Preston v. The City of Rochester et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
CHARLES DEMPSEY, individually, and
L.D., by her father and natural guardian,
Charles Dempsey,
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
6:19-CV-06780 CDH
v.
THE CITY OF ROCHESTER, a municipal
entity, JAVIER ALGARIN, ADAM GORMAN,
and JOHN DOE, RPD Officer responsible for
training Javier Algarin,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
ERIN GURSSLIN,
Plaintiff,
6:20-CV-06508 CDH
v.
CITY OF ROCHESTER, a municipal entity,
JEREMY NELLIST, Police Officer, JOSHUA
P. KELLY, Police Officer, FABIAN RIVERA,
Commander, and AARON SPRINGER,
Lieutenant,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
REGINALD MCGILL,
Plaintiff,
6:22-CV-06523 CDH
v.
THE CITY OF ROCHESTER and TREVOR
JONES,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
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_______________________________________
VICTORIA PRESTON,
Plaintiff,
6:22-CV-06525 CDH
v.
THE CITY OF ROCHESTER and
MITCHELL LEACH,
Defendants.
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
The above-captioned matters are four trial-ready cases in which Rochester
Police Department (“RPD”) officers shot and killed the plaintiffs’ pet dogs. (Dempsey
v. They City of Rochester et al., No. 6:19-CV-6780 (“Dempsey”), Dkt. 104 at 1; Gursslin
v. City of Rochester, et al., No. 6:20-CV-6508 (“Gursslin”), Dkt. 128 at 1; McGill v. The
City of Rochester, et al., No. 6:22-CV-6523 (“McGill”), Dkt. 60 at 1; Preston v. The City
of Rochester, et al., No. 6:22-CV-6525 (“Preston”), Dkt. 46 at 1). Each case involves
claims against the City of Rochester (the “City”) and at least one individual employee
of the RPD. The same attorneys represent the plaintiffs and the defendants in each
case. 	For 	purposes 	of 	the 	instant 	Decision 	and 	Order, 	the 	plaintiffs 	and 	the
defendants 	in 	these 	four 	cases 	are 	referred 	to 	collectively 	as 	“Plaintiffs” 	and
“Defendants.”
In each of the cases, Defendants have filed a motion to bifurcate the trial
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b). (Dempsey, Dkt. 119; Gursslin, Dkt.
140; McGill, Dkt. 68; Preston, Dkt. 53). In particular, Defendants argue that the issue
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of municipal liability should be bifurcated and tried separately from the issue of
individual liability. For the reasons that follow, the motions to bifurcate are denied.
BACKGROUND
The Court assumes the parties’ familiarity with the factual and procedural
background of these matters for purposes of this Decision and Order. The facts and
procedure salient to the instant motions are summarized below. In each case, the
parties dispute the pet dog’s behavior in the moments prior to the shooting, with
Defendants maintaining that the pet dog presented a threat to officer safety.
I. 	Factual Background
A. 	Dempsey
On October 19, 2018, Dempsey defendants Javier Algarin and Adam Gorman,
along with other RPD officers, responded to a 911 call regarding drug sales occurring
at a property near the home where the plaintiffs Charles Dempsey and his daughter,
L.D., resided. (Dempsey, Dkt. 104 at 3). After Gorman and a non-party officer
apprehended two suspects, Algarin jumped over a tall fence and entered the
Dempseys’ backyard, purportedly in search of a gun he believed a suspect had
dropped. (Id. at 3-4). Algarin subsequently left the backyard, but after Gorman
instructed Algarin to “backtrack,” he jumped back into the Dempseys’ backyard. (Id.
at 4-5). Seconds after Algarin re-entered the backyard, Dempsey let his and L.D.’s
black Labrador retriever, Tesla, out of their back door. (Id. at 5). When Tesla ran
towards Algarin, he shot her twice, later pointing his gun at Dempsey, telling him to
“get down[.]” (Id.). L.D., who was eleven at the time, observed Algarin pointing his
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gun at Dempsey and the aftermath of Tesla’s injuries. (Id. at 5-6). Despite efforts to
save Tesla, she died from her injuries. (Id. at 6).
B. 	Gursslin
On September 6, 2018, Gursslin defendants Jeremy Nellist and Joshua P.
Kelly traversed through the backyard of the plaintiff Erin Gursslin’s property on St.
