Quinones v. Basil Chevrolet, Inc. et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SAMUEL QUINONES,
Plaintiff,
V.
BASIL CHEVROLET, INC. et al.,
Defendants.
E.S DIST
FILED
LOE WENG\l
N OI STR I
1:25-CV-416 JLS (MJR)
REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
This case has been referred to the undersigned pursuant to Section 636(b)(1) of
Title 28 of the United States Code, by the Honorable John L. Sinatra, Jr. (Dkt. No. 9) .
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. (Dkt. No . 8) For the
following reasons , it is recommended that the motion to dismiss be denied.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced 	this 	lawsuit on 	May 	13, 	2025, 	alleging 	that defendants
subjected 	him 	to 	race, 	color, 	and 	national 	origin 	discrimination, 	a 	hostile 	work
environment, and retaliation in the course of his employment, in violation of federal and
New York state law. (Dkt. No. 1) On July 14, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Dkt. No.
8) Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Dkt. No . 10) and defendants filed a reply (Dkt.
No . 11 ). The Court heard oral argument on September 11, 2025.
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APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD
In order to state a claim on which relief can be granted, a complaint must contain
"a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief."
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a "complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face."' Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 663, (2009); quoting Bell At/. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007) .
When evaluating a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true the factual
allegations contained in a complaint and draw all inferences in plaintiff's favor. See Allaire
Corp. v. Okumus 433 F.3d 248, 249-50 (2d Cir. 2006). "The plausibility standard is not
akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662. "Determining whether a complaint
states a plausible claim for relief ... requires the ... court to draw on its judicial experience
and common sense." Id. at 679.
THE COMPLAINT 1
Plaintiff Samuel Quinones is a Hispanic, Brown, and Puerto Rican male. (Dkt. No.
1, ,I 2, ,I 14) Quinones suffers from anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder. (Id. at ,I
15) Defendants Basil Chevrolet, Inc., Basil Chevrolet Buick Cadillac LLC, Basil Chevrolet
Buick GMC LLC , and Joe Basil Chevrolet, Inc. (collectively referred to as "defendants" or
"Basil Chevrolet") own and operate multiple car dealerships in the upstate New York area.
(Id. at ,I,I 8-12, ,I 20) Defendants, who operate as a single corporate entity, are controlled
by Joe Basil, a part-owner of Basil Chevrolet and a registered officer of Joe Basil
1 For purposes of evaluating the instant motion to dismiss, the Court assumes as true all facts alleged in
the complaint.
2
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Chevrolet, Inc. (Id. at ,r 12, ,r 21) Defendants acted as Quinones' single and/or joint
employer at all times relevant to this lawsuit. (Id. at ,r 20)
Quinones commenced employment with Basil Chevrolet on November 4, 2023 as
a detail supervisor. (Id. at ,r 27) His primary responsibilities consisted of detailing cars .
(Id. at ,r 28) Joe Basil, a Caucasian, non-Hispanic male, held supervisory authority over
Quinones . (Id. at ,r 22 , ,r 23) Basil controlled many tangible aspects of Quinones' job
duties, and had the power to hire or fire Quinones. (Id.) Casey Barrett, a Caucasian, non-
Hispanic female, is employed as a service manager for Basil Chevrolet. (Id. at ,-f24, ,-r 26)
Barrett also held supervisory authority over Quinones, including the power to hire or fire
him. (Id. at ,-r 25) Barrett also controlled many tangible aspects of Quinones' job duties.
(Id.)
Beginning in April 2024 and lasting through late August 2024, Barrett subjected
Quinones to frequent and severe harassment based on his race, color, and national
origin. (Id. at ,-r 29) This harassment included racially offensive remarks by ~arrett, which
were either directed at Quinones or made in Quinones' presence . (Id. at ,-r,-r 30-36) Barrett
made these remarks on a daily basis and often twice per day. (Id. at ,-r 29) Examples of
the remarks included: (1) Barrett asking, "what is this a brown people meeting?" when
plaintiff was speaking with other Hispanic employees; and (2) Barrett commenting·, "oh
look guys, it must be cold out-brown people got coats on," when Quinones and another
Hispanic employee had their coats on. (Id. at ,-r,-r 31-33) Quinones would sometimes wear
a mask when working. (Id. ,-r,-r 35-36) Barrett would make remarks such as "why do you
have your mask on? are you hiding your brown skin?" and "why do you have your mask
on? is your Puerto Rican skin cold?" (Id.)
3
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According to the complaint, these statements or questions were only examples of
the types of remarks Quinones was subjected to on a routine and daily basis by Barrett,
and did not constitute of the totality of Barrett's conduct. (Id. 'at ,I 30) Barrett and other
employees laughed when Barrett made these and similar statements, and Quinones was
offended and humiliated by Barrett's remarks. (Id. at ,I 34, ,I 37)
In 	late 	August 	2024, 	Quinones 	complained 	to 	Joe 	Basil 	about 	Barrett's
harassment. (Id. at ,I 38) Barrett admitted that the conduct occurred . (Id. at ,I 39) However,
Barrett was given a "slap on the wrist" and was only removed from work for one week, at
which time she was permitted to return .2 (Id. at ,I,I 44-45) Because Barrett's harassment
exacerbated Quinones' anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder, Quinones requested
to work a part-time schedule. (Id. at ,I 40, ,I 42) Defendants approved the request. (Id.)
