Watson v. Oneida County et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
TERRY WATSON as Administrator
of the Estate of Antwan Cater,
Plaintiff,
-v- 	9:25-CV-1601 (AJB/DJS)
ONEIDA COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On November 17, 2025, plaintiff Terry Watson (“plaintiff”), as administrator of the estate
of his deceased son, Antwan Cater (“decedent”), filed this civil rights and wrongful death action
alleging that defendants failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care to decedent
while he was a pretrial detainee at the Oneida County Correctional Facility (“OCCF”).
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that on February 13, 2024, OCCF correction officers J.
Braco Dizdarevic, Bradlee Chapman, Barry Bray, Jason Silipo, and Joseph Herringshaw and five
medical staff members responsible for providing care to detainees at the facility observed
decedent experiencing a seizure but failed to provide timely life-saving measures, including the
prompt initiation of CPR, resulting in his death. Dkt. No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiff’s six-count
complaint initially asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correction officers J. Braco
Dizdarevic, Bradlee Chapman, Barry Bray, Jason Silipo, and Joseph Herringshaw; medical staff
Jason Johnson, Connie Hubbel, Celia Goodwin, Nicholas Dubina, and Peter Manno (collectively,
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the “medical staff defendants”); Oneida County (the “County”); New York Correct Care
Solutions Medical Services, P.C. (“NYCCSMS”); and Wellpath Liquidating Trust (the “Trust”),
alleging violations of decedent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights based on deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs. See generally Compl. Plaintiff’s complaint also asserted state-law
claims for wrongful death, negligence, and medical malpractice. Id.
Thereafter, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against Officer
Herringshaw as well as his state-law claims for negligence (Count IV) and medical malpractice
(Count V) against the County and the four remaining officers. Dkt. No. 30. The medical staff
defendants, the Trust, and NYCCSMS have answered the complaint and asserted certain cross-
claims. Dkt. Nos. 24, 36, 40, 42, 43.
On December 11, 2025, the County, Officers Chapman, Bray, and Silipo (the “CO
defendants”), and Officer Dizdarevic (collectively the “moving defendants”) moved to dismiss
the complaint on the remaining counts pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
Dkt. No. 15.
The motion has been fully briefed, Dkt. Nos. 32, 33, 34, and will be considered on the
basis of the submissions without oral argument.
II. 	BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s complaint, Dkt. No. 1, and are assumed true
for the purpose of assessing the moving defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Antwan Cater was 25 years old at the time of his death in the custody of the County at
OCCF. Compl. ¶ 1. Prior to his arrival at OCCF, on December 28, 2023, decedent was arrested
for shoplifting toys from a Wal-Mart and was subsequently released to attend substance use
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treatment. Id. ¶¶ 52, 57. On January 29, 2024, decedent was re-arrested and booked at OCCF
after he failed to report for the treatment program. Id. ¶ 58.
Decedent had a well-documented history of seizures, substance use disorder, and mental
health issues, all of which he disclosed upon his admission to OCCF. Compl. ¶¶ 58–65. OCCF
medical staff prescribed decedent a detox plan and placed him in the Constant Supervision Unit
(the “CSU”). Id. ¶ 66. During the period after his arrival at OCCF, decedent’s condition visibly
deteriorated: he became disoriented, nonverbal, and erratic, and he exhibited alarming behavior
including crying, shouting, and physical distress. Id. ¶¶ 68, 72–74, 79, 84, 89–95.
Just before noon on February 13, 2024, decedent was transferred from the CSU to the
General Population Medical Infirmary in advance of a court appearance scheduled for that day.
Compl. ¶¶ 98, 99. At approximately 12:50 p.m., Correction Officer Dizdarevic observed
decedent “laying flat on the floor [of his cell] but breathing and turning his head from side to side
with his eyes open,” appearing to experience a seizure. Id. ¶ 111. Officer Dizdarevic “walked
down the hall to the medical unit to report what he had seen” but did not enter the cell or
otherwise provide medical assistance to decedent at that time. Id. ¶¶ 114–15. Officer Dizdarevic
returned to his desk. Id. ¶ 115.
