Williams v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________________________________________
Denise W.,1
Plaintiff,
v. 5:25-CV-349
(MJK)
Commissioner of Social Security
Defendant.
_____________________________________________________________________
Howard D. Olinsky Esq., for Plaintiff
Geoffrey M. Peters Esq., Special Asst. U.S. Attorney, for Defendant
Mitchell J. Katz, U.S. Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION & ORDER
Denise W. brought this action under the Social Security Act (42
U.S.C. § 405(g)) seeking judicial review of the Social Security
Commissioner’s final decision denying her application for benefits. (Dkt.
1.). Denise W. consented to the jurisdiction of a Magistrate Judge. (Dkt.
6). Both parties filed briefs (Dkts. 14, 15, 16) which the Court treats as
motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), in accordance with General Order
18.2
1 This decision will identify the plaintiff using only her first name and last initial to
protect her privacy.
2 The Court appreciates the use of hyperlinks in plaintiff’s brief.
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I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On June 22, 2021, Denise W. filed an application for Title XVI
supplemental security income benefits, alleging disability beginning
January 12, 2017. (T. 35).3 The Social Security Administration denied
the claim initially on November 15, 2021, and again upon
reconsideration on May 23, 2022. (Id.). Denise W. requested a hearing a
month later. (Id.)
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) Robyn Hoffman held a hearing
on October 14, 2022. (T. 57-64). At the hearing, Denise W. explained
that she was exposed to COVID-19 and was experience symptoms. (T.
59). Denise W. agreed to a limited telephone appearance where ALJ
Hoffman explained the right to representation. (T. 60-64).
On January 11, 2023, ALJ Hoffman held a supplemental hearing.
(T. 35, 67-101). Denise W. appeared and testified at the hearing
unrepresented. (T. 35, 67-101). On February 5, 2024, ALJ Hoffman
issued an unfavorable decision. (T. 32-46). The appeals council denied
Denise W.’s appeal. (T. 1-7).
3 All page references are to the Administrative Transcript (“T.”) and not the page
numbers assigned by the CM/ECF pagination system.
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II. GENERALLY APPLICABLE LAW
A. Disability Standards
To be considered disabled, plaintiffs seeking disability insurance
or supplemental security income benefits must establish that they are
“unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to
last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months …” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A). In addition, plaintiffs’
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of s
uch severity that [they are] not only unable to do [their]
previous work but cannot, considering [their] age, education,
and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial
gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless
of whether such work exists in the immediate area in which
[they] live[], or whether a specific job vacancy exists for
[them], or whether [they] would be hired if [they] applied for
work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner uses a five-step process, set forth in 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520 and 416.920, to evaluate disability insurance and
supplemental security income disability claims.
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is
currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. If [they are]
not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
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has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits [their]
physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. If the
claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has
an impairment which meets or equals the criteria of an
impairment listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will
consider [them] disabled without considering vocational
factors such as age, education, and work experience …
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the
fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, [they have] the residual functional capacity to
perform [their] past work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to
perform [their] past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant
can perform.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); see also 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520, 416.920. Plaintiffs have the burden of establishing
disability at the first four steps. See Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 418
(2d Cir. 2013). If they establish that their impairment prevents them
from performing their past work, the burden then shifts to the
Commissioner to prove the final step. Id.
B. Scope of Review
When reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, courts must
determine whether the correct legal standards were applied and
whether substantial evidence supported the decision. Id. at 417; see also
Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42
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U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F.3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012). It must be “more
than a scintilla” of evidence scattered throughout the administrative
record. Id. Yet this standard is a very deferential standard of review “—
even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at
448. “To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported
by substantial evidence, reviewing courts consider the whole record,
examining the evidence from both sides, because an analysis of the
substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258
(2d Cir. 1988). But reviewing courts may not substitute their
interpretation of the administrative record for that of the Commissioner
if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s decision. Id.; see
also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
ALJs need not explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting
evidence in the record. See Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d
Cir. 1983); see also Miles v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981)
(“[W]e are unwilling to require an ALJ explicitly to reconcile every
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conflicting shred of medical testimony[.]”). But ALJs cannot “‘pick and
choose’ evidence in the record that supports [their] conclusions.” Cruz v.
Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see also Fuller v.
Astrue, No. 09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6,
2010).
III. FACTS
The record includes Denise W.’s medical and mental health
treatment records which the parties are familiar with. The Court will
refer to the pertinent records and the hearing testimony in its analysis
of the parties’ claims as appropriate.
IV. THE ALJ’S DECISION
At Step One of the five-step-sequential analysis, ALJ Hoffman
determined that Denise W. has “not engaged in substantial gainful
activity since June 22, 2021, the application date.” (T. 38) (cleaned up).
At Step Two, ALJ Hoffman concluded that Denise W. “had the
following severe impairments: “anxiety and depressive disorders.” (Id.)
(cleaned up). ALJ Hoffman also determined that Denise W.’s “high
blood pressure, restless leg syndrome, tremors, a heart condition,
borderline diabetes, kidney dysfunction, insomnia, vertigo, silent
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seizures, thalassemia, and possible fibromyalgia” were not severe. (T.
38-39.).
At Step Three, ALJ Hoffman determined that Denise W. “does not
have an impairment, or combination of impairments, that medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart. P, Appendix. 1.” (T. 39) (internal citations omitted).
Next, ALJ Hoffman discussed the “paragraph B” criteria. (T. 14-
15). “To satisfy the paragraph B criteria,” mental impairments “must
result in one extreme limitation or two marked limitations in a broad
area of functioning.” See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §
12.00(A)(2)(b) (cleaned up). The four broad areas of mental functioning
are: (1) understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
interacting with others; (3) maintaining concentration, persistence, or
pace; and (4) adapting and managing oneself. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,
subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(C). Here, ALJ Hoffman found the Paragraph B
criteria unsatisfied because she determined that Denise W. had: (1) no
limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information; (2)
mild limitations in interacting with others; (3) moderate limitations in
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maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and (4) moderate
limitations in adapting or managing oneself. (T. 42).
The ALJ also considered the “paragraph C” criteria. (Id.). The
“paragraph C” criteria require a documented medical history of the
existence of the disorder over a period of at least two years, with
evidence of both (a) medical treatment, mental health therapy,
psychosocial support(s), or a highly structured setting(s) that is ongoing
and that diminishes the symptoms and signs of the mental disorder;
and (b) marginal adjustment, that is, minimal capacity to adapt to
changes in environment or to demands that are not already part of daily
life. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, § 12.00(A)(2)(c). Here, ALJ
Hoffman noted that the “paragraph C” criteria were not met. (T. 42).
After this, ALJ Hoffman determined that Denise W. had the
residual function capacity (“RFC”) to perform:
a full range of work at all exertional levels. Mentally, the
claimant retains the ability to understand and follow simple
instructions and directions, perform simple tasks
independently, maintain attention/concentration for simple
tasks, and regularly attend to a routine and maintain a
schedule. She can relate to and interact appropriately with all
others to the extent necessary to carry out simple tasks. The
claimant can handle simple, repetitive, work-related stress in
that she can make occasional decisions directly related to the
performance of simple tasks in a position with consistent job
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duties that do not require her to supervise or manage the
work of others.
(T. 42).
To make this finding, ALJ Hoffman considered “the medical
opinion(s) and prior administrative medical finding(s)” pursuant to 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c. (T. 44).
At Step Four, ALJ Hoffman reasoned that Denise W. “has no past
relevant work,” is within the “individuals closely approaching advanced
age” category, has “the equivalent of a high school education,” and
“transferability of skills is not an issue.” (T. 44-45).
Finally, at Step Five, ALJ Hoffman concluded that “considering”
Denise W.’s “age, education, work experience, and residual functional
capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national
economy that” she “can perform.” (T. 45). Accordingly, ALJ Hoffman
determined that Denise W. is not disabled as defined by the Social
Security Act. (Id.).
V. ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Denise W. argues: (1) ALJ Hoffman committed legal error because
she failed to properly evaluate the opinion of Dr. R. Figueroa; and
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(2) ALJ Hoffman committed legal error when she failed to find Denise
W.’s headaches a severe impairment at Step Two. (Pl. Br. at pgs. 1, 6-
18).4 In response, the Commissioner argues that ALJ Hoffman did not
commit any legal errors. (Def. Br. at pgs. 4-14).
VI. DISCUSSION
The Court affirms ALJ Hoffman’s decision. First, the Court holds
that ALJ Hoffman correctly determined that Denise W.’s headaches
were not a severe impairment. And second, the Court holds that ALJ
Hoffman erred when performing the consistency analysis on Dr.
Figueroa’s opinion, but that error was harmless.
A. ALJ Hoffman correctly determined that Denise W.’s
headaches were not a severe impairment.
The Court affirms ALJ Hoffman’s determination that Denise W.’s
headaches were not severe.
At Step Two of the five-step-sequential analysis, ALJs determines
whether claimants have a severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment. Petrie v. Astrue, 412 F. App’x 401, 404 (2d Cir.
2011) (summary order). A “severe impairment” is any “impairment or
4 (Pl. Br.) refers to Plaintiffs Brief, Dkt. 14, and (Def. Br.) refers to Defendants
Brief, Dkt. 15.
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combination of impairments which significantly limits” a claimants
“physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §
416.920(c). Claimants bear “the burden of presenting evidence [that]
establish[es] severity.” Taylor v. Astrue, 32 F. Supp. 3d 253, 265
(N.D.N.Y. 2012) (citations omitted). Claimants must provide evidence of
the impairments impact and “any limitations that it may impose upon
the ability to perform basic work functions.” Mark Robert L. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 17-CV-0142 (DEP), 2018 WL 4509493 at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
20, 2018). ALJs should only make non-severe findings when “the
medical evidence establishes only a slight abnormality which would
have no more than a minimal effect on an individual’s ability to work.”
Taylor, 32 F. Supp. 3d. at 265. “The Step-Two severity standard is de
minimis and intended only to screen out the very weakest cases.”
Brenda H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 20-CV-01025, 2022 WL 125820 at *3
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2022) (cleaned up)
ALJ Hoffman properly determined that Denise W.’s headaches
were not severe. ALJ Hoffman determined that Denise W.’s headaches
are not severe for three reasons. First, Denise W. “has not been
hospitalized or required emergency treatment specifically for headaches
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and there is no evidence that she keeps a headache diary.” (T. 39).
Second, Denise W. did not “mention headaches during consultative
internal medical exams conducted in November 2021 and April 2022.”
(Id.) (internal citations omitted). Third, Denise W.’s “clinical exam[s]
[were] mostly normal[,] and a CT scan of her head was negative.” (id.)
(cleaned up). Starting with the first reason, ALJ Hoffman is allowed to
find headaches non-severe because Denise W. failed to include a
headache diary. See Snyder v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-277-CV, 2023
WL 1943108, at *3 (2d Cir. Feb. 13, 2023) (affirming the ALJ’s non-
severe determination where the ALJ noted that, among other things,
the plaintiff “did not submit a headache log to support the frequency of
headaches she alleged,” and “that the plaintiff did not require recurrent
hospitalizations”). Next, ALJ Hoffman is allowed to rely on Denise W.’s
failure to complain about her headaches. See Couse, 2017 WL 1437505,
at *4 (cleaned up) (recommending the District Court affirm the ALJ’s
finding that the plaintiff’s headaches were not severe because the
“[p]laintiff did not complain of headaches to the consultative examiner
in January of 2013.”). With the first two statements, ALJ Hoffman
properly determined that Denise W.’s headaches were not severe.
