Kozak v. Office Depot, Inc.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOANN R. KOZAK,
Plaintiff,
v.
OFFICE DEPOT, INC.,
Defendant.
16-CV-943-LJV-JJM
DECISION & ORDER
On November 23, 2016, the plaintiff, Joann R. Kozak, commenced this action
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the New York State Human Rights Law
(“NYSHRL”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”). Docket Item 1. On January 17, 2017, the case
was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy for all
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B). Docket Item 10.
On September 27, 2023, the defendant, Office Depot, Inc., moved for summary
judgment. Docket Item 156. After Kozak responded, Docket Item 159, Office Depot
replied and moved to strike the declarations of Kozak and her attorney, Docket
Items 169 and 170.
On May 15, 2024, Judge McCarthy issued a Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) finding that Office Depot’s motion to strike should be denied and that its motion
for summary judgment should be granted in part and denied in part. Docket Item 187.
More specifically, Judge McCarthy found that the motion for summary judgment should
be denied as to Kozak’s hostile work environment claim but otherwise granted. Id.
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 1 of 15

2
Kozak objected to the portions of the R&R that recommended granting summary
judgment. Docket Item 192. Office Depot then responded, Docket Item 194, and Kozak
replied, Docket Item 197. Office Depot subsequently filed a notice of supplemental
authority regarding Flanagan v. Trader Joe’s E., Inc., 2025 WL 18151 (2d Cir. Jan. 2,
2025) (summary order), Docket Item 198, and Kozak responded to that submission,
Docket Item 199.
A district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of
a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). The court must
review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s recommendation to which a party
objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3).
This Court has carefully and thoroughly reviewed the R&R, as well as the
objection, response, reply, and submissions regarding supplemental authority; it also
has reviewed the record in this case, including the materials submitted to Judge
McCarthy. Based on that de novo review, the Court accepts and adopts Judge
McCarthy’s recommendation to deny the motion to strike, and it accepts in part and
modifies in part Judge McCarthy’s recommendation regarding the motion for summary
judgment. More specifically, this Court agrees with Judge McCarthy that summary
judgment should be denied as to the hostile work environment claim and granted as to
the age discrimination claim and the disability discrimination claim; it also agrees that
Kozak’s Rule 56(d) application should be denied. But the Court finds that Office
Depot’s motion should be denied as to the claims of sex discrimination and retaliation.
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 2 of 15

3
LEGAL PRINCIPLES
“A motion for summary judgment may be granted ‘if the movant shows that there
is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.’” Soto v. Gaudett, 862 F.3d 148, 157 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(a)). “Summary judgment is appropriate when ‘there can be but one reasonable
conclusion as to the verdict,’ i.e., ‘it is quite clear what the truth is,’ and no rational
factfinder could find in favor of the nonmovant.” Id. (first quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986), then quoting Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys.,
Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962)). Conversely, “[s]ummary judgment should be denied if,
when the party against whom summary judgment is sought is given the benefit of all
permissible inferences and all credibility assessments, a rational factfinder could resolve
all material factual issues in favor of that party.” Id. “In deciding such a motion, the
court cannot properly make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.” Id.
DISCUSSION
The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the factual background of this
case and Judge McCarthy's analysis in the R&R. See Docket Item 187.
I. 	MOTION TO STRIKE, HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIM, AND
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Neither party objected to Judge McCarthy’s recommendations (1) that Office
Depot’s motion to strike should be denied, (2) that Office Depot’s motion for summary
judgment should be denied as to Kozak’s hostile work environment claim, and (3) that
Office Depot’s motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Kozak’s disability
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 3 of 15

