Pierson v. Commissioner of Social Security et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
KEITH R. P.,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 5:24-CV-1489
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 	(BKS/PJE)
et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
Keith R. P.
Plaintiff pro se
Social Security Administration 	KRISTINA D. COHN, ESQ.
Office of the General Counsel
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
Attorneys for defendant
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER1
Keith R. P.2 (“plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking
review of a decision by the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (“the
Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”). See Dkt.
No. 1. Plaintiff moves for the Commissioner’s decision to be vacated and remanded for
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation and in accordance with General
Order 18 and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.3(e).
2 In accordance with guidance from the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the
Judicial Conference of the United States, which was adopted by the Northern District of New York in 2018
to 	better 	protect 	personal 	and 	medical 	information 	of 	non-governmental 	parties, 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order will identify plaintiff’s last name by initial only.
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further proceedings. 	See Dkt. No. 7. 	The Commissioner moves for the decision to be
affirmed. See Dkt. No. 15.3 For the following reasons, it is recommended that plaintiff’s
cross-motion 	be 	denied, 	the 	Commissioner’s 	cross-motion 	be 	granted, 	and 	the
Commissioner’s decision be affirmed.
I. Background
On May 18, 2022, plaintiff filed a Title II and Title XVIII applications for DIB, alleging
a disability onset date of October 5, 2021. 	See T. at 215-244 (See Dkt. No. 12-5)5. 	On
September 13, 2022, the Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied plaintiff’s claims.
See 	id. 	at 	96-99 	(See 	Dkt. 	No. 	12-4). 	On 	November 	8, 	2022, 	plaintiff 	sought
reconsideration, which the SSA denied on March 9, 2023. See id. at 105, 108-116 (See
Dkt. No. 12-4). Plaintiff appealed and requested a hearing. See id. at 117-18 (See Dkt.
No. 12-4). On November 8, 2023, a hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”) Robyn Hoffman. 	See id. at 39-66 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	On February 20, 2024,
the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. See id. at 14-38 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). On October
21, 2024, the Appeals Council affirmed the ALJ’s determination and the decision became
final. See id. at 1-6 (Dkt. No. 12-2). Plaintiff timely commenced this action on December
9, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1.
II. Legal Standards
A. Standard of Review
3 This matter has been treated in accordance with General Order 18. Under that General Order, once issue
has been joined, an action such as this is considered procedurally as if cross-motions for judgement on the
pleadings have been filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4 “T.” followed by a number refers to the pages of the administrative transcript. See Dkt. No. 8. Citations
to the administrative transcript refer to the pagination in the bottom, right-hand corner of the page. Citations
to the parties’ briefs refers to the pagination generated by the Court’s electronic filing and case management
program located at the header of each page.
5 Due to the voluminous nature and many parts of the administrative transcript, in addition to the record
citation, the undersigned will include the docket cite for factual citations.
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“In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a district court may not
determine de novo whether an individual is disabled.” 	Joseph J. B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2024),
report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-CV-652 (BKS/CFH), 2024 WL 4216048
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2024) (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1388(c)(3))6; see also Wagner v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	“Rather, the
Commissioner’s determination will only be reversed if the correct legal standards were
not applied, or it was not supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing Johnson v.
Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1987)); see also Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464,
467 (2d Cir. 1982). “Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla,’ meaning that in
the record one can find ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion.’” Id. (quoting Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31 (2d
Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971))). 	“The
substantial evidence standard is a very deferential standard of review . . . [This] means
once an ALJ finds facts, we can reject [them] only if a reasonable factfinder would have
to conclude otherwise.” 	Id. (quoting Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin., Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443,
448 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“Where there is
reasonable doubt as to whether the Commissioner applied the proper legal standards,
the decision should not be affirmed even though the ultimate conclusion is arguably
supported by substantial evidence.” Id. (citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 148
(N.D.N.Y. 1999) (citing Johnson, 817 F.2d at 986)). 	“However, if the correct legal
standards were applied and the ALJ’s finding is supported by substantial evidence, such
6 All unpublished opinions cited in this Report-Recommendation and Order, unless otherwise noted, have
been provided to plaintiff.
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finding must be sustained ‘even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s
position and despite that the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from
the [Commissioner’s].’” Id. (quoting Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1992)).
B. Determination of Disability
“Every individual who is under a disability shall be entitled to a disability . . . benefit
. . . .” 	42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(E). 	Disability is defined as the “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment . . . which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months[.]” 	Id. § 423(d)(1)(A). 	“A medically-determinable impairment is an
affliction that is so severe that it renders an individual unable to continue with his or her
previous work or any other employment that may be available to him or her based upon
age, education, and work experience.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *2 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A)). “Such an impairment must be supported by ‘medically acceptable
clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.’” 	Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(3)).
“Additionally, the severity of the impairment is ‘based on objective medical facts,
diagnoses[,] or medical opinions inferable from [the] facts, subjective complaints of pain
or disability, and educational background, age, and work experience.’” 	Id. (quoting
Ventura v. Barnhart, No. 04-CV-9018 (NRB), 2006 WL 399458, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21,
2006) (citing Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1037 (2d Cir. 1983))).
The Second Circuit employs a five-step analysis, based on 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520,
to determine whether an individual is entitled to disability benefits:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity.
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If he [or she] is not, the [Commissioner] next considers whether the claimant
has a “severe impairment” which significantly limits his [or her] physical or
mental ability to do basic work activities.
If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is whether,
based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an impairment which is
listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the claimant has such an
impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him [or her] disabled without
considering 	vocational 	factors 	such 	as 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is afflicted
with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial gainful activity.
Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment, the fourth inquiry
is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he [or she] has the
residual functional capacity to perform his [or her] past work.
Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his [or her] past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform . . .
Berry, 675 F.2d at 467 (spacing added). 	“If at any step a finding of disability or non-
disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *2 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003)). “The plaintiff bears
the initial burden of proof to establish each of the first four steps.” Id. (citing DeChirico v.
Callahan, 134 F.3d 1177, 1180 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)). 	“If the
inquiry progresses to the fifth step, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove that
the plaintiff is still able to engage in gainful employment somewhere.” 	Id. (citing
DeChirico, 134 F.3d at 1180 (citing Berry, 675 F.2d at 467)).
III. The ALJ’s Decision
Applying the five-step disability sequential evaluation, the ALJ first determined that
plaintiff “has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since October 5, 2021, the alleged
onset date.” T. at 20 (Dkt. No. 12-2). At step two, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “has
the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis [“MS”], posttraumatic stress disorder
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[“PTSD”], generalized anxiety disorder [“GAD”], and alcohol use disorder.” Id. (Dkt. No.
12-2). At step three, the ALJ determined that plaintiff “does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.” Id. (Dkt. No. 12-2).
Before reaching step four, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff retained the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to
to perform a range of sedentary work . . . . 	Specifically, the claimant can
occasionally lift and carry ten pounds; frequently lift/carry less than ten
pounds; sit for six hours; and stand and/or walk for two hours, all in an eight-
hour workday with normal breaks. 	He can occasionally climb ramps or
stairs; 	occasionally 	climb 	ladders, 	ropes 	or 	scaffolds; 	can 	perform
occasional 	stooping, 	kneeling, 	crouching, 	and 	crawling; 	and 	can
occasionally 	balance 	as 	that 	term 	is 	defined 	in 	the 	Dictionary 	of
Occupational 	Titles 	(DOT) 	and 	the 	companion 	publication 	Selected
Characteristics of Occupations (SCO). 	The claimant retains the ability to:
understand and follow simple instructions and directions; perform simple
tasks independently; maintain attention/concentration for simple tasks;
regularly attend to a routine and maintain a schedule; relate to and interact
appropriately with all others to the extent necessary to carry out simple
tasks; can handle simple, repetitive work-related stress in that the claimant
can make occasional decisions directly related to the performance of simple
tasks in a position with consistent job duties that do not require the claimant
to supervise nor manage the work of others; and should have occasional
interaction with the public.
T. at 22 (Dkt. No. 12-2).7 	The ALJ then proceeded to step five “of the sequential
evaluation, based on the expedited process set forth in 20 CFR 404.1520(h).” Id. at 32
(Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ explained that she “declined to make a finding as to whether
7 Sedentary work is defined as
lifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like
docket files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary job is defined as one which
involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out
job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a); 416.967(a).
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the claimant can perform any past relevant work” because “[a]n actual determination of
past relevant work will not have an effect on the legal outcome of this case.” Id. (Dkt. No.
12-2). The ALJ noted that plaintiff “was born on March 7, 1985[,] and was 36 years old,
which is defined as a younger individual age 18-44, on the alleged disability onset date.”
Id. (Dkt. No. 12-2). At step five, the ALJ determined that “[c]onsidering the claimant’s age,
education, work experience, and residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in
significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform.” Id. (Dkt. No.
12-2). Ultimately, the ALJ concluded that “[t]he claimant has not been under a disability,
as defined in the Social Security Act, from October 5, 2021, through the date of this
decision.” Id. at 33. (Dkt. No. 12-2).
IV. Discussion
A. The Parties’ Arguments
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence for
several reasons. 	Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to list several severe impairments,
including a traumatic brain injury, cerebrospinal fluid (“CSF”) pressure, traumatic spinal
injuries, 	progressive 	multifocal 	leukoencephalopathy 	(“PMF”), 	meningitis, 	and 	long
COVID. 	See Dkt. No. 7 at 4-5. 	Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to properly consider
the medical evidence, specifically, the medical records discussing the severity of his MS.
See id. at 5-6. 	Plaintiff claims that all his impairments have similar symptoms, cause
similar limitations, and overlap with one another. 	See id. at 6. 	Plaintiff also claims that
he does not suffer from alcohol use disorder. See id. at 5.
He asserts that the consultative medical experts’ opinions in Exhibits 10F and 11F
are the most accurate descriptions of his physical limitations because “no other [doctor]
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had thoroughly evaluated his medical symptoms.” Dkt. No. 7 at 5. Contradictorily, plaintiff
argues that none of his medical providers or the state consultative medical experts
properly evaluated his symptoms and conditions. See id. at 3-4. He states that he has
additional medical evidence to submit in support of his claims. See id. at 10.
Similarly, 	plaintiff 	argues 	that 	the ALJ 	“failed 	to 	properly 	incorporate 	[the]
restrictions reported” by the consultative medical experts in Exhibits 10F and 11F, and the
ALJ’s RFC determination does not fully consider his pain and limitations. Id. at 4. Plaintiff
contends that he cannot perform any of the mental or physical tasks listed as part of his
RFC and he lacks the ability to perform sedentary work. See id. at 7-9. Finally, plaintiff
disagrees with Dr. Tarala’s dismissal of his conditions and refusal to send him for
additional testing or treatment. See id. at 2.