Paul Street during the course of executing a search warrant at a location three
properties north of Gursslin’s home. (Gursslin, Dkt. 128 at 2-23). While planning for
the execution of this search warrant, Nellist and Kelly had determined that they
would infiltrate to and exfiltrate from their final operating position by walking down
Gursslin’s driveway and through her backyard and then jumping the fence in the
northwest corner of her backyard. (Id. at 2). While exfiltrating through Gursslin’s
property, Nellist and Kelly encountered Gursslin’s foster dog, Nina, whom they shot
and killed. (Id. at 3).
C. 	McGill
At approximately midnight on August 2, 2021, the plaintiff Reginald McGill
called 911 to report that he had found a bullet hole in the front wall of his bedroom
and a bullet on his bed. (McGill, Dkt. 60 at 3). McGill defendant Trevor Jones and
two other, non-party RPD officers arrived at McGill’s home to investigate. (Id.). After
the officers inspected the bullet inside McGill’s bedroom, they exited the home. (Id.).
Jones walked down the driveway and then walked back towards the house, at which
time McGill’s dog, Roxy, exited the home and approached him. (Id. at 4). Jones shot
Roxy three times and she died from her injuries. (Id. at 4-5).
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D. 	Preston
On February 14, 2021, the plaintiff Victoria Preston was at a home in the City
owned by her ex-boyfriend and the father of her one-year-old daughter. (Preston, Dkt.
46 at 2). Preston’s child and her dog, Zyria, were also present. (Id.). RPD Officers and
Child Protective Services (“CPS”) employees arrived at the home and Preston placed
Zyria in the bathroom. (Id.). However, Zyria subsequently escaped from the bathroom
and was shot and killed by Preston defendant Mitchell Leach. (Id. at 2-3).
II. 	Procedural Background
Defendants moved for summary judgment in each of these cases, and Chief
Judge Elizabeth A. Wolford, to whom the matters were then assigned, determined
that there were genuine issues of material fact as to certain claims and that trials
were required. (See Dempsey, Dkt. 104; Gursslin, Dkt. 120; Gursslin, Dkt. 128 1 ;
McGill, Dkt. 60; Preston, Dkt. 46). Following dispositive motion practice, the following
claims against the individual defendants remain in the cases, as do claims against
the City pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S.
658 (1978):
x 	Dempsey: unreasonable search of curtilage against Algarin and Gorman;
unreasonable seizure of Tesla and Dempsey by Algarin; failure to intervene
by Gorman with respect to Algarin’s entry into the backyard; and New York
1 	Three motions for summary judgment were filed in Gursslin: a motion for
partial summary judgment by the plaintiff (Gursslin, Dkt. 94), a cross-motion for
partial summary judgment by the defendants (Gursslin, Dkt. 99), and a second
motion for partial summary judgment by the defendants (Gursslin, Dkt. 114).
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State law claims of trespass and assault against Algarin and Gorman.
(Dempsey, Dkt. 104 at 18, 26, 28-31). 2
x 	Gursslin: unreasonable seizure of Nina by Nellist, Kelly, and individual
defendants Fabian Rivera and Aaron Springer. (Gurrslin, Dkt. 128 at 1-2, 27).
x 	McGill: unreasonable seizure of Roxy by Jones. (McGill, Dkt. 60 at 1, 14-15).
x 	Preston: unreasonable seizure of Zyria by Leach. (Preston, Dkt. 46 at 1, 16-17).
The parties have consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73 in each case. (Dempsey, Dkt.
114; Gursslin, Dkt. 137; McGill, Dkt. 65; Preston, Dkt. 50).
On September 12, 2025, Defendants filed the instant motions pursuant to Rule
42(b) seeking to bifurcate the scheduled trials, proposing that the trials be split into
two, with the first set of trials covering individual liability and the second set covering
municipal liability. (Dempsey, Dkt. 119; Gursslin, Dkt. 140; McGill, Dkt. 68; Preston,
Dkt. 53).
Plaintiffs filed responses on October 3, 2025, and Defendants filed their replies
on October 17, 2025. (Dempsey, Dkt. 121; Dempsey, Dkt. 122; Gursslin, Dkt. 143;
Gursslin, Dkt. 144; McGill, Dkt. 70; McGill, Dkt, 71; Preston, Dkt. 56; Preston, Dkt.