Upon Barrett's return, Quinones still encountered her frequently in the workplace, which
caused him further stress and anxiety. (Id. at ,I 48)
After 	Quinones 	complained 	about 	Barrett's 	conduct, 	defendants 	began 	to
"micromanage him and his schedule." (Id. at ,I 49) Defendants also overly criticized
Quinones and closely monitored his work performance for "every instance in which he
could be written-up." (Id. at ,I 50) Other employees who made similar mistakes, but who
had 	not 	complained 	about 	discrimination, 	were 	not 	subjected 	to 	the 	same 	close
monitoring and/or criticism as Quinones. (Id. at ,I 51)
Basil Chevrolet and Joe Basil terminated Quinones on or about November 22,
2024. (Id. at ,I 52) According to plaintiff, he was terminated based on his race, color, and
national 	origin 	and 	because 	he 	complained 	about 	Barrett's 	harassment 	and
2 The complaint does not indicate whether Barrett was paid during her one week removal from work.
4
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discrimination. 3 (Id. 	at ,m 52-54) Defendants claimed that they terminated Quinones
because they needed an employee, in Quinones' position, who could work full-time. (Id.
at ,r 53) According to plaintiff, this reason was pretextual, since defendants approved
Quinones' request to work part-time and never offered him the opportunity to return to a
full-time schedule. (Id. at ,r,r 53-54)
Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to race and national origin discrimination,
as well as hostile work environment discrimination, in violation of Section 1981 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 (42 U.S. C. § 1981) ("Section 1981 "); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e) ("Title VII"); and/or the New York State Human Rights Law
("NYSHRL"). (Id. at ,r,r 70-125) Plaintiff further asserts that he was retaliated against for
complaining about discrimination and harassment, also in violation of Section 1981, Title
VII, and/or NYSHRL. (Id.)
DISCUSSION
Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Title VII
In order for a Title VII claim to survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must
plausibly allege facts showing that plaintiff: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) was
qualified for the position; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) has at least
minimal support for the proposition that the employer was motivated by discriminatory
intent. Davis v. Metro North Commuter R.R., 23-CV-1041, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 7918
3 The complaint also alleges that Quinones was terminated for "submitting and utilizing a disability
accommodation of working part-time." (0kt. No. 1, ,i 52) However, the complaint does not specifically
allege any causes of action premised on disability discrimination under federal or state law. (0kt. No. 1,
pgs. 9-15) And plaintiff submits, in his opposition to the motion to dismiss, that he is not asserting any
claims of disability discrimination. (0kt. No. 10, pg . 15) Thus, the Court treats the complaint as raising no
claims based on disability discrimination.
5
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(2d Cir. April 3, 2024) (accord Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 79 (2d Cir. 2023). It is
undisputed that plaintiff, who is Hispanic and Puerto Rican, belongs to a protected class.
It is also undisputed that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action when he was
terminated by defendants in November of 2024. However, defendants dispute that plaintiff
has sufficiently alleged that he was qualified for his position or that his termination was
motivated by discriminatory intent.
In order to show qualification at this early stage of the lawsuit, plaintiff need only
make 	the 	"minimal 	showing" 	that 	he 	"possesses 	the 	basic 	skills 	necessary 	for
performance of [the] job." Gregory v. Daly, 243 F.3d 687 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal citations
and quotations omitted). When, like here, a plaintiff alleges discriminatory termination and
the employer has already hired the employee into the job at issue, "the inference of
minimal qualification is , of course , easier to draw than in a hiring or promotion case
because , by hiring the employee, the employer itself has already expressed a belief that
[he] is minimally qualified ." Id.
Defendants are correct that the instant complaint neither lists plaintiff's specific
qualifications nor generally states that plaintiff was qualified for the position of detail
supervisor. But such allegations are not necessary in this context. The complaint states
that Quinones was hired by defendants on November 4, 2023 as a detail supervisor.
Quinones worked in that position, in either a full-time or part-time capacity, until his
termination by defendants on or about November 22, 2024. The stated reason for the
termination was defendants' 	desire for a full-time 	employee. These 	assertions 	are
minimally sufficient to establish that plaintiff was qualified for the 	position of detail
supervisor. See e.g ., Ulrich v. Moody's Corp., 13 Civ. 0008 , 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145898
6
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(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31 , 2014) (finding that by hiring plaintiff, the employer expressed a belief
that plaintiff was minimally qualified); Winter v. Schenectady City School Dist., 1:23-CV-
1355, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 230011 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2024) (where plaintiff alleged
that he was hired by defendant on two separate occasions, "it may fairly be inferred that
he was qualified for the position"); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2003)
(noting 	that plaintiff in Title VII 	employment discrimination 	case "undisputedly was
qualified for the[] position, as he had in fact been hired for the position."). 4
A plaintiff may satisfy the fourth element, namely an inference of discriminatory
intent, by alleging verbal remarks that are probative of discrimination. Testa v. Carefusion,
14-CV-5202, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101204 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2016). A plaintiff may also
establish an inference of discrimination by "point[ing] to circumstances such as the
employer's criticism of the plaintiff's performance in ethnically degrading terms; or its
invidious 	comments 	about others 	in the employee's 	protected 	group; 	or the 	more
favorable treatment of employees not in the protected group; or the sequence of events
leading to the plaintiff's discharge." Hanks v. City of Syracuse, 22-18289, 2023 U.S . App.
LEXIS 34152, at *4 (2d Cir. Dec. 26, 2023) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795
F.3d 297, 312 (2d Cir. 2015).
At the pleadings stage, plaintiff has only a "minimal burden" of alleging facts
suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation . Vega v. Hempstead Union Free
4 The cases cited by defendants do not require a different result. Neither occur in the context of a
disparate treatment discrimination claim involving discharge, where the plaintiff was working in the
position at issue at the time of their termination . See e.g., Dans/er-Hill v. Rochester Inst. of Tech ., 764 F.