The 	Commissioner 	argues 	that 	the ALJ’s 	determination 	was 	supported 	by
substantial 	evidence and 	should 	be 	affirmed. 	See 	generally 	Dkt. 	No. 	15. 	The
Commissioner argues that plaintiff’s complaints of a traumatic brain injury, CSF pressure,
spinal injuries, PMF, and long COVID do not constitute severe impairments within the
meaning of the applicable regulations because he has not been diagnosed with these
conditions and there is no objective evidence documenting the same. See Dkt. No. 15 at
10-11 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521). The Commissioner also argues that the ALJ’s RFC
determination is supported by substantial evidence because “the ALJ properly evaluated
the medical opinions of record and articulated her findings concerning the persuasiveness
of each opinion pursuant to 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c. 	Plaintiff failed to show, as was his
burden, that he had a more restrictive RFC than the ALJ assessed.” Id. at 13 (additional
citation omitted). The Commissioner claims that “[o]bjective findings showed that Plaintiff
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had normal neurological findings, full muscle strength throughout the extremities, intact
sensation, normal gait” and the medical opinions proffered by Dr. Figueroa, Dr. Vinlaun,
Dr. 	Periakarrupan, 	Dr. 	Shapiro, 	Dr. 	Li, 	and 	Dr. 	Kamin 	support 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination. 	See id at 13-15. 	The Commissioner contends that the ALJ “afforded
Plaintiff the benefit of the doubt when she incorporated greater standing and walking
physical limitations than those found by Dr. Figueroa.” 	Id. at 14 (citing T. at 29).
Additionally, the Commissioner states that plaintiff’s activities of daily living (“ADL”)
support the ALJ’s RFC determination and plaintiff’s complaints of pain were inconsistent
with the record. 	See id. at 15-16. 	In sum, the Commissioner argues that plaintiff’s
contentions regarding the ALJ’s RFC determination constitute a disagreement with the
weight of the evidence and there are jobs that plaintiff could perform in the national
economy given his physical and mental limitations. See id. at 16-18.
B. Severe Impairments
“At the second step of the evaluation, the medical severity of a claimant’s
impairments is considered.” 	Richard H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:17-CV-0515
(DNH/TWD), 	2018 	WL 	4627118, 	at 	*4 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Aug. 	15, 	2018), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 5:17-CV-0515 (DNH/TWD), 2018 WL 4625402 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 26, 2018) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)). 	A claimant’s impairment “must
result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities that can be shown
by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques. 	Therefore, a
physical or mental impairment must be established by objective medical evidence from
an acceptable medical source.” 	20 C.F.R. § 404.1521. A claimant’s own “statement of
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symptoms, 	a 	diagnosis, 	or 	a 	medical 	opinion 	to 	establish 	the 	existence 	of 	an
impairment(s)” is not sufficient. Id.
“A ‘severe impairment’ is defined as any impairment or combination of impairments
which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities.” Richard H., 2018 WL 4627118, at *4. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c);
404.1521) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	Basic work activities are defined as “the
abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1522(b). Basic work
activities include
(1) Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
(2) Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
(3) Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
(4) Use of judgment;
(5) Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work
situations; and
(6) Dealing with changes in a routine work setting.
Id. § 404.1522(b)(1)-(6). The claimant is responsible for submitting evidence establishing
the severity of their disability. See id. § 404.1512(a)(2)(i).
Here, the ALJ determined that plaintiff had severe impairments consisting of MS,
PSTD, GAD, and alcohol use disorder. 	See T. at 20 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ
explained that
[n]o other medical disorder mentioned in the record, whether considered
singly or combined with any other medically determinable impairment, has
been established as a “severe” impairment that meets the 12-month
duration 	requirement. 	For 	example, 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	history 	of
degenerative changes to his cervical spine (Exhibit 13F, page 2) and a tiny
thoracic cord syrinx (Exhibit 13F, page 3). However, the evidence does not
support a finding that these impairments, singly or in combination, limit the
claimant’s ability to function in any significant way.
Id. (See Dkt. No. 12-2).
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Plaintiff asserts that he suffers from a traumatic brain injury, CSF pressure,
traumatic spinal injuries, traumatic spinal injuries, PMF, meningitis, and long COVID, and
that these conditions constitute severe impairments. See Dkt. No. 7 at 4-5. Yet, plaintiff
has not demonstrated that he has been diagnosed with any of these conditions. Plaintiff
refers to various medical records by year or a period of years, but he does not state when
and by whom he was diagnosed with these conditions. See generally Dkt. No. 7. Rather,
he repeats that his treatment providers disagreed with his self-reports, failed to properly
consider and analyze his symptoms, and refused to send him to the correct specialists or
for additional treatment. See id. at 3-4, 6.
Plaintiff claims that a 2022 MRI of his brain shows CSF pressure. See Dkt. No. 7
at 4. 	However, the MRI reports specifically state, “[n]o acute or subacute ischemia,
enhancing intracranial mass, signs of hemorrhage or hydrocephalus.” 	T. at 309, 358,
406-07 (See Dkt. No. 12-7). Plaintiff also references MRIs and X-ray’s taken between
2018 and 2024 that show a “broken spine.” 	See Dkt. No. 7 at 5. 	Yet, MRI records of
plaintiff’s cervical and thoracic spine from March 2022 indicate that plaintiff had a “[n]ormal
spinal cord without demyelination” and “no abnormal enhancement of the vertebral
bodies, disc spaces, or spinal cord.” 	T. at 389-91 (See Dkt. No. 12-7). 	The records
indicate that the March 2022 examination results were compared to plaintiff’s examination
results from 2018. 	See T. at 389, 391. (See Dkt. No. 12-7). 	Other than his subjective
complaints and self-reports, plaintiff has proffered no evidence that he suffers from any
additional severe impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1521; Castillo v. O'Malley, No. 24-41-
CV, 2024 WL 4707253, at *3 (2d Cir. Nov. 7, 2024) (quoting Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d
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46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A]n ALJ is ‘not required to accept the claimant's subjective
complaints without question.’”).
