear to be under the
influence of drugs or alcohol at any point during their interactions on April 4, 2024.
(Id.). Investigator Sanford noted that Steinmetz appeared to understand what was
going on and did not exhibit any confusion about what was happening. (Id. at 18). He
also did not appear to have difficulty understanding or answering Investigator
Sanford’s questions. (Id.).
Investigator Sanford testified that prior to interviewing Steinmetz on April 4,
2024, he had listened to numerous audio messages of Steinmetz talking to MV1. (Id.
at 29). He stated that Steinmetz’s voice during the interview sounded similar to how
he had previously heard it and that Steinmetz has a “very low raspy voice.” (Id.).
Investigator Sanford confirmed that there was nothing about the way Steinmetz was
speaking during the interview that indicated to Investigator Sanford that he was
under the influence of drugs. (Id.). He acknowledged that Steinmetz used a vape
device at various times while in the interview room but reiterated that at no time
during the interview did Steinmetz appear intoxicated or under the influence of drugs
or alcohol. (Id. at 30).
Investigator Sanford recounted the process by which Steinmetz’s interview
was reduced to a written statement. (Id. at 31-32). Investigator Sanford testified that
he arrested Steinmetz on April 4, 2024, and that before taking Steinmetz into custody
he completed a “pre-arraignment medical and mental health form.” (Id. at 36). This
form was admitted into evidence. (Gov’t Hearing Exhibit 3). The form contains a box
labeled “Deputy/Officer 	Observations,” which 	asks, 	among 	other 	things, if 	the
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detainee 	is 	“coherent,” 	“[d]isoriented,” 	“[s]howing 	signs 	of 	mental 	illness,” 	or
“appear[s] to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.” (Id.). The “Yes” box is
checked for “coherent,” and the “No” box is checked for each of the other noted items.
(Id.). Investigator Sanford testified that he completed these questions himself, based
on his observations. (Dkt. 76 at 37).
The form contains a second box labeled “Questions to be asked of the detainee.”
(Gov’t Hearing Exhibit 3). Investigator Sanford testified that he asks those questions
out loud and that the detainee answers yes, no, or refused. (Dkt. 76 at 37). The
question “Do you have a history of drug or alcohol abuse?” is answered “No,” as are
the questions “Will you be withdrawing from drugs or alcohol?” and “Have you
ingested any drugs or substances since the time you were stopped?” (Gov’t Hearing
Exhibit 3). Investigator Sanford specifically testified that Steinmetz answered “no”
to the question “Have you ingested any drugs or substances since the time you were
stopped?” (Dkt. 76 at 39).
On cross-examination, Investigator Sanford testified that he did not ask
Steinmetz if he had been consuming drugs or if he had smoked any marijuana during
the 	interview. 	(Id. 	at 	48). 	Investigator Sanford 	was 	questioned 	regarding 	his
familiarity with “THC vape pens” and whether they emit an odor that smells like
marijuana. (Id. at 48-49). Investigator Sanford testified that he had never personally
seen an odorless vape pen but that he knew that such a thing exists. (Id. at 49).
Investigator Sanford testified that in his prior experience with THC vape pens, they
emitted a “strong odor of cannabis.” (Id. at 49-50). He stated that he could not recall
any odor from the vape device that Steinmetz was using on April 4, 2024, and that he
could say “definitively” that he did not smell any odor of cannabis. (Id. at 51).
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Investigator Sanford testified that he did not ask Steinmetz if he was on any
medications as a result of his medical procedure on April 4, 2024. (Id. at 56). He
further testified that he did not find it difficult to understand what Steinmetz was
saying despite the fact that Steinmetz has a “low raspy voice.” (Id. at 57). Investigator
Sanford confirmed that a raspy voice can be an “indicator[] for a narcotic analgesic,”
but that having a raspy voice alone does not mean that someone is using drugs. (Id.
at 57-58).
Investigator Sanford was questioned about the effects of marijuana and
explained that there are many strains of marijuana and that different strains may
have different physical effects. (Id. at 58-60). He stated that drowsiness or speaking
in a raspy voice could be possible reactions to marijuana use. (Id. at 60). He also
explained that different people have different tolerances to different drugs, depending
in part on their history of use. (Id.).
On re-direct, Investigator Sanford affirmed that when he filled out the pre-
arraignment form described above, he asked Steinmetz if he “had ingested any drugs
or substances since he was stopped” before Steinmetz was brought down to booking
and that Steinmetz said no. (Id. at 62). Investigator Sanford also explained that in
determining whether someone was impaired by a drug, he would rely not on one
factor or one observation but on the totality of his observations. (Id. at 63). He
reiterated that at all times Steinmetz appeared to understand the process, where he
was, and what he was doing. (Id. at 63-64).