Approximately eight minutes later, around 12:58 p.m., Officer Dizdarevic returned to the
cell accompanied by Correction Officers Chapman, Bray, and Silipo. Compl. ¶¶ 117–19. The
officers arrived with a restraint chair, which they intended to use to remove decedent from his
cell and transport him to court. Id. ¶ 117. Upon entering the cell, at 12:58:17, the officers
observed decedent lying on his back, unresponsive. Id. ¶¶ 120–22. More than 40 seconds later,
at 12:58:59, the officers called for medical assistance from Nurse Jason Johnson. Id. ¶¶ 128–29.
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Officer Chapman requested that someone “grab some smelling salt.” Id. ¶ 130. CPR was not
initiated at that time. Id. ¶ 135.
Medical staff, including Nurse Johnson, arrived at decedent’s cell at 12:59:48. Id. ¶ 136.
Upon arrival, medical personnel assessed decedent before initiating resuscitative measures. Id.
¶¶ 137–41, 144–76. Nurse Johnson reported that, at approximately 1:00:52, he “checked for
[decedent’s] carotid pulse and determined that [decedent’s] ‘pulse was weak but present’ and
that he felt decedent ‘swallow.’” Id. ¶¶ 148–49. At 1:02:50, Nurse Johnson stated: “I can’t hear
a pulse, I can’t hear anything.” Id. ¶ 164. Medical personnel did not initiate CPR until
approximately 1:04 p.m.—fourteen minutes after Officer Dizdarevic first observed decedent
lying on the floor of the cell. Id. ¶ 181. Emergency efforts continued, but decedent was later
pronounced dead at approximately 1:44 p.m. See generally id. ¶¶ 180–206.
In their respective incident reports, each of the correction officer defendants provided a
consistent post hoc justification for their failure to obtain or render immediate medical aid,
namely, that they believed decedent was feigning a seizure to avoid appearing in court later that
day. See Compl. ¶¶ 211–14.
After reviewing the circumstances of decedent’s death, the Medical Review Board of the
New York State Commission on Correction (“COC”) found “significant issues with the medical
response and resuscitation measures provided to [decedent],” including delays in initiating
resuscitation, activating EMS, and administering Narcan. Id. ¶¶ 232–36. The COC also
concluded that medical staff appeared unprepared to respond to an unresponsive individual,
noting that resuscitation equipment was not brought to the scene until nearly five minutes after
decedent was found unresponsive, and directed a comprehensive review and retraining of CPR
and emergency response procedures. Id. ¶¶ 236–39.
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But according to plaintiff, decedent was not the first OCCF detainee who died after
receiving deficient medical care at the facility. On April 27, 2023, 25-year-old Milik Burnett
died of an accidental fentanyl overdose in OCCF custody after OCCF allegedly failed to respond
to his medical emergency. See Compl. ¶ 242. After Burnett’s death, the County Sheriff’s Office
initiated an internal investigation and found that a corrections officer failed to conduct
supervisory watch tours of Burnett’s dorm in the hour before Burnett was found unresponsive.
Id. ¶ 249.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a pleading for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Although a complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to
dismiss, “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more
than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will
not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (cleaned up). While “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678, “[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id.
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To assess this facial plausibility requirement, the court “must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in the
pleading, documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference, and matters
of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff has withdrawn his common law negligence (Count IV) and medical malpractice
(Count V) claims against the moving defendants. See Dkt. No. 30. Counts II (Fourteenth
Amendment deliberate indifference), IV (common law negligence), and V (medical malpractice)
are alleged as to the non-moving defendants and will not be addressed here.
On December 11, 2025, the moving defendants moved to dismiss Counts I, III, and VI of
the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that plaintiff failed
to state a claim of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs under the Fourteenth
Amendment and failed to plausibly allege municipal liability under Monell v. Department of
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Dkt. No. 15. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing
that the complaint plausibly alleges a constitutionally deficient response to a serious medical
emergency and sufficiently pleads both individual and municipal liability. Dkt. No. 32.
