Smith v. William George Agency et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
BISHME SMITH,
Plaintiff,
5:26-CV-5
v. 	(MAD/DJS)
WILLIAM GEORGE AGENCY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
BISHME SMITH
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Syracuse, NY 13261
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
The Clerk has forwarded for review an Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff.
Dkt. No. 18, Am. Compl. The filing fee in this action has not been paid, but Plaintiff has
filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2. That Motion has been granted.
Dkt. No. 13. 	The matter has been referred to the undersigned for an initial review
pursuant to L.R. 72.3.
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I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint alleges that, on October 16, 2025, a Family Court entered
an order (the “Family Court Order”) placing Plaintiff’s minor child in the care and
custody of Defendant William George Agency (“Defendant Agency”). Am. Compl. at p.
2. 	The Amended Complaint further alleges that the Family Court Order “did not
condition Plaintiff’s visitation on the consent or approval of the child’s mother,”
Defendant Yolanda King (“Defendant King”), “nor did it authorize monitored or
supervised visitation.” Id.
The Amended Complaint asserts that, from approximately December 18, 2025
through early January 2026, Plaintiff “attempted to arrange visitation” with his minor son,
but Defendants Ian Evans, an employee at Defendant Agency, and Jason Newman, a
caseworker for the Office of Children and Family Services, delayed Plaintiff’s visitation
with his son by “redirect[ing] Plaintiff back and forth, each claiming that the other was
responsible for scheduling visits,” and insisting that Plaintiff needed the consent of
Defendant King. Id. at pp. 2-3.
The Amended Complaint also alleges that, while Plaintiff was able to schedule a
visit with his son for on or about January 14, 2026, when he arrived at the Defendant
Agency, he was met by Defendant Abrams, an employee of the Defendant Agency, who
thereafter observed Plaintiff’s visitation with his minor son. Id. at pp. 3-4. The Amended
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Complaint notes that, by comparison, when Defendant King visits the minor child, she
does so in a different room and is not supervised by Defendant Abrams. Id.
II. CAUSES OF ACTION ASSERTED IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
The Amended Complaint contains eleven causes of action. 	Id. at pp. 5-8. 	The
first, second, and fifth causes of action assert violations of the First Amendment’s right
to familial association and the Fourteenth Amendment’s right to substantive and
procedural due process based on Defendants’ alleged interference with Plaintiff’s right to
visitation in violation of the Family Court Order. Id. at pp. 5-7. The third cause of action
asserts an additional constitutional violation, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s
right to equal protection, based on Defendants allegedly permitting Defendant King
unmonitored visitation while supervising Plaintiff’s visitation and hosting Plaintiff’s
visitation in a different room. Id. at pp. 4 & 6.
The sixth cause of action asserts a violation of Family Court Act § 1030(a) based
on Defendants allegedly denying Plaintiff reasonable and regularly scheduled visitation.
Id. at p. 7. 	The seventh cause of action seeks contempt of court based on Defendants’
alleged failure to comply with the Family Court Order. Id.
The 	fourth 	cause 	of 	action 	asserts 	a 	conspiracy 	entered 	into 	between 	the
Defendants to obstruct Plaintiff’s visitation rights. 	Id. at pp. 6-7. 	Similarly, the ninth
cause of action asserts Monell liability against Defendant Agency based on its alleged
policy of “obstructing fathers’ visitation . . . and misrepresenting court authority.” Id. at
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p. 8. The tenth cause of action asserts that Defendant King acted jointly with state actors
to deprive Plaintiff of constitutional rights. Id.
The eighth cause of action asserts a violation of the state-created danger doctrine
and the eleventh cause of action asserts a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress based on the harm Plaintiff alleges resulted from the disruption to the parent-child
relationship. 	Id. 	Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as
declaratory and injunctive relief. 	Id. at pp. 8-11. 	With regard to the declaratory relief
sought by Plaintiff, Plaintiff asks the Court to issue a declaration that he has a right to
visitation with his child, that Defendants violated that right, and that the Family Court
Order did not condition his visitation with his minor child on the consent of Defendant
King or the imposition of monitoring. Id. at p. 9.
III. GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed in forma
pauperis, “(2) . . . the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that
– . . . (B) the action . . . (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which
relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune
from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).1
1 To determine whether an action is frivolous, a court must look to see whether the complaint “lacks an arguable
basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989).
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In reviewing a pro se complaint, the court has a duty to show liberality toward pro
se litigants, see Nance v. Kelly, 912 F.2d 605, 606 (2d Cir. 1990) (per curiam), and should
exercise “extreme caution . . . in ordering sua sponte dismissal of a pro se complaint
before the adverse party has been served and both parties (but particularly the plaintiff)
have had an opportunity to respond,” Anderson v. Coughlin, 700 F.2d 37, 41 (2d Cir.