VI. 	Steinmetz’s Hearing Testimony
At the evidentiary hearing on September 11, 2025, Steinmetz testified on his
own behalf. (Id. at 65-66). Steinmetz testified regarding his mental health issues,
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stating that he had first experienced mental health issues eight years prior and had
been mental health arrested over a dozen times. (Id. at 66-67). He stated that he had
also attempted suicide over a dozen times and that he had been using drugs and
alcohol since he was eight years old. (Id. at 67).
Steinmetz testified that in April of 2024, he was using “[w]eed and cocaine”
every day. (Id. at 68). 8 He testified that on April 4, 2024, he got up at 7:00 a.m. and
“started smoking weed” and that about a half an hour later he “sniffed a lot of
cocaine.” (Id. at 73). He estimated that he ingested 13 or 14 lines of cocaine in the
morning, “throughout the time [he] was waiting to see the surgeon and then after the
surgeon.” (Id. at 74). He stated that he was feeling anxious, depressed, and “[s]tressed
out.” (Id. at 75). He also testified that the vape device he had was a “THC vape pen”
and that he “just kept hitting it” every couple of minutes. (Id.). He testified that the
vape device emitted a “fruity smell.” (Id. at 77).
Steinmetz recalled that at his appointment, the doctor removed stitches,
cleaned his wounds, checked his “veins and . . . nerves and tendons,” and restitched
and rewrapped the wounds. (Id. at 76). He further recalled that Carrie told him after
he came out of the appointment that she had received a call and that law enforcement
wanted to talk to him. (Id.). Steinmetz testified that he rode to the LCSO with
Investigator Sanford and his partner and recalled that Investigator Sanford was
driving and that Steinmetz was seated behind him. (Id. at 76-77).
Steinmetz testified that he was “out of it,” not “all there,” and “[s]tressed out”
when he arrived at the LCSO. (Id. at 78). He claimed not to recall being interviewed,
8 	Defense counsel initially referred to April of 2025 in his questioning but later
clarified that the time period at issue was April of 2024. (Dkt. 76 at 68, 73).
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having been read his Miranda warnings, or signing a statement. (Id. at 78-79).
Steinmetz stated that he did not tell Investigator Sanford that he was under the
influence of any drugs or alcohol. (Id. at 79).
On cross-examination, Steinmetz testified that in the portions of the video
played in court at the hearing, Investigator Sanford did not threaten him or force him
to talk. (Id. at 82). He confirmed that he “sounded the same way” in the videotape of
the interview as he did on the witness stand but denied that he “looked the same,”
stating that he was high in the video, was wearing different clothes, and his hand
was “braced up.” (Id. at 83). Steinmetz testified that it had been over a year since he
used THC and cocaine. (Id. at 84).
Steinmetz confirmed that he had signed the Miranda waiver form but stated
that he did not remember doing so. (Id. at 85). Steinmetz was asked if he was worried
about Carrie on the day of the interview and stated that he was “just asking about
[his] wife” and that he “wasn’t worried about her responding to anything.” (Id. at 86).
Steinmetz recalled that prior to his interview, he had last seen Carrie being taken to
another room. (Id.). He also recalled that he saw her in the interview room that day,
that he talked to her, and that he “gave her a kiss and told her [he] loved her.” (Id. at
86-87). Steinmetz testified that after that, Investigator Sanford took him to jail and
that he saw a judge. (Id. at 89).
On redirect, Steinmetz testified that he had been arrested and questioned by
a police officer on prior occasions and that he had never previously given a voluntary
statement because he had “always asked for a lawyer if [he] needed one.” (Id. at 90).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Motions to Suppress Physical Evidence
Steinmetz has moved to suppress “any evidence derived from search and
seizure of [his] cell phones on the ground that such searches were conducted without
a warrant in violation of [his] rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution.” (Dkt. 70 at 2). He further seeks to suppress “evidence derived
from execution of a search warrant on [his] cell phone on the ground that such was
tainted by evidence obtained from a previous warrantless search.” (Dkt. 65 at 1). For
the reasons that follow, I recommend that these motions be denied.
A. 	Standing
“Fourth Amendment rights are personal, and may be enforced only by persons
whose own protection under the Amendment has been violated.” United States v.
Fields, 113 F.3d 313, 320 (2d Cir. 1997). “A defendant seeking to suppress the fruits
of a search by reason of a violation of the Fourth Amendment must show that he had
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched.” United States v. Hamilton,
538 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). The Court’s analysis “involves
two distinct questions: first, whether the individual had a subjective expectation of
privacy; and second, whether that expectation of privacy is one that society accepts
as reasonable.” Id. “Defendant has the burden of showing that he has standing to
challenge admission of the seized evidence.” United States v. Sacco, 436 F.2d 780, 784
(2d Cir. 1971); see also United States v. Rivera-Figueroa, No. 17-CR-00183 LJV JJM,
2018 WL 7291428, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018) (“[A] defendant seeking to
suppress evidence must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that he had
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location or items searched.” (citation
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omitted)), adopted, 2019 WL 244490 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2019).