A. 	Deliberate Indifference Claim (Count I)
Plaintiff alleges deliberate indifference claims against “(1) CO Dizdarevic with respect to
his failure to do anything to help [decedent] for eight minutes after he reported the seizure to
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Nurse Johnson; and (2) all of the CO [d]efendants due to their failure to attempt any resuscitation
measures after they found [decedent] unresponsive.” Dkt. No. 32 (“Pl.’s Mem.”) at 7.1
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution “prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual
punishments’ on persons convicted of crimes.” Lara-Grimaldi v. Cnty. of Putnam, 132 F.4th 614,
630 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII) (emphasis added). But pretrial detainees,
like decedent, see Compl. ¶ 2, “have not been convicted of a crime and thus may not be punished
in any manner—neither cruelly and unusually nor otherwise.” Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17,
29 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 168 (2d Cir. 2007)) (citation modified).
Accordingly, “‘the relevant constitutional provision’ governing a state’s responsibility to care for
persons in its custody who are not prisoners, such as . . . pretrial detainees, . . . ‘is not the Eighth
Amendment but is, instead, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.’” Lara-
Grimaldi, 132 F.4th at 631 (quoting City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244
(1983)). A pretrial detainee’s rights are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections
available to a convicted prisoner.” Lara-Grimaldi, 132 F.4th at 631 (quoting City of Revere, 463
U.S. at 244).
To establish a § 1983 claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs in the Fourteenth
Amendment context, the plaintiff must show that: (1) he or she had a “serious medical need”;
and (2) the defendant “acted with deliberate indifference.” Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73,
86 (2d Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). The first prong is objective, requiring the detainee to allege
“a condition of urgency such as one that may produce death, degeneration, or extreme pain.” Id.
(citing Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)). The second prong, also
objective in nature, requires a showing that the defendant “recklessly failed to act with
1 Pagination corresponds with CM/ECF headers.
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reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee even though
the defendant-official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to
health or safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35.
Defendants argue that this claim must be dismissed because plaintiff has failed to
plausibly allege the second element of this claim, i.e., that they acted with deliberate
indifference. In defendants’ view, “[b]y promptly notifying medical staff, CO Dizdarevic acted
with reasonable care under the circumstances” and that “[b]y promptly calling for medical
assistance upon discovering the decedent’s condition, [the CO defendants] acted reasonably to
address the medical emergency.” Dkt. No. 15-1 (“Defs.’ Mem.”) at 17.
This argument will be rejected. As an initial matter, the first element of this § 1983
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claim—whether the alleged deprivation of
adequate medical care is objectively “sufficiently serious,” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
834 (1994) (cleaned up), is plainly properly pled. As plaintiff notes, because “defendants have
not challenged the seriousness of the alleged deprivation of medical care, the Court should
assume the first prong of the deliberate indifference claim was properly pled.” Pl.’s Mem. at 14
(quoting Maldonado v. Town of Greenburgh, 460 F. Supp. 3d 382, 396 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)) (cleaned
up).
The Court agrees. But even if defendants had challenged the gravity of the deprivation of
medical care at issue, plaintiff plausibly alleges that the decedent “was unconscious, not
breathing, and ultimately died” when the CO defendants and Officer Dizdarevic entered
decedent’s cell, id. (quoting Maldonado, 460 F. Supp. at 396), circumstances which plainly
represent “a condition of urgency that may result in degeneration or extreme pain.” Id. (quoting
Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)); Jackson v. Johnson, 118 F. Supp. 2d
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278, 291 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (Hurd, J.) (characterizing “loss of consciousness and
unresponsiveness” as “serious medical issues”).
With respect to the second prong, plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that defendants knew
or should have known that failing to render appropriate medical care would result in a substantial
risk to decedent’s health. Of course, mere negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference. See, e.g., Tutora v. Correct Care Sols., 2019 WL 1383646, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
2019) (collecting cases); Miller v. Cnty. of Nassau, 2018 WL 1597401, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31,
2018). Likewise, disagreements over medical judgment, without more, do not rise to the level of
a constitutional violation. See Crouch v. Spaulding, 2019 WL 1004539, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24,
2019), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1004357 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2019).
Rather, a pretrial detainee must show either that “the defendant-official acted
intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to
mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the [ ] detainee even though the defendant-official
knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.”
Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35; Dumel v. Westchester Cnty., 656 F. Supp. 3d 454, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2023)
(explaining this plaintiff-friendly standard is “akin to objective recklessness”).
