Mandala et al v. NTT Data, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________
GEORGE MANDALA,
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
6:18-CV-6591 MAV CDH
v.
NTT DATA, INC.,
Defendant
_______________________________________
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff George Mandala (“Plaintiff”) asserts claims of (1) disparate impact
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, (2) disparate
impact discrimination in violation of the New York Human Rights Law (“NYHRL”),
and (3) discriminatory denial of employment in violation of the NYHRL and Article
23-A 	of 	the 	New 	York 	Correction 	Law 	against 	defendant 	NTT 	Data, 	Inc.
(“Defendant”). (Dkt. 49, see Dkt. 71 at 9-10, 19).
Plaintiff has filed a motion to compel a conference pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(f) and Local Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b). (Dkt. 76). Defendant
opposes Plaintiff’s motion and asks the Court to award it attorney’s fees pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(a)(5)(B). (Dkt. 81 at 22). For the reasons that
follow, both Plaintiff’s motion and Defendant’s request for fees are denied.
BACKGROUND
This matter has been referred to the undersigned for all non-dispositive
pretrial 	proceedings. 	(See 	Dkt. 	48; 	Dkt. 	68). 	The 	Court 	assumes 	the 	parties’
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familiarity with the factual and procedural background of this matter for purposes of
this Decision and Order. The facts and procedure salient to the instant motion are
summarized below.
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 15, 2018. (Dkt. 1). The matter was
originally dismissed in 2019 (Dkt. 28), and the dismissal was affirmed on appeal (Dkt.
34). However, Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to vacate the judgment and file a
first amended complaint. (Dkt. 35). The Court denied that motion (Dkt. 40), but on
appeal, the Second Circuit reversed and remanded (Dkt. 46).
On remand, Plaintiff filed the first amended putative class action complaint on
March 18, 2024. (Dkt. 49). Defendant moved for dismissal (Dkt. 57), and on July 28,
2025, the Court issued a Decision and Order (the “July 2025 Order”) granting in part
and denying in part Defendant’s motion (Dkt. 71).
On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff sent Defendant a letter “requesting to schedule
an initial conference to begin the Rule 26(f) conferral process[.]” (Dkt. 76-1 at 6; Dkt.
76-2 at ¶ 3). The meeting was set for August 27, 2025. (Dkt. 76-1 at 6; Dkt. 76-2 at
¶ 3). However, on August 25, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of
the July 2025 Order or, in the alternative, for certification of the July 2025 Order for
interlocutory appeal. (Dkt. 72). That motion is currently pending before the presiding
District Judge.
On August 26, 2025, Defendant emailed Plaintiff saying that a “meet and
confer [was] woefully premature because [Defendant] ha[d] a pending motion with
the Court and ha[d] not even filed an Answer.” (Dkt. 76-1 at 6 (quotations and original
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alteration omitted); see also Dkt. 76-2 at ¶ 4; Dkt. 81 at 9). The parties held their
scheduled meeting on August 27, 2025, during which Defendant reiterated its
position that a Rule 26(f) conference was premature and that the parties need not
engage in discovery planning until after a Rule 16 conference. (Dkt. 76-1 at 6; Dkt.
76-3 at 3; Dkt. 81 at 9). On the same day, the Court issued a Text Order holding that
“Defendant is not required to file an answer in this matter until after the Court issues
its decision on the pending motions.” (Dkt. 74).
On September 16, 2025, Defendant emailed Plaintiff, again stating that a meet
and confer was premature given that Defendant had not served its answer, no Rule
16 conference was scheduled, and no discovery demands had been served. (Dkt. 76-1
at 6-7; Dkt. 76-2 at ¶ 7). On September 17, 2025, Plaintiff responded, again requesting
that the parties conduct a Rule 26(f) conference. (Dkt. 76-1 at 7; Dkt. 76-2 at ¶ 8).
Defendant did not respond to this request. (See Dkt. 76-1 at 7).
On September 25, 2025, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant
“to participate in a discovery planning conference” pursuant to Rule 26(f) and Local
Rule 16(b). (Dkt. 76 at 1). Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the Court should compel
a Rule 26(f) conference because: (1) “[Defendant]’s second motion to dismiss has been
denied” (Dkt. 76-1 at 5) and the motion for reconsideration “does not automatically
stay . . . the parties’ obligations under Rule 26(f)” (Dkt. 76-1 at 7; see also Dkt. 82 at
5); (2) now is a practicable time to hold a Rule 26(f) conference (see Dkt. 76-1 at 5);
and 	(3) 	a 	stay 	of 	discovery 	is 	inappropriate 	here 	because 	the 	motion 	for
reconsideration is unlikely to succeed, the burden of holding a Rule 26(f) conference
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upon Defendant is minimal, “it is in the public interest to avoid further delay in the
adjudication of [Plaintiff’s] important civil rights claims[,] . . . [and a stay] would
disproportionately burden Plaintiff[] . . . [who has] the burden [of proof][.]” (Dkt. 76-
1 at 9).
