Fraccola v. DelConte et al

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
ALBERT G. FRACCOLA, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs. 	6:25-cv-00034
(MAD/TWD)
HON. SCOTT J. DELCONTE;
HON. STEPHEN K. LINDLEY;
HON. MARK A. MONTOUR;
HON. E. JEANNETTE OGDEN;
HON. DONALD A. GREENWOOD;
1ST CHOICE REALTY, INC.;
GETNICK LIVINGSTON ATKINSON
GIGLIOTTI & PRIORE, LLP; and
ESTATE OF PHYLLIS FRACCOLA
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
ALBERT G. FRACCOLA, JR.
14 Wadsworth Road
New Hartford, New York 13413
Plaintiff pro se
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK 	BRITTANY M. HANER, ESQ.
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Defendants DelConte,
Lindley, Montour, Ogden, and Greenwood
GETNICK LIVINGSTON ATKINSON 	JEFFERY T. LOTTERMOSER, JR.,
& PRIORE, LLP 	ESQ.
258 Genesee Street, Suite 401
Utica, New York 13502
Attorneys for Defendant Getnick Livingston
Atkinson Gigliotti & Priore, LLP
OFFICE OF PETER M. HOBAICA, LLC 	PETER M. HOBAICA, ESQ.
2045 Genesee Street
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Utica, New York 13501
Attorneys for Defendant Estate of Phyllis Fraccola
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff, Albert G. Fraccola, Jr., commenced this action pro se on January 8, 2025. Dkt.
No. 1. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges that five New York state judges ("Judicial Defendants")
violated his constitutional rights by issuing unfavorable rulings against him. See id. at ¶¶ 49-59.
Specifically, Plaintiff brings his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First,
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Id. at ¶ 2. The complaint seeks injunctive and
declaratory relief, as well as millions of dollars in compensatory and punitive damages. Id. at ¶¶
60-63. There are three other non-judicial Defendants named in the complaint: 1st Choice Realty,
Inc.; the law firm of Getnick Livingston Atkinson Gigliotti & Priore, LLC; and the Estate of
Phyllis Fraccola. Dkt. No. 1.
The Estate of Phyllis Fraccola filed a verified answer on March 1, 2025, which suffered
from a filing deficiency that counsel remedied. Dkt. Nos. 15, 23. Likewise, the Getnick law firm
filed an answer on March 5, 2025, which also suffered from a filing deficiency that was quickly
addressed. Dkt. Nos. 18, 21-22. Meanwhile, 1st Choice Realty does not appear to be represented
by counsel and has not filed anything in this action.1
Judicial Defendants did not file an answer. Instead, they filed a motion to dismiss on May
6, 2025, for failure to state a claim. Dkt. No. 30. Plaintiff filed a response on June 16, 2025, Dkt.
1 The record shows that a process server served a summons upon a person named Albert Fraccola,
Jr., as president of Defendant 1st Choice Realty, at Plaintiff's home address. Dkt. Nos. 2-5, 14.
The Court is uncertain whether Plaintiff essentially served the summons upon himself, or whether
someone with the same name accepted the summons on behalf of Defendant 1st Choice Realty.
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No. 42, and Judicial Defendants filed a reply on June 26, 2025, Dkt. No. 43. Without
authorization from the Court, Plaintiff filed an additional response on July 9, 2025. Dkt. No. 45.
Judicial Defendants' motion to dismiss is now before the Court.
II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff's claims stem from his role as a shareholder of 1st Choice Realty, Inc. ("the
Business"), a now-defunct corporation. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 6-8. He and an individual named Phyllis
Fraccola were each fifty-percent shareholders until January 23, 2016, when Phyllis Fraccola
passed away. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff claims that he and Phyllis Fraccola agreed to dissolve the
Business in 2002, id. at ¶ 7, which necessitated a winding up of the Business, id. at ¶ 8. However,
Plaintiff claims he was prevented from winding up the Business because Phyllis Fraccola refused
to meet with him. Id. at ¶ 9.