Supp. 2d 577 , 581 (W.D. N.Y. 2011) (plaintiff failed to state she was qualified to perform the requirements
of her position at the time she was terminated because she went on disability leave and was later
deemed totally disabled, at which time she was terminated and approved for long-term disability benefits);
Pearson-Fraser v. Bell At/., 01 Civ. 2343 , 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25216 (S .D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2002)
(dismissing discrimination claim where plaintiff failed to allege that she was qualified for the position she
sought or that she was denied that position).
7
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Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 85 (2d Cir. 2015). Indeed, "the question is not whether a plaintiff
is likely to prevail, but whether the well-pleaded factual allegations plausibly give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination, i.e., whether plaintiff[] allege[s] enough to 'nudge[]
their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible."' Id. (quoting Twombly, 550
U.S. at 570). See also Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311 ("[A]t the initial stage of the litigation[,] .
. . the plaintiff does not need substantial evidence of discriminatory intent").
Here, Quinones alleges that, over the course of a five-month period, he was
subjected to a daily barrage of harassing comments and questions by Barrett, 	his
supervisor, all of which evidenced a clear animus directed at Quinones' race, color, and
national origin. Quinones alleges that even after he complained and the racially offensive
harassment ended, he was subjected to close monitoring and unfair criticism of his work
performance, and later terminated . These allegations are minimally sufficient, at the
pleadings 	stage, 	to 	establish 	an 	inference 	of 	discrimination 	based 	on 	Barrett's
discriminatory remarks as well as the sequence of events leading to Quinones' discharge.
Defendants argue that Barrett's conduct is irrelevant because the complaint fails
to specifically allege that Barrett made the decision to terminate Quinones . In determining
whether a comment is a probative statement that evidences an intent to discrimination or
whether it is a non-probative "stray remark," courts consider the following factors: "(1) who
made the remark, i.e., a decisionmaker, a supervisor, or a low-level co-worker; (2) when
the remark was made in relation to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of
the remark, i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as discriminatory; and
(4) the context in which the remark was made, i.e., whether it was related to the decision
making process ." Rolon v. Pep Boys, 601 F. Supp. 2d 464 (D. Conn. 2009); Henry v.
8
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Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F. 3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010). Here, these factors cut in favor
of finding a plausible inference of discriminatory animus.
The alleged remarks, which occurred on a daily basis for five months, could clearly
be viewed 	as racially discriminatory. The remarks were made by Barrett, who had
supervisory authority over Quinones and controlled the tangible aspects of his job. While
the complaint does not specifically allege that Barrett terminated Quinones, the complaint
does allege that Barrett had the power to do so. These allegations, considered in totality
and with all reasonable inferences being drawn in favor of plaintiff, show that Barrett was
an individual with "substantial influence" over Quinones' employment, whose conduct is
relevant in determining whether the termination was motivated by discriminatory animus .
Owens v. N. Y.C. Haus., 934 F.2d 405,410 (2d Cir. 1991).
Indeed, courts in this Circuit have found discriminatory comments by supervisors
relevant in establishing an inference of discrimination at the pleadings stage, regardless
of whether the supervisor was alleged to have been directly responsible for the adverse
employment action at issue. See e.g., Nahar v. ADR Ventures, 23-CV-3835, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 158275 (S .D.N.Y. Sept. 3, 2024) (comments by supervisor with control over
plaintiff's schedule and authority to fire plaintiff gave rise to inference of discrimination at
the motion to dismiss stage, even though supervisor's precise role in plaintiff's termination
was unclear); Cano v. Seiu Local 32BJ, 19-CV-08810, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113240
(S.D .N.Y. June 15, 2021) (comments by supervisor whose role in plaintiff's termination
was unclear were sufficient, at the pleadings stage, to contribute to plausible inference of
race and/or national origin discrimination); Yang v. Oep't of Educ., 14-CV-7037, 2016 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 97469 (E .D.N.Y. July 26 , 2016) (finding that frequent comments by a plaintiff's
9
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supervisor pointing out that plaintiff was Chinese were sufficient to give rise to an
inference of national origin discrimination at the motion to dismiss stage, even though
supervisor was not the person who "formally" terminated plaintiff) ; Rolon , 601 F. Supp.
2d at 464 (fact that supervisor who made the discriminatory remarks did not make the
ultimate 	termination 	decision 	was 	"not 	determinative" as 	to 	whether 	the 	remarks
sufficiently supported an inference of discrimination). 5
Moreover, it is alleged that owner Joe Basil, the individual who is alleged to have
formally 	terminated 	Quinones, 	knew 	about 	Barrett's 	harassment and 	did 	not take
reasonable steps in response . See e.g ., DeFranco v. N. Y. Power Auth ., 731 F. Supp. 3d
479 (W.D .N.Y. 2024) (finding that complaint alleged plausible inference of discriminatory
animus because even though discriminatory remarks were made by co -workers, they
were witnessed and permitted by supervisor and decisionmaker). 6
The 	allegations 	in the 	complaint indicate that Barrett's 	harassment occurred
between April and late August of 2024, and that Quinones was terminated on November
22, 2024. Although Barrett's comments may not have been made in close proximity to the
termination, 	"that consideration 	is 	less significant where , as 	here, [p]laintiff alleges
5 Defendants cite Brown v. County of Erie , 12-CV-251, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32507 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 8,
2013) , for the proposition that stray remarks by an individual not involved in the terminati on decision
cannot support an inference of discrimination. But in Brown , the majority of the alleged conduct and
speech was directed at individuals both inside and outside of the protected class , and thus failed to show
racial animus. The Brown Court went on to conclude that a single racially discriminatory remark by a non-
decisionmaker was insufficient. Differently here, plaintiff alleges a barrage of racially offensive comments
by his supervisor as well as a sequence of evidence leading up to his termination which are sufficient, at
this early stage, to support an inference of discrimination.