As relevant here, “[a] claim of an unconstitutional delay or interruption in treatment is
only cognizable if it ‘reflects deliberate indifference to a serious risk of health or safety, to a life-
threatening or fast-degenerating condition[,] or to some other condition of extreme pain that
might be alleviated through reasonably prompt treatment.’” Case v. Anderson, 2017 WL
3701863, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2017) (quoting Amaker v. Coombe, 2002 WL 523388, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2002)). In assessing such claims, courts consider “the particular risk of harm
faced by” a detainee, including the seriousness of the medical need, whether the delay worsened
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the condition, and the reasons for the delay. Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir.
2003).
Applying these principles, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that the CO defendants and
Officer Dizdarevic recklessly failed to act with reasonable care in the face of a serious and,
importantly, obvious medical emergency. For one, plaintiff plausibly alleged that decedent had a
recorded history of mental illness, and his recent psychological deterioration was well-
documented. Compl. ¶¶ 53–56, 71, 74, 84, 89–95. The complaint also plausibly alleges that
decedent was observed experiencing a presumptive seizure, left without intervention for several
minutes, and later found unresponsive, yet no resuscitative measures were initiated by the
officers present. Id. ¶¶ 111, 115, 120–35.
As to Officer Dizdarevic, plaintiff alleges that, after personally observing decedent
experiencing a presumptive medical emergency, he failed to take any action to assist decedent for
approximately eight minutes (save for his trip to alert the medical unit). See Pl.’s Mem. at 7. A
delay in providing medical care may constitute deliberate indifference where it involves a life-
threatening or rapidly deteriorating condition and reflects a failure to act with reasonable care.
See Carpenter, 316 F.3d at 186; Case, 2017 WL 3701863, at *8. Here, plaintiff plausibly alleges
that decedent was experiencing a visible, acute medical emergency and that prompt intervention
was required.
Officer Dizdarevic not only had reason to understand that decedent was suffering from a
serious medical emergency requiring prompt attention, but the surrounding circumstances also
support the inference that he was actually aware of the urgency of decedent’s condition. Indeed,
upon observing decedent seizing, Officer Dizdarevic immediately proceeded to the medical unit
to report what he had just witnessed. Compl. ¶¶ 112–13. But after proceeding to the medical
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unit, Officer Dizdarevic returned to his desk without rendering assistance to decedent. Id. ¶¶
114–15. 	At this stage, the alleged delay—viewed in light of the severity and obviousness of the
condition—is sufficient to support an inference that Officer Dizdarevic “recklessly failed to act
with reasonable care to mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the [ ] detainee even though
[he] knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or safety.”
Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35.
As for the remaining correction officer defendants, plaintiff alleges that, upon discovering
decedent unresponsive and not breathing, the officers failed to initiate any resuscitative
measures. Compl. ¶¶ 120–35. Unlike cases involving delayed or disputed treatment, the alleged
conduct here involves a complete failure to act in the face of a readily apparent medical
emergency. At the pleadings stage, plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient to support an inference
that the CO defendants knew or should have known that decedent faced an excessive risk to his
health and failed to take reasonable steps to mitigate that risk. See McRaven v. Sanders, 577 F.3d
974, 983 (8th Cir. 2009) (affirming denial of qualified immunity to officer who was trained in
CPR but failed to perform it on a pre-trial detainee manifestly in need of it); Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t
of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1083 (9th Cir. 2013) (reversing award of summary judgment
where officers “did not fail to provide CPR because they were busy with other tasks . . .
[i]nstead, they allegedly took no life saving action while waiting for [medical staff] to arrive.”).2
Indeed, while it is plausible to infer that the CO defendants were aware of a substantial
risk to decedent’s health, the Court need not resort to inference on this knowledge element. As
plaintiff notes, the CO defendants were all required to be trained in CPR and first aid. See Pl.’s
2 Although McRaven and Lemire involved Eighth Amendment claims, rather than claims arising under the
Fourteenth Amendment, their reasoning applies here. See Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29 (explaining that “[a] detainee’s
rights are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner.”) (quoting City of
Revere, 463 U.S. at 244) (internal quotations omitted).
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Mem. at 13; 9 N.Y.C.R.R. §§ 6018.2(a)–(b); N.Y. Exec. Law § 837-a(9).3 Further, OCCF staff
were aware of decedent’s “daily use of K2 and history of K2 withdrawal.” Compl. ¶ 210.