The undersigned is sympathetic to plaintiff’s various conditions and pain; however,
plaintiff has failed to meet his burden that he suffers from a severe impairment other than
those listed by the ALJ. 	See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521; 404.1522(b); 404.1512(a)(2)(i);
Richard H., at *4 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii)).
C. RFC Determination
“RFC describes what a claimant is capable of doing despite his or her impairments,
considering all relevant evidence, which consists of physical limitations, symptoms, and
other limitations beyond the symptoms.” 	Joseph J. B., at *8 (quoting Malcolm M. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:17-CV-986 (CFH), 2019 WL 187725, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 14,
2019) (first citing Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145, 150 (N.D.N.Y. 1999), then citing
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945))). 	“[A]n RFC finding is administrative in nature, not
medical, and its determination is within the province of the ALJ.” 	Id. (quoting Curry v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 855 F. App’x 46, 48 n.3 (2d Cir. 2021) (summary order) (citing 20
C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2))). 	“In assessing RFC, the ALJ’s findings must specify the
functions plaintiff is capable of performing; conclusory statements regarding plaintiff’s
capabilities are not sufficient.” 	Id. (quoting Martone, 70 F. Supp. 2d at 150 (citations
omitted)).
“In making the RFC determination, the ALJ must consider all relevant medical and
other evidence, including any statements about what the claimant can still do provided by
any medical sources.” 	Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *8 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1545(a)(3), 404.1546(c)). 	“[T]he ALJ’s conclusion [need] not perfectly correspond
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with any of the opinions of medical sources cited in his [or her] decision, [and] he [or she
i]s entitled to weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [i]s
consistent with the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56
(2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). 	“The Court ‘defer[s] to the Commissioner’s resolution
of conflicting evidence[.]’” Id. (quoting Smith v. Berryhill, 740 F. App’x 721, 726 (2d Cir.
2018) (summary order) (internal citation omitted)). “Therefore, even if a plaintiff disagrees
with the ALJ’s assessment of opinion evidence and can point to evidence in the record to
support his or her position, whether there is substantial evidence supporting the
[plaintiff’s] view is not the question; rather, [the Court] must decide whether substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” Id. (quoting Elizabeth P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:20-CV-891 (CFH), 2022 WL 507367, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2022)) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “The ALJ must not ignore evidence or cherry pick
only the evidence from medical sources that support a particular conclusion and ignore
the contrary evidence, but [t]he Court will not reweigh the evidence that was before the
ALJ.” 	Id. (quoting April B. v. Saul, No. 8:18-CV-682 (DJS), 2019 WL 4736243, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2019) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)).
1. Plaintiff’s Claimed Limitations
As discussed above, the ALJ concluded that plaintiff had the RFC to perform
sedentary work with several restrictions. See supra at 6; see also T. at 22 (Dkt. No. 12-
2). Affording plaintiff due solicitude, he argues the RFC determination is not supported
by substantial evidence because he cannot perform any of the physical or mental tasks
listed by the ALJ when describing sedentary work. 	See Dkt. No. 7 at 7-8. 	More
specifically, plaintiff claims that his (1) physical impairments affect his “limbs” and his
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“ability to stand, walk, sit, reach, [and] lift anything”; and (2) mental impairments affect his
ability to concentrate and think. Id. at 7. He claims that he cannot “engage in physical or
social activities due to lower and upper spine pain[],” and because he has lost the use of
his arms and legs. Id. Plaintiff claims that his limbs are “going paralyzed” and he has “no
pivot point.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff also states that he suffers from “brain pains . . . loss of limb
function, stabbing nerve pains, [and] organ pains” that substantially limit all his life
activities. Dkt. No. 7 at 7. Plaintiff claims that he “can’t put any pressure on [his] left leg
without nauseating nerve pains into [his] lower spine[,] hips, organs, and down [his] legs”;
“can’t even open [or] close doors or reaching into cupboards without extreme nauseating
nerve and organ pains”; and that pain causes him to feel paralyzed, such that he has to
lay down. 	Id. 	It appears that plaintiff is arguing that the ALJ failed to consider these
symptoms and limitations.
Yet, the ALJ’s decision considered many of the symptoms and limitations plaintiff
describes in his brief. The ALJ noted that
[t]he claimant states that he is disabled due to physical and mental
impairments including, multiple sclerosis, sciatica, and posttraumatic stress
disorder (Exhibits 1E, 14E, and 8F). 	He states that his symptoms include
widespread pain including, brain pain, upper and lower spine pain, and
lower extremity pain; numbness in his left upper extremity and lower
extremities; inflammation that circulates throughout his body; skin rashes
and hives resulting in skin lesions; and anxiety (Exhibit 1E, page 2; Exhibit
4E, pages 1-4; and Exhibit 14E, page 1). 	He states that he first began
having an odd feeling in the back of his head as well as cognitive issues
during the later half of 2017 after undergoing hand surgery and taking nearly
five hours to wake from anesthesia (Exhibit 8F, page 1).
T. at 23 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ concluded that “the claimant’s medically
determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause the alleged symptoms;
however, the claimant’s statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
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effects of these symptoms are not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
evidence in the record for the reasons explained in this decision.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 12-
2). 	The ALJ then provided a thorough discussion of the medical evidence and medical
opinions of record, explaining why this evidence supported her conclusion. See id. at 23-
32 (See Dkt. No. 12-2).