57). The Court held oral argument on the instant motions on October 27, 2025, and
reserved decision. (See Dempsey, Dkt. 125; Gursslin, Dkt. 147; McGill, Dkt. 74;
Preston, Dkt. 60).
2 	The Dempsey plaintiffs also seek to hold the City liable for the New York state
law claims pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior. See Palmer v. City of N.Y.,
564 F. Supp. 3d 221, 252 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (municipalities “may be liable for the state-
law torts committed by their employees under the theory of respondeat superior”).
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DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standard
Pursuant to Rule 42(b), “[f]or convenience, to avoid prejudice, or to expedite
and economize, the court may order a separate trial of one or more separate issues,
claims, crossclaims, counterclaims, or third-party claims.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b); see
also Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 316 (2d Cir. 1999) (courts
should consider if “an order [for bifurcation] will further convenience, avoid prejudice,
or promote efficiency”); Vichare v. AMBAC Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 466 (2d Cir. 1996) (“The
interests served by bifurcated trials are convenience, negation of prejudice, and
judicial efficiency.”).
When deciding a motion to bifurcate, courts generally consider, among other
relevant factors, (1) “whether bifurcation is needed to avoid or minimize prejudice,”
(2) “whether it will produce economies in the trial of the matter,” and (3) “whether
bifurcation will lessen or eliminate the likelihood of juror confusion.” Crown Cork &
Seal Co., Inc. Master Ret. Tr. v. Credit Suisse First Boston Corp., 288 F.R.D. 335, 337
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Vichare, 106 F.3d at 466 (bifurcation may
“be appropriate where the evidence offered on two different issues will be wholly
distinct . . . or where litigation of one issue may obviate the need to try another issue”);
Tafari v. Goord, No. 06-CV-331, 2011 WL 4914961, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 14, 2011)
(“To determine whether bifurcation is warranted, the Courts generally consider the
following 	three 	factors: 	(1) 	whether 	significant 	resources 	would 	be 	saved 	by
bifurcation; (2) whether bifurcation will increase juror comprehension, and (3)
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whether bifurcation will lead to repeat presentations of the same evidence and
witnesses.”) (quotation omitted).
“Cases in which bifurcation has been granted or denied can be informative but
are not decisive in a Rule 42(b) analysis, since ‘by its very nature, discretion yields
differing outcomes.’” Mensler v. Wal-Mart Transp., LLC, No. 13-cv-6901 (JCM), 2015
WL 7573236, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015) (alteration omitted and quoting Amato,
170 F.3d at 316); see also Felix v. City of N.Y., No. 16-CV-5845 (AJN), 2020 WL
6048153, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2020) (“Courts in this district have taken a range of
approaches to the bifurcation of claims against individual officers from claims against
municipalities.”). Thus, while “[i]t is entirely appropriate for a district court to
bifurcate Section 	1983 individual 	and 	municipal 	liability 	claims” 	in 	certain
circumstances, bifurcation is not “mechanically required in cases featuring claims of
both municipal and individual liability. [O]n the contrary, the Second Circuit has
recognized that the decision whether to bifurcate a trial is committed to the ‘sound
discretion’ of the district court.” McKoy v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 14-CV-00249 (JMW),
2025 WL 552610, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2025) (original alterations omitted and
quoting Amato, 170 F.3d at 316); see also In re Sept. 11 Litig., 802 F.3d 314, 339 (2d
Cir. 2015) (“Decisions to bifurcate trials . . . are authorized by [Rule] 42(b) and are
typically well within the discretion of district courts.”).
“Bifurcation is the exception, not the rule, and the movant must justify
bifurcation on the basis of the substantial benefits that it can be expected to produce.”
Moody v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 3d 410, 433 (W.D.N.Y. 2017)
(quotation omitted); see also 	Small v. City of N.Y., No. 09-CV-1912 (RA), 2022 WL
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1261739, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2022) (“Although a trial court has broad discretion
to grant separate trials under appropriate circumstances, for reasons of efficient
judicial 	administration 	courts 	favor 	having 	only 	one 	trial 	whenever 	possible.”
(quotation omitted)); Falzon v. Johnson, No. 12-CV-674 (CLP), 2016 WL 11430072,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2016) (“Jurors are generally entitled to hear all of the
evidence in one proceeding and deliberate as to all of the issues in the case at the
same time.”); Dallas v. Goldberg, 143 F. Supp. 2d 312, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (the party
pursuing 	separate 	trials 	“bears 	the 	burden 	of 	establishing 	that 	bifurcation 	is
warranted”), 	opinion 	modified 	on 	denial 	of 	reconsideration, 	No. 	95 	CIV.