6 Defendants argue that Barrett's removal from work for a week following Quinones' complaints of
harassment undermines any inference of discrimination by defendants. However, the complaint alleges
that defendants' response was not appropriate and/or reasonable in light of the severity of the
harassment alleged here. Indeed, there appear to be questions of fact as to whether Barrett's leave was
paid . And it is alleged that Barrett did not suffer any other sanctions or disciplinary action as a result of her
daily race-based harassment of Quinones. Conversely, it is alleged that Quinones was still made to
interact with Barrett frequently upon her return to the workplace; that he was subjected to excessive
monitoring and criticism after his complaints; and that he was fired without good cause.
10
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continuous harassment over an extended period of time." de Dussuau v. Blockbuster,
Inc., 	03 Civ. 6614, 2006 U.S. Dist. 	LEXIS 7368 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 7. 2006). 	See also
Wesolowski v. Polish Cmty. Ctr. of Buffalo, 21-CV-751, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144634
(Aug. 12, 2022) (rejecting argument that discriminatory comments made six months
before adverse action were too remote, since comments were made over at least a six-
month period of time and showed 	a "persistent pattern of discriminatory conduct") .
Indeed, courts have found similar or longer gaps in time sufficient to support an inference
of discrimination. See Papalia v. Mi/rose Consultants, Inc., 09-CV-9257, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 150316, (S .D.N.Y. 	Dec. 29, 2011) (finding inference of gender discrimination
where the discriminatory comments were made one year prior to the plaintiff's demotion);
Nahar, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 158275 (finding inference of discrimination where plaintiff
did not allege precise timing of discriminatory remarks but had worked for defendant for
less than th irteen months, "capping the amount of time which could have possibly elapsed
between [the discriminatory remarks] and [plaintiff's] termination .") .
Moreover, the discriminatory remarks did not occur in a vacuum, with plaintiff
experiencing no negative treatment in between when the harassment occurred and his
termination a few months later. To the contrary, it is alleged that immediately following
Barrett's harassment and up until the time of his termination, Quinones was subjected to
excessive monitoring and unwarranted criticism. See Amador v. All Foods, Inc., 12-CV-
1715, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47458 (E.D.N .Y. Feb. 20, 2013) (finding sequence of events
sufficient to establish temporal link between statements and adverse employment action
where statements were made in April, plaintiff's work week was changed and she was
11
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held to a higher production standard in May, plaintiff was reassigned to June, and plaintiff
was terminated in July).
Finally, while it is not alleged that the discriminatory remarks were made in the
context of the termination decision, "that factor alone does not outweigh the other factors."
Defranco, 731 F. Supp. 3d at 492 (allegations that plaintiff was openly mocked by co-
workers regarding his hearing disability, followed by "escalating hostilities" and a series
of adverse 	actions, 	were 	sufficient 	to 	"nudge 	his 	[discrimination] 	claims 	from 	the
conceivable to the probable."); Pagan v. Morrisania Neighborhood Family Health Ctr. , 12
Civ. 9047, 	2014 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	14978 	(S.D.N.Y. 	Jan . 22 , 2014) 	(inference 	of
discrimination alleged in complaint even though discriminatory remarks not made in
context of decision making process because "none of the factors should be regarded as
dispositive.").
Plaintiff need not plead a prima facie case of discrimination at this juncture, Vega,
801 F.3d at 86. Discovery may well demonstrate that Quinones cannot establish that his
termination occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination .
However, the allegations here are minimally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
Section 1981
Section 1981 "outlaws discrimination with respect to the enjoyment of benefits,
privileges, terms, and conditions of a contractual relationship, such as employment[.]"
Williams v. N. Y.C. Haus. Auth., 61 F.4th 55 (2d Cir. Feb. 23, 2023). To state a claim of
discrimination under Section 1981, a plaintiff must allege facts showing: (1) he is a
member of a racial minority; (2) that defendant intended to discriminate against him on
the basis of race; and (3) discrimination concerning one of the statute's enumerated
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activities. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 	F.3d 329, 339 (2d Cir. 2000). Section 1981
claims of racial discrimination are generally analyzed under the same standard as Title
VII claims of discrimination. McKinney v. Cnty. of Dutchess, 24-1195, 2025 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12740 (2d Cir. May 27, 2025). However, as to the second requirement of a Section
1981 claim specifically, "a plaintiff must initially plead ... that, but for race, [he] would not
, have suffered the loss of a legally protected right." Comcast Corp. v. Nat'/ Ass'n of Afr.
Am.-Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327, 341 (2020) .7
Plaintiff's allegations, which the Court has already concluded are sufficient to state
a Title VII claim that race was a motivating factor in his termination, are also minimally
sufficient to state that but-for his race, Quinones would not have been terminated. See
Knox v. CRC Mgmt. Co., 134 F.4th 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2025) (discriminatory comments made
not long 	before plaintiff's firing 	plus supervisor's failure to take action on 	plaintiff's
complaint about racial harassment were sufficient "to make out a prima facie case of
discriminatory discharge" under Section 1981 ); Sokolovsky v. Silver Lake Specialized
Care 	Ctr., 	21-CV-01598, 	2023 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	163545 (E.D.N.Y. 	Sept. 	14, 2023)
(derogatory comments by supervisors about plaintiff's ethnicity, around the time of her
termination, sufficiently linked discriminatory animus to termination for purposes of stating
a Section 1981 discrimination claim); Murray v. Brag Sales Inc., 23-CV-6610, 2024 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 153586 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2024) (noting that for both Title VII and Section
7 Race is the only protected class under Section 1981 . Hooda v. Brookhaven Nat. Lab'y, 659 F. Supp. 2d
382, 392 (E . D.N.Y. 2009). This broadly includes color, ancestry, and ethnicity, but not national origin. Id.