In 2003, Plaintiff took legal action against Phyllis Fraccola in New York State Supreme
Court, Oneida County. Id. at ¶¶ 9-10. There, Justice John W. Grow (who is not a defendant in
this action)2 issued an order requiring both shareholders to take certain actions in furtherance of
winding up the business. Id. at ¶ 12; see also id. at 30-31. Plaintiff alleges that Phyllis Fraccola
did not comply, and in 2006, she and her attorneys (from the Defendant law firm) prepared two
"spurious, fabricated, fake, forged[,] and false instrument deeds." Id. at ¶ 16; see also id. at 33-
36, 38-42. According to Plaintiff, the first forged deed purported to convey a 1st Choice Realty-
owned property in Marcy, New York for Phyllis Fraccola's "permanent personal use." Id. at ¶ 17.
Likewise, Plaintiff claims the second forged deed conveyed a 1st Choice Realty-owned property
2 The complaint contains allegations that Justice Grow lacked jurisdiction to issue a separate order
in 2005. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 39, 41. The complaint also alleges that Justice Grow engaged in
impermissible ex parte communications with an attorney in that matter. Id. at ¶ 42. However,
neither Justice Grow nor the attorney are defendants in this case, and these allegations appear
wholly unrelated to the claims that Judicial Defendants now seek to dismiss.
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in Troy, New York for the same purpose. Id. In August 2006, Phyllis Fraccola and her lawyers
allegedly filed the fraudulent deeds with the county clerks in Oneida County and Rensselaer
County, respectively. Id. at ¶ 19; see also id. at 36, 42. As a result, Plaintiff alleges that he has
spent nearly two decades bringing "numerous Court actions to recover for the millions of dollars
criminally purloined from" him and from the Business. Id. at ¶ 21.
In 2022, Plaintiff sued Defendants 1st Choice Realty, Getnick law firm, and Estate of
Phyllis Fraccola in New York State Supreme Court, Oneida County. Id. at ¶¶ 27-28; see also
Fraccola v. 1st Choice Realty, No. CA2022-002865, 2023 WL 11014946 (Sup. Ct. Oneida Cnty.
Apr. 6, 2023). According to Plaintiff, his objective was to finally wind up the Business, which he
characterizes as "in dissolution since January 7, 2004." Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 27-28. As the presiding
Supreme Court justice, Judicial Defendant Scott DelConte (now a justice of the New York State
Supreme Court Appellate Division, Fourth Department) dismissed Plaintiff's complaint with
prejudice in 2023. Id. at ¶ 35; see Fraccola, 2023 WL 11014946, at *2-3. In the decision,
Judicial Defendant DelConte admonished Plaintiff for repeatedly filing "frivolous, vexatious[,]
and meritless motions" and "unabashedly disregard[ing] the prior orders" of other judges.
Fraccola, 2023 WL 11014946, at *1-2. Plaintiff appealed the 2023 DelConte decision to the
Fourth Department, which he tangentially mentions in his complaint. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 28;
Fraccola v. 1st Choice Realty, Inc., 224 A.D.3d 1227 (4th Dep't 2024). There, a panel comprised
of Judicial Defendants Stephen Lindley, Mark Montour, E. Jeannette Ogden, and Donald
Greenwood "unanimously affirmed" the decision. Fraccola, 224 A.D.3d at 1227.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alludes to his unsuccessful prior legal pursuits with minimal
specificity, arguing that "past and present lower Court Judges, Appellate Court Judges with
opposing attorneys, in concert or separately for two (2) decades, crushed the dissolution process
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for 1st Choice Realty . . . ." Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 33. In light of those repeated unfavorable rulings,
Plaintiff now alleges that Judicial Defendant DelConte's 2023 order represents "an untrustworthy
fabricated narrative to cover-up the two (2) Getnick law firm and then Phyllis Fraccola's alleged
criminal forged and fake deeds." Id. at ¶ 38. Ultimately, Plaintiff contends that Judicial
Defendants "orchestrated the deprivation of Plaintiff's Civil Rights and Civil Liberties" by
"seiz[ing] Plaintiff's property" without a jury trial and depriving him of the opportunity to
"present evidence for his grievances." Id. at ¶ 54.