4
discrimination claims. This Court therefore need not review those findings. See
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149-50 (1985). In any event, however, this Court agrees
with Judge McCarthy’s analysis on these issues and adopts his recommendation on
these claims.
II. 	AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Under the ADEA, it is “unlawful” for employers to “fail or refuse to hire,”
“discharge,” or “otherwise discriminate against” an employee or potential employee
“because of [that] individual’s age.”1 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1); see Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 120 (1985) (“Section 4(a)(1) of the [ADEA] proscribes
differential treatment of older workers with respect to a privilege of employment.”
(alterations, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). To defeat a summary
judgment motion on an ADEA claim, the plaintiff must present “sufficient evidence upon
which a reasonable jury could conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that her
age was a ‘but for’ cause of [the defendant’s] decision to fire her.” Gorzynski v. JetBlue
Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 107 (2d Cir. 2010). Claims of age discrimination under the
NYSHRL “are analyzed under the same framework as age discrimination claims
brought pursuant to the ADEA.” Braun v. Adm’rs for the Pros., Inc., 2018 WL 3597504,
at *7 (E.D.N.Y. July 26, 2018).
Judge McCarthy found that even when “[r]ead in a light most favorable to Kozak,
the record as a whole demonstrates that there is insufficient evidence from which a juror
could reasonably conclude that Kozak’s age was a motivating factor for her termination,
1 The ADEA applies only to “individuals who are at least 40 years of age.” 29
U.S.C. § 631(a).
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 4 of 15

5
much less the ‘but for’ cause,” as is required to prove age discrimination. Docket Item
187 at 53. This Court agrees.
In her objection, Kozak argues that “[a] reasonable juror could find that [her
manager, Scott] McGovern had a discriminatory motive and was not only a participant in
the decision to terminate Kozak but was integral to and proximately caused the decision
to terminate her.” Docket Item 192 at 18. But there is no indication that McGovern had
any discriminatory motive based on Kozak’s age.
As Judge McCarthy observed, “there is no evidence that . . . a reduction in
workforce plan played any role in [Kozak’s] termination.” Docket Item 187 at 49.
Moreover, the employees Kozak identified as comparators were not similarly situated.
See id. at 50-52. And the mere fact that Kozak was replaced by a younger worker
cannot alone save her claim. See Strohmeyer v. Int’l Brotherhood of Painters & Allied
Trades, 989 F. Supp. 455, 460 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“It is not a violation of the [ADEA] to
replace an employee in the protected class with a younger person, as long as the
protected employee is not replaced because of h[er] age.”), aff’d, 164 F.3d 619 (2d Cir.
1998); Coleman v. Prudential Relocation, 975 F. Supp. 234, 242 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“If
plaintiff’s case could survive a summary judgment motion merely because her duties
were assumed by a younger person, that would mean that virtually every employee over
forty years old [who was terminated and whose duties were assigned to someone
younger] could state an age claim that would withstand summary judgment.” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
Simply put, there is no evidence from which a reasonable juror could conclude
that Kozak was fired because of her age. This Court therefore agrees with Judge
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 5 of 15

6
McCarthy that Office Depot’s motion for summary judgment should be granted on
Kozak’s age discrimination claim.2
III. 	SEX DISCRIMINATION CLAIM
Kozak’s sex discrimination claim is a different story, however. Title VII prohibits
an employer from discharging “any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] against
any individual[,] . . . because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1). “To succeed on a Title VII disparate treatment
claim, a plaintiff must prove ‘discrimination either by direct evidence of intent to
discriminate’ or, more commonly, by ‘indirectly showing circumstances giving rise to an
inference of discrimination.’” Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566, 569 (2d Cir. 2024)
(quoting Banks v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 81 F.4th 242, 270 (2d Cir. 2023)). “When only
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent is available, courts use the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework to assess whether the plaintiff has shown sufficient
evidence of discrimination to survive summary judgment.” Id.; see McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
“A plaintiff’s first step under McDonnell Douglas is to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination by showing that ‘(1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she is
2 Judge McCarthy also found that Kozak “fail[ed] to raise a material issue of fact
as to whether the reasons given by Office Depot for her termination were false,
unworthy of belief, implausible, or motivated (in whole or even in part) by
discrimination.” Docket Item 187 at 45. As explained below, this Court respectfully
disagrees with Judge McCarthy’s conclusion that there is no material issue of fact
precluding summary judgment on pretext with respect to Kozak’s sex discrimination
claim. But that does not mean that Kozak has shown that the given reason was a
pretext for age discrimination. There is simply no evidence from which a jury could infer
a causal nexus between Kozak’s age and her termination.
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 6 of 15