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ALJ Hoffman may have erred by relying on objective
measurements when finding Denise W.’s headaches were not severe,
but that error was not fatal. To start, the Court hedges on whether the
use of objective evidence to establish headaches as severe is error
because there is an intra-circuit split on this issue. Compare Ramona R.
v. Saul, No. 19-CV-1630F, 2021 WL 732694, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 25,
2021) (reasoning that “district courts within the Second Circuit,
including this court, have repeatedly acknowledged that there is no
objective test for migraine headaches.”) (collecting cases) with Linda M.
v. Kijakazi, No. 3:21-cv-57 (DJS), 2022 WL 4550810, at *7 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 28, 2022) (“It is therefore clear that not only is an ALJ entitled to
rely on objective evidence to find a primary headache disorder as a
medically determinable impairment, but such evidence is in fact
required by the regulations”). But as noted above, ALJ Hoffman did not
only rely on clinical evidence. So even if ALJ Hoffman’s reliance on
objective measurements was error, it was not fatal.
Denise W. did not establish that her headaches were severe.
Denise W. correctly argues that there is evidence in the record that she
had headaches; but that evidence is insufficient to establish the severity
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of her headaches. The record shows that providers treated Denise W. for
headaches on numerous occasions. See, e.g., (T. 583, 598, 670, 674, 756).
But the “mere presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that
a person has been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment is
not, by itself, sufficient to render a condition severe.” Taylor, 32 F.
Supp. 3d at 265. Worse yet, Denise W. “failed to show that [her]
headaches caused any limitations.” Couse, 2017 WL 1437505, at *4.
Denise W.’s argument further fails because she concedes that her
“headaches are linked with her anxiety” and ALJ Hoffman considered
Denise W. anxiety, which doubles as consideration of Denise W.’s
headaches. (Pl. Br. at pg. 16); Cf. Cruz v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-176S, 2017
WL 1190488, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (“[B]ecause the limitations
arising from Plaintiff’s TMJ-induced headaches were properly
incorporated into the RFC, there was no error in not specifically naming
TMJ as a severe impairment at Step Two.”). In essence, Denise W. did
not carry her burden to prove that her headaches were severe.
Denise W. also argues that ALJ Hoffman’s “headache analysis
does not give sufficient consideration to [Denise W.]’s subjective reports
of headaches or her treatment.” (Pl. Br. at pg. 14). The Court rejects
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this argument because it is a thinly-veiled request to reweigh the
evidence. See Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Krull’s
disagreement is with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence, but the
deferential standard of review prevents us from reweighing it.”).
Indeed, “it is within the ALJ’s discretion . . . to consider the claimant’s
subjective complaints, evaluate her credibility, and make an
independent judgment, in light of medical findings and other evidence,
regarding the true extent of the pain alleged.” Jackson v. Berryhill, No.
17-CV-6268, 2018 WL 3306193, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. July 5, 2018) (cleaned
up).
Even if the Court is wrong as to the above analysis, there is an
alternative basis to affirm ALJ Hoffman’s Step Two decision. If the ALJ
considers the non-severe ailments after Step Two, then the error is
harmless. See, e.g., Reices-Colon v. Astrue, 523 F. App’x 796, 798 (2d
Cir. 2013) (“And, in those subsequent steps, the ALJ specifically
considered [the plaintiff’s] anxiety and panic attacks[,]” which the ALJ
considered non-severe. And “[b]ecause these [non-severe] conditions
were considered during the subsequent steps, any error was
harmless.”). Here, ALJ Hoffman considered Denise W.’s headaches after
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Step Two. When crafting the RFC, ALJ Hoffman noted that Denise W.
“claimed to have daily panic attack characterized by rapid heartbeat,
headaches, shortness of breath, shakiness, and confusion.” (T. 43)
(internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). Two paragraphs later,
ALJ Hoffman noted that she “considered the claimant’s alleged
symptoms and the effect they have purportedly had on her daily
functioning.” (Id.). Altogether, this is enough to establish that ALJ
Hoffman considered Denise W.’s headaches after Step Two. See, e.g.,
Mikus v. Berryhill, No. 6:16-CV-284 (DJS), 2017 WL 1319838, at *4
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2017) (“[B]ecause ALJ Martin clearly considered the
headache disorder later in her opinion, I find that the omission of a
discussion regarding Plaintiff’s headaches at Step Two was harmless
and thus find no reversible error with regard to this aspect of the ALJ’s
decision.”).