9076(LTS)RL, 2002 WL 1013291 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2002).
II. 	Defendants’ Motions to Bifurcate
Relying on the factors set forth in Tafari, 2011 WL 4914961, at *1, Defendants
argue that bifurcation is warranted to (1) “prevent . . . unnecessary and premature
investment of court resources” and (2) to prevent “prejudice to the individual officers.”
(Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1 at 2-3; see also Gursslin, Dkt. 140-1 at 2-3; McGill, Dkt. 68-1 at
2-3; Preston, Dkt. 53-1 at 2-3). 3
More particularly, Defendants argue that bifurcation would promote judicial
economy because if a jury rules in favor of the individual defendants in an initial trial,
the jury could be spared the “encumbrance” of having to assess the “clear majority”
of evidence that addresses municipal liability. (Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1 at 5). Defendants
3 	For ease of reference, when discussing Defendants’ arguments the Court cites
primarily to the briefs in Dempsey, which are substantively identical to the briefs
filed by Defendants in the other actions.
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contend that bifurcation would promote judicial economy in Dempsey particularly, as
compared to the other cases, because the Dempsey plaintiffs allege multiple claims,
seek extensive damages, have retained separate psychological experts for Dempsey
and L.D., and will likely introduce extensive medical records to justify their damages.
(Id. at 5-7). Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs “must present evidence of multiple
prior unreasonable dog shootings” to establish municipal liability, and assert that in
a unified trial, a jury may “impermissibly rely on” evidence of unrelated firearm
discharges to determine the liability of the individual defendants, so “[t]he Court
should bifurcate to prevent such prejudice.” (Id. at 8).
In opposition, Plaintiffs argue that the Court should deny Defendants’ motions
because Defendants fail to meet their burden under Rule 42(b). (Dempsey, Dkt. 121;
Gursslin, Dkt. 143; McGill, Dkt. 70; Preston, Dkt. 59).4 More specifically, Plaintiffs
contend the bifurcation motions should fail because: (1) “[m]ost cases hold that Monell
claims can and should be tried alongside the claims against individual officers”
(Dempsey, Dkt. 121 at 9); (2) bifurcation will bar Plaintiffs from presenting evidence
that the individual defendants violated an RPD policy and that their training was
4 	Plaintiffs cite Vichare for the proposition that courts weigh the following four
factors in deciding a motion to bifurcate: “(1) whether the issues are interwoven, (2)
whether bifurcation will avoid prejudice, (3) whether separate trials will conserve
judicial 	resources, 	and 	(4) 	whether 	separate 	juries 	risk 	inconsistent 	verdicts.”
(Dempsey, Dkt. 121 at 8 (citing Vichare, 106 F.3d at 467)); see also Gursslin, Dkt. 143
at 8-9; McGill, Dkt. 70 at 11; Preston, Dkt. 59 at 9-10). The Court could not identify a
clear recitation of such factors on the cited page of Vichare, nor elsewhere in the case.
See Vichare, 106 F.3d at 466 (“Bifurcation may [] be appropriate where the evidence
offered on two different issues will be wholly distinct, or where litigation of one issue
may obviate the need to try another issue.” (citation omitted)).
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constitutionally inadequate, thus providing the individual defendants with a “non-
rebuttable” qualified immunity defense that they “followed [their] [RPD] training[,]”
(id. at 13); (3) a jury cannot evaluate the “totality of the circumstances,” the
reasonableness of the individual defendants’ actions, their individual liability, or
their qualified immunity defenses without evaluating relevant evidence of RPD’s
policies, training, and customs (id. at 15-18); (4) instructions directing the jury to
consider what the individual defendants “personally knew and did” separately from
whether the City’s policies and training caused their actions can cure any risk of
prejudice against the individual defendants (id. at 16); and (5) bifurcation will waste
judicial resources by requiring the Court and the jury to evaluate the same witnesses,
documents, camera footage, and legal arguments twice and may risk inconsistent
verdicts (id. at 6-7, 14). 5 6
5 	In her reply declaration, defense counsel reports that she “informed [Plaintiffs’
counsel] that [she] could not locate the quotations on pages 17-18 of [his] opposition
memorandum in the cases to which they were attributed . . . [and eventually] [h]e
acknowledged that the quotes appear to just be a mistake . . . later stat[ing] that he
[also] incorrectly attributed a quote from United States v. Krug, No. 15-cr-00157, 2019
WL 336568, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2019) to Amnesty Am. v. Town of West Hartford,