Steinmetz seeks suppression of evidence obtained from the four cell phones
recovered from his residence. (See Dkt. 70-1 at ¶¶ 11-16). The government “agrees
that, viewed in the light most favorable to [Steinmetz], [Steinmetz] has established
standing” as to the Max West Astro. (Dkt. 66 at 4). However, the government does
not concede that Steinmetz has established standing with respect to the other three
phones. I agree with the government. Steinmetz has not asserted facts that would
establish a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the other three phones
nor offered any argument as to why he has standing to challenge the searches thereof.
I accordingly conclude that Steinmetz has established standing only with respect to
the Max West Astro.
B. 	Request for an Evidentiary Hearing
Steinmetz requests an evidentiary hearing in connection with his motions to
suppress the evidence recovered from his cell phones. “[A]n evidentiary hearing on a
motion to suppress ordinarily is required if the moving papers are sufficiently
definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable the court to conclude that
contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in question.” United
States v. Pena, 961 F.2d 333, 339 (2d Cir. 1992) (citation and quotation omitted). “In
order to warrant a suppression hearing, the defendant must demonstrate a specific
factual dispute that can be resolved by a hearing.” United States v. Richardson, No.
09-CR-55A SR, 2010 WL 5553995, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010), adopted, 2011 WL
53476 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 2011). “To sufficiently raise an issue of fact, the defendant,
in moving for a suppression hearing, must include an affidavit of someone alleging
personal knowledge of the relevant fact[.]” United States v. Marquez, 367 F. Supp. 2d
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600, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). “An attorney’s affidavit made without personal knowledge
is insufficient to create an issue of fact requiring an evidentiary hearing.” United
States v. Tata, No. 11-CR-6083 CJS, 2011 WL 7004205, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 21,
2011), adopted, 2012 WL 92558 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 11, 2012). “In the absence of a
demonstrated issue of fact, there is no basis for holding an evidentiary hearing or
suppressing the evidence.” United States v. Vandegrift, No. 18-CR-6044W, 2019 WL
2165566, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019) (quotation omitted), adopted, 2019 WL
2163536 (W.D.N.Y. May 17, 2019).
At the oral argument held on August 13, 2025, I asked defense counsel what
specific fact disputes relevant to the motion to suppress physical evidence required
an evidentiary hearing. (See Dkt. 71). Defense counsel identified two such fact
disputes: the relationship between Carrie and the cell phones, and whether MV1 was
acting at the behest of law enforcement when she recovered the cell phones from
Steinmetz’s residence (See id.). For the reasons that follow, I conclude that an
evidentiary hearing is not required with respect to either of these purported fact
disputes.
Considering first the suggestion that MV1 was acting on instructions from law
enforcement when she retrieved the cell phones, Steinmetz has failed to establish
that a genuine dispute exists on this point. He has not submitted an affidavit from
any individual with actual knowledge regarding this issue and has pointed to nothing
other than speculation regarding the timing of MV1’s retrieval of the phones to
support his assertion that it is possible MV1 was acting at the behest of law
enforcement. “Where . . . a defendant’s allegations are based entirely on speculation
or conjecture, the defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.” United States
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v. Villanueva, 32 F. Supp. 2d 635, 639 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
In the similar context of motions to suppress pretrial identification, courts have
long recognized that “a defendant may not baldly request a hearing into the
admissibility of pretrial identification evidence.” United States v. Williams, No. 13
CR. 580 JMF, 2014 WL 144920, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014) (quotation omitted).
Instead, he must proffer some information to support his contention that law
enforcement engaged in improper conduct. See id. (collecting cases). Seeking to
“develop a factual record from which th[e] Court may divine the appropriateness of
the . . . procedures employed . . . is a patently insufficient basis for a hearing.” Id.
(original alteration and quotation omitted). Likewise, defense counsel’s suggestion
that a hearing in this case would permit Steinmetz to explore the possibility that law
enforcement instructed MV1 to retrieve the cell phones—a proposition for which
there is no evidence in the record—fails to satisfy the requisite standard.
Turning to the question of Carrie’s relationship to the cell phones, as to the
three cell phones other than the Max West Astro, as noted above, Steinmetz has failed
to establish standing to challenge the search of these cell phones. In any event, with
respect to these phones, Steinmetz has neither produced nor pointed to anything that
would call into question Carrie’s statements to law enforcement regarding her
ownership thereof. There is no fact dispute as to these phones and no evidentiary
hearing is required as to them.