Additionally, as the Commissioner correctly argues, the objective medical evidence
of record contradicts plaintiff’s claims and supports the ALJ’s determination that plaintiff
could perform a restrictive range of sedentary work. 	See Dkt. No. 15 at 13. 	Plaintiff’s
treatment records indicate that he had “normal neurological findings, full muscle strength
throughout [his] extremities, intact sensation, and normal gait.” Id. (citing T. at 302, 305,
344, 361-62, 384, 393, 396, 401-02, 404, 411-12, 440, 445-46, 625, 709-10, 774-75, 782-
83, 883, 894-95) (See Dkt. Nos. 12-7, 12-8). These treatment records also indicate that
plaintiff’s exercise regimen included lifting weights five times per week. 	See T. at 344,
361, 709, 782.
Plaintiff does not cite any objective medical evidence to support any of the
assertions raised in his brief. Plaintiff’s only basis for these claims is his own subjective
statements. 	See Vincent E.V. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:23-CV-2758 (GRJ), 2024
WL 898670, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2024) (citing Kuchenmeister v. Berryhill, No. 16 Civ.
7975, 2018 WL 526547, at *19, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9750, at *59 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
2018)) (“An ALJ has the discretion to discount a claimant’s subjective complaints where,
as here, those complaints can be considered inconsistent with the overall clinical
assessments and treatment notes.”). “[P]laintiff's argument[] amount[s] to a disagreement
with how the ALJ weighed the evidence, which is within [the ALJ’s] province to do.”
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Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *1 (quoting Nichole K. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:23-CV-858 (EAW), 2024 WL 3022592, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 17, 2024)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. 2016)
(summary order) (“Krull’s disagreement is with the ALJ’s weighing of the evidence, but
the deferential standard of review prevents us from reweighing it.”); Tina W. v. Comm'r of
Soc. Sec., No. 5:22-CV-15 (MAD), 2023 WL 157952, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2023)
(quoting Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58, 59 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)
(“It is not the Court’s function to reweigh the evidence on appeal, only to ‘decide whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision.’”)).
Therefore, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ considered plaintiff’s subjective
reports of his symptoms and limitations and provided a thorough explanation supporting
her treatment of plaintiff’s self-reports. Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument lacks force.
2. Medical Opinions
“For claims filed on or after March 27, 2017,” an ALJ need “not defer or give any
specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) [‘PAMFs’], including those from [a claimant's] medical
sources.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a) (internal citation omitted). 	Rather medical opinions
and PAMFs are evaluated based on their “persuasiveness.” 	Id. 	In evaluating the
“persuasiveness” of a medical opinion or PAMF, an ALJ is to “consider” the following
factors: 	(1) 	supportability; 	(2) 	consistency; 	(3) 	relationship 	with 	the 	claimant;
(4) specialization; and (5) “other factors.” 	Id. §§ 416.920c(a); 416.920c(c)(1)-(5).
“However, in many cases, the ALJ only need ‘explain’ how the supportability and
consistency factors were considered, as they are ‘the most important factors.’” Brian K.
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v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-CV-26 (CFH), 2025 WL 18718, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2,
2025) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)(2)-(3)
(stating that an ALJ “is not required to” explain the remaining factors unless the ALJ
determines that “two or more medical opinions or [PAMFs] about the same issue are both
equally well-supported [ ] and consistent with the record [ ] but are not exactly the same”).
For 	the 	“supportability” 	analysis, 	“[t]he 	more 	relevant 	the 	objective 	medical
evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs], the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or
[PAMFs] will be.” 	20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); see also Kathleen A. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 3:20-CV-1034 (LEK), 2022 WL 673824, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2022) (quoting
Carmen M. v. Comm’r of the Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-6532 (MJR), 2021 WL 5410550, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2021)) (noting that “[t]he supportability analysis focuses on ‘how well
a 	medical 	source 	supported 	their 	opinion(s) 	with 	objective 	medical 	evidence and
supporting explanations’”). 	With regard to the “consistency” analysis, “[t]he more
consistent a medical opinion(s) or [PAMFs] is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)
or [PAMFs] will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2); see also Kathleen A., 2022 WL 673824,
at *5 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); then citing Galo G. v. Comm’r of the Soc.
Sec., No. 20-CV-1011 (FJS), 2021 WL 5232722, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 2021)) (“In the
consistency analysis, an ALJ must look outside the medical opinion itself to ‘evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim,’ and will find the medical
opinion more persuasive the more consistent it is with these external sources.”).
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“ALJs are not required to state on the record every reason justifying a decision and
[are] not required to discuss every single piece of evidence submitted.” 	Brian K., 2025
WL 18718, at *4 (quoting Ryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-2947-CV, 2022 WL
17933217 at *2 (2d Cir. Dec. 27, 2022) (summary order) (quoting Brault, 683 F.3d at 448))
(internal quotation marks omitted). “However, they must articulate how persuasive they
found the medical opinions and PAMFs.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b)). “If the ALJ
fails adequately to ‘explain the supportability or consistency factors,’ or bases ‘[the]
explanation upon a misreading of the record, remand is required.’” Id. (quoting Rivera v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 19-CV-4630 (LJL/BCM), 2020 WL 8167136, at *14 (S.D.N.Y.
Dec. 30, 2020) (quoting Andrew G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:19-CV-0942 (ML), 2020
WL 5848776, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2020), report and recommendation adopted 2021
WL 134945 (Jan. 14, 2021))); see also Jennifer A. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-
1167 (MAD), 2023 WL 8654215, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 2023) (quoting Eric G. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-1314 (MAD), 2023 WL 3004780, *4, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
2023)) (“The ALJ need not specifically write the terms ‘supportability’ or ‘consistency’ to
meet the articulation requirements in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c and 416.920c; it is enough
that the ALJ applied the proper legal analysis.”)