7
qualified for her position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the
circumstances give rise to an inference of discrimination.’” Bart, 96 F.4th at 570
(quoting Banks, 81 F.4th at 270). “The burden at this stage ‘is not onerous.’” Id.
(quoting Banks, 81 F.4th at 270).
“Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the
employer to ‘articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason’ for its adverse
action.” Id. (quoting Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 83 (2d Cir.
2015)). “Upon that showing, the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the
employer’s stated reason was pretext for discrimination.” Id. “[A] plaintiff can satisfy
that third-stage burden either by showing (1) that the employer’s stated reason is false
and merely a pretext for discrimination, or (2) that the employer’s stated reason,
although factually accurate, is not the only reason, because the employer’s decision
was also attributable to an impermissible consideration.” Id. at 577. An inference of
discrimination can be drawn from “the employer’s criticism of the plaintiff’s performance
in ethnically degrading terms; or its invidious comments about others in the employee’s
protected group; or the more favorable treatment of employees not in the protected
group; or the sequence of events leading to the [adverse employment action].” Abdu-
Brisson v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 468 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Chambers v.
TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43 F.3d 29, 37 (2d Cir. 1994)); see also Sassaman v. Gamache,
566 F.3d 307, 314-15 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The failure of an employer to conduct an
adequate investigation or to undertake an appropriate response can constitute evidence
in support of a Title VII plaintiff’s allegations.”).
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 7 of 15

8
Here, as Judge McCarthy observed, “[t]he crux of the parties’ dispute turns on
whether Kozak has established a triable issue of fact that the purported reason for her
termination was pretextual.” Id. at 42. Office Depot says that Kozak was fired because
its investigation determined that she had made false claims—including claims of sexual
harassment—against McGovern. Among other things, her termination email stated:
To misrepresent facts and make a false claim against any associate, let
alone your supervisor, is dishonest and unprofessional. 	Additionally, your
continuous attempts to promote your false claim by repeatedly calling
associates and managers even after we requested you stop, impeded our
internal investigation. Your actions have been unethical and unprofessional
and violate our Code of Ethical Conduct and will not be tolerated. As a
result, your employment is hereby terminated, effective immediately.
Docket Item 187 at 18-19 (quoting Docket Item 156-1 at 86). So the question is this:
has Kozak raised a triable issue of fact as to whether this purported reason was a
pretext for discrimination?
Judge McCarthy “agree[d] with Kozak that McGovern’s conduct toward her and
evaluation of her performance changed abruptly after [McGovern] told Kozak that he
liked her but she did not reciprocate.” Id. at 53. And “[g]iving Kozak every favorable
inference,” Judge McCarthy determined, “a juror could reasonably conclude that
McGovern then took steps (e.g., the DSMs [DSM Store Visit Guides], PIP [Performance
Improvement Plan], and PCD [Performance Correction Document]) to lay a foundation
for a possible termination, demotion, or other adverse employment action against
Kozak.” Id. In other words, Judge McCarthy found that Kozak’s supervisor, McGovern,
began to treat and evaluate her differently at work—and to set her up for demotion or
firing—after McGovern learned that Kozak was not interested in a relationship with him.
But Judge McCarthy concluded that “these steps were ultimately unrelated to the
reason for Kozak’s termination.” Id. “Although McGovern was a participant in the May
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 8 of 15

9
27, 2015 incident that triggered the chain of events leading to Kozak’s termination,”
Judge McCarthy explained, “Kozak offers no evidence that [McGovern] was involved in
the decision to terminate her.” Id. at 53-54. Instead, “[t]hat decision was made by
others, with no alleged gender animus, and based on accusations made by [another
employee, Carol] Cannon, who also lacked any alleged discriminatory animus, that
were wholly unrelated to the performance issues identified by McGovern in the DSMs,
PCD, or PIP.” Id. at 54. Respectfully, this Court disagrees.
According to Kozak, when she met with McGovern to receive her PIP and PCD
evaluations on May 27, 2015, McGovern began “yelling very, very loudly.” Docket Item
159-3 at ¶ 46. McGovern then “blocked the door with his chair” and “would not let
[Kozak] leave the office.” Id. “He took the PCD and PIP he was angrily shaking at
[Kozak] in his fist, threw them on the desk[,] and told [her] to sign this.” Id. “He yelled:
‘You sit down or you’re fired.’” Id. Kozak “was very fearful and signed.” Id. Afterwards,
he told her not to “tell anybody what happened in this room.” Id.
The next day, Kozak went to work but was too upset to enter the building. Id. at
¶ 48. So she reported to the Buffalo Police that McGovern had “trap[ped] her in the
office[ ] . . . and refused to let her leave[] [f]or approximately [30] minutes[,] . . . . verbally
abuse[d] her[,] and force[d] her to sign paperwork she did not agree with.” Docket Item
156-1 at 163. She also submitted a complaint to Office Depot’s HR department.
Docket Item 159-3 at ¶ 48.
Not surprisingly, McGovern had a very different recollection of the May 27
meeting. See Docket Item 156-1 at 178-79; Docket Item 159-10 at 46. Cannon also
provided a written statement, which made a variety of claims against Kozak, including
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 9 of 15