On the other hand, Steinmetz has shown fact disputes with respect to the Max
West Astro—namely, as to whether it was he or Carrie who purchased this phone and
paid the bills with respect thereto, as well as whether Carrie regularly used this
phone. But that does not end the Court’s inquiry. An evidentiary hearing is required
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only where a fact dispute is material—that is, where its resolution in the defendant’s
favor would call into question the validity of the search. See United States v. Rush,
352 F. Supp. 2d 383, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[A] district court is not required to hold
an evidentiary hearing if the defendant’s ‘moving papers did not state sufficient facts
which, if proven, would have required the granting of the relief requested.’” (quoting
United States v. Culotta, 413 F.2d 1343, 1345 (2d Cir. 1969))).
Here, for reasons set forth at length below, I conclude that even if Carrie did
not purchase, use, or pay the bills for the Max West Astro, she had the apparent
authority on April 2, 2024, to authorize a search thereof. Accordingly, no evidentiary
hearing is required on Steinmetz’s motions to suppress physical evidence, and I
recommend that his request for such a hearing be denied.
C. 	Law Enforcement’s Receipt of the Cell Phones from Pike
Steinmetz next argues that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when
MV1 removed the cell phones from his residence without permission, contending that
“circumstances suggest that [MV1] was encouraged to take the phones by” law
enforcement. (Dkt. 70-1 at ¶ 20). However, as noted above, the only “circumstance”
identified by Steinmetz as supporting this speculation is that MV1 spoke to law
enforcement on March 30, 2024, and retrieved the cell phones two days later, on April
1, 2024. (See id. at ¶ 21). Steinmetz offers no explanation for how this timing is
indicative of impropriety on the part of law enforcement. Further, MV1’s written
statement to law enforcement on March 30, 2024, makes no mention of video
recordings or photographs on a cell phone. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 1). Nor has
Steinmetz offered any evidence to call into question the written statements—affirmed
under penalty of perjury—by MV1 and Pike in which they both report that on April
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1, 2024, MV1 was at Steinmetz’s residence retrieving belongings when she recalled
the existence of the photographs and video recordings. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 3; Gov’t
Briefing Exhibit 4). MV1 and Pike also both state that it was MV1’s aunt who told
MV1 to leave the cell phones with Pike so that Pike could turn them over to the LCSO.
(Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 3; Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 4).
More 	than 	100 	years 	ago, 	the 	Supreme 	Court 	held 	that 	the 	Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition on unlawful searches and seizures is not implicated when
a private individual takes the property of another person. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256
U.S. 465, 475 (1921). “In Burdeau, the Supreme Court held that the government does
not violate the Fourth Amendment when it prosecutes a defendant using evidence
obtained in the first instance—even unlawfully—by a private party.” United States v.
Maher, 120 F.4th 297, 310 (2d Cir. 2024); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S.
649, 656 (1980) (“It has, of course, been settled since Burdeau . . . that a wrongful
search 	or 	seizure 	conducted 	by 	a 	private 	party 	does 	not 	violate 	the 	Fourth
Amendment and that such private wrongdoing does not deprive the government of
the right to use evidence that it has acquired lawfully.”). Here, the cell phones at issue
were obtained by a private individual (MV1) and turned over to another private
individual (Pike), who then turned them over to the LCSO. There is no basis to
conclude that either MV1 or Pike were acting “at the instigation of a government
officer or authority.” Cassidy v. Chertoff, 471 F.3d 67, 74 (2d Cir. 2006). Under these
circumstances, Steinmetz’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when the
LCSO received the cell phones from Pike.
D. 	Initial Search by Investigator Sanford
Steinmetz argues that the forensic extraction performed by Investigator
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Sanford on April 2, 2024, violated his Fourth Amendment rights, contending that “[i]f
. . . one of the cell phones was used by [him], no one, including Carrie . . . , can consent
to a search.” (Dkt. 70-1 at ¶ 13). In opposition, the government argues that Carrie
had “both actual and apparent authority” to authorize a search of the cell phones.
(Dkt. 60 at 9).
“A warrantless police search of a defendant’s private [property] which would
otherwise violate the defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment is lawful if
conducted pursuant to the consent, voluntarily given, of another person who has
authority to consent by reason of that person’s ‘common authority over or other
sufficient relationship to the [property].’” United States v. McGee, 564 F.3d 136, 138-
39 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). The
Supreme Court has held that a third party’s authority to consent to a search may be
actual or apparent. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188-89 (1990). That is, “[e]ven
if the person giving consent in fact lacked authority to do so, the consent may
nonetheless validate the search if the person reasonably appeared to the police to
possess authority to consent to the search.” McGee, 564 F.3d at 139. “The government
bears the burden of establishing the reasonableness of the officers’ belief by a
preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Hadden, No. 20 CR. 468 (RMB), 2022
WL 214386, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 2022) (citing United States v. Trzaska, 859 F.2d
1118, 1120 (2d Cir. 1988)).
Whether a third party has actual authority to consent to a search does not turn
“upon the law of property, with its attendant historical and legal refinements.”
