Hall v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
BENJAMIN H.,
Plaintiff,
5:24-cv-1376
v. 	(DJS)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210
Syracuse, NY 13202
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled. 	Dkt.
No. 1. Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
1 Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General Order,
this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. Dkt. No. 4 & General Order 18.
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and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. Nos. 11, 13, & 14. For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied
and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is granted.
I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born in 1994. Dkt. No. 6, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”) at pp. 233 & 264. He
has at least four years of college education. 	Tr. at p. 237. 	He has not worked since
November 2018. Id. He has past work experience as a supermarket clerk. Id. Plaintiff
alleges disability based on autism, anxiety, stress, and mental processing speed. Tr. at
p. 236.
B. Procedural History
Plaintiff applied for supplemental security income and disability insurance
benefits on August 7, 2020. 	Tr. at pp. 78 & 79. 	He alleged a disability onset date of
August 20, 1996. Id. Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on October 2, 2020.
Tr. at pp. 114-23. Reconsideration was denied on April 6, 2021, Tr. at pp. 126-51, after
which Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). 	Tr.
at pp. 152-53. Plaintiff appeared at a hearing before ALJ Gretchen Greisler on October
18, 2021, at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert testified. 	Tr. at pp. 33-60. 	On
December 15, 2021, the ALJ issued a written decision (the “2021 Decision”) finding
Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. at pp. 13-27. On October 14, 2022, the Appeals Council
denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Tr. at pp. 1-7.
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In 2022, Plaintiff filed suit in the Northern District of New York seeking review
of the ALJ’s decision. Tr. at pp. 723-24. The parties stipulated to remand the matter to
the ALJ for further proceedings. Tr. at p. 731. On September 16, 2023, Administrative
Appeals Judge (“AAJ”) James Short issued an Order (the “Remand Order”), which
vacated the 2021 Decision and remanded the case to the ALJ for resolution of certain
issues discussed in the Remand Order. 	Tr. at pp. 740-44. 	On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff
appeared at a second hearing before the ALJ, at which Plaintiff and a different vocational
expert testified. 	Tr. at pp. 669-93. 	On September 13, 2024, the ALJ issued a written
decision (the “2024 Decision”) again finding Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. at pp. 648-
61. This action followed.
C. The ALJ’s 2024 Decision
In the 2024 Decision, the ALJ made the following findings of fact and
conclusions of law. 	First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements of the Social Security Act through June 30, 2019. Tr. at p. 650. Second,
the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August
20, 1996, the alleged onset date. 	Id. 	Third, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
following 	severe 	impairments: 	autism 	spectrum 	disorder, 	anxiety 	disorder, 	and
depression. 	Tr. at p. 651. 	Fourth, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have an
impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity
of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. Fifth,
the ALJ found:
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that the [Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform a full
range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional
limitations: the [Plaintiff] can perform tasks at a consistent goal-oriented
pace but not at a fast, production rate pace, such as would be experienced
in assembly-line type of work; the [Plaintiff] can make simple decisions
directly related to his . . . work and tolerate occasional minor changes that
are gradually introduced; the [Plaintiff] can tolerate occasional interaction
with supervisors and coworkers and incidental contact with the public;
and the [Plaintiff] can relate to and interact with others to the extent
necessary to carry out simple tasks, but should avoid work requiring more
complex interaction or joint efforts with coworkers to achieve work goals.
Tr. at p. 653. 	Sixth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has no past relevant work. 	Tr. at p.
659. 	Next, the ALJ found that transferability of job skills was not an issue because
Plaintiff does not have past relevant work. Tr. at p. 660. The ALJ then determined that,
based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual functional capacity,
there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can
perform. Tr. at pp. 660-61. The ALJ, therefore, concluded that Plaintiff is not disabled.
Tr. at p. 661.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. 	See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986
(2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied
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correct legal principles, application of the substantial evidence standard to uphold a
finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of
the right to have her disability determination made according to the correct legal
principles.”); accord Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983); Marcus v.
Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979). 	“Substantial evidence” is evidence that
amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than
one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion must be upheld. Rutherford
v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that
the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court
must afford the Commissioner’s determination considerable deference and may not
substitute “its own judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably
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have reached a different result upon a de novo review.” 	Valente v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041 (2d Cir. 1984).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. 	The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). 	The five-step
process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. 	If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work
activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, 	based 	solely 	on 	medical 	evidence, 	the 	claimant 	has 	an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. 	If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who
is afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial
gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed impairment,
the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe impairment, he
has the residual functional capacity to perform his past work. Finally, if
the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the [Commissioner] then
determines whether there is other work which the claimant could perform.