10
that Kozak had a drinking problem and had asked Cannon to lie for Kozak. Docket Item
156-1 at 169-74. Ultimately, Office Depot’s Director of HR—Mary Bryan—credited
McGovern’s and Cannon’s version of the facts and determined that Kozak had lied
about what happened.
Kozak asserts that there were major deficiencies in the investigation—
deficiencies that might well support an inference of discriminatory animus. See Docket
Item 192 at 26; cf. Sassaman, 566 F.3d at 314 (“The allegation that defendants made
minimal—if any—efforts to verify [an employee]’s accusations could be construed by a
reasonable jury as further evidence that [the plaintiff]’s forced resignation occurred
under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.”). For example,
Kozak says that Bryan did not interview her or McGovern—the only two people present
for the incident in McGovern’s office.3 See Docket Item 192 at 26. Instead, Kozak
says, “Bryan accepted as credible McGovern’s self-serving written version of events,
which never discussed sexual harassment.” Id. at 27.
This Court agrees with Kozak that—viewing the facts in her favor—there is a
material question of fact as to whether Office Depot’s rationale for firing her was a
pretext. More specifically, if a jury were to credit Kozak, they could reasonably conclude
that the investigation was a “sham”; from that, the jury could infer animus on the part of
Bryan. Indeed, because Kozak’s alleged rejection of McGovern’s advances set in
motion a series of events and decisions that at least temporally led to Kozak’s
termination, that inference is common sense.
3 Although there are some conflicting facts on this point, viewing those facts in
the light most favorable to Kozak, the Court concludes for the purposes of this motion
that neither was interviewed.
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 10 of 15

11
It is true, as Judge McCarthy observed, that courts are not super-personnel
departments, and, therefore, “‘the reliability of the evidence supporting [the employer’s]
conclusions’ is not the critical issue.” Docket Item 187 at 43, 46 (quoting McPherson v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 216 (2d Cir. 2006)). That is “because ‘[i]n a
discrimination case . . . [the court is] decidedly not interested in the truth of the
allegations against [the] plaintiff[,’] but rather ‘in what motivated the employer.” Id. at 46
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting McPherson, 457 F.3d at 216). Thus, “[w]hat
matters is that [the employer] relied on the results of its investigation—flawed or not—as
the basis to terminate [the plaintiff’s] employment.” Leiner v. Fresenius Kabi USA, LLC,
2019 WL 5683003, at *8 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2019).
So if, for example, Kozak had been fired because of her alleged drinking
problem—wholly apart from and unrelated to her sexual harassment allegations—that
would be a different story. In that instance, this Court would not delve into the reliability
of the evidence demonstrating a drinking problem or the believability of the witnesses.
Cf. Flanagan, 2025 WL 18151, at *2 (finding that plaintiff had “fail[ed] to raise a genuine
dispute that the reason Trader Joe’s proffered for her termination”—her “recent
performance” and her “decision to take vacation during a critical period when Trader
Joe’s struggled to deal with the consequences of the COVID-19 outbreak in mid-March
2020”—was pretext (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, by contrast, Kozak’s
claim of sexual harassment—about which Judge McCarthy and this Court found
material questions of fact that preclude summary judgment on the claim of a hostile
work environment—is inextricably intertwined with the reason for her firing. And if the
jury believes Kozak about what happened but discredits Bryan’s claims about the
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 11 of 15