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Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, n.7 (“Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from
the mere property interest a third party has in the property.”). Instead, actual
authority “rests . . . on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint
access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of
the co-inhabitants [or co-users] has the right to permit the inspection in his own right
and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the
common area to be searched.” Id. The Second Circuit has upheld third-party consents
where “two prongs are present: first, the third party had access to the area searched,
and, second, either: (a) common authority over the area; or (b) a substantial interest
in the area; or (c) permission to gain access.” United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 87
(2d Cir. 1992) (citing United States v. Gradowski, 502 F.2d 563, 564 (2d Cir. 1974)). 9
To determine whether the person consenting to a search had apparent
authority, courts examine whether “the facts available to the officer at the moment
warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had
authority over the premises [or property].” McGee, 564 F.3d at 139 (original alteration
omitted) (quoting Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188). This inquiry is “objective,” and—unlike
the determination of actual authority—is unaffected by information that comes to
light later about the third party’s ability to consent, if the officer could not reasonably
have known about it. United States v. LeClerc, 185 F. Supp. 3d 370, 376 (W.D.N.Y.
2016); see also United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Facts that
9 	In McGee, the Second Circuit made clear that this formulation meant that
“consents given in circumstances that conform[ed] to the two-prong pattern ha[d]
already been upheld” and did not mean that “unless a consent conform[ed] to the two
prongs, it [wa]s invalid.” 564 F.3d at 140 n.2. In other words, the two prongs identified
in Davis are not the only pattern for which a valid third-party consent may be found.
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came to light after the search began cannot reasonably have influenced the officers’
beliefs regarding whether [the third party] possessed apparent authority.”).
“[T]he third-party consent exception to the warrant requirement applies to cell
phones . . . , just like other essential ‘effects’ protected by the Fourth Amendment.”
United States v. Gardner, 887 F.3d 780, 783-84 (6th Cir. 2018) (finding that minor
victim had apparent authority to consent to search of cell phone where she used the
phone, had it in her possession on the relevant date, knew the phone’s passcode, and
gave the phone to the officers, and that this would be true even if she told the officers
her boyfriend owned the phone). The Fourth Circuit held in United States v. Perry,
92 F.4th 500 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 2643 (2024), that the defendant’s
girlfriend had actual authority to consent to a search of his cell phone where she had
“at least joint . . . access and control over the cell phone at the time of the search,”
had been the only person to use the phone for several months, “regularly used the
phone for purely personal purposes,” and “had access to the contents of the entire
phone.” Id. at 512-13. In United States v. Langenberg, 52 F.4th 755 (8th Cir. 2022),
the Eighth Circuit held that a company’s co-owner had apparent authority to
authorize a search of a salesman’s phone where he had possession of, knew the
password and had access to, and claimed ownership of the phone at the time he
turned it over to the police. Id. at 755-56.
Here, as to the non-Max West Astro phones, I conclude that the government
has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that Carrie had actual authority to
consent to the search of these devices. Carrie signed a written statement—affirmed
under penalty of perjury—in which she stated that she was the owner, purchaser,
and bill payer for these devices. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 5). Steinmetz has not disputed
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these facts as to any phone other than the Max West Astro. These cell phones were
found in Carrie’s and Steinmetz’s shared bedroom (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 3; Gov’t
Briefing Exhibit 4), and she was able to access them with a PIN or her fingerprint
(Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 5; Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 7 at ¶ 13). Carrie thus had common
authority over these phones and permission to gain access to them and their contents.
As to the Max West Astro, I conclude that—even accepting Steinmetz’s
representations 	regarding 	this 	device—the 	government 	has 	shown 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence that Investigator Sanford reasonably believed on April
2, 2024, that Carrie had authority to consent to a search of this cell phone. The Max
West Astro (like the other cell phones) had been found in the bedroom Steinmetz and
Carrie shared as husband and wife. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 3; Gov’t Briefing Exhibit
4). Carrie was able to access it with a passcode, a fact that Steinmetz acknowledges.
(Dkt. 70-2 at ¶ 24); see LeClerc, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 377 (“The Second Circuit has
suggested that marriage and shared ownership of property are important factors to
consider in assessing whether a third-party has authority to consent to a search.”);
cf. United States v. Scanlon, No. 1:15-CR-00142 EAW, 2017 WL 6001268, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Dec. 4, 2017) (concluding that wife had apparent authority to consent to
search of firearm cabinet where she “occupied the marital home with Defendant, the
firearm cabinet was located with a glass front in plain view in the master bedroom
that Defendant shared with his wife, Mrs. Scanlon had access to the key . . . , and
Mrs. Scanlon physically unlocked the cabinet for [law enforcement]”). Carrie also
affirmed under penalty of perjury that she owned, had purchased, and paid the bills
for this phone (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 5; see also Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 6 at 4) and a
reasonable officer would have had no reason to question those representations at the
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time of the consent and the search.