("Section 1981 does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of gender or religion, national origin, or
age."). Here, plaintiff has pied that he is Hispanic, Brown, and Puerto Rican. He alleges harassment and
discrimination on the basis of his race, color, and national origin . To the extent that plaintiff is attempting to
state a discrimination claim under Section 1981 based on national origin, such a claim cannot proceed.
However, plaintiff's allegations regarding his race, color, and ethnicity are sufficient to state that he is
member of a racial minority for purposes of stating a discrimination claim under Section 1981 .
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1981 claims, an inference of discrimination can arise from the sequence of events leading
to the plaintiff's discharge); Calve/as v. City of New York, 19 Civ. 6629, 2020 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 109266 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2020) (stating that the but-for cause requirement is
"easily surmounted" at the pleading stage).
Contrary to defendants' suggestion, plaintiff's claim that he was terminated for
complaining about Barrett does not belie his claim that, but-for his race, he would not
have been terminated. Although Section 1981 	imposes a higher standard of but-for
causation , "a defendant cannot avoid 	liability just by citing 	some other factor that
contributed to its challenged employment decision ," since "[o]ften , events have multiple
but-for causes." Bostock v. Clayton Cty. , 590 U.S. 644 (2020) . Thus , "requiring proof that
a prohibited consideration was a but-for cause of an adverse action does not equate to a
burden to show that such consideration was the 'sole' cause. " Kwan v. Anda/ex Grp. LLC,
737 F.3d 834 , 846 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2013) . See also Shamciyan v. Acacia Network, Inc., 22
Civ. 2122, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 171008 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (noting that it does not defeat
plaintiff's Section 1981 race discrimination claim to allege that he was also the victim of
age and religious discrimination).
Here, Barrett's discriminatory remarks , as well as the sequence of events leading
to Quinones' termination, are minimally sufficient to plausibly support an inference that
racial discrimination was a but-for cause of Quinones' termination, even if other factors,
including Quinones' complaints, also contributed to this outcome .
NYSHRL
Prior to 2019, discrimination claims brought under the NYSHRL were analyzed in
the same manner, and pursuant to the same standard, as discrimination claims brought
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pursuant to Title VII. See Flanagan v. Girl Scouts of Suffolk Cnty., Inc., 23-7900, 2025
U.S. App. LEXIS 12747 (2d Cir. May 27, 2025). However, in 2019, the NYSHRL was
amended to align more closely with the more liberal pleading standard set forth under the
New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL"). See Qorrolli v. Metro. Dental Assocs.,
124 F.4th 115, 123 (2d Cir. 2024) (accord N.Y. Exec. Law § 300). Since the 2019
amendments, courts in this Circuit have found that a plaintiff asserting a NYSHRL claim
must allege that he was treated "less well" because of his employer's discriminatory
intent. Brikman v. Westchester Med. Ctr. Advanced Physician Servs., P.C., 23-CV-10749,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160020 (S.D.N.Y. Aug . 13, 2025). This simply requires a plai,ntiff
to show that "[h]~ was subjected to inferior terms, conditions, or privileges of employment
due to h[is] membership in a protected class." Moore v. Hadestown Broadway Limited
Liability Company, 	722 	F. 	Supp. 	3d 	229, 	246 	(S.D.N.Y. 	2024) 	(internal quotations
omitted). Under this more lenient standard, a plaintiff need not allege that "discriminatory
animus 	was 	the 	but-for 	cause 	or 	even 	the 	primary 	motivation 	of 	their 	alleged
mistreatment." Delo v. Paul Taylor Dance Found., 	Inc., 685 F. Supp. 3d 	173, 	183
(S . D.N .Y. 2023).
Because Quinones plausibly alleges a race discrimination claim under Title VII and
Section 1981, his NYSHRL claim necessarily passes muster under the "more liberal
pleading standard" applicable to claims brought under that statute. Flanagan, 2025 U.S.
App . LEXIS 12747, *13 . See Mumin v. City of New York, 23-CV-03932, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 189235 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2025) (denying motion to dismiss disparate treatment
NYSHRL claims where court denied motion to dismiss analogous Title VII claims, "as
those standards are more employee friendly that the standards under Title VII"); Gahfi v.
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New York City Oep't of Educ., 23-CV-1782, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37633 (E.D.N.Y. Feb.
28, 2025) ("Regardless of the exact standard to be applied in the NYSHRL context,
because plaintiff has met the higher Title VII standard for pleading a claim of religious
discrimination, her claim[] under the 'more lenient' NYSHRL. ... also survive.").
Hostile Work Environment
Title VII
To state a hostile-work-environment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege
that "the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and
create an abusive working environment." Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 320-321 (2d Cir. 2015)
(quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc ., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) . The complaint must "plead
facts that would tend to show that the complained of conduct: (1) is objectively severe or
pervasive - 	that is, creates an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile
or abusive; (2) creates an environment that the plaintiff subjectively perceives as hostile
or abusive; and (3) creates such an environment because of the plaintiff's [protected
characteristic]." Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 113 (2d Cir. 2007) (internal citations and
quotations omitted). "A plaintiff need not show that the hostile working environment was
both severe and pervasive; only that it was sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive, or
a sufficient combination of these elements, to have altered [his] working conditions." Redd
v. N. Y. State Div. of Parole, 678 F.3d 166, 175 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal citations omitted).