Defendants, for their part, assert that they did not seek or render immediate aid because
they believed decedent was feigning a medical emergency to avoid a court appearance scheduled
for later that day. See Compl. ¶¶ 211–14. At this stage, however, that asserted belief does not
defeat plaintiff’s claim. Even assuming defendants initially questioned the legitimacy of
decedent’s condition, an officer may not disregard an objectively serious medical need based on
a subjective assumption that the detainee is exaggerating or feigning symptoms. See Farmer,
511 U.S. at 842 (officials may not avoid liability by declining to verify a risk they strongly
suspect to exist); Jackson, 118 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (characterizing defendant’s “attempt to justify
her actions by claiming that [plaintiff] was feigning injury to gain attention” as “troubling” when
plaintiff “exhibited numerous symptoms and physical manifestations of a serious medical
condition”). Where, as alleged here, a detainee exhibited signs of a life-threatening medical
emergency, a belief that the detainee was “playing possum,” Compl. ¶ 214, does not preclude a
finding of deliberate indifference at the pleading stage.
Further, defendants’ contention that they acted reasonably by summoning medical
assistance does not, at this stage, foreclose liability where plaintiff alleges that no immediate
steps were taken to address an urgent and deteriorating condition. Cf. Jackson, 118 F. Supp. 2d
at 291 (“[Defendants] cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for their actions merely by
passing the blame to . . . [medical staff]. If they thought that [the plaintiff] was in medical
distress, they should have acted upon that perception.”).
3 N.Y. State Division of Criminal Justice Services, “Basic Course for Correction Officers Administrator’s Guide,”
(May 2016),
https://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/ops/docs/training/pubs/basicpeace/basiccoursecorrectionsofficersadminguide.pd
f.
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Lastly, given the alleged facts, defendants’ reliance on Fessette v. Schroyer, 2015 WL
7283189 (N.D.N.Y. 2015), is misplaced. See Dkt. No. 34 (“Defs.’ Reply Mem.”) at 4–5. That
case involved a “seventeen hour delay” in rendering pain medication to an inmate after the
inmate fell and injured himself in the shower. See Fessette, 2015 WL 7283189, at *3. As the
Fessette court noted, “[i]f officials . . . ignore[] a ‘life threatening and fast-degenerating’
condition, the delay may constitute deliberate indifference.” Id. (citing Demata v. N.Y. State
Corr. Dep’t of Health Servs., 198 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Unlike the non-life-threatening injury at issue in Fessette, plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that decedent was experiencing an acute medical emergency—namely, a seizure followed by
unresponsiveness and cessation of breathing—conditions that plainly qualify as life-threatening
and rapidly deteriorating. Accordingly, the alleged delay in initiating life-saving measures falls
squarely within the category of conduct that courts have recognized as potentially constituting
deliberate indifference.
Taken together, plaintiff’s allegations plausibly support the conclusion that the CO
defendants and Officer Dizdarevic were equipped to recognize a medical emergency—including
an unresponsive detainee—and understood the need for prompt intervention, including the
initiation of CPR. See McRaven, 577 F.3d at 983 (“An officer trained in CPR, who fails to
perform it on a prisoner manifestly in need of such assistance, is liable under § 1983 for
deliberate indifference.”). Accordingly, the Court concludes that plaintiff has adequately stated a
claim for deliberate indifference to medical needs against the CO defendants and Officer
Dizdarevic.
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B. 	Monell Liability (Count III)
Plaintiff advances two theories of municipal liability against the County: “(1) [the
County’s] widespread practice or custom of failing to provide immediate emergency medical
treatment in response to detainees’ medical emergencies; and (2) [the County’s] deliberate
indifference to its failure to train COs and medical staff to immediately administer CPR to
individuals who are unresponsive[.]” Pl.’s Mem. at 21; Compl. ¶ 262.
Municipalities cannot be held vicariously liable for the acts of their employees under 42
U.S.C. § 1983; rather, municipalities may be held liable only when “execution of a government’s
policy or custom” causes a constitutional violation. Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, to
state a claim for municipal liability, a plaintiff must plausibly allege “(1) an official policy or
custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.”
Torraco v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 615 F.3d 129, 140 (2d Cir. 2010) (citations omitted); see id.
at 694–95.