United States v. Archambault, No. 13-CR-100A, 2016 WL 3546022 (W.D.N.Y.
May 10, 2016), is on point. There, the court concluded that even if the defendant
owned and had exclusive use of the cell phone and memory card at issue, those facts
“[did] not affect whether [a law enforcement officer], based on the facts known to him
at the time, could have reasonably (but, perhaps, mistakenly) believed that the
[d]efendant’s mother 	had authority to consent to the searches.” Id. at *4. In
Archambault, the defendant had told his mother to remove electronic devices from
his car. Id. at *1. His mother then told law enforcement that the defendant had left
the cell phone at her house, that she had purchased the cell phone for her son, and
that another of her sons had been using the phone since the defendant’s arrest. Id.
The 	court 	concluded 	that 	these 	representations 	were 	sufficient 	to 	cause 	law
enforcement to reasonably believe that the mother had apparent authority to consent
to the search of the cell phone and the memory card. Id. at *1, *4.; see also United
States v. Gregg, No. 8:17-CR-409-T-33JSS, 2017 WL 7101172, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Dec.
14, 2017) (finding the defendant’s wife had apparent authority to authorize a search
of a cell phone and tablet “given that [she] had joint access to and control of the house,
the bedroom, the closet, and the bedside table where she found the devices, and the
lack of any indication that [the d]efendant forbade her from using the devices”),
adopted, 2018 WL 585550 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2018), aff’d, 771 F. App’x 983 (11th Cir.
2019). Similarly, Carrie’s representations in this case, coupled with the Max West
Astro having been recovered from her and Steinmetz’s marital bedroom and her
ability to unlock the Max West Astro, are sufficient to establish apparent authority,
because Steinmetz’s contradictory evidence (even if accepted as true) was not known
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to law enforcement at the time of the search.
For these reasons, Carrie’s consent authorizing the searches of the cell phones
recovered from her and Steinmetz’s marital bedroom—including the Max West
Astro—was valid. I accordingly conclude that there is no basis to suppress the
evidence obtained from those searches.
E. 	Validity of the Search Warrant
In his supplemental motion, Steinmetz seeks suppression of the evidence
obtained from the Max West Astro pursuant to the search warrant signed by Judge
Pedersen in April 2025. (Dkt. 65; Dkt. 65-1). Steinmetz argues that the search
warrant “was obtained using evidence derived in the initial unlawful search” and that
because Judge Pedersen “was told that [Steinmetz] had been charged, and the search
warrant seeks additional evidence, that he could only have concluded that evidence
was derived from the first digital search.” (Dkt. 65-1 at ¶¶ 6, 9). Steinmetz contends
that any evidence obtained from the second forensic examination is therefore fruit of
the poisonous tree and must be suppressed. (Id. at ¶¶ 10-11).
Initially, I have concluded, for the reasons previously detailed, that the initial
forensic examination of the Max West Astro was not unlawful. This conclusion is fatal
to Steinmetz’s supplemental motion. See United States v. Antonelli, 434 F.2d 335, 338
(2d Cir. 1970) (“[W]here there is no ‘poisonous tree’ there can be no ‘fruit.’”). However,
assuming for the sake of argument that the first forensic examination was unlawful,
I still conclude that the search warrant was valid.
Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, “no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[P]robable
cause is a fluid concept—turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular
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factual contexts—not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983). When assessing a search warrant
application, the issuing judge must “make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, . . . there is
a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place.” Id. at 238. When reviewing a probable cause determination, a court asks
whether the issuing judge “had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause
existed.” United States v. Falso, 544 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2008) (alteration and
citation omitted).
“[A]lthough 	unlawfully 	obtained 	evidence 	should 	not 	be 	included 	in 	an
affidavit, it is well established that the mere inclusion of tainted evidence in an
affidavit does not, by itself, taint the warrant or the evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant.” United States v. Peeples, 962 F.3d 677, 688 (2d Cir. 2020) (original
alteration, footnote, and quotation omitted). Instead, “a reviewing court should excise
the tainted evidence and determine whether the remaining, untainted evidence
would provide a neutral magistrate with probable cause to issue a warrant.” Id. at
688-89 (alteration and citation omitted).
Here, if the purportedly unlawfully obtained information is excised from the
search warrant application, the remaining evidence is still sufficient to support a
finding of probable cause. In particular, the warrant application details MV1’s
statements to law enforcement regarding Steinmetz’s use of a cell phone to make
video recordings and take photographs of her naked body and of his sexual abuse of
her. (Gov’t Briefing Exhibit 7 at ¶ 12). It also sets forth the circumstances under
which the cell phones were obtained by MV1 from Steinmetz’s and Carrie’s bedroom
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and turned over to the LCSO. (Id. at ¶¶ 11-12). This information is sufficient to
support a finding of probable cause. See, e.g., United States v. Chapline, No. 18-CR-
235-LJV-MJR, 2020 WL 5260801, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2020), adopted, 2020 WL
3166731 (W.D.N.Y. June 12, 2020); United States v. Jimenez, No. 16-CR-060-A, 2017
WL 2569684, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. June 14, 2017); United States v. Vonneida, No. 11-CR-
6210, 2012 WL 6651919, at *5-6 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2012), adopted, No. 11-CR-6210,
2012 WL 6651927 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2012). Under these circumstances, there is no
basis to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant.