Under the cases previously discussed, the claimant bears the burden of the
proof as to the first four steps, while the [Commissioner] must prove the
final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982); accord McIntyre v. Colvin, 758
F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). “If at any step a finding of disability or non-disability can
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be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.” Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S.
20, 24 (2003).
III. ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises three claims of error for review in this proceeding. First, Plaintiff
argues that “[t]he ALJ failed to comply with the order of the Appeals Council regarding
the evaluation of the opinion evidence of Michael Kernan, M.D.” (“Dr. Kernan”). Dkt.
No. 11, Pl’s Mem. of Law at pp. 13-15. Second, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he ALJ failed
to adequately evaluate and sufficiently explain his [sic] analysis of the opinions of State
agency medical consultants” L. Hoffman, Ph.D. (“Dr. Hoffman”), and P. Fernandez,
Ph.D. (“Dr. Fernandez”), which Plaintiff contends “yield[ed] a decision which violates
the regulations and lacks the support of substantial evidence.” Id. at pp. 16-21. Third,
Plaintiff claims that “[t]he ALJ improperly based the denial of benefits, in part, on
vocational testimony that assumed Plaintiff’s need for a job coach.” 	Id. at pp. 21-23.
Defendant responds that the ALJ complied with the Appeals Council’s Remand Order
and 	that 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	both 	the 	ALJ’s 	evaluation 	of 	the 	prior
administrative medical findings from Drs. Hoffman and Fernandez, as well as the ALJ’s
Step Five finding. Dkt. No. 13, Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 4-18.
A. Compliance with the Remand Order
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not comply with the Appeals Council’s Remand
Order. Pl’s Mem. of Law at pp. 13-15. More specifically, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ’s
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“decision failed to build a logical bridge between the evidence submitted by Dr. Kernan
and the ALJ’s findings about Listing 12.10.” Id. at p. 14. The Court disagrees.
In the Remand Order, the AAJ noted several problems with the ALJ’s 2021
Decision. First, the AAJ determined that, in evaluating whether Plaintiff’s severe mental
impairments met or equaled listing 12.10, the 2021 Decision did not contain any
consideration of Dr. Kernan’s March 17, 2021 opinion2 that Plaintiff’s “autism spectrum
disorder met (or equaled) the criteria of Listing 12.10 (autism spectrum disorder)
because Dr. Kernan’s treatment history showed the claimant had a ‘marked’ limitation
in the ability to interact with others and a ‘marked’ limitation in the ability [to] adapt or
manage oneself.” 	Tr. at pp. 740-41. 	Second, the AAJ found that the 2021 Decision
“d[id] not indicate the level of persuasiveness afforded to Dr. Kernan’s March 17, 2021
opinion.” 	Tr. at p. 741. Third, the AAJ determined that the 2021 Decision “d[id] not
explain how the mandatory supportability factor was considered when evaluating Dr.
Kernan’s opinion” because it “d[id] not articulate any objective medical evidence and
supporting explanations presented by Dr. Kernan to support his medical opinion,” and
“d[id] not contain any discussion why the assessed limitations by Dr. Kernan were not
incorporated in the residual functional capacity.” 	Id. 	Fourth, the AAJ found that the
2021 Decision did not adequately explain how Dr. Kernan’s opinion was inconsistent
2 The Court notes that Dr. Kernan prepared other opinions—including those dated September 16, 2020, and June
4, 2020—discussed by the ALJ in the 2024 Decision, Tr. at pp. 657-59, that are not specifically challenged by
Plaintiff. See generally Pl’s Mem. of Law. In any event, as to those opinions, the Court also finds no error in the
ALJ’s analysis that warrants remand.
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with other evidence, including Plaintiff’s need for educational accommodations at
college, daily activities, and objective testing results. Tr. at pp. 741-43. Consequently,
the AAJ ordered the ALJ on remand to “[f]urther evaluate the medical source opinion(s)
and prior administrative medical findings pursuant to the provisions of 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c and 416.920c.” Tr. at p. 744.