In determining whether a hostile work environment exists, a court "must consider
the totality of the circumstances, including 'the frequency of the discriminatory conduct;
its severity; whether it is physically threatening 	or humiliating, 	or a mere offensive
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utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance."'
Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 321 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). "As a general rule, incidents
must be more than episodic; they must be sufficiently continuous and concerted in order
to be deemed pervasive." Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 439 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal
citations omitted). The Second Circuit "ha[s] repeatedly cautioned against setting the bar
too high" in this context, holding that "a plaintiff need only plead facts sufficient to support
the conclusion that []he was faced with harassment ... of such quality or quantity that a
reasonable employee would find the conditions of [his] employment altered for the worse."
Patane, 508 F.3d at 113 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Here, Quinones alleges that he was regularly and routinely subjected to degrading
and demeaning comments by Barrett, his supervisor, 	regarding his race, color, and
national origin. These comments included Barrett referring to Quinones and others as
"Brown people" in a derogatory manner, and appearing to mock the color of their skin.
According to the complaint, these racially offensive comments occurred on a daily basis,
and often at least twice per day, from April 2024 to late August of 2024. Quinones was
not only offended and humiliated by the comments, but they also caused him so much
stress and anxiety that he requested a part-time schedule. When Quinones complained
about the harassment, Barrett was given only a "slap on the wrist," while Quinones was
subjected to excessive monitoring and criticism of his work performance. Moreover,
Quinones was still forced to encounter Barrett frequently in the workplace.
These allegations are minimally sufficient, at this early stage of the litigation, to
plead that Quinones faced discriminatory ridicule that was sufficiently severe or pervasive
as to alter the conditions of his employment for the worse. See e.g., Cano, 2021 U.S.
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Dist. 	LEXIS 	113240 	(derogatory 	comments 	regarding 	Hispanic 	and/or 	Columbian
heritage, made by a co-worker and supervisors during a short period of employment and
not addressed after plaintiff complained, considered together with "allegedly trumped up
criticism 	of 	his 	performance 	in 	order 	to 	create 	a 	justification 	for 	terminating 	his
employment," were sufficient to raise a plausible claim of hostile work environment
harassment at pleading stage); Cruz v. Coach Stores, 202 F.3d 560, 571 (2d Cir. 2000)
(finding a hostile work environment where, inter a/ia, beginning on the victim's first day of
employment, "[the employer] made 'loud racial comment[s]' ... during [the plaintiff's] daily
trips to the mailroom"); Levy v. NYC Health + Hasps., 660 F. Supp. 3d 220 (S.D.N.Y.
2023) (complaint adequately alleged "steady barrage" of racial slurs sufficient to state
hostile work environment claim).
Defendants argue that the four remarks by Barrett detailed in the complaint do not
rise to the level of frequency necessary to establish a hostile work environment. But
defendants misconstrue the allegations presented here. Differently than in most of the
cases relied upon by defendants, Quinones does not allege that these four comments are
the sum total of the harassment he experienced. Instead , Quinones alleges that the four
incidents described in the complaint are examples of the types of racially degrading
comments he endured on a daily basis, over the course of five months. See Knox, 134
F.4th at 39 (finding that district court erred in granting summary judgment on hostile work
environment claim where plaintiff submitted 	sworn 	declaration stating that she was
subjected to daily harassment from her supervisor and that another employee routinely
made derogatory comments about her race and nationality, and describing two examples
of such comments); Bernardi v. New York State Oep 't of Corrections, 19-CV-11867, 2021
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U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95225 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2021) (denying motion to dismiss hostile work
environment claim based on use of Italian slurs as well as comments by colleagues to
"go back to his own country" and that his "guinea food stinks," where plaintiff alleged that
he experienced "many" such comments but the complaint was "not entirely specific about
the exact dates of certain instances").
The 	Court 	acknowledges 	that the 	instant complaint 	does 	not offer detailed
examples 	of 	all 	the 	harassment 	allegedly 	experienced 	by 	Quinones, 	nor 	is 	the
harassment described in the complaint as severe as the harassment described in some
of the cases cited by defendants. However, neither of these facts requires dismissal at
the pleadings stage. Quinones alleges that one or more times per day, for five months
straight, his supervisor made derogatory and humiliating comments about his race and
the color of his skin. A reasonable person could find such pervasive conduct to be hostile
and/or abusive. Moreover, "whether a particular work environment is objectively hostile is
necessarily a fact-intensive inquiry," Patane, 	508 F.3d at 114, and, accordingly, "is
generally inappropriate for the Court to determine on a motion to dismiss," Amaya v.
Ballyshear LLC, 295 F. Supp. 3d 204, 224 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) . While Quinones will need to
put forth credible evidence supporting the exact nature, severity, and frequency of the
remarks to withstand summary judgment, the allegations here are minimally sufficient to
state a Title VII hostile work environment claim .
Section 1981
Hostile work environment claims brought under Section 1981 are assessed under
the same standard as hostile work environment claims brought under Title VII. Banks v.
Gen. Motors, LLC , 81 F.4th 242, 261-62 (2d Cir. 2023). See also Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at
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320-21 (applying same standard to hostile work environment claims brought under Title
VII and Section 1981 ).