In support of this argument, Plaintiff claims that Judicial Defendants acted as
individuals—rather than in their judicial roles—to "maliciously, intentionally[,] selectively[,] and
unfairly deprive[] [him of] his Constitutional rights to settle his grievances by Due Process and
equal protection of the law by Jury Trial." Id. at ¶¶ 52, 58. Although Plaintiff refers to "ten (10)
causes of action" in his complaint, he does not expressly identify any causes of action by number.
Id. at ¶ 61. Broadly, he appears to seek extensive monetary damages, vacatur of prior unfavorable
state court decisions, a declaration that Defendants violated his constitutional rights, a declaration
that the Marcy and Troy deeds are invalid, and an injunction requiring him to complete the
winding up process for 1st Choice Realty. See id. at ¶¶ 60-63.
III. DISCUSSION
A. 	Standard of Review
1. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Rule 12(b)(1)
As a threshold matter, "a federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case
without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter
jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction)." 	Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l
Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523
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U.S. 83, 93-102 (1998)); see Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 700-01
(2d Cir. 2000) ("If subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action must be dismissed" (citation
omitted)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) provides subject matter jurisdiction as a
ground for a party's motion to dismiss. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A court may also raise the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte at any time. Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Tr. Co., 211
F.3d at 700. "A case is properly dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule
12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate it."
Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).
2. 	Dismissal for Failure to State a Claim: Rule 12(b)(6)
If the Court is satisfied that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case, a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the
"legal sufficiency" of the pleader's claim for relief. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12
(2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Although a court's review of a motion to dismiss is generally
limited to the facts presented in the pleading, courts may still consider documents attached to the
pleading as an exhibit or incorporated by reference into the pleading. See Mangiafico v.
Blumenthal, 471 F.3d 391, 398 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2002)). A court may also consider documents that are "integral" to the
pleading, even if they are not physically attached or incorporated by reference. See id. (quoting
Chambers, 282 F.3d at 152-53). Courts must accept as true all well-pleaded facts in the pleading
and draw all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor. See ATSI Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar
Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This presumption of truth, however,
does not extend to legal conclusions. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation
omitted).
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To survive a motion to dismiss, a party need only plead "a short and plain statement of the
claim," see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is
entitled to relief[,]'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). Under this standard,
the pleading's "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right of relief above the speculative
level," id. at 555 (citation omitted), and present claims that are "plausible on [their] face," id. at
570. "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than
a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation
omitted). A complaint that "pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability"
generally does not meet the pleading standard. See id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
However, complaints by pro se parties must receive greater deference than those filed by
attorneys. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). As such, Twombly and Iqbal
notwithstanding, this Court must continue to "construe [a pro se complaint] broadly, and interpret
[it] to raise the strongest arguments that [it] suggests." Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138, 146
(2d Cir. 2002). To that end, Plaintiff does not expressly state whether he is suing Judicial
Defendants in their official or individual capacities. Because that distinction is critical in civil
rights cases, and because the Court must liberally construe Plaintiff's pleadings to raise the
strongest possible arguments, both approaches are addressed.
B. 	Eleventh Amendment Immunity (Official Capacity)
As mentioned, if a federal court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a
claim, it must dismiss that claim. See Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(1). "The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars federal courts
from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over claims against a state or one of its agencies absent
their consent to such a suit or an express statutory waiver of immunity." Kilcher v. N.Y. State
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Police, No. 1:19-CV-00157, 2019 WL 2511154, *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 18, 2019) (citing Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 90-100 (1984)). When a plaintiff sues a state
official, Eleventh Amendment immunity depends on whether the suit is essentially against the
state itself. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 101. On that issue, this Court has
recognized immunity for state officers, including state court judges, "who are sued in their official
capacity . . . ." Jemzura v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 961 F. Supp. 406, 412 (N.D.N.Y. 1997); see
Samodovitz v. Troutman, — F. Supp. 3d —, No. 1:24-CV-1508, 2025 WL 2415632, *4-5
(N.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2025) (citing Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130, 135 (1964)) (holding that
the judges of the New York Court of Appeals are unquestionably "state actors under § 1983" and
therefore "immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity").