Reading plaintiff’s brief liberally and affording him due solicitude, plaintiff seems to
argue that the state medical consultative examiners’ opinions in Exhibits 10F and 11F
most accurately describe his symptoms and limitations and the ALJ “failed to properly
incorporate [the] restrictions reported” by the consultative medical experts when reaching
her RFC determination.8 Dkt. No. 7 at 4-5.
8 The undersigned notes that plaintiff also argues, contradictorily, that none of the state medical consultative
examiners correctly evaluated his symptoms and limitations. See Dkt. No. 7 at 3, 10.
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a. Jeanne Shapiro, Ph.D.
Exhibit 10F is a psychiatric evaluation report from state medical consultative
examiner Jeanne Shapiro, Ph.D., dated August 23, 2022. See T. at 613-17 (See Dkt. No.
12-7). Dr. Shapiro opined that plaintiff
does not appear to have any limitations understanding, remembering, or
applying simple or complex instructions and directions or using reason and
judgment to make work-related decisions. Moderate limitations interacting
adequately 	with 	supervisors, 	coworkers, 	and 	the 	public. 	Moderate
limitations sustaining concentration and performing a task at a consistent
pace. 	Moderate limitations sustaining an ordinary routine and regular
attendance at work. 	Marked limitations regulating emotions, controlling
behavior, and maintaining well being. 	Moderate limitations consistently
maintaining personal hygiene and appropriate attire. No limitations in being
aware of normal hazards and taking appropriate precautions. 	Difficulties
are caused by psychiatric problems.
The results of the examination appear to be consistent with psychiatric
problems and this may significantly interfere with his ability to function on a
daily basis.
T. at 616 (See Dkt. No. 12-7).
The ALJ concluded that Dr. Shapiro’s opinion was “of some persuasive value.” T.
at 29 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). The ALJ explained that Dr. Shapiro’s opinion was supported
by her “detailed examination” of plaintiff. 	Id. (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ further
explained:
[w]hile Dr. Shapiro’s general finding that the claimant has more than minimal
mental limitations is very generally consistent with the claimant’s history of
mental impairments and CPEP visit, her specific findings are less consistent
with the other evidence of record. 	For example, her conclusion that the
claimant has marked limitations in regulating emotions, controlling behavior,
and maintaining well being is inconsistent with the claimant’s lack of
psychiatric abnormalities during most examinations and lack of sustained
mental health treatment since his alleged onset date.
Id. at 30 (See Dkt. No. 12-2).
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Although plaintiff does not use the words “supportability” and “consistency” in his
motion, plaintiff appears to argue that Dr. Shapiro’s opinion is consistent with the evidence
of record, and the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Shapiro’s opinion is erroneous. See Dkt. No. 7
at 4. 	However, the evidence of record supports the ALJ’s consistency conclusion that
plaintiff’s mental health examinations were generally normal, and plaintiff’s reports to Dr.
Shapiro differ from what he told other treatment providers before and after Dr. Shapiro’s
examination. See T. at 301, 305, 344, 362, 404, 433, 440, 633, 774, 883. Therefore, the
undersigned concludes that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of Dr.
Shapiro’s opinion. 	See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(2); see also Kathleen A., 2022 WL
673824, at *5 (first quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2); then citing Galo G., 2021 WL
5232722, at *4).
b. Rita Figueroa, M.D.
Exhibit 11F is a neurological evaluation report from state medical consultative
examiner Rita Figueroa, M.D., dated August 23, 2022. 	See T. at 619-22 (See Dkt. No.
12-7). Dr. Figueroa opined that plaintiff had “moderate to severe limitations for repetitive
bending, lifting, and carrying.” 	Id. at 621 (See Dkt. No. 12-7). 	The ALJ concluded that
Dr. Figueroa’s opinion was “generally persuasive.” 	Id. at 29 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The
ALJ 	noted 	that 	Dr. 	Figueroa’s 	“examination 	was 	remarkable 	for 	the 	following
abnormalities: a stiff unaided gait, an inability to walk on his heels due to a self-reported
toe injury, reduced range of motion of the lumbar spine, fine tremors in the right hand, and
an inability to ‘sense the two-point discrimination’ in any extremity.” 	Id. (citing T. at 620-
21) (See Dkt. Nos. 12-2, 12-7). 	The ALJ concluded that Dr. Figueroa’s opinion was
supported by “a detailed examination” of plaintiff and
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generally 	consistent 	with 	the 	claimant’s 	above[-]discussed 	treatment
records, including his diagnostic testing and history of multiple sclerosis.
However, I find that the claimant’s treatment records and the opinions of the
State agency medical consultants (Exhibits 2A and 4A) do suggest that the
claimant 	has 	greater 	standing 	and 	walking 	limitations 	and 	additional
postural limitations than those outlined by Dr. Figueroa.
Id. (See Dkt. No. 12-2).
Affording plaintiff solicitude due to his pro se status, he argues that the ALJ’s
treatment of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion is not supported by the substantial evidence because
the ALJ “failed to incorporate [the] restrictions” reported by Dr. Figueroa. Dkt. No. 7 at 4.
However, it is unclear to what restrictions plaintiff is referring or how the ALJ otherwise
erred in her treatment of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. 	The ALJ determined Dr. Figueroa’s
opinion was generally persuasive and adopted most of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion. See T. at
29 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ found one part of Dr. Figueroa’s opinion to be less
persuasive – the limitations for standing and walking. See id. Instead, the ALJ adopted
“the opinions of the State agency medical consultants (Exhibits 2A and 4A)” to conclude
that plaintiff had greater standing and walking limitations than those proffered by Dr.