Thus, for the same reasons that the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to
allege a Title VII hostile work environment claim, they are also sufficient to allege a hostile
work environment claim under Section 1981 . See Quinones v. City of Binghamton, 3:19-
CV-1460, 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2172 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2022) (finding that allegations of
"constant and continuous" harassment, 	including allegations that plaintiff was called
"Ricky Ricardo," mimicked when speaking Spanish , and subjected to other insulting or
derogatory comments about his background, were sufficient to plead a Section 1981
hostile work environment claim).
NYSHRL
Following the 2019 amendments to the NYSHRL, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work
environment 	claim 	need 	only 	establish 	that 	he was 	"treated 	less 	well 	than 	other
employees because of [a protected characteristic]." Carey v. New York State Dep't of
Health, 23 Civ. 3061, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189312 (Sept. 25, 2025) (accord N.Y. Exec.
Law § 296(1 )(h)). The statute expressly rejects any requirement that the conduct be
"severe or pervasive." Id.
Because the Court finds that plaintiff's Title VII and Section 1981 hostile work
environment claims survive the motion to dismiss, and in view of the fact that the NYSHRL
applies a more lenient standard that its federal counterparts, the motion to dismiss
plaintiff's NYSHRL hostile work environment claims should be dismissed as well. Kekovic
v. Titan Motor Grp., 22-CV-2142, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 175560 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29,
2023). See also Riggs v. Akamai Techs ., 1:23-CV-06463, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119502
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(S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2024) ("Because Title VII imposes a higher standard than the NYSHRL
.. . , the Court also denies the motion to dismiss Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims
under the state ... human rights laws.").
Retaliation
Title VII
To state a Title VII retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show: " (1) participation in a
protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the
adverse employment action ." Shultz v. Congregation Shearith Israel of City of N. Y., 867
F.3d 298, 309 (2d Cir. 2017). As for causation, "the plaintiff must plausibly allege that the
retaliation was a 'but-for' cause of the employer's adverse action," not merely that
"retaliation was a 'substantial' or 'motivating' factor in the employer's decision ." Vega, 801
F.3d at 90-91. Under this framework, "'but-for' causation does not require proof that
retaliation was the only cause of the employer's action, but only that the adverse action
would not have occurred in the absence of the retaliatory motive." Kwan , 737 F.3d at 846;
Vega, 801 F.3d at 91.
"Informal complaints to supervisors, instituting litigation, or filing a formal complaint
are protected activities under Title VII." Giscombe v. N. YC. Oep 't of Educ., 39 F. Supp.
3d 396 , 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). See also Hernandez v. Kwiat Eye & Laser Surgery, PLLC,
20-CV-42, 2023 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11521 (S . D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2023) (finding that plaintiff's
internal complaints "to someone in 	a managerial position" regarding 	a supervisor's
conduct were protected activity) . Here, Quinones engaged in protected activity, of which
defendants were aware, when he complained to Joe Basil about Barrett's harassment.
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And 	Quinones' termination on 	November 22, 2024 constitutes a materially adverse
employment action. Vega, 801 F.3d 	at 79.
"Causation may be shown by direct evidence of retaliatory animus or inferred
through temporal proximity to the protected activity." Duplan v. City of New York, 888 F.3d
612, 625 (2d Cir. 2018). Here, defendants submit that plaintiff has failed to plead any
direct evidence of retaliatory animus and that plaintiff's termination did not occur close
enough in time to his complaints of discrimination to infer a finding of retaliation. It is
alleged 	that 	Quinones 	complained 	about 	Barrett 	in 	late August 	of 2024 	and 	was
terminated on November 22, 2024. Defendants cite a number of cases where courts
within this Circuit have concluded that a temporal gap of approximately three months
between 	the 	protected 	activity 	and 	the 	adverse 	action 	prohibited 	an 	inference 	of
causation.
The Second Circuit has declined to "draw[] a bright line to define the outer limits
beyond which a temporal relationship is too attenuated to establish a causal relationship
I
between exercise of a federal constitutional right and an allegedly retaliatory action."
Summa v. Hofstra Univ., 708 F.3d 115, 128 (2d Cir. 2013) Instead, district courts are
advised "to exercise [their] judgment about the permissible inferences that can be drawn
from temporal proximity in the context of particular cases ." Espinal v. Goard, 558 F.3d
119, 129 (2d Cir. 2009). To this end, the Second Circuit has found gaps of well over three
months sufficient to establish a causal relationship, if accompanied by other indicia of
retaliatory motive. Summa, 708 F.3d at 128-29 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding a seven-month gap
is itself "not prohibitively remote" and "within the temporal range ... found sufficient to raise
inference of causation"); Rasmy v. Marriott Int'! Inc., 952 F.3d 379, 392 (2d Cir. 2020)
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(finding five . months sufficient to show causation and noting the supervisor's verbal
abuse); Garcia v. 	Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 15 Civ. 767, 2018 U.S . Dist. LEXIS 142514
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2018) ("[A]t times the Circuit has found three months to be insufficient,
but eight months indicative of a causal connection." (citations omitted)), aff'd, 803 F. App'x
441 (2d Cir. 2020) (summary order) .
The 	"other 	surrounding 	circumstances" 	pied 	here 	support 	an 	inference 	of
causation . Summa, 708 F.3d at 128. This is not a scenario where an employee complains
of discrimination and then works for an additional three months or more, without incident
or negative treatment by their employer, and is then terminated. 	Instead, Quinones
alleges 	that 	immediately 	after 	he 	complained 	about 	Barrett, 	he 	was 	subjected 	to
increased monitoring and unwarranted criticism. Quinones specifically .alleges that others
who 	made similar mistakes, 	but had 	not complained, 	were 	not criticized 	or overly
monitored. Quinones further alleges that while defendants initially approved his request
to work part-time, they terminated him around three months later, ostensibly because they
needed a full-time employee, and never presented him the option of returning to a full-
time schedule. Indeed, courts may "overlook a longer gap in time between protected
conduct and an adverse employment action where the pattern of retaliatory conduct
begins soon after the [protected conduct] and only culminates later in actual discharge."