Importantly, this immunity is not absolute. The narrow Ex Parte Young exception is
sometimes available when a plaintiff sues a state officer in her official capacity for injunctive
relief and "challeng[es] the constitutionality of a state official's actions in enforcing state law . . .
." CSX Transp., Inc. v. N.Y. State Off. of Real Prop. Servs., 306 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing
Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 154 (1908)); see also Anghel v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 947 F.
Supp. 2d 284, 298 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (recognizing the same exception in suits for declaratory relief
against a state officer in her official capacity). To determine whether the exception applies, courts
"conduct a straightforward inquiry into whether the complaint alleges an ongoing violation of
federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective." CSX Transp., Inc., 306 F.3d
at 98 (quoting Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md., 535 U.S. 635, 645 (2002)). This
"does not include an analysis of the merits of the claim." Verizon Md., Inc., 535 U.S. at 646
(citing Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997)). However, Plaintiff
must still sufficiently plead "plausible and nonconclusory factual allegations" to support
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application of the exception. Kelsey v. Kessel, No. 24-1105, 2025 WL 1324213, *1 (2d Cir. May
7, 2025). Again, because Plaintiff is pro se, the Court construes his pleading liberally. Elmore v.
Harriman, No. 5:24-CV-186, 2025 WL 1682624, *4 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 2025).
1. 	Claims for Monetary Damages
As a threshold matter, New York has not consented to suit or statutorily waived sovereign
immunity. Samodovitz, 2025 WL 2415632, at *4 (citing Forjone v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 414
F. Supp. 3d 292, 300 (N.D.N.Y. 2019)). Additionally, the law is clear that state court judges are
eligible for Eleventh Amendment immunity from civil suits for money damages in their official
capacities. See, e.g., id. at *5; Aron v. Becker, 48 F. Supp. 3d 347, 366-68 (N.D.N.Y. 2014); see
also Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 366-67 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the New York State
Unified Court System is an arm of the state that is immune from suit under the Eleventh
Amendment). Furthermore, because the Ex Parte Young exception does not apply to claims for
monetary damages, the Court need not analyze the exception at this step. Thus, the Eleventh
Amendment immunizes Judicial Defendants from suit for monetary damages in their official
capacities, prevents the Court from exercising jurisdiction, and necessitates dismissal of those
claims.
2. 	Claims for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief
With the understanding that Judicial Defendants are eligible for immunity in their official
capacities, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief must fail unless the Ex Parte
Young exception applies. As explained, the exception is narrow. For the exception to apply,
Plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show that Judicial Defendants engaged in an ongoing
violation of federal law, and must request relief that is prospective in nature. See CSX Transp.,
Inc., 306 F.3d at 98.
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Even under the liberal construction required for pro se pleadings, Plaintiff's complaint
does not appear to allege that Judicial Defendants are engaged in an ongoing violation of federal
law, and most of his claims are retrospective, rather than prospective. For example, Plaintiff
claims that Judicial Defendants violated his constitutional rights by ruling against him and seeks
vacatur of prior state court decisions, a declaration that Judicial Defendants violated his
constitutional rights when they issued their unfavorable decisions, and a declaration that the
Marcy and Troy deeds are invalid. Furthermore, even if the Court construes Plaintiff's request for
an injunction requiring him to wind up the Business (or any of his other claims) as prospective,
his claims are not associated with any cognizable ongoing violation of federal law by Judicial
Defendants. Rather, the relief that Plaintiff seeks is connected to alleged past wrongdoings,
which cannot support application of the exception. See Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v.
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (stating that the Ex Parte Young exception "does
not permit judgments against state officers declaring that they violated federal law in the past"
(emphasis added)). Thus, the Ex Parte Young exception is unavailable, and Judicial Defendants
are immune in their official capacities from Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The Court accordingly dismisses those claims for lack of jurisdiction.