361 F.3d 113, 126 (2d Cir. 2004).” (Dempsey, Dkt. 122-1 at ¶¶ 4-7 (quotation omitted)).
On October 24, 2025, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion acknowledging that “several
case citations in [his] opposition papers were incorrect” and reporting that he
additionally informed defense counsel “that the citation to United States v. Williams,
690 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2012) should have read Williams v. City of New York, 690
F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2012).” (Dempsey, Dkt. 123 at 1-2 (quotations omitted)). The Court
appreciates counsel’s ability to address this matter without Court intervention. Of
course, the Court expects all attorneys who, by signing pleadings, assert their
accuracy, to read every case in full and to quote from them accurately before
submitting papers to the Court.
6 	Local Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a)(3) provides that, with limited exceptions not
applicable here, “motions and opposition to motions shall be supported by at least one
(1) affidavit, declaration or affirmation, and by such other evidence . . . as appropriate
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Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the applicable law, and
the evidence of record, the Court concludes that bifurcation is not warranted in these
matters. In reaching this conclusion, the Court has considered the issues of prejudice,
juror confusion, and judicial economy, and concludes that each counsels against
bifurcation, for the reasons set forth below.
A. 	Risk of Prejudice to Defendants and Juror Confusion
Defendants contend that holding a unified trial in these cases creates a risk
that a jury will “impermissibly rely on” evidence of unrelated firearm discharges to
determine the liability of the Individual Defendants. (Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1 at 8).
Defendants further argue that they may suffer a “double-portion of prejudice” in
Dempsey in particular, because they will already be prejudiced by evidence of L.D.’s
purported damages resulting from “long-term psychological therapy[,] [] multiple in-
patient hospitalizations because of the incident, . . . [and] a permanent loss of
closeness between father and child.” (Id. at 9) (citations omitted); see also Dempsey,
Dkt. 119-2 at ¶¶ 5-6). Plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that a jury cannot evaluate
the “totality of the circumstances,” the reasonableness of the individual defendants’
actions, their individual liability, or their qualified immunity defenses without
to resolve the particular motion. Failure to comply with this requirement may
constitute grounds for resolving the motion against the non-complying party.” Loc. R.
Civ. P. 7(a)(3) (emphasis added). Plaintiffs have not included an affidavit, declaration,
or affirmation with their opposition papers as required by Local Rule 7. The Court
excuses this failure in its discretion. See KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Beauty Quest
Skincare, LLC, No. 1:21-CV-778, 2022 WL 1488676, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. May 11, 2022)
(“It is within the district court’s discretion to excuse non-compliance with local
rules.”). The Court, however, cautions that all future filings must adhere to the Local
Rules.
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evaluating relevant evidence of RPD’s policies. (Dkt. 121 at 15).
The Court agrees that certain evidence Plaintiffs may present in support of
their claims made under Monell could present reasonable concerns of prejudice as to
the individual defendants, but finds that such concerns can be adequately addressed
by the “curative power of jury instructions and limiting instructions.” McKoy, 2025
WL 552610, at *4. “[C]ourts in this Circuit have repeatedly observed that even
‘substantial prejudice’ may be ‘adequately mitigated through the ubiquitous and
efficacious means of limiting instructions.’” Gordon Springs v. City of N.Y., No. 17-
CV-0451 	(AJN), 	2019 	WL 	10892065, 	at 	*2 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	21, 	2019) 	(quoting
Schoolcraft v. City of N.Y., 133 F. Supp. 3d 563, 571 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). Here, the jury
can and will be properly instructed where evidence is admitted for only a limited
purpose.