12
thoroughness of her investigation, it could reasonably conclude that Kozak was fired not
because she falsely accused her supervisor but because she was a woman who
accused her male boss of misconduct and sexual harassment.
Thus, this Court respectfully disagrees with Judge McCarthy and denies Office
Depot’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Kozak’s Title VII sex
discrimination claim.
IV. 	RETALIATION CLAIM
Like discrimination claims, “retaliation claims [under Title VII and the NYSHRL]
are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.” Concepcion v. City
of New York, 2016 WL 386099, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2016), aff’d, 693 F. App’x 31
(2d Cir. 2017). To establish a prima facie case, the plaintiff must demonstrate: “(1)
participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity;
(3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir.
2005)). “Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of retaliation, the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for
the employment action.” Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC, 737 F.3d 834, 845 (2d Cir.
2013). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the reason is pretextual.
Id. “A plaintiff may prove that retaliation was a but-for cause of an adverse employment
action by demonstrating weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions
in the employer’s proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its action.” Id. at 846.
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 12 of 15

13
As explained above, Office Depot’s proffered non-discriminatory reason for firing
Kozak was that she had made false accusations of harassment against her supervisor
and then “attempt[ed] to promote [her] false claim by repeatedly calling associates and
managers even after [Office Depot] requested [that she] stop.”4 See Docket Item 156-1
at 86. Thus, there is clearly a link between Kozak’s protected activity—complaining
about her supervisor’s sexually harassing her—and her termination.5 Of course, if a
jury believes Office Depot’s witnesses and finds that Kozak did in fact make up the
allegations, then her firing would be based on a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
and would not be retaliation for protected activity. But, as with Kozak’s sex
discrimination claim, viewing all facts and drawing all inferences in her favor, a jury
could reasonably conclude that the real reason she was fired was because she made a
genuine complaint against her supervisor.
Thus, this Court respectfully disagrees with Judge McCarthy and denies Office
Depot’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Kozak’s retaliation claim.
V. 	RULE 56(D) APPLICATION
Finally, Judge McCarthy denied Kozak’s request for additional discovery, which
he construed as a request under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). See Docket
4 Cannon also reported that Kozak had been drinking at work, see Docket Item
156-1 at 173, but there is no indication from the termination email that Kozak’s alleged
drinking was a basis for her termination, see id. at 86. On the contrary, an email dated
May 7, 2015, indicates that Office Depot initially was considering either “coaching” or a
“written warning” to address allegations about Kozak’s drinking. See Docket Item 156-1
at 176.
5 Although Kozak’s calling her coworkers incessantly could have been an
independent reason to terminate her, there is no indication from the record that this
alone would have resulted in her termination.
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 13 of 15

14
Item 187 at 57-58. Rule 56(d) provides that a motion for summary judgment may be
deferred or denied if the “nonmovant shows by affidavit or declaration that, for specified
reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d).
A party seeking additional discovery under this rule “must file an affidavit explaining (1)
what facts are sought and how they are to be obtained, (2) how those facts are
reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact, (3) what effort the affiant
has made to obtain them, and (4) why the affiant was unsuccessful in those efforts.”
Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989).
This Court agrees with Judge McCarthy that Kozak has failed to meet her burden
here. In particular, with regard to documents concerning Office Depot’s reduction in
force, “Kozak’s counsel offers no reason why she did not earlier seek—during the
previous seven years the case had been pending—to compel [production of] these
documents, which she now argues are central to her case, particularly when she knew
of the existence of some reduction in work force plan by Office Depot since the 2016
New York State Case Division of Human Rights investigation.” See Docket Item 187 at
58-59 (emphasis added). Simply put, the time to raise these issues has come and
gone.
Thus, this Court adopts Judge McCarthy’s recommendation to deny additional
discovery under Rule 56(d).
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 14 of 15

15
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above and in the R&R, Office Depot’s motion to strike,
Docket Item 169, is DENIED, and its motion for summary judgment, Docket Item 156, is
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. More specifically, the motion for summary
judgment is granted as to Kozak’s age and disability discrimination claims but denied as
to her hostile work environment, sex discrimination, and retaliation claims. Kozak’s
request for additional discovery is DENIED. This Court will schedule a status
conference to set a trial date.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	March 25, 2025
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case 1:16-cv-00943-JLS-JJM Document 200 Filed 03/25/25 Page 15 of 15