Billue v. Praxair, Inc., 05-CV-170, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30744 (D. Conn. Apr. 26, 2007)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The totality and context of the allegations here, considered in a light most favorable
to plaintiff, permit a reasonable inference that Quinones' complaints about Barrett were a
but-for cause of his termination. See e.g., Bechless-Canton v. Lutheran Soc. Servs. of
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N. Y., 20 Civ. 4379, 2021 	U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135371 (S.D.N .Y. July 20, 2021) (finding
seven-month gap between complaint and termination not too remote to support inference
of retaliation, where plaintiff alleged that she was treated with hostility following the
complaint and then terminated for an "abundantly false reason"); Servello v. New York
State Office of Children & Family Servs., 1:18-CV-0777, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31723
(N .D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2019) (finding that plaintiff alleged an aggregate course of conduct
that, taken together, constituted a materially adverse action, where he complained about
unequal pay in February, was immediately subjected to counseling, increased scrutiny,
and negative evaluations, and then terminated in July); Chan v. NYU Downtown Hosp.,
03 Civ. 3003, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1419 (S .D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2004) ("[E]vidence of an
intervening pattern of antagonism [after] the complaint ... could support an inference that
an alleged retaliatory act that was taken against the complainant was causally related to
her complaint of discrimination."). 8
Section 1981
Retaliation claims asserted under Section 1981 are subject to the same standards
as retaliation claims brought under Title VII. See Banks, LLC, 81 F.4th at 275. See also
Cardwell v. Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP, 1:19-CV-10256, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 198655
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2020) (applying the same pleading standards to retaliation claims
under Title VII and Section 1981 in evaluating motion to dismiss); Guity v. Uniondale
Union Free Sch. Dist., 15-cv-5693, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27542 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2017)
8 Defendants contend that their discipline of Barrett contradicts any inference of retal iatory animus toward
Quinones. First, there are questions of fact as to whether defendants' response was sufficient.
Regard less , defendants' discipline of Barrett and alleged retaliation against Quinones need not be
mutually exclusive events . Stated another way, it could be the case that defendants both pun ished the
harasser in some manner and terminated plaintiff in reta li ation for his complaints of discrimination .
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(collecting cases). Thus, defendants' motion to dismiss the Section 1981 retaliation claim
should be denied for all the same reasons discussed with regard to his Title VII retaliation
claim.
NYSHRL
As noted above, the NYSHRL was amended in 2019 to more closely align with the
NYCHRL's more liberal pleading standard. Qorrolli, 124 F.4th at 122. With regard to a
claim of retaliation, the more lenient NYCHRL standard "requires only conduct that is
'reasonably likely to deter a person from engaging in' protected activity, not a materially
adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment, and second,
the NYCHRL imposes a more lenient 'motivating factor' causation standard, rather than
requiring but-for causation." Penza v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y., Inc., 1:19-CV-
07478, 	2024 	U.S. 	Dist. 	LEXIS 	145300 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 	15, 2024) 	(internal 	citations
omitted). See also Kittle v. Mavis Disc. Tire, Inc., 24-CV-2537, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
189190 (E .D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2025) ("[W]hile courts have not yet clearly defined the scope
of the newly amended NYSHRL, they have generally agreed that the new retaliation
standard is 'more liberal' than the federal standard.").
Because plaintiff has adequately pied a claim of retaliation under Title VII and
Section 1981, he has also adequately pied a claim of retaliation under the more expansive
standard of the NYSHRL. See Baichan v. New Rochelle City Sch. Dist., 23-CV-06202,
2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83928 (S . D.N .Y. My 7, 2024) ("Given the Court's conclusion that
Plaintiff has plausibly alleged retaliation in violation of Title VII, the Court finds Plaintiff
has plausibly alleged retaliation under the more liberal NYSHRL standard.").
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that defendants' motion to dismiss
the complaint be denied. (0kt. No. 8)
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1 ), it is hereby ORDERED that this Report and
Recommendation be filed with the Clerk of Court.
Unless otherwise ordered by Judge Sinatra, any objections to this Report and
Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen days of service of
this Report and Recommendation in accordance with the above statute, Rules 72(b), 6(a),
and 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and W.D .N.Y. L. R. Civ. P. 72. 	Any
requests for an extension of this deadline must be made to Judge Sinatra.
Failure to file objections, or to request an extension of time to file objections,
within fourteen days of service of this Report and Recommendation WAIVES THE
RIGHT TO APPEAL THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER. 	See Small v. Sec'y of Health
& Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989).
The District Court will ordinarily refuse to consider de nova arguments, case law
and/or evidentiary material which could 	have been, 	but were not, 	presented to the
Magistrate Judge in the first instance. See Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale
Elec. Co. , 840 F.2d 985 , 990-91 (1st Cir. 1988).
Finally, the parties are reminded that, pursuant to WD.N. Y. 	L.R.Civ.P. 72(b),
written objections "shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings and
recommendations to which objection is made and the basis for each objection, and shall
be supported by legal authority." Failure to comply with these provisions may result
in the District Court's refusal to consider the objection.
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SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	January 5, 2026
Buffalo, New York
MICHAEL J.
United States Magistrate Judge
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