To prevail on a Monell claim, a plaintiff must also show “a direct causal link between a
municipal policy or custom and the alleged constitutional deprivation.” City of Canton v. Harris,
489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). Thus, a municipality is not liable “for an injury inflicted solely by its
employees or agents;” rather, liability attaches only when the municipality itself, through the
execution of its policies or customs, is the “moving force” behind the constitutional violation.
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. This requirement ensures that a plaintiff identifies conduct attributable
to the municipality itself, rather than merely relying on the actions of individual employees. See
Chamberlain v. City of White Plains, 986 F. Supp. 2d 363, 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
A plaintiff may demonstrate the existence of a municipal “policy or custom” in several
ways, including by alleging: (1) a formally adopted policy; (2) actions taken by government
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officials responsible for establishing the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation
in question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although not expressly authorized,
constitutes a custom or usage of which a supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4)
a failure to train or supervise subordinates that amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of
those who come into contact with municipal employees. See, e.g., Davis v. City of New York,
2018 WL 10070540, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2018).
The County contends that plaintiff’s Monell claim must be dismissed because the
complaint “does not plausibly allege that the County maintained an official policy, custom, or
practice that caused the alleged constitutional violations” since the “sole prior incident cited by
the plaintiff is insufficient to establish a widespread and persistent custom” and, further, that
“plaintiff’s conclusory allegations of deliberate indifference by County policymakers lack factual
support.” Defs.’ Mem. at 19–20.
These arguments are rejected. At the pleadings stage, a Monell claim will survive a
motion to dismiss if a plaintiff “make[s] factual allegations that support a plausible inference that
the constitutional violation took place pursuant to either a formal course of action officially
promulgated by the municipality’s governing authority or the act of a person with policy making
authority for the municipality.” Acosta v. City of New York, 2012 WL 1506954, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 26, 2012) (quoting Missel v. Cnty. of Monroe, 351 F. App’x 543, 545 (2d Cir. 2009)
(summary order)). “The policy or custom need not be memorialized in a specific rule or
regulation,” Kern v. City of Rochester, 93 F.3d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1996), and may be “reflected in
either action or inaction,” Cash v. Cnty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 341–42 (2d Cir. 2011).
Measured against this general legal standard, plaintiff’s factual allegations are sufficient
to plausibly plead a Monell claim against the County.
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To be sure, “isolated acts [] by non-policymaking municipal employees are generally not
sufficient to demonstrate a municipal custom, policy, or usage that would justify municipal
liability,” but “such acts would justify liability of the municipality if, for example, they were
done pursuant to municipal policy, or were sufficiently widespread and persistent to support a
finding that they constituted a custom, policy, or usage of which supervisory authorities must
have been aware, or if a municipal custom, policy, or usage would be inferred from evidence of
deliberate indifference of supervisory officials to such abuses.” Jones v. Town of East Haven,
691 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing Villante v. Dep’t of Corr., 786 F.2d 516, 519 (2d Cir.
1986)).
Here, plaintiff alleges a pattern of similar conduct—namely, at least one other recent
instance involving alleged failures by OCCF staff to provide timely and adequate emergency
medical care to a detainee experiencing a serious medical event involving a suspected drug
overdose. See Compl. ¶¶ 242–50. The complaint also references post-incident findings by the
COC Medical Review Board documenting “significant issues” in the emergency response to
decedent’s medical crisis, including delays in initiating resuscitation, activating EMS, and
administering Narcan, as well as concerns that staff were unprepared to respond to an
unresponsive individual. See Compl. ¶¶ 232–39. At the motion to dismiss stage, these
allegations, taken together, support a plausible inference that the challenged conduct was not
merely isolated or aberrational, but instead reflective of a recurring practice of delayed or
inadequate responses to medical emergencies at OCCF.
Defendants attempt to discount the Burnett incident because it has not resulted in an
“adjudicated constitutional violation.” See Defs.’ Reply Mem. at 6. This argument
misunderstands the pleading standard for a Monell claim. There is no requirement that
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comparator incidents be reduced to judgment or even fully litigated. Courts may consider
unadjudicated prior incidents, complaints, internal investigations, and other evidence of similar
conduct at the pleading stage. See, e.g., Outlaw v. City of Hartford, 884 F.3d 351, 380 (2d Cir.