The Court is unpersuaded by Defendants’ assertion that instructions directing
the jury to separate evidence of individual liability from municipal liability “will not
suffice if Plaintiffs [] argue . . . that a conclusion that the City’s actions were
unconstitutional means officers acted unconstitutionally as well.” (Dempsey, Dkt. 122
at 3). The Court has confidence in a jury’s ability to distinguish between the City’s
behavior and that of the individual defendants when properly instructed, because
appropriate jury instructions “are well established means of preempting a jury’s
inclination to rely on prejudice, sympathy, or bias in their deliberation.” Gordon
Springs, 2019 WL 10892065, at *2; see also Schoolcraft, 133 F. Supp. 3d at 571 (“[T]he
substantial prejudice which City Defendants contend will result from permitting the
jury to hear evidence regarding quotas or the blue wall of silence will be adequately
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mitigated through the ubiquitous and efficacious means of limiting instructions, jury
charges and limiting instructions.” (citation omitted)). The Court intends to make use
of such instructions to ensure fair proceedings here. See Rutherford v. City of Mount
Vernon, No. 18 CIV. 10706 (AEK), 2023 WL 8676815, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2023)
(“Courts regularly task juries with reviewing different evidence for, and applying
different standards to, different parties, and with proper instructions, a jury in this
case will be able to perform this function.”).
The Court also agrees with Plaintiffs that the individual defendants’ intent to
invoke a qualified immunity defense makes their training relevant to the issue of
individual liability. (See Dempsey, Dkt. 121 at 13-14); see also Rutherford, 2023 WL
8676815, at *3 (“Evidence of training and policy is particularly relevant where, as
here, the defendants intend to argue that they are protected by qualified immunity.”);
Gibbs v. Borona, No. 3:16-CV-00635 (JAM), 2021 WL 4726519, at *2 (D. Conn. Oct.
11, 2021) (“Although internal police training standards do not themselves define what
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, the weight of authority suggests that
the fact that [a law enforcement defendant] received training . . . is nonetheless
relevant among other factors to the jury’s overall consideration of whether [the law
enforcement defendant’s] actions were objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment and whether they were negligent under state law.”); Vazquez-Mentado
v. Buitron, No. 5:12-CV-0797 LEK ATB, 2014 WL 12894096, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 9,
2014) (“evidence of training of law enforcement officials may be relevant to what a
reasonable officer would understand as to whether he was violating a clearly
established constitutional right” (internal citation omitted)). In other words, evidence
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regarding the RPD’s policy and training with respect to interactions with pet dogs
would be admissible in connection with the individual liability claims. As such, “it is
not clear to this Court that bifurcation will eliminate or even substantially reduce the
potential prejudice that Defendants fear.” Svege v. Mercedes-Benz Credit Corp., 329
F. Supp. 2d 283, 285 (D. Conn. 2004).
The Court is further unpersuaded by Defendants’ argument that a failure to
bifurcate will yield “a double-portion of prejudice” in Dempsey because at the time of
the incident L.D. was eleven and “the incident had a ruinous effect on [her] life[.]”
(Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1 at 9). Even if the Court were to grant bifurcation, evidence as
to L.D.’s experiences would be admissible in each trial. See Svege, 329 F. Supp. 2d at
285 (denying request to bifurcate where the defendants argued that they would be
prejudiced by “evidence regarding the injuries and orphaning of . . . two minor
children” because “whether the Court bifurcates the issues or not, the jury will learn
. . . that . . . two children were injured”); see also Chase v. Near, No. 06-CV-685C(SC),
2007 WL 2903823, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2007) (“[T]he court recognizes the
sympathetic nature of a young plaintiff and the potential of prejudice to the
defendants. Nonetheless, there are no particular factors specific to this case that
distinguish the potential for prejudice here from the potential prejudice which is
normally and customarily dealt with through an appropriate charge and curative
instructions where necessary.” (quotation omitted)).
At the oral argument on the bifurcation motions, the parties’ arguments
related to prejudice and juror confusion focused in large part on their differing views
of the legal theories at issue in these matters. To be clear, the Court’s confidence in
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the 	ability 	of 	appropriate 	instructions 	to 	mitigate 	any 	potential 	prejudice 	to
Defendants is not and should not be viewed as an endorsement of Plaintiffs’ legal
theories, which are not properly before the Court at this time. The Court will
ultimately decide, with appropriate consideration given to the parties’ arguments
made in motions in limine, what evidence may be presented in this case. See Sentry
Ins. a Mut. Co. v. Brand Mgmt. Inc., No. 10-CIV-347-ENV-RLM, 2016 WL 11430443,
at *1 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 2016) (“A motion in limine allows the trial court to determine
in advance of trial the relevance and admissibility of proposed evidence.”) (citing Luce
v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 40 n.2 (1984)). Indeed, motions in limine and their attendant
rulings provide another avenue to mitigate any potential prejudice to the defendants
without requiring bifurcation.