The ALJ’s 2024 Decision addresses each of the issues raised by the AAJ in the
Remand Order. As to the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Kernan’s March 17, 2021 opinion
regarding Plaintiff’s autism spectrum disorder and the level of persuasiveness afforded
to that opinion, the ALJ recognized in the 2024 Decision that Dr. Kernan’s “opinion
indicate[s] that the [Plaintiff] has marked limitations in interacting with others and
adopting or managing oneself, and that he meets listing 12.10,” but stated that she found
this opinion less persuasive, Tr. at p. 658, and ultimately concluded that “[t]he severity
of the [Plaintiff]’s mental impairments, considered singly and in combination, do not
meet or medically equal the criteria of listings 12.04, 12.06, 12.10, and near listings.”
Tr. at p. 651. 	Contrary to Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ simply made the same
statements as contained in the 2021 Decision “without providing adequate reasons to
reject the evidence that Listing level severity was established,” Pl’s Mem. of Law at p.
14, the ALJ sufficiently explained why she found Dr. Kernan’s opinion less persuasive.
The ALJ noted that “[t]he opinion does not contain functional ties and is in the
form of a checkbox form” and that “the opinion does not have any explanation to
support, other than brief sentences.” 	Tr. at p. 658. 	The ALJ also explained that
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“treatment notes from the provider do not support the opinion” because, “despite some
occasions wherein the [Plaintiff] had a[n] anxious or depressed mood, he was noted to
be attentive, alert, [and] oriented, with normal speech and thought content repeatedly
during exams” and “was repeatedly noted to not be agitated or slowed during
encounters.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 463, 466, 470, 531, 535, 536, & 538). The ALJ also
found the opinion “not consistent with the totality of the record,” which the ALJ stated
“contains other evidence which suggests that the [Plaintiff] does not have such severe
limitations, including the prior administrative findings and the opinion of the state
agency psychiatric medical consultant, which both indicated the [Plaintiff] was able to
perform simple work with limited social interactions.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 67-77, 91-
108, & 447-51). Likewise, the ALJ drew attention to the fact that Plaintiff “was able to
meet with several different providers and engaged in conversation, and he was able to
testify at the hearing.” Id. As such, the ALJ’s analysis in the 2024 Decision sufficiently
explained her consideration of the factors of supportability and consistency when
evaluating Dr. Kernan’s opinion.
The ALJ also adequately explained how Dr. Kernan’s opinion was inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s work history, educational history, daily activities, and psychiatric
consultative examinations. 	The ALJ noted that, in connection with Plaintiff’s work
history 	and 	educational 	history, 	Plaintiff 	“maintain[ed] 	a 	schedule 	and 	routine,
continually attend[ed] classes, successfully complet[ed] assignments, interact[ed] with
others, and follow[ed]-through on tasks.” 	Tr. at pp. 658-59. 	The ALJ recounted
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Plaintiff’s testimony that he “worked at the grocery store managing carts, taking the
bottles from the return machine, and taking out the garbage,” and noted that such
“tasks . . . require attention, concentration, understanding, and remembering.” Tr. at p.
654. 	The ALJ observed that Plaintiff graduated from high school with a Regents
Diploma, a grade point average of 92.360, and a rank of 129 out of 676 students, and
that Plaintiff made high honor roll and received positive comments from his teachers.
Tr. at pp. 651-52 (citing Tr. at pp. 293 & 298). The ALJ also drew attention to the fact
that Plaintiff was ultimately able to obtain a four-year bachelor’s degree from the
Rochester Institute of Technology. Tr. at pp. 652, 654, & 658 (citing Tr. at pp. 447 &
291-389). 	While the ALJ acknowledged that Plaintiff “required special educational
supports in the school setting,” the ALJ found that “these records are remote and the
[Plaintiff]’s ability to subsequently engage in mentally demanding activities . . . is more
indicative of his abilities.” Tr. at p. 659.
In addition, with regard to Plaintiff’s daily activities, the ALJ indicated that
Plaintiff is able to: “tend to his own grooming, . . . do chores such as housework and
cleaning, . . . cook simple meals, and make simple purchases.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 250-
62 & 447-51). 	As for Plaintiff’s performance during the psychiatric consultative
examination, the ALJ stated that Plaintiff was found to have “appropriate personal
hygiene and grooming, appropriate posture, motor behavior, and eye contact, fluent
speech, coherent and goal-directed thought processes, and intact attention and memory
despite [his] limitations.” 	Id. (citing Tr. at p. 449). 	In sum, the ALJ concluded that
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Plaintiff’s 	work 	history, 	educational 	history, 	daily 	activities, 	and 	psychiatric
consultative examinations were not consistent with Dr. Kernan’s significant finding that
Plaintiff had “no useful ability to function.” Id.