On October 10, 2025, Defendant filed its opposition, asking the Court to deny
Plaintiff’s 	motion 	and 	“award 	[Defendant] 	its 	reasonable 	expenses, 	including
attorney’s fees incurred in opposing” Plaintiff’s motion, pursuant to Rule 37(a)(5)(B).
(Dkt. 81 at 22). Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s motion should be denied because:
“(1) [Defendant]’s motion for reconsideration . . . is currently pending; (2) this Court
has already ordered [Defendant]’s deadline to file an answer . . . stayed pending
resolution of [it]’s Motion; (3) [Defendant]’s Motion sought a stay pending its
resolution; and (4) . . . it would be inefficient to address discovery before the threshold
legal questions [in this litigation] are reached.” (Dkt. 81 at 7 (citations omitted)).
Plaintiff filed a reply on October 17, 2025. (Dkt. 82).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Legal Standard
Rule 26(f) provides that “[e]xcept in a proceeding exempted from initial
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)(B) or when the court orders otherwise, the parties
must confer as soon as practicable—and in any event at least 21 days before a
scheduling conference is to be held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b).” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 26(f) (emphasis added). While “Rule 16 typically requires the issuance of a
scheduling order ‘within the earlier of 90 days after any defendant has been served
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with the complaint or 60 days after any defendant has appeared,’ a court need not do
so if ‘finds good cause for delay.’” Israel v. O'Malley, No. 24-CV-86-LJV, 2024 WL
5040722, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2024), (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(2)), appeal
dismissed, No. 24-3284, 2025 WL 882886 (2d Cir. Mar. 12, 2025). Further, “[a] party
may not seek discovery from any source before the parties have conferred as required
by Rule 26(f), except . . . when authorized by these rules, by stipulation, or by court
order.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d)(1); see also Strike 3 Holdings, LLC v. Doe, 329 F.R.D. 518,
520 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
Courts in this Circuit have held that a pending dispositive motion is good cause
to delay issuance of a scheduling order. See, e.g., Adams v. Credit Acceptance Corp.,
No. 25-CV-410JLS(SR), 2025 WL 1953268, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. July 16, 2025) (“In light
of the pending motions to dismiss, which may completely dispose of the case against
certain defendants or otherwise narrow the issues in dispute, the Court finds good
cause to delay issuance of a scheduling order.”); Weller v. Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount
Sinai, No. 23-CV-4775 (PKC) (LB), 2025 WL 745992, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025)
(“Plaintiff filed a motion to compel Defendants to participate in a Rule 26(f)
Conference. This Court referred the motion to the [magistrate judge who] held a
conference on Plaintiff's motion to compel . . . and denied the motion. Discovery is
stayed 	pending 	the 	resolution 	of 	the 	motion 	to 	dismiss.”) 	(citations 	omitted);
Israel, 2024 WL 5040722, at *1 (“Given the pending motion to dismiss, which may
completely dispose of the case or narrow the issues in dispute, the Court concludes
that such good cause exists. Accordingly, a scheduling order in this case is not
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necessary prior to a ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss.”) (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 16(b)(2)). A motion seeking reconsideration of the decision on a dispositive motion
is, itself, dispositive. See Clark v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., No. 24-CV-1625 (AT) (RFT),
2025 WL 1550067, at *1 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2025), adopted, No. 24 CIV. 1625 (AT)
(RFT), 2025 WL 1548667 (S.D.N.Y. May 30, 2025); S.E.C. v. Razmilovic, No. 04-CV-
2276 (SJF) (SIL), 2015 WL 4878482, at 3 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2015).
Local Rule 16(b) provides in part that “[p]rior to the initial pretrial conference,
counsel for all parties . . . shall confer as required by [Rule] 26(f), and shall file with
the Court a joint, written discovery plan consistent with [Rule] 26(f).” Loc. R. Civ. P.
16(b)(2) (emphasis added).
II. 	Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Rule 26(f) Conference
The Court has not scheduled a Rule 16 conference in this matter, nor does it
intend to do so until Defendant’s pending motion for reconsideration is resolved.
Consistent with case law within this Circuit, the Court finds that Defendant’s
pending motion for reconsideration constitutes good cause to delay issuance of such
an order. The resolution of the pending motion for reconsideration may dispose of or
significantly narrow this litigation.