Based on the reasons articulated above, the Court concludes that the risk of
prejudice factor and juror confusion factors do not support bifurcation in these
matters.
B. 	Judicial Economy
The Court also concludes that considerations of judicial economy do not
support bifurcation here. Initially, the Court notes that because Defendants seek
bifurcation in each of these matters, were the Court to grant the motions, the
potential result would be the holding of two trials in each of these cases, or a total of
eight trials. The Court is not persuaded that holding eight trials, rather than four,
will 	“promote[] 	efficient 	use of 	the 	Court’s, 	parties’ 	and 	[a] 	jur[y’s] 	time 	and
resources[.]” (Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1 at 4).
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Felix is instructive. In Felix, the plaintiffs sued two New York City Police
Department detectives and the City of New York under § 1983 and Monell, arguing
that a fatal shooting occurred in part because the City of New York failed to properly
train and supervise its officers. 2020 WL 6048153, at *1. In denying the City of New
York’s motion to bifurcate, the court observed that “bifurcation often results in
greater burden on court resources and significant delay to the entry of final
judgment,” and noted that “[a]lthough a finding that no constitutional violation
occurred could obviate the need for testimony regarding the Monell claim, those gains
in judicial efficiency are likely to be outweighed by the efforts required to schedule
and prepare for separate trials.” Felix, 2020 WL 6048153, at *6. This Court is
similarly unconvinced that bifurcation will promote judicial economy here, where
granting Defendants’ motions would potentially require that the Court and the
parties schedule and prepare for eight trials, rather than four.
Further, 	Defendants’ 	arguments 	that 	bifurcation 	would 	promote 	judicial
economy are largely premised on their contention that because “a plaintiff must prove
a constitutional violation before seeking to hold a municipal[ity] liab[le][,] . . . the
outcome of the first trial against the police officers may eliminate the need to present
evidence against the City in a second trial[,] [and] [i]f/when the jury concludes that
the officer[s] did not unlawfully seize these pet dogs, the parties and Court will not
proceed to a second, longer trial regarding municipal liability.” (Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1
at 4). However, this assertion is not fully accurate.
As to Dempsey in particular, although Defendants are correct that Plaintiffs
must show a constitutional violation to establish municipal liability, they are not
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correct that if “[a] jury concludes that the officer[s] did not unlawfully seize [Tesla],
the parties and Court will not proceed to a second, longer trial regarding municipal
liability.” (Id.). This is because the plaintiffs in Dempsey assert constitutional claims
in addition to the unreasonable seizure of Tesla, including unreasonable search of
their curtilage, unreasonable seizure of Dempsey, and the failure of Gorman to
intervene, on each of which they seek to hold the City liable. (See Dempsey, Dkt. 31;
Dempsey, Dkt. 104 at 18, 26, 28-31). The plaintiffs also assert two state law claims in
Dempsey, and Defendants have made no argument that a jury would not be required
to evaluate these claims in a bifurcated trial even if it found the individual defendants
committed no constitutional violations.
Moreover, even in Gursslin, McGill, and Preston, where the sole claims to be
tried are for unreasonable seizure of the plaintiffs’ pet dogs, it is by no means clear
that a jury verdict in favor of the individual defendants would obviate the need for a
trial on municipal liability. The Second Circuit has held that “under Monell[,]
municipal liability for constitutional injuries may be found to exist even in the
absence of individual liability, at least so long as the injuries complained of are not
solely attributable to the actions of named individual defendants.” Barrett v. Orange
Cnty. Hum. Rights Comm’n, 194 F.3d 341, 350 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Haslinger v.
Westchester Cnty., No. 18-CV-5619, 2020 WL 2061540, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2020)
(dismissing claim against individual defendants but denying dismissal against
county because the plaintiff “plausibly alleged all three prongs of a Monell municipal
liability claim”). Specifically, “even in situations where the acts or omissions of
individual 	employees 	do 	not 	violate 	an 	individual’s 	constitutional 	rights, 	the
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combined acts or omissions of several employees acting under a governmental policy
or custom may violate those rights.” Barrett, 194 F.3d at 350 (quotations omitted).