2018) (“Monell liability, by its nature, will often turn on evidence concerning victims other than
the plaintiffs and alleged misfeasors other than the individual defendants”); Kern, 93 F.3d at 44
(noting that “persistent and widespread” practices of city officials may constitute a municipal
custom) (quoting Sorlucco v. New York City Police Dep’t, 971 F.2d 864, 870–71 (2d Cir. 1992));
Colon v. City of Rochester, 419 F.Supp.3d 586, 605 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) (“The question on a motion
to dismiss is whether, assuming the truth of the plaintiffs’ factual allegations, those past incidents
give rise to a plausible claim of deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality to the
types of constitutional violations alleged in the case before the court.”).
The cases defendants cite in support of their argument stand for a narrower proposition,
namely, that a plaintiff cannot establish Monell liability merely by citing to a handful of filed
lawsuits, and that speculative or conclusory allegations of a “policy” are insufficient. See Roman
v. City of Mount Vernon, 2022 WL 2819459, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2022) (“[C]ourts in this
district have consistently held that ‘citations to lawsuits, even if they did involve comparable
conduct, do not alone establish a custom or practice that is widespread and persistent,
particularly if the lawsuits did not result in an adjudication of liability.’” (citing Bethune v.
Westchester County, 2020 WL 1032508, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2020)) (emphasis added). Here,
plaintiff offers more than a bare recitation of case citations; the complaint alleges a specific,
recent, and factually developed prior incident involving OCCF’s alleged failure to respond to a
detainee’s overdose emergency, as well as contemporaneous findings by the COC Medical
Review Board with respect to decedent’s death. Whether those incidents ultimately give rise to
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liability is a merits question, and their relevance to plausibility is not contingent on a prior
judicial finding of constitutional wrongdoing. In sum, defendants’ citation to cases emphasizing
the absence of prior Monell liability is beside the point—those decisions do not stand for the
proposition that only adjudicated constitutional violations count as predicate “incidents” for
pattern purposes.
The same pattern of alleged conduct also supports plaintiff’s failure-to-train theory. A
municipality’s failure to train its employees may constitute a policy or custom where “in light of
the duties assigned to specific officers or employees the need for more or different training is so
obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights, that the
policymakers . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent.” City of Canton,
489 U.S. at 390. Plaintiffs may satisfy this standard, at the pleading stage, by alleging facts
suggesting “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained [municipal] employees.”
Simms v. City of New York, 480 F. App’x 627, 630 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Connick v. Thompson,
563 U.S. 51, 62 (2011)). While the Court need not specify which of plaintiff’s two theories of
liability (if either of them) might best support a Monell claim, the alleged failure to train
correction officers to respond to an unresponsive detainee—particularly where the need for
immediate action is self-evident—also supports a reasonable inference that the County’s training
program was deficient and that this deficiency was a moving force behind the constitutional
violation.
“[W]hen [county] policymakers are on actual or constructive notice that a particular
omission in their training program causes [county] employees to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights, the [County] may be deemed deliberately indifferent if the policymakers choose to retain
that program[.]” Simms, 480 F. App’x at 630 (quoting Connick, 563 U.S. at 62). Plaintiff alleges
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that correction officers failed to initiate basic life-saving measures in response to an obvious
medical emergency, and that similar failures have occurred in other instances, permitting the
inference that the County was on notice of deficiencies in its training yet failed to take corrective
action.
At the pleading stage, plaintiff is not required to prove the existence of such a policy or
custom, but only to allege facts that render its existence plausible. Here, the alleged pattern of
similar incidents is sufficient to nudge plaintiff’s Monell claim “across the line from conceivable
to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Accordingly, plaintiff has adequately alleged the
existence of a municipal custom or practice against the County.
C. 	Wrongful Death Claim (Count VI)
Plaintiff alleges that “[a]s a direct and proximate result of [d]efendants’ acts and
omissions . . ., the statutory distributees of [decedent’s] estate sustained pecuniary and non-
economic loss resulting from the loss of [decedent’s] love, comfort, society, attention, services,
income, support, and life,” Compl. ¶ 290, and, further, that “[decedent] suffered physical injury,
severe pain and suffering, emotional distress, monetary damages, and death.” Id. ¶ 291.