Consequently, the Court finds that “[s]ince a Rule 16 conference has not been
scheduled, it is premature to hold a Rule 26(f) conference.” Fecteau v. City of Mount
Vernon, No. 23 CIV. 09173 (KMK)(JCM), 2025 WL 754043, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2025) (“The Court denies Plaintiff’s request to compel a Rule 26(f) conference. . . . In
addition, the parties may not engage in discovery until the [court] holds a Rule 16
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conference 	and 	enters 	a 	Case 	Management 	and 	Scheduling 	Order.” 	(citations
omitted)), reconsideration denied, No. 23 CIV. 09173 (KMK)(JCM), 2025 WL 1196039
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2025). “It is equally not ‘practicable’ to order Defendant[] to
participate in a Rule 26(f) conference at this stage of the proceedings. Defendant[’s]
motion challenges the sufficiency of the complaint and may result in changes to the
operative pleading.” Zavala v. Kruse-W., Inc., No. 1:19-CV-00239-DAD-SKO, 2019
WL 3219254, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 17, 2019).
Plaintiff’s argument that discovery has not been stayed (see Dkt. 82 at 5) is
misplaced. “Discovery cannot be stayed until it is opened. It is not opened until the
Rule 26(f) conference occurs.” Id. Because no Rule 26(f) conference has occurred, nor
is it practicable for one to occur at this time, there is no need for a formal stay of
discovery. For all these reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference
is denied.
III. 	Defendant’s Request for Attorney’s fees
Rule 37(a)(5)(B) provides that if a motion compelling disclosure or discovery is
denied, a court “must, after giving an opportunity to be heard, require the movant . .
. to pay the party . . . who opposed the motion its reasonable expenses incurred in
opposing the motion, including attorney’s fees . . . [but not] if the motion was
substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(B). Substantial justification “is determined by an objective
standard of reasonableness and does not require that the party have acted in good
faith.” 6340 NB LLC v. Cap. One, N.A., No. 20-CV-02500-OEM-JMW, 2023 WL
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7924176, at *8 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2023) (quotation omitted); see also Gomez–Beleno
v. Holder, 644 F.3d 139, 145 (2d Cir.2011) (providing that a motion “is substantially
justified if it is justified in substance or in the main—that is, justified to a degree that
could satisfy a reasonable person.” (citation omitted); Data Collective II, L.P. v. Baron
Cap. Mgmt. Inc., No. 25-MC-00057 (JAV), 2025 WL 1380122, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13,
2025) (“A motion to compel is substantially justified within the meaning of Rule
37(a)(5) if there is a genuine dispute, or if reasonable people could differ as to the
appropriateness of the contested action.”). This “rule is mandatory unless one of the
conditions for not making an award is found to exist, but these conditions are
themselves broad enough that the court retains some discretion in the matter[.]”
Pegoraro v. Marrero, No. 10 CIV. 00051 AJN KN, 2012 WL 5964395, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.
Nov. 28, 2012) (internal quotation omitted).
In its opposition, Defendant argues that the instant motion is not substantially
justified because “(1) [Defendant]’s Motion [for reconsideration] remains pending; (2)
the Court already stayed [Defendant]’s deadline to answer . . .; and (3) [Defendant]
had expressly requested a stay of discovery in its Motion.” (Dkt. 81 at 22). Plaintiff
opposes Defendant’s request for fees by arguing that his motion to compel a Rule 26(f)
conference is substantially justified because it is supported by proper legal precedent,
he waited until the Court resolved Defendant’s motion to dismiss to bring the instant
motion, and an award of costs would be unjust. (Dkt. 82 at 6-7).
While Defendant is correct that the Court has ordered that it need not file an
answer until its motion for reconsideration is resolved, the relevant Order does not
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address Rule 26(f) or Local Rule 16. (See Dkt. 74). Further, the Court had not
previously 	expressly 	determined 	that 	the 	pending 	motion 	for 	reconsideration
constitutes good cause to delay issuance of a scheduling order. Consequently, Plaintiff
had received no specific instructions from the Court prior to issuance of this Decision
and Order regarding the parties’ obligation to hold a Rule 26(f) conference. The Court
has also not found in its own research particularly robust case law regarding these
issues in the context of a motion for reconsideration.
As a result, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s motion was reasonable, made in
good faith, and “not so lacking in substantial justification as to warrant an award of
fees[.]” Callahan v. HSBC Sec. (USA) Inc., No. 22-CV-8621 (JPO), 2025 WL 1404492,
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2025). Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees is accordingly
denied.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference
(Dkt. 76) is denied, as is Defendant’s request for attorney’s fees (Dkt. 81 at 22).
SO ORDERED.
________________________________
COLLEEN D. HOLLAND
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: 	Rochester, New York
January 15, 2026
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LL	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L	L 	EEN D HOL	OL	OL	LLA	LA	LAND	N
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