F. 	Leon Good Faith Exception
The government argues that, in any event, the good faith exception set forth
in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), applies in this case. I agree. In Leon,
the Supreme Court held that “the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should not
be applied to evidence obtained by a police officer whose reliance on a search warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate was based on ‘objective good faith,’ even though the
warrant itself might ultimately be found to be defective.” United States v. Smith, No.
23-CR-6184FPG, 2024 WL 2924686, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. May 14, 2024) (citing Leon, 468
U.S. at 918-23), adopted, 2024 WL 2923015 (W.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024).
“The burden is on the government to demonstrate the objective reasonableness
of the officers’ good faith reliance on an invalidated warrant.” United States v.
Williams, 350 F. Supp. 3d 261, 271 (W.D.N.Y. 2018) (citation and quotation omitted).
The Leon good faith exception does not apply:
(1) where the issuing magistrate has been knowingly misled; (2) where
the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his or her judicial role; (3)
where the application is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to
render reliance upon it unreasonable; [or] (4) where the warrant is so
facially deficient that reliance upon it is unreasonable.
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United States v. Moore, 968 F.2d 216, 222 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).
The Second Circuit has applied the Leon good faith exception where the search
warrant application included information obtained through a search that was
subsequently determined to be unlawful. United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359,
1368 (2d Cir. 1985); see United States v. Iverson, No. 14-CR-00197 LJV JJM, 2015
WL 13216848, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2015), adopted, 166 F. Supp. 3d 350 (W.D.N.Y.
2016), aff’d, 897 F.3d 450 (2d Cir. 2018).
The government has adequately demonstrated that the Leon good faith
exception applies here. For the reasons already discussed, the search warrant is not
facially deficient, nor does the application lack sufficient indicia of probable cause.
The record is further devoid of any evidence that Judge Pedersen was knowingly
misled or wholly abandoned his judicial role. Accordingly, even if the search warrant
was defective in some manner, the evidence seized in reliance upon it should not be
suppressed.
For all these reasons, I recommend that Steinmetz’s motion and supplemental
motion to suppress evidence recovered from his cell phones be denied.
II. 	Motion to Suppress Statements
Steinmetz also moves to suppress “any alleged oral or written statements or
admissions involuntarily made by [him] to a law enforcement officer.” (Dkt. 70 at 1).
Steinmetz argues that he “did not understand or appreciate his right to remain silent”
when he was interviewed on April 4, 2024. (Dkt. 70-1 at ¶ 22). In his post-evidentiary
hearing brief, Steinmetz contends that “his drug use was so severe that he could not
understand or remember the Miranda warnings, demonstrating that his statement
was not the product of rational intellect.” (Dkt. 79 at 3 (italics added)).
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“The Fifth Amendment protects against compelled self-incrimination. It is well
settled that before a suspect may properly be subjected to custodial interrogation, he
must be informed that he has the right to remain silent, that any statement he makes
may be used in evidence against him, and that he has the right to have counsel
present.” United States v. Mathurin, 148 F.3d 68, 69 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Miranda,
384 U.S. at 467-71). It is the government’s burden to demonstrate that Miranda
warnings were given. Id.
To establish a valid waiver of Miranda rights, the government must prove by
a preponderance of the evidence “(1) that the relinquishment of the defendant’s rights
was voluntary, and (2) that the defendant had a full awareness of the right being
waived and of the consequences of waiving that right.” United States v. Jaswal, 47
F.3d 539, 542 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). The
Court assesses the voluntariness of a waiver based on “the totality of all the
surrounding circumstances, including the accused’s characteristics, the conditions of
interrogation, 	and 	the 	conduct 	of 	law 	enforcement 	officials.” 	United 	States 	v.
Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991). “A statement may still be voluntarily given
even when the speaker is intoxicated or under the influence of drugs, as there is no
per se rule that a confession given under such circumstances is involuntary.” United
States v. Wyche, 307 F. Supp. 2d 453, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (further explaining that
“[e]ven assuming that [the defendant] had taken alcohol or drugs the evening before
his morning interrogation, the fact that he may have done so is not dispositive”).
In this case, Steinmetz was advised of his Miranda rights, indicated that he
understood them, and nevertheless voluntarily agreed to speak to law enforcement.