C. 	Judicial Immunity (Individual Capacity)
1. 	Claims for Monetary Damages
Although separate from Eleventh Amendment immunity, the doctrine of judicial immunity
also protects judges from suits for money damages based on actions taken pursuant to their
judicial role. See Aron, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 363. Where this immunity applies, it is absolute. Id.
(citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 225-26
(1988)). There are two situations where judicial immunity does not apply: (1) "when the judge
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takes action 'outside' his judicial capacity"; and (2) "when the judge takes action that, although
judicial in nature, is taken 'in absence of jurisdiction.'" Id. (quoting Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12).
Generally, "acts arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered
judicial in nature." Brady v. Ostrager, 834 Fed. Appx. 616, 618 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Bliven v.
Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009)). On the other hand, where a judge did engage in judicial
acts, immunity will be denied "where he (i) acts in the clear absence of all jurisdiction; and (ii)
knew or must have known that he was acting in such a manner." Id. (quoting Tucker v. Outwater,
118 F.3d 930, 936 (2d Cir. 1997)).
In a judicial immunity analysis, courts must "broadly" construe the scope of the defendant
judge's jurisdiction. Aron, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 363-64 (quoting Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349,
356 (1978)). Furthermore, a court must analyze the defendant judge's jurisdiction separately from
any alleged erroneous or malicious action. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 356-57. According to the
Supreme Court, "[a] judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in
error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability
only when he has acted in the 'clear absence of all jurisdiction.'" Id. (citation omitted).
Plaintiff argues that "denial of Constitutional and Civil Rights [is] absolutely . . . not a
Judicial function and conflicts with any definition of Judicial function . . . ." Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 49.
Plaintiff also alleges that Judicial Defendants acted outside the scope of their jurisdiction by
ruling according to "their own prejudices and goals." Id. at ¶ 52. However, Plaintiff fails to plead
any articulable facts showing that Judicial Defendants' personal prejudices motivated their
unfavorable rulings or that they otherwise acted as individuals, rather than as judges. He also
fails to plead any facts tending to show why the New York State Supreme Court and Appellate
Division would lack jurisdiction over Plaintiff's dispute with 1st Choice Realty, the Estate of
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Phyllis Fraccola, and the Getnick law firm. See N.Y. J UD . LAW § 140-b. His complaint is also
devoid of any facts that would support an inference that Judicial Defendants were doing anything
other than the quintessential function of their job: issuing decisions on matters of law.
Even after applying the most liberal construction possible, the Court rejects Plaintiff's
argument that Judicial Defendants acted as self-interested individuals—rather than as judges—
when they issued judicial decisions unfavorable to him. Furthermore, insofar as Plaintiff intended
to sue Judicial Defendants in their individual capacities for their official actions, judicial
immunity shields them from Plaintiff's claims for monetary damages. Immunity applies because
Judicial Defendants clearly acted within the scope of their judicial role, and because Plaintiff fails
to allege any specific facts—beyond his personal displeasure with their unfavorable rulings—to
show that Judicial Defendants flouted their jurisdiction.
2. 	Claims for Retrospective Declaratory Relief
As to Plaintiff's claims for retrospective declaratory relief, the Second Circuit has
recognized that judicial immunity protects judges from suits for declaratory relief based on past
conduct. See Shtrauch v. Dowd, 651 Fed. Appx. 72, 74 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that the plaintiff
was not "entitled to declaratory relief because he allege[d] only past conduct and [did] not seek to
prevent an ongoing or future violation of federal law") (citation omitted). As described, Plaintiff
bases his claims for declaratory relief on the past conduct of Judicial Defendants (by way of their
unfavorable rulings) and others (by way of the production and recording of the Marcy and Troy
deeds).3 Accordingly, Judicial Defendants are immune on these claims, even to the extent that
Plaintiff intended to sue them in their individual capacities.