Figueroa’s opinion.9 Id. The ALJ only deviated from Dr. Figueroa’s opinion to apply more
restrictive standing and walking limitations, and the ALJ cited the PAMFs in support of this
deviation. See T. at 80, 92 (See Dkt. No. 12-3).
9 Exhibit 2A contains a medical opinion from A. Vinlaun, M.D., dated September 13, 2022. See T. at 68-86
(See Dkt. No. 12-3). Exhibit 4A contains a medical opinion from A. Periakaruppan, M.D. See T. at 88-95
(See Dkt. No. 12-3). Dr. Vinlaun and Dr. Periakaruppan opined that plaintiff’s “gait is stiff” and he is “unable
to heel toe walk.” 	Id. at 80, 92 (See Dkt. No. 12-3). 	The ALJ determined that Dr. Vinlaun and Dr.
Periakaruppan’s opinions were supported by a detailed narrative and explanation, and their opinions were
consistent with the other evidence of record. See id. at 30-31 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). Plaintiff generally claims
that neither Dr. Vinlaun or Dr. Periakaruppan “thoroughly evaluated his medical symptoms,” yet both Dr.
Vinlaun and Dr. Periakaruppan’s opinions contain a detailed list of the medical evidence they considered in
forming their respective opinions. Dkt. No. 7 at 6; see T. at 70-72, 89.
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Accordingly, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Figueroa’s
opinion is supported by substantial evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1); Kathleen
A., 2022 WL 673824, at *4 (quoting Carmen M., 2021 WL 5410550, at *4).
c. James Tarala, M.D.
Dr. Tarala is one of plaintiff’s treating providers. He submitted a partially-completed
physical impairment questionnaire on plaintiff’s behalf dated August 6, 2023. See T. at
721-27 (See Dkt. No. 12-8). 	The ALJ noted that “Dr. Tarala specifically described his
treatment of the claimant as well as the claimant’s signs, symptoms, and diagnoses
(Exhibit 16F, pages 72-78). 	Dr. Tarala did not outline what the claimant’s functional
abilities were.” 	Id. at 31 (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ listed Dr. Tarala’s notation that
“[t]his questionnaire cannot be accurately completed given that we don’t treat his [the
claimant’s] MS and do [sic] to inconsistent follow up on the behalf of the patient with
neurology and due to non-compliance with treatment recommendations from the few
different neurologists he has seen.” 	Id. (See Dkt. No. 12-2). 	The ALJ stated that she
“considered Dr. Tarala’s statement as part of [her] overall review of the record” but
concluded that “Dr. Tarala [did] not provide[] any opinion regarding the claimant’s
functional abilities for [her] to assess.” Id. (See Dkt. No. 12-2).
Plaintiff argues that Dr. Tarala dismissed his concerns regarding CSF pressure and
other injuries and refused to examine his conditions beyond ordering an X-ray. See Dkt.
No. 7 at 2. 	Plaintiff’s argument amounts to a disagreement with the medical treatment
and course of treatment that he received from Dr. Tarala. 	Plaintiff’s argument does not
dispute the ALJ’s review of Dr. Tarala’s partial physical impairment questionnaire or the
ALJ’s 	decision not to consider 	Dr. Tarala’s 	questionnaire 	in 	formulating her 	RFC
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determination. See id. Therefore, the undersigned concludes that it is not necessary to
evaluate Dr. Tarala’s opinion further.10
D. Duty to Develop the Record
“‘Whether the ALJ has met his duty to develop the record is a threshold question’
that the Court must determine ‘[b]efore reviewing whether the Commissioner’s final
decision is supported by substantial evidence[.]’” Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *4
(quoting Craig v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 218 F. Supp. 3d 249, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2016)). “While
the ALJ has an affirmative obligation to develop the administrative record, her duty to do
so is not without limit.” 	Gillard v. Colvin, 5:11-CV-1173 (GLS), 2013 WL 954909, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2013) (citation omitted). 	“Indeed, if all of the evidence received is
consistent and sufficient to determine whether a claimant is disabled, further development
of the record is unnecessary, and the ALJ may make her determination based upon that
evidence.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(a)). “Consistent with that notion, where there
are no ‘obvious gaps’ in the record, the ALJ is not required to seek additional information.”
Id. (quoting Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Evans v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 110 F. Supp. 3d 518, 537-38 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (first citing Rosa, 168
F.3d at 79 n.5 (2d Cir. 1999), then citing Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 1996)).
“The ultimate question is whether the administrative record is ‘robust enough to enable a
meaningful assessment of the particular 	conditions on which the [plaintiff] 	claims
10 Plaintiff alleges that Drs. Shapiro and Figueroa are the only doctors to thoroughly evaluate his symptoms
and impairments, and all of his other medical providers failed to do so. 	See Dkt. No. 7 at 5-6. 	The
administrative transcript contains treatment records and medical opinions from several of plaintiff’s other
medical providers. Yet, plaintiff does not state which doctor(s) he believes failed to correctly evaluate him,
or how any of these doctors failed to properly consider his symptoms and impairments. 	Without this
additional information, judicial review is frustrated because the undersigned is unable to determine the
part(s) of the ALJ’s decision of which plaintiff is seeking review. As such, this conclusory, undeveloped,
and unsupported argument is without force and fails to serve as a basis to remand.
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disability.’” 	Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *4 (quoting Sanchez v. Colvin, No. 13-
CV-6303 (PAE), 2015 WL 736102, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2015) (additional citations
omitted)). 	“The ALJ’s duty to develop the record is enhanced when the disability in
question is a psychiatric impairment.” Michael D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:22-CV-
104 (CFH), 2023 WL 3601718, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2023) (quoting Corporan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-CV-6704 (JPO), 2015 WL 321832, at *22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23,
2015) (additional citations omitted)).