The Court cannot rule out, at this stage of the proceedings, the possibility that
Gursslin, McGill, or Preston could articulate a viable theory of municipal liability
based on the combined acts or omissions of employees of the City.
Further, when “the individual defendants violated [a party’s] rights but
nonetheless 	enjoy 	qualified 	immunity,” 	that 	party 	may 	still 	pursue
a Monell claim. Bonilla v. Jaronczyk, 354 F. App’x 579, 582 (2d Cir. 2009). Here,
while a jury may find that the individual defendants committed no constitutional
violation in a particular case, it could also find that they did commit constitutional
violations yet are entitled to qualified immunity. The contention that a verdict in
favor of the individual defendants would necessarily resolve the question of municipal
liability is thus speculative.
Additionally, as discussed above, a careful review of the record indicates that
“there will be significant overlap between the evidence [Plaintiffs] will offer in
support of [their] Monell claims and in support of the other claim[.]” Schoolcraft, 133
F. Supp. 3d at 571. For instance, testimony by the individual defendants about their
training and instructions regarding when searches and seizures are constitutionally
permitted is relevant to the question of whether Defendants unreasonably searched
Plaintiffs’ curtilage or seized Dempsey. See Rutherford, 2023 WL 8676815, at *3; (see
also Dempsey, Dkt. 104 at 17 (“Were a juror to conclude that Algarin’s re-entry into
Plaintiffs’ backyard violated the Fourth Amendment, that same juror could easily
conclude that Algarin’s actions were taken pursuant to an official municipal policy.”)).
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Similarly, even if the Court granted the motions for bifurcation and the
individual 	defendants 	were 	held 	not 	liable 	in 	an 	initial 	trial, 	this 	would 	not
necessarily render expert testimony or medical records regarding Plaintiffs’ damages
“unnecessary evidence.” (Dempsey, Dkt. 119-1 at 7). Such evidence would only be
unnecessary if a jury’s finding on individual liability eliminates the need to determine
municipal liability, which the Court has already concluded may not be the case.
All these considerations weigh against granting bifurcation in these matters.
In each case, the Court concludes that scheduling “a second trial to address municipal
liability to be held weeks or months later . . . would be [an] inefficient, burdensome,
and time-consuming endeavor.” Rutherford, 2023 WL 8676815, at *4.
The Court also notes that judicial economy may arguably be served by
resolving factual issues regarding the City’s training and policies during the first-
scheduled trial in Dempsey. The doctrine of issue preclusion “bars litigation of an
issue when (1) the identical issue was raised in a previous proceeding; (2) the issue
was actually litigated and decided in the previous proceeding; (3) the party had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue; and (4) the resolution of the issue was
necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits.” Proctor v. LeClaire,
715 F.3d 402, 414 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). Thus, the findings of the jury in
the Dempsey matter could potentially have preclusive effect as to the City, which is a
party to all these actions, and thus narrow the scope of subsequent trials. See Luo v.
Baldwin Union Free Sch. Dist., 677 F. App’x 719, 721 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[C]ollateral
estoppel applies even if the subsequent action asserts a different cause of action, or
the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.”) (internal quotation and citation
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omitted); White v. Pro. Claims Bureau, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 3d 351, 359 (E.D.N.Y. 2018)
(“The Supreme Court has abandoned the mutuality requirement for collateral
estoppel, and has ruled that a plaintiff can use ‘offensive collateral estoppel’ to ‘estop
a defendant from relitigating the issues which the defendant previously litigated and
lost against another plaintiff.’”) (quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322,
329-33 (1979)); Green v. Kadilac Mortg. Bankers, 936 F. Supp. 108, 114 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (“The Supreme Court has long since removed any doubt that the doctrine of
collateral estoppel applies to actions brought under § 1983.”) (citing Allen v. McCurry,
449 U.S. 90, 104-05 (1980)).
In sum, the Court finds that the judicial economy factor also weighs against
bifurcation in these cases. The Court accordingly declines to exercise its discretion to
order separate trials on individual liability and municipal liability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions to bifurcate (Dempsey, Dkt.
119; Gursslin, Dkt. 140; McGill, Dkt. 68; Preston, Dkt. 53) are denied.
SO ORDERED.
________________________________
COLLEEN D. HOLLAND
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: 	Rochester, New York
November 26, 2025
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