People of the State of New York v. Niagara-Wheatfield Central School District

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
LETITIA JAMES, NEW YORK STATE
ATTORNEY GENERAL, 	DECISION
and
Plaintiff, 	ORDER
v.
21-CV-759-JLS(F)
NIAGARA-WHEATFIELD CENTRAL
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	LETICIA JAMES
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Attorney for Plaintiff
AMANDA M. MEYER,
SANDRA E. PULLMAN,
Assistant New York Attorney Generals, of Counsel
28 Liberty Street, 15th Floor
New York, New York 10005
and
DANIEL R. MAGUIRE
Assistant New York Attorney General, of Counsel
Main Place Tower
350 Main Street, Suite 300a
Buffalo, New York 14202
HARRIS BEACH MURTHA PLLC
Attorneys for Defendant
DANIEL R. LeCOURS, of Counsel
677 Broadway, Suite 1101
Albany, New York 12207
and
TRACIE L. LOPARDI, of Counsel
Larkin at Exchange
726 Exchange Street
Suite 1000
Buffalo, New York 14210
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In this action seeking equitable relief for violations of Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, and a state law claim of common law negligent
supervision, by papers filed January 28, 2025, Defendant requests, based on the court’s
inherent power, a stay of further proceedings pending disposition of Defendant’s petition
for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court. Specifically, Defendant seeks the court’s
order to stay further proceedings in this case, particularly fact discovery that would be
required pursuant to the Second Circuit’s reversal on October 15, 2024 of this court’s
August 26, 2022 Decision and Order (Dkt. 52) adopting the undersigned’s Report and
Recommendation filed May 11, 2022 (Dkt. 41) that the Plaintiff’s action be dismissed for
lack of parens patriae standing. On March 3, 2025, Defendant’s application (24A842)
for extension of time within which to file Defendant’s petition for certiorari to April 10,
2025 was granted by Justice Sotomayor. Thus, the issue presented in Defendant’s
motion is whether the expected pendency of Defendant’s petition warrants a stay of
further proceedings in this case.
In deciding whether to grant a stay in these circumstances courts consider five
factors: (1) plaintiff’s interest in proceeding expeditiously balanced against potential
prejudice to plaintiff that may result from delay, (2) defendant’s interest and burden if
stay is not grant, (3) interests of the court, (4) the interests of non-parties, and (5) the
public interest. See Nelson v. G.Skill USA, Inc., 2023 WL 3300408, at *4 (W.D.N.Y.
May 8, 2023) (citing Kappel v. Comfort, 914 F. Supp. 1056, 1058 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing
Volmar Distributors v. New York Post Co., 152 F.R.D. 36, 39 (S.D.N.Y.1993)) (“the
Koppel factors”). “The proponent of a stay bears the burden of establishing its need.”
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 708 (1997). The Kappel factors have been applied in
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cases where, as here, the proffered rationale for a stay is based upon the pendency of
a certiorari petition to the Supreme Court. See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
v. Manseth, 2024 WL 805628, at **4-7 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 2024). “The decision of
whether to stay a case is a ‘case-by-case determination’ that turns on the particular
facts and posture of the individual case.” Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 2024
WL 805628, at *2 (quoting Kappel, 914 F. Supp. at 1058). Such a determination is
within the court’s discretion. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v.
United State E.P.A, 630 F.Supp.2d 295, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
With respect to the period of delay and potential prejudice which may accrue to
Plaintiff, the court finds this factor favors Defendant for three reasons. First, the
Supreme Court is likely to decide whether to grant Defendant’s expected petition by the
end of the Court’s current term, or by the end of June. Thus, to the extent the pendency
of Defendant’s petition may, if a stay is granted, cause any delay in commencing
discovery, such delay is minimal. Second, given that a litigation hold has, since April 6,
2022, been in effect; see Dkt. 38, there is little risk of loss of discoverable documents.
Third, as to the memories of potentially affected students and their parents or
guardians, any further delay of deposition practice directed to such putative witnesses is
not likely to significantly diminish their ability to recall events from the relevant period
2016-2019 that has not already occurred. Thus, any additional delay in commencing
discovery attributable to Defendant’s petition is also minimal. While Plaintiff contends
that “[a]dditional delay is clearly prejudicial to the State,” see (Dkt. 68) at 5, such
assertion ignores the fact that if, as a result of Defendant’s petition, it is determined that
Plaintiff lacks standing, New York State will suffer no such prejudice. Accordingly, this
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factor supports granting the stay.
In regard to the second Kappel factor, defendant’s interests in avoiding
potentially unnecessary discovery and related costs, also favors granting a stay. In the
instant case, the Defendant expects that Plaintiff will seek to examine the records of 82
additional students and families, see (Dkt. 65-2) at 11, in an effort to establish some 30
putative Title IX violations asserted by Plaintiff by Defendant in addition to the four
cases alleged in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint. Defendant has a reasonably-based
interest in avoiding such discovery during the pendency of Defendant’s certiorari petition
as granting the Defendant’s petition together with a potential reversal by the Supreme
Court of the Second Circuit’s disposition of Plaintiff’s appeal of Judge Sinatra’s
dismissal of the case would render any discovery completed in vain. Thus, the second
Kappel factor, defendant’s interest, favors granting the requested stay.
With respect to the third Kappel factor, the interest of the court, it is fair to say
that it is obvious that it cannot be gainsaid that a favorable ruling by the Supreme Court
on Defendant’s petition that Plaintiff lacks standing would render any rulings made by
this court during the Supreme Court’s review, void. Moreover, it is common for courts to
grant a stay where a petition for certiorari is pending that if granted may be dispositive
of the underlying proceeding as would be true of the instant case. See Right to Life of
Dutchess County, Inc. v. Federal Election Com’n, 6 F.Supp.2d 248, 251 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (court stayed proceedings where defendant had filed petition of certiorari); Davis
v. Blige, 2008 WL 2477461, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2008) (same). Thus the court’s
interest would be served by granting the stay.
As regards the fourth Kappel factor, the interest of 30 (and potentially as many as
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an additional 82) non-parties, the court finds this further also points to granting the
requested stay. This is true because upon learning, as a result of Plaintiff’s discovery
request, that their students may have been involved in some form of improper conduct
while a student at Defendant’s school, such knowledge will have a highly disconcerting
effect upon such parents as well as their students whose records are sought by Plaintiff.
In order to avoid such potentially unnecessary and avoidable adverse effects, a stay is
justified and warranted.1 Finally, the public interest also supports granting the
requested stay. In light of Judge Cabranes’s concurrence, effectively encouraging
Defendant to seek Supreme Court review of the panel’s decision, the public interest in
assuring that important litigation proceeds in accordance with a correct application of
law without unnecessarily stigmatizing effects on innocent non-parties is probable and
well-grounded. Accordingly, the court finds the fifth Kappel factor also operates in favor
of granting the stay.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Defendant’s motion (Dkt. 65) is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
/s/ Leslie G. Foschio
_________________________________
LESLIE G. FOSCHIO
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dates: March 14, 2025
Buffalo, New York
1 Plaintiff’s questioning of Defendant’s assertion that discovery pertaining to an additional 30 victims will
require discovery related to 82 additional families, see (Dkt. 68) at 6, presumes that the relevant
discovery would only be required of the putative victims, rather than the associated alleged violators and
any student witnesses.
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