* * *
To end, the Court finds that ALJ Hoffman did not err as to Step
Two. The ALJ properly determined that Denise W.’s headaches were
not severe. But even if ALJ Hoffman erred, the error was harmless.
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B. ALJ Hoffman erred when performing the consistency
analysis on Dr. Figueroa’s opinion, but that error was
harmless.
The Court affirms ALJ Hoffman’s decision. ALJs are specifically
required to explain how they considered the supportability and
consistency factors for a medical opinion. But failure to do so is not fatal
if the error is harmless. Here, ALJ Hoffman erred when performing the
consistency analysis on Dr. R. Figueroa’s medical opinion. But the
Court can glean how ALJ Hoffman found Dr. Figueroa’s medical source
statement inconsistent with the other opinions. As a result, the error
does not require remand.
ALJs must consider all medical opinions and evaluate their
persuasiveness based on their supportability, consistency, the author’s
relationship with the claimant, the author’s specialization, and other
factors. Tyler W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-CV-01345 (CFH), 2024
WL 1075209, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2024). “The two most important
factors for determining the persuasiveness of medical opinions are
consistency and supportability[.]” Stephanie F. v. Kijakazi, No. 20-CV-
1528 (BKS), 2022 WL 3355964, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022). Because
that is so, ALJs must “explain how [they] considered the supportability
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and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
“Supportability” means that “the more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical
source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§
404.1520c(c)(1), 416.920c(c)(1) (cleaned up). “Consistency” means that
“the more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative
medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§
404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2). In plain English, supportability is an
internal check—examining whether the medical source references
medical evidence that comes from the medical source. Consistency is an
external check—examining whether the medical sources references
evidence from other medical and nonmedical sources.
An ALJ’s “failure to explain the supportability and consistency of
the medical opinions in the record is procedural error.” Stephanie F.,
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2022 WL 3355964, at *9. And procedural errors are subject to harmless
error review. See id; see also Loucks v. Kijakazi, No. 21-CV-1749, 2022
WL 2189293, at *2 (2d. Cir. 2022) (summary order) (applying harmless
error review to a procedural error).
ALJ Hoffman properly performed the supportability analysis on
Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. ALJ Hoffman rejected Dr. Figueroa’s opinion
that Denise W. has “moderate limitations for prolonged sitting,
standing, and walking” and Denise W. “should avoid ladders and
unprotected heights.” (T. 39) (citing T. 547). ALJ Hoffman, supporting
her decision to reject Dr. Figueroa’s limitations, reasoned that Dr.
Figueroa’s exam findings were largely unremarkable. (T. 39).
Specifically, ALJ Hoffman noted that Dr. Figueroa found that Denise
W. had a normal gait and station, needed no help changing for the
exam, needed no help getting on and off the exam table, had no
difficulty walking on her heels and toes, had no difficulty rising from
her chair, and Denise W. did not use any assistive device. (T. 39). ALJ
Hoffman concluded that Dr. Figueroa’s “findings do not support [the]
proposed limitations.” (Id.). “Dr. Figueroa’s objective findings . . . are
indeed difficult to reconcile with her medical source statement.” Cheryl
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A. L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 523-CV-151 (AMN/TWD), 2024
WL 1073442, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2024) (cleaned up)
(recommending the District Court affirm the ALJ’s decision). So the
Court finds that ALJ Hoffman properly performed the supportability
analysis as to Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. See Vellone v. Saul, No. 20-CV-
261, 2021 WL 319354, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2021) (“in cases where
the new regulations apply, an ALJ must explain his/her approach with
respect to the first two factors when considering a medical opinion”).