Accordingly, the ALJ properly complied with the Appeals Council’s Remand
Order.
B. Opinions of Drs. Hoffman and Fernandez
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ did not “adequately evaluate and sufficiently explain
his [sic] analysis” of the opinions of Drs. Hoffman and Fernandez. Pl.’s Mem. of Law
at pp. 16-21. 	More specifically, Plaintiff argues that the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) “adopted in this case omits a key limitation—no more than brief and superficial
interactions with supervisors and coworkers—assessed by State agency physicians
Hoffman and Fernandez,” and Plaintiff claims that “the ALJ does not provide an
adequate explanation for why the restriction was rejected.” 	Dkt. No. 14 at p. 3. 	The
Court finds no error on the part of the ALJ.
In evaluating medical opinion evidence, an ALJ must consider all medical
opinions and evaluate their persuasiveness based on several factors, the two most
important of which are supportability and consistency. Janet Lynn W. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2025 WL 951446, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2025) (quotations omitted). 	“[A]n
ALJ is required to explain how [he or] she considered the supportability and consistency
factors.” 	Id. 	(quotations, 	internal 	quotation 	marks, 	and 	alterations 	omitted).
“[S]upportability” means that “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and
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supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical
opinions 	or 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	finding(s) 	will 	be.” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§
404.1520c(c)(1). 	“[C]onsistency” 	means 	that 	“[t]he 	more 	consistent 	a 	medical
opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical
opinion(s) 	or 	prior 	administrative 	medical 	finding(s) 	will 	be.” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§
404.1520c(c)(2).
Here, in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “can
tolerate occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers” and “can relate to and
interact with others to the extent necessary to carry out simple tasks, but should avoid
work requiring more complex interaction or joint efforts with coworkers to achieve work
goals.” Tr. at p. 653.
In making this finding, the ALJ found the prior administrative findings of state
agency medical consultants Dr. Hoffman at the initial level and Dr. Fernandez at the
reconsideration level “partially persuasive.” Tr. at p. 655 (citing Tr. at pp. 67-77 & 91-
108). As relevant here, the ALJ noted that “[b]oth indicated . . . moderate limitations in
interacting with others” and found that Plaintiff “was capable of . . . brief and superficial
interaction with coworkers and supervisors.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 71 & 98). The ALJ
concluded that the “[t]he overall record does support somewhat greater limitations.” Tr.
at p. 656. 	The ALJ explained that, on one hand, Plaintiff is “able to regularly attend
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appointments, as well as go to other public areas such as school and work,” and has been
“able to develop a rapport with providers, and was repeatedly noted to be cooperative.”
Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 405-19 & 447-51). On the other hand, however, the ALJ noted that
Plaintiff “is uncomfortable in large groups,” “can experience social anxiety,” and “has
difficult[y] navigating conversations.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 250-51, 252-62, 447-51 &
1101-16).
The ALJ found the opinion of Todd Deneen, Psy.D. (“Dr. Deneen”), “partially
persuasive” as well. 	Tr. at p. 655 (citing Tr. at pp. 447-51). 	Dr. Deneen opined that
Plaintiff had a “moderate limitation in the ability to interact adequately with supervisors,
coworkers, and the public.” 	Id. (citing Tr. at p. 450). 	The ALJ explained “[t]he
record . . . supports greater limitations for interacting with others” because Plaintiff “is
uncomfortable in large groups, experiences panic attacks, does better in individual or
smaller groups, and has some difficulty navigating long conversations or reciprocating
speech.” 	Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 447-51 & 1101-16). 	The ALJ noted, however, that
“[d]espite his difficulty, [Plaintiff] was able to engage with different providers, . . . he
was noted to have clear, fluent speech, and appropriate eye contact and behavior during
the consultative examination,” and “[o]n other occasions, his mood and affect, and
speech were normal, as well.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 429-34 & 447-51).
The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff’s educational records led the ALJ to determine
that Plaintiff “is able to perform simple work with limited social interaction,” as
contemplated in the RFC. Tr. at p. 655. More specifically, the ALJ drew attention to
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the fact that Plaintiff was able to graduate from high school with a Regents Diploma and
obtain a four-year bachelor’s degree from the Rochester Institute of Technology. Tr. at
p. 654 (citing Tr. at pp. 291-389). The ALJ also discussed a letter of recommendation
that Plaintiff received from his high school teacher, wherein the teacher recounted how
Plaintiff “bec[a]me more confident and independent,” “blossomed socially,” “learned
how to comfortably work in a group,” “was a leader,” and “learned how to relate to his
peers, not just adults.” Id. (citing Tr. at p. 369).