Under New York law, a wrongful death claim requires a plaintiff to show: (1) the death of
a human being; (2) a wrongful act, neglect, or default of the defendant that caused the death; (3)
the survival of distributees who suffered pecuniary loss as a result of the death; and (4) the
appointment of a personal representative of the decedent’s estate. See Chong v. N.Y.C. Transit
Auth., 83 A.D.2d 546, 547 (2d Dep’t 1981). Pecuniary injuries may include “loss of support,
voluntary assistance, possible inheritance, [and] medical and funeral expenses incidental to
death.” Regan v Long Island R.R. Co., 128 A.D.2d 511, 513 (2d Dep’t 1987).
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In New York, wrongful death is a statutory cause of action, and recovery is limited to
“fair compensation for the pecuniary injuries resulting from the decedent’s death” to the
distributees. McKee v. Colt Elecs. Co., 849 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). Such
damages do not include grief or loss of society, though they may encompass losses such as
financial support and parental guidance. Id. And, under New York Law, wrongful death is a
statutory cause of action that permits recovery only where the decedent could have maintained an
action for the underlying wrongful conduct had he or she lived. See Hernandez v. N.Y.C. Health
& Hosps. Corp., 78 N.Y.2d 687, 693 (N.Y. 1991).
By contrast, where a plaintiff seeks recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for constitutional
violations resulting in death, the limitations imposed by New York’s wrongful death statute do
not necessarily apply. See McFadden v. Sanchez, 710 F.2d 907, 911 (2d Cir. 1983); Banks ex rel.
Banks v. Yokemick, 177 F. Supp. 2d 239, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). Because § 1983 is intended to
compensate for the deprivation of constitutional rights, available damages are determined by
federal common-law principles and may extend beyond strictly pecuniary losses. See Townes v.
City of N.Y., 176 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir. 1999).
To the extent defendants challenge the wrongful death claim on procedural grounds,
including alleged non-compliance with notice-of-claim requirements, the Court notes that
plaintiff has withdrawn his state-law negligence and medical malpractice claims and maintains
that he timely served a notice of claim with respect to the wrongful death cause of action. Dkt.
No. 30; Pl.’s Mem. at 6–7; Dkt. No. 33-1, Bourland Decl. Ex. A. Although it seems likely that
this cause of action is only properly asserted against the non-moving defendants (against whom
plaintiff’s primary state-law tort claims remain), it may be the case that this wrongful death claim
has some role to play in plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against the moving defendants.
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Because the complaint does not clearly delineate whether count VI is brought solely
pursuant to New York law or is intended to overlap with plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, and because
the available theories of recovery and the proper defendants on this count may depend on which
other claims survive, the Court declines to resolve these questions at this stage. Accordingly,
defendants’ motion to dismiss count VI of the complaint is denied without prejudice to renewal.
Following the close of discovery or at such earlier time as the court may direct the parties are
invited to address the scope and viability of the wrongful death claim—including the interplay
between New York’s wrongful death statute and plaintiff’s § 1983 claims—in any subsequent
dispositive motion.
V. 	CONCLUSION
In sum, following the stipulation at Dkt. No. 30, plaintiff’s remaining claims are: (1)
Count I, alleging Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against defendants
Johnson, Hubbel, Goodwin, Dizdarevic, Chapman, Bray, and Silipo; (2) Count II, alleging
Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference claims against defendants Johnson, Dubina, and
Manno; (3) Count III, alleging a Monell claim against defendant Oneida County; (4) Count IV,
alleging common law negligence claims against the medical staff defendants, NYCCSMS, and
the Trust; (5) Count V, alleging medical malpractice claims against the medical staff defendants,
NYCCSMS, and the Trust; and (6) Count VI, alleging wrongful death claims against defendants
Johnson, Hubbel, Goodwin, Dizdarevic, Chapman, Bray, and Silipo.
The medical staff defendants, NYCCSMS, and the Trust have answered the complaint,
while the County and CO defendants moved to dismiss Counts I, III, and VI as asserted against
them. Because the motion to dismiss is denied in its entirety, those claims shall proceed to
discovery, and the County and CO defendants will be directed to answer the complaint.
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Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. 	Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 15) is DENIED;
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion and set an answer
deadline accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 11, 2026
Utica, New York.
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