ALJ Hoffman did not properly perform the consistency analysis on
Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. ALJs “must specifically set forth how they
considered the consistency of a medical opinion in the analysis of the
medical opinion, not merely refer to the other medical evidence at some
point in the decision.” Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No.
3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022).
But here ALJ Hoffman failed to do so. When performing the consistency
analysis, ALJ Hoffman only concluded Dr. Figueroa’s opinion is
inconsistent “with the other aforementioned medical opinions, activities
and examination findings.” (T. 39). Frankly, that is an insufficient
articulation of the consistency analysis. See, e.g., William B. J. v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:20-CV-0989 (LEK), 2022 WL 344059, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2022) (remanding the ALJ’s decision where “the ALJ
concluded that the ‘opinion is somewhat persuasive and somewhat
consistent with the record because he is the claimant's treating
physician.”’).
ALJ Hoffman’s articulation error was harmless. The Court can
easily glean why ALJ Hoffman found Dr. Figueroa’s moderate
limitations inconsistent with the other opinions. Dr. S. Siddiqui, a state
agency physician, opined that Denise W. has no physical limitations. (T.
120). Exactly the same, Dr. R. Mohanty, M.D., a state agency physician,
opined that Denise W. has no physical limitations. (T. 139-40). Both
doctors came to this conclusion after reviewing Denise W.’s medical
records and finding that she had a “normal gait, [full range of motion,]
and 5/5 strength throughout.” (T. 112, 130). Dr. Mohanty, who had
additional medical records, also noted that Denise W. did not use an
assistive device, can walk on her heels/toes without difficulty, her
“[t]andem walk [is] normal[,]”and she can rise from her seat without
difficulty.” (T. 131). Elke Lorensen, M.D., a consultative examiner,
made those same findings when she consultatively examined Denise W.
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(T. 533-34). After finishing her examination, Dr. Lorensen concluded
that Denise W. had “no gross limitations[.]” (T. 535). But oddly, Dr.
Figueroa—who also found that Denise W. has a normal gait, does not
use an assistance device can walk on her heels and toes without
difficulty, her tandem walk is normal, needs no help changing for the
exam, needs no help getting on and off the exam table, and is able to
rise from the chair without difficulty—crafted moderate limitations. (T.
544-48). In short, Dr. Figueroa had the same medical findings as three
other providers and crafted a completely different medical source
opinion. Compare (T. 548) with (T. 112, 130, 535). That is the definition
of inconsistent. As a result, ALJ Hoffman’s articulation error is
harmless.
Denise W.’s cherry-picking argument is unpersuasive. Denise W.
argues that ALJ Hoffman erred because “[t]he ALJ d[id] not explicitly
address Plaintiff’s mental health treatment records as a basis to
discredit Dr. Figueroa’s opinion, and the description of these records
contained later in the decision is insufficient to do so.” (Pl. Br. at pg. 9).
This argument is gob smacking. ALJ Hoffman need not rely on mental
health records when addressing the supportability and consistency of
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physical limitations. If ALJ Hoffman relied on mental health records to
find Denise W.’s physical limitations insufficient for disability, Denise
W. would claim error, and she would be correct. One has nothing to do
with the other. So this Court rejects Denise W.’s cherry-picking
argument.
* * *
To conclude, the Court finds that ALJ Hoffman erred in her
consistency analysis of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. But the error was
harmless. Thus, it does not warrant remand. See, e.g., Daniel M. S. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-379 (BKS/TWD), 2025 WL 957411 at
*4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (cleaned up) (affirming the ALJ’s decision
where there was a procedural error occurred). In consequence, the
Court affirms ALJ Hoffman’s decision.
VII. CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that Denise W.’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 14) is DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings (Dkt. 15) is GRANTED; and it is further
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ORDERED, that the decision of the Commissioner is
AFFIRMED, and Denise W.’s Complaint (Dkt. 1) is DISMISSED IN
ITS ENTIRETY.
Dated: April 9, 2026
____________________________
Hon. Mitchell J. Katz
U.S. Magistrate Judge
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