In Jammy N. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., like here, the plaintiff argued that the case
should be remanded because the findings of two doctors limited the plaintiff to “brief
and superficial contact,” which the plaintiff argued was “inconsistent with the RFC
limiting [p]laintiff to ‘occasional interaction.’” 2025 WL 786386, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar.
12, 2025) (quotation omitted). The court noted that many courts had found that “where,
as here, an ALJ properly gave considerable weight to a medical opinion stating a
[p]laintiff’s ability to handle brief and superficial contact, an RFC containing a
limitation to ‘occasional interaction’ is supported by substantial evidence.” 	Id. (citing
cases). Consequently, the court concluded that “the RFC limiting Plaintiff to occasional
interaction 	with 	supervisors 	[and] 	coworkers . . . [wa]s 	supported 	by 	substantial
evidence and remand [wa]s not warranted on th[at] ground.” 	Id. 	The Court finds no
reason to hold otherwise here.
Additionally, courts have also held that an ALJ’s RFC determination limiting a
plaintiff to unskilled work, such as simple tasks, sufficiently addresses a plaintiff’s need
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for brief and superficial social interaction. Michael G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL
2457637, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. June 16, 2021) (citing cases). Thus, here, while Drs. Hoffman
and Fernandez may have opined that Plaintiff is limited to no more than brief and
superficial interactions with supervisors and coworkers, Tr. at p. 655, the ALJ has, in
any event, accounted for this limitation by concluding that Plaintiff has the RFC to
“relate to and interact with others to the extent necessary to carry out simple tasks, but
should avoid work requiring more complex interaction or joint efforts with coworkers
to achieve work goals.” Tr. at p. 653.
As such, the ALJ properly explained the factors of supportability and consistency
in considering the opinions of Drs. Hoffman and Fernandez, and the RFC restrictions
set by the ALJ regarding Plaintiff’s ability to interact with supervisors and coworkers
are supported by substantial evidence.
C. Job Coach
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by relying on the vocational expert’s
testimony to “support[] a denial of benefits” while not “includ[ing] the need for a job
coach in the RFC.” 	Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 21-23. 	In support of this argument,
Plaintiff draws attention to the fact that the vocational expert testified that, should an
individual need a supervisor to provide a brief, five-to-ten-minute reminder of his or her
job tasks each day, then the vocational expert “would typically offer that person a job
coach if requested.” 	Id. at p. 22; Tr. at p. 687. 	Plaintiff further claims that the ALJ’s
“implicit reliance on the availability of [an] employer” to provide the accommodation
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of a job coach was improper. 	Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 22. 	This argument is without
merit.
“An ALJ may disregard a vocational expert’s response to a hypothetical based
on additional limitations that the ALJ does not find are supported by substantial evidence
in the record.” 	Prince v. Berryhill, 304 F. Supp. 3d 281, 293 (D. Conn. 2018) (citing
Suarez v. Colvin, 102 F. Supp. 3d 552, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2015)). 	In Prince v. Berryhill,
the ALJ posed several hypotheticals to the vocational expert, one of which “was
accurately based on the RFC the ALJ ultimately determined,” while “the other
hypotheticals presented [plaintiff]’s RFC with variations that included additional
limitations.” 	Id. 	The court held “that the ALJ did not err when he disregarded the
vocational expert’s testimony” in response 	to “several of the hypotheticals that
contained additional limitations beyond [plaintiff]’s RFC.” Id.
Here, the ALJ expressly told the vocational expert that she was going to provide
the vocational expert with “hypotheticals.” 	Tr. at p. 686. 	Thereafter, the relevant
portion of the hearing transcript referenced by the Plaintiff states as follows:
Q 	Oh okay. 	If I were to amend that to provide, in addition to the other
restrictions, that the individual could perform simple repetitive tasks and
could not multitask, would any of those jobs be available?
A Yes, all of them would be.
Q What if the individual would need redirection or reinstruction on a daily
basis by a supervisor, and by that I mean, you know, would have - - would
need a reminder, not a full-scale retraining, but you know, 5 to 10 minutes
to be reminded of tasks?
A Well, we would typically offer that person a job coach if requested.
Q Okay.
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A The job coach would make him competitively employable, but it would
provide an extra level of support and supervision.