Plaintiff argues that he believed the state medical consultative examiners “would
help obtain medical evidence related to [his] claim that would be necessary for [the ALJ]
to review.” Dkt. No. 7 at 4. Plaintiff also claims that there is “missing medical evidence”
from the record, and he has “more medical information to share.” Id. at 7, 10. 	Affording
plaintiff due solicitude, it appears that plaintiff is arguing that a gap exists in the record,
and the ALJ failed to fully develop the record.
A gap in the record exists when there is incomplete or missing evidence that
prevents the ALJ from 	rendering an 	RFC 	determination 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence, in turn, triggering the ALJ’s duty to develop the record further. See Joseph J.
B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *6 (citing Eusepi v. Colvin, 595 F. App’x 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2014)
(summary order) 	(citation omitted) (“[T]he agency is required affirmatively to seek out
additional evidence only where there are ‘obvious gaps’ in the administrative record.”));
Gillard, 2013 WL 954909, at *2 (citation omitted) (“[B]ecause the record was sufficiently
robust for the ALJ to make a disability determination, she was not obligated to further
develop the record[.]”).
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Here, plaintiff has not demonstrated that the administrative transcript is missing
any evidence or that he is prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to obtain additional evidence.
See Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371, at *7 (quoting Lucius R. v. O’Malley, No. 3:22-CV-
1312 (MPS), 2024 WL 1200181, at *15 (D. Conn. Jan. 22, 2024) (“Plaintiff has not met
his burden to show that he was prejudiced by the absence of [any] allegedly missing
records.”); Tavarez v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-2784 (FB), 2012 WL 2860797, at *3 (E.D.N.Y.
July 11, 2012) (“The claimant also bears the burden, when contending that the ALJ failed
to develop the record, to show that the missing evidence was significant and harmful to
her claim.”) (citations omitted). 	Plaintiff claims that there is medical evidence missing
from the record and he has additional medical evidence that would ultimately help prove
his claims. 	See Dkt. No. 7 at 4, 7, 10. 	Yet, plaintiff does not allege (1) what medical
evidence is he believes to be missing, (2) the name of the doctor or treatment provider
who generated the allegedly-missing medical records, or (3) when the missing or
additional records were generated. 	Further, plaintiff has not alleged how this missing or
additional evidence will aid in substantiating any of his claims. 	The undersigned has
reviewed the record, concludes that there is not an obvious gap in the record, and the
ALJ’s duty to develop the record further was not triggered. 	See Joseph J. B., 2024 WL
4217371, at *6 (citing Eusepi, 595 F. App’x at 9). Accordingly, this argument lacks merit.
Therefore, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s cross-motion be denied,
the Commissioner’s cross-motion be granted, and the ALJ’s decision affirmed because
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision. See Joseph J. B., 2024 WL 4217371,
at *1; Melissa W., 2025 WL 1929917, at *9; 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920c(c)(1)-(2).
E. H. Morris Glass
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Although not addressed by the Commissioner, plaintiff’s complaint also seeks
proceed against H. Morris Glass (“Glass”). See generally Dkt. No. 1. Glass appears to
be the SSA Appeals Officer who notified plaintiff of the October 21, 2024, Appeals Council
decision. 	See Dkt. No. 1-1 at 3. 	However, as the only proper defendant is the
Commissioner of Social Security, plaintiff cannot proceed against Glass. 	See Byng v.
Soc. Sec. Admin. - Utica, N.Y. Field Off., No. 6:25-CV-0377 (DNH/PJE), 2025 WL
3541472, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2025), report and recommendation adopted sub nom.
Byng v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 6:25-CV-377, 2025 WL 3540319 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2025)
(citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)); Keesing v. Apfel, 124 F. Supp. 2d 134, 135 (N.D.N.Y. 2000)
(“The only proper defendant in an action under section 405(g) is the Commissioner of
Social Security.”); Maloney v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 02-CV-1725 (JFB/SMG), 2006 WL
1720399, at *5, n.8 (E.D.N.Y. June 19, 2006), aff’d, 517 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2008) (“[T]he only
proper party for any benefit claims review by the district court pursuant to 405(g) is the
Commissioner.”); Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-1384 (MKB), 2020 WL
2744132, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020) (citing Langella v. Bush, No. 03-CV-5114, 2004
WL 2668400, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2004)) (“The only proper defendant in a challenge
to a decision by the Social Security Administration is the Commissioner of Social
Security.”). 	Therefore, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s claims, as raised
against Glass, be dismissed without prejudice and without opportunity to amend. See id.
at *15.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby:
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RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s cross-motion (Dkt. No. 7) be DENIED; and it is
further
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	the 	Commissioner’s 	cross-motion 	(Dkt. 	No. 	15) 	be
GRANTED, and the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, that insofar as plaintiff seeks to proceed against Glass, such
claims be DISMISSED without prejudice and without opportunity to amend; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order
on all parties in accordance with Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to U.S.C. §636(b)(1) and Local Rule 72.1(c), the parties have fourteen
days within which to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall
be filed with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. Roldan v. Racette,
984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 892
F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV P. 6(a), 6(e), 72.11
Dated: February 25, 2026
Albany, New York
11 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three
additional days will be added to the fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the
date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections. See F ED. R.
C IV . P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal federal holiday,
then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal federal
holiday. See id. § 6(a)(1)(c).
Case 5:24-cv-01489-BKS-PJE Document 16 Filed 02/25/26 Page 27 of 27