1983) (internal citations omitted). 	Therefore, a court should not dismiss a complaint if
the plaintiff has stated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 	“A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Although a court should construe the factual allegations in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained
in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” 	Id. 	“Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”
Id. (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged - but it has not show[n] - that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Id.
at 679 (quoting FED . R. CIV . P. 8(a)(2)). Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”
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Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
Thus, 	a 	pleading 	that 	only 	“tenders 	naked 	assertions 	devoid 	of 	further 	factual
enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
IV. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to the domestic relations abstention doctrine, “a federal court presented
with matrimonial issues or issues on the verge of being matrimonial in nature should
abstain from exercising jurisdiction so long as there is no obstacle to their full and fair
determination in state courts.” Zappin v. Comfort, 2024 WL 5001624, at *2 (2d Cir. Dec.
6, 2024) (quotation, internal quotation marks, citations, and alterations omitted). 	The
doctrine is utilized in “both federal-question and diversity cases involving domestic
relations disputes.” Id. (quotation and internal quotation marks omitted).
A plaintiff seeking to avoid the strong policy in favor of abstention bears the
burden of showing that “bad faith, harassment, or any other unusual circumstances that
would call for equitable relief” provide an exception such that the federal court should
intervene in the state court proceeding. Diamond D Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d
191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002).
The Second Circuit has repeatedly applied the domestic relations abstention
doctrine to uphold the dismissal of actions brought by parents claiming that they were
deprived of custody and visitation rights with their children. 	See, e.g., Cleary v.
MacVicar, 813 F. App’x 12 (2d Cir. 2020). Dismissal in such cases is without prejudice
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for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 	See, e.g., Phillips v. Schenectady Child Support
Unite, 2025 WL 895035, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Phillips v. Schenectady Cnty. Child Support Unit, 2025 WL 1191320
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2025), appeal dismissed (Sept. 18, 2025).
Here, Plaintiff has asserted that Defendants violated his rights to a relationship and
visitation with his son through their constitutional and statutory violations. See generally
Compl. 	Each of Plaintiff’s claims likely turns on what the Family Court Order states.
See supra Section II. 	Notably, Plaintiff does not challenge the constitutionality of the
Family Court Order, but rather his claims center around alleged breaches of and
interference with the Family Court Order by the Defendants over which this Court should
not exercise jurisdiction. See McKnight v. Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 518 (E.D.N.Y.
2010), aff’d, 434 F. App’x 32 (2d Cir. 2011).
Furthermore, the relief sought by Plaintiff necessarily implicates the Family Court
Order. For example, Plaintiff seeks a declaration that he has a right to visitation with his
child, that Defendants violated that right, and that the Family Court Order did not
condition his visitation on the consent of Defendant King or the imposition of monitoring.
Id. at p. 9. Granting this relief would not only require the Court to review and interpret
the Family Court Order but would also potentially involve the Court amending or altering
the language of the Family Court Order. The proper course would instead be for the Court
to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this case.
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Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that any exception provides for the
federal court’s intervention in the state court proceeding, and the Court has no reason to
believe that any bad faith, harassment, or other unusual circumstances exist here. Plaintiff
has not alleged that the Family Court action “was initiated with and is animated by a
retaliatory, harassing, or other illegitimate motive,” or that he has “no reasonable
expectation of obtaining a favorable outcome” in Family Court or any other state court.
Diamond D Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d at 199 (citation, quotation, and internal
quotation marks omitted). 	To the contrary, Plaintiff has alleged that the Family Court
Order benefitted Plaintiff by “not condition[ing] Plaintiff’s visitation on the consent or
approval 	of 	the 	child’s 	mother” 	and 	not 	“authoriz[ing] 	monitored 	or 	supervised
visitation.” Compl. at p. 2.
Likewise, Plaintiff has not met the high standard of showing that there is “no state
remedy 	available 	to 	meaningfully, 	timely, 	and 	adequately 	remedy 	the 	alleged
constitutional violation” and that Plaintiff would “suffer ‘great and immediate harm’ if
the federal court does not intervene.” Diamond D Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d
at 201 (quoting Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441-42 & n. 7 (1977)). Plaintiff has
not alleged, and the Amended Complaint does not indicate, that Plaintiff has actually
sought and been denied relief in any state court. The District Court has also previously
noted that “Plaintiff has routinely sought emergency injunctive relief” relative to Family
Court orders he is involved in, all of which have been denied to date, thereby further
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indicating that no great and immediate harm will result if the Court does not intervene in
this case. Dkt. No. 7.
Accordingly, because Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint stems entirely from the
Family Court action and there is no obstacle to full and fair determination in state courts,
abstention is proper.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Complaint 	be 	DISMISSED 	without
prejudice; and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: February 23, 2026
Albany, New York
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