Tr. at p. 687. A review of the hearing transcript thereby makes clear that the ALJ merely
posed a hypothetical question to the vocational expert. Tr. at p. 686-87. The transcript
does not contain a response by the ALJ finding that Plaintiff requires a job coach. See
generally id. Likewise, the RFC does not state that Plaintiff requires a job coach. See
Tr. at p. 653. 	The reason for this is explained in the 2024 Decision, wherein the ALJ
stated that, while “[a]lternate hypotheticals were posed to the vocational expert,” the
record did not support greater limitations than those listed in the RFC. 	Tr. at p. 661.
Further, in the 2024 Decision, the ALJ explained that she only credited Plaintiff with
having, at most, a mild limitation in understanding, remembering, and applying
information, and that finding is supported by substantial evidence. Tr. at pp. 651 & 655-
56.
At Step Three, the ALJ explained that “the record supports a mild limitation in
this area of mental functioning” because:
[Plaintiff’s] 	thought 	processes 	were 	generally 	within 	normal 	limits.
During the psychiatric consultative examination, his recent and remote
memory skills were intact, he could recall 3 out of 3 objects immediately,
and 2 out 3 after a delay, [and] he could recite 5 digits forward and 3 digits
backward. . . . [Plaintiff] reports needing reminders, but he can generally
follow written and spoken instructions if he has extended time to process
information.
Tr. at p. 651 (citing Tr. at pp. 432, 448-49, & 252-62).
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In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ found the opinion of psychiatric
consultative examiner Dr. Deneen partially persuasive. 	Tr. at p. 655 (citing Tr. at pp.
447-51). 	The ALJ found that, with regard to Dr. Deneen’s finding that Plaintiff “had
no limitation understanding, remembering and applying simple or complex directions
and instructions,” “[t]he record supports greater limitation” because Plaintiff “has
difficulty remembering complex directions, and requires prompts or reminders to
complete tasks.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 250-62, 291-328, & 447-51). However, the ALJ
concluded that Plaintiff’s “limitation in this regard is no more than mild, as he is able to
follow simple instructions, and he was able to complete, with support, complex tasks
such as graduate from high school and college.” Id. (citing Tr. at pp. 291-328 & 447-
51). 	Similarly, in evaluating the opinion of Dr. Kerman, the ALJ took issue with the
fact that “Dr. Kerman did not indicate [Plaintiff] had any limitation understanding,
carrying out, or remembering instructions” because “it conflicts with the overall record
which suggests that [Plaintiff] does have limitation in this area, albeit mild,” “including
the prior administrative findings” which “indicated [Plaintiff] had a mild limitation.”
Tr. at p. 657 (citing Tr. at pp. 61-66, 91-108, & 483).
The ALJ also found partially persuasive the opinions of the state agency medical
consultants Drs. Hoffman and Fernandez, which “[b]oth indicated that [Plaintiff] had
mild limitations in understanding, remembering, and applying information.” 	Tr. at p.
655 (citing Tr. at pp. 71 & 98). The ALJ explained that “[t]hese findings are somewhat
consistent with the overall record, as other evidence suggests [Plaintiff] has a mild
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limitation 	in 	understanding, 	remembering, 	and 	applying 	information, 	including
education records which indicate that [Plaintiff] was provided accommodations such as
repeating instructions,” among other things, but was nevertheless “able to graduate high
school with a regents diploma, attend college, and obtain a four year Bachelor’s degree
from RIT.” Tr. at pp. 655-56 (citing Tr. at pp. 291-328 & 447).
On the other hand, the ALJ found the opinion of Roshan Ghimire, M.D. (“Dr.
Ghimire”), “generally not persuasive.” 	Tr. at p. 656 (citing Tr. at pp. 896-901). 	Dr.
Ghimire’s opinion “provides for significant mental limitations,” including, but not
limited to, “remembering work-like procedures” and “understanding and remembering
simple instructions.” Id. (citing Tr. at p. 898). In contrast, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff
testified “that he can follow-through on simple tasks” and that he “reported in the
function report that he is able to follow written instructions, as long as there are not too
many steps involved, and that he can follow written instructions ‘generally ok’ if he has
extended time to process the information.” Tr. at p. 657 (citing Tr. at pp. 252-62).
Accordingly, the ALJ did not err by not including a job coach in the RFC.
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED;
and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
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ORDERED, that Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff disability benefits is
AFFIRMED and the Complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: February 23, 2026
Albany, New York
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