3 Additionally, with respect to the deeds, Plaintiff only offers conclusory statements of their
invalidity. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 16-19. Thus, even if immunity and jurisdiction were not a
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3. 	Claim for Prospective Injunctive Relief
Turning to Plaintiff's claim for prospective injunctive relief, it is critical to note that
judicial immunity does not always protect judges against that type of relief. See Pulliam v. Allen,
466 U.S. 522, 536-37 (1984). "[S]uch relief is available against judicial officers only when 'a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.'" Sibley v. Watches, No.
24-855, 2025 WL 2448202, *2 (2d Cir. Aug. 26, 2025) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). Here,
because Plaintiff did not identify a declaratory decree that Judicial Defendants allegedly violated,
"nor did he establish that declaratory relief was unavailable[,]" judicial immunity applies,
shielding Judicial Defendants from liability in their individual capacities. Id. at *2 (citing
Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757, 761 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Hahn v. New York, 825 Fed. Appx.
53, 54-55 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming a New York State Supreme Court justice's immunity from a
claim for injunctive relief—even in his individual capacity—because the plaintiff did not allege "a
violation of a judicial decree or that declaratory relief was unavailable").
D. 	Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
In addition to the aforementioned jurisdictional doctrines, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prevents this Court from exercising jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims against all Defendants.
"The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars 'cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries
caused by state-court judgments rendered before the federal district court proceedings
commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Mann v. N.Y.
State Ct. of Appeals, No. 1:21-CV-49, 2021 WL 5040236, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2021) (quoting
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Four requirements
concern here, the complaint contains insufficient information for the Court to declare the deeds
invalid.
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must all be met for the doctrine to apply: (1) "the federal-court plaintiff must have lost in state
court"; (2) "the plaintiff must complain of injuries caused by a state-court judgment"; (3) "the
plaintiff must invite district court review and rejection of that judgment"; and (4) "the state-court
judgment must have been rendered before the district court proceedings commenced." Id.
(quoting Sykes v. Mel S. Harris & Assocs. LLC, 780 F.3d 70, 94 (2d Cir. 2015)). The Second
Circuit has further emphasized "that the second requirement – that the plaintiff complains of an
injury caused by a state-court judgment – is the core requirement from which the other Rooker-
Feldman requirements derive." Id. (quoting Sung Cho v. City of New York, 910 F.3d 639, 646 (2d
Cir. 2018)).
Here, it is clear that Plaintiff lost in state court, the at-issue state court judgments were
handed down before Plaintiff brought the present action, and Plaintiff is now inviting district
court review and rejection of the unfavorable judgments. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 28, 33, 35, 60; see also
Fraccola, 2023 WL 11014946, aff'd, 224 A.D.3d 1227. As to the second element, the complaint
makes clear that Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the state court judgments. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 1
at ¶¶ 36 (referring to Judicial Defendant DelConte's 2023 order as "[a] profound deprivation of
[Plaintiff's] Civil Rights and Civil Liberties when taking of Plaintiff's Life, Liberty and seizure of
his property lacking a Constitutional Jury Trial with due process of law"), 51 (accusing Judicial
Defendants of "act[ing] against and violat[ing] established statutory and Constitutional rights of
Plaintiff . . . "), 53 (stating that "the New York State Corrupt Judges . . . knew or had to know, or
reasonably knew, that their actions, taken within the sphere of official responsibility, would
violate" Plaintiff's constitutional rights). Accordingly, all four Rooker-Feldman requirements are
met, and dismissal of the complaint is warranted on this alternative ground with respect to all
Defendants.
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Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case, it does not opine on
the merits of Plaintiff's claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the
applicable law, and for the reasons set forth above, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Judicial Defendants' motion to dismiss4 (Dkt. No. 30) is GRANTED; and
the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in all Defendants' favor and
close this case; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 19, 2025
Albany, New York
4 The Court recognizes that Defendants 1st Choice Realty, Inc.; Getnick law firm; and Estate of
Phyllis Fraccola have not moved to dismiss. However, because the Court may raise the issue of
subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, it dismisses Plaintiff's claims against those Defendants due
to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Moreover, none of those Defendants are state actors and,
therefore, were not acting under color of state law.
Case 6:25-cv-00034-MAD-TWD Document 49 Filed 11/19/25 Page 15 of 15