He also signed a written waiver form. See United States v. Santiago, 709 F. Supp. 3d
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65, 70 (D. Conn. 2024) (stating that “written Miranda waiver forms provide strong
evidence that a defendant has voluntarily waived his Miranda rights” (quotation
omitted)).
While Steinmetz claims that he was so impaired by THC and cocaine that he
did not understand his rights or his waiver thereof, that assertion is not credible and
is not supported by the evidence of record. Investigator Sanford credibly testified that
Steinmetz did not appear to be intoxicated or impaired by drug use at the time of the
interview and waiver. Investigator Sanford’s testimony is supported by his experience
and training, as well as the video and audio recordings of the interview and
contemporaneous documentary evidence. During the interview, Steinmetz was able
to provide detailed information about his family and history. Steinmetz “was clearly
lucid and aware of what was going on. His answers to [Investigator Sanford’s]
questions . . . were responsive and coherent. . . . Most importantly, when he was read
his rights, [Steinmetz] showed no signs of confusion or incomprehension[.]” United
States v. Reed, No. 21-CR-6057L 2023 WL 329328, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2023); see
also Avincola v. Stinson, 60 F. Supp. 2d 133, 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (finding statements
voluntary despite “physical manifestations of [the defendant’s] drug use,” where the
defendant was alert and appeared to “appreciate the nature and consequences of his
statements” (citation omitted)).
Steinmetz’s hearing testimony, which he relies on in support of his motion, is
not credible. While Steinmetz claimed to have very little memory of the morning of
April 4, 2024, he was selectively able to remember portions of that morning in detail.
For example, he recalled precisely what occurred leading up to and at his doctor’s
appointment, despite claiming to have ingested 13 or 14 lines of cocaine and
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continually used THC. He recalled the drive to the LCSO and was able to state who
was sitting where in the vehicle. He also recalled his interaction with Carrie at the
end of the interview. It is wholly unbelievable that Steinmetz has no memory
whatsoever of the interview itself due to his drug use and mental health issues, yet
remembers the events immediately before and after.
Steinmetz’s testimony is also completely inconsistent with the video and audio
recordings of the interview, which—as explained above—show that he was lucid,
engaged, 	and 	understood 	what 	was 	happening. 	Steinmetz 	was 	responsive 	to
Investigator Sanford’s questions and asked his own relevant questions about the
proceedings. In no way did he behave as someone who was so impaired as to be unable
to comprehend or exercise his rights. And, significantly, Steinmetz’s voice, demeanor,
and manner of speaking on the witness stand on April 4, 2024—a date on which he
indisputably was not under the influence of drugs—were essentially the same as his
voice, demeanor, and manner of speaking on the video and audio recordings.
I am further unpersuaded by Steinmetz’s argument that it was incumbent on
Investigator Sanford to ask him if he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol or
to inquire about his mental health. Steinmetz cites no case law in support of the
proposition that a law enforcement officer must make such an inquiry where an
interviewee is lucid and does not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol.
Under the circumstances of this case, the government has easily met its burden
of showing that Steinmetz’s waiver of his Miranda rights was knowing and voluntary.
I accordingly recommend that Steinmetz’s motion to suppress statements be denied.
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CONCLUSION
For all the foregoing reasons, I recommend that the District Judge deny
Steinmetz’s motions for suppression of physical evidence and for suppression of
statements.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), it is hereby ORDERED that this Report and
Recommendation be filed with the Clerk of Court.
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the
Clerk of Court within fourteen days of service of this Report and Recommendation in
accordance with the above statute, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 45 and 59(b),
and Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 59. 10
Failure to file objections, or to request an extension of time to file
objections, 	within 	fourteen 	days 	of 	service 	of 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation waives the right to appeal the District Court’s Order. See
Wagner & Wagner, LLP v. Atkinson, Haskins, Nellis, Brittingham, Gladd & Carwile,
P.C., 596 F.3d 84, 92 (2d Cir. 2010).
The District Judge will ordinarily refuse to consider de novo arguments, case
law, and/or evidentiary material which could have been, but were not, presented to
the Magistrate Judge in the first instance.
10 	Counsel is advised that a new period of excludable time pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3161(h)(1)(D) commences with the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Such
period 	of 	excludable 	delay 	lasts 	only 	until 	objections 	to 	this 	Report 	and
Recommendation are filed or until the fourteen days allowed for filing objections has
elapsed. See United States v. Andress, 943 F.2d 622 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Long, 900 F.2d 1270 (8th Cir. 1990).
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Pursuant to Local Rule of Criminal Procedure 59(c)(2), written objections “shall
specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and recommendations to
which objection is made and the basis for each objection, and shall be supported by
legal authority.” Failure to comply with these provisions may result in the
District Judge’s refusal to consider the objection.
SO ORDERED.
_______________________________
COLLEEN D. HOLLAND
United States Magistrate Judge
DATED: 	December 4, 2025
Rochester, New York
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