Hanyon v. Express Auto Credit Corp et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
STEVEN HANYON,
Plaintiff,
3:26-CV-91
v. 	(BKS/DJS)
EXPRESS AUTO CREDIT CORP., et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
STEVEN HANYON
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Port Crane, New York 13833
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION and ORDER
On February 23, 2026, this Court issued a Report-Recommendation that the
Complaint, Dkt. No. 1, in this matter be dismissed for failing to comply with Rule 8’s
notice requirements. Dkt. No. 12. That recommendation noted:
the Complaint is unclear as to the nature of Plaintiff’s allegations. The
Complaint purports to assert claims under the First, Second, Fourth, and
Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 	Compl. at p. 3. 	It,
however, offers no factual allegations identifying the basis for those claims.
See generally id. Plaintiff utilized a form complaint and under the section
labelled 	“Statement 	of 	Claim” 	Plaintiff 	wrote: 	“Putting 	me 	through
frustration where I get criminal charges, but did not do any terrorist acts,
like defendants GPS remote shut off device in their vehicles.” 	Id. at p. 4.
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It also alleges the breach of an employment contract, but does not explain
which of the Defendants is responsible for that or how. Id.
Dkt. No. 12 at p. 5 (footnote omitted). 	Plaintiff did not file objections to the Report-
Recommendation but filed an Amended Complaint. 	Dkt. No. 13, Am. Compl. 	The
District Court found that the filing of the Amended Complaint mooted the Report-
Recommendation and directed the undersigned to review the Amended Complaint. Dkt.
No. 14.
The legal standards for that review were set forth in detail in the prior Report-
Recommendation, Dkt. No. 12 at pp. 2-3, and will not be repeated here. In essence, the
obligation to review the Amended Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requires the
Court to consider whether it: “(i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). As noted in the original Report-
Recommendation “[a] court’s initial review of a complaint under § 1915(e) must
encompass the applicable standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” including
Rule 8. Dkt. No. 12 at p. 3.
The Amended Complaint is a single paragraph. It reads in full:
I would like to have Order of Protections Enforced to Protect my Family
and myself, Due to Local and State doing Interfraction from since I started
filing my first lawsuit, like reinstating old Criminal Records in Broome
County, Getting shot and tampering with my email so I would get a Charge
and no one cares that I have Pea Sized Lymphoma, I also had to turn in
Judges for ignoring exact evidence, being discriminated and for denying
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claims I just need funds to be able to leave the driveway so I can make
money of from my Dreams [sic].
Am. Compl.
On March 12, 2026, Plaintiff filed what he captioned to be an Amended Petition.
Dkt. No. 17. That document reads in full:
I Steven Hanyon Amended this petition 28 U.S. Code § 2284 because I
apply myself to have a life, and expect to have my freedom and rights, I
have worked most of my life to support my country and the public that
serves. I deserve respect and those who don’t it’s common senses like
everyone else, people get upset with others when they are not respected. I
sent a email with a opinion not a threat, and I got sent to jail for five months
during a civil action 28 U.S. Code § 2513, I was taken off from my family’s
property and even in my tampered email disclaimer by the third party 18
U.S.C. § 242. Which my email disclaimer is suppose to protect me from
accidental threats. I was told to take a plea deal with the Public Defender
and plea guilty 33 u.s. code § 931, so I can go on probation. I finally met
with my Probation officer in Jail while we where working on my Pre-
sentence Investigation, He said something about my Federal Civil Action
and said not to leave a paper trail like that ever again and when I got home
my first cause action was deleted 18 U.S. Code § 1519.
I filed new cases because I was taking to jail and I had a unemployment
hearing coming up, which I do not think I should even go on Public
Assistance or New York State Unemployment because my Employee
Contract was broken by defendants 25 U.S. Code § 3116. I also brought up
my civil cases to my probation officer and emailed him to serve copies of
paper work from my civil cases, He said no more sending emails and I also
told him I do not want to look incompetent for my Federal Civil Actions
and He wants me to do a Mental Health evaluation and get into Counseling.
I talked to him about working for Goodwin and was waiting on the next
step process after my Interview, all the sudden I was denied 18 U.S. Code
§ 246 or whoever is blacklisting me from employment to stop 18 U.S. Code
§ 208. What I am saying is I need relief from defendants 18 U.S. Code §
1964 and would like to be removed off probation 18 U.S.C. § 3564 because
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I did not commit the crime and need to be able to leave the driveway so I
can get back in the workforce to have my dreams [sic].
Id.
These purported amendments, fare no better than the original Complaint in terms
of satisfying the standards outlined in section 1915. Plaintiff does not identify any causes
of action. He lists just Broome County Court as a named Defendant but makes no factual
allegations against it. This does not provide sufficient notice under Rule 8. That rule is
designed to make sure that defendants in an action have clear and adequate notice of the
claims against them. 	Feldman v. Lyons, 852 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (N.D.N.Y. 2012).
Where, as here, the pleading “does not provide an adequate description of the particular
acts by the defendant which led to this suit or an explanation of how such acts were
illegal” dismissal is appropriate. Powell v. Marine Midland Bank, 162 F.R.D. 15, 16
(N.D.N.Y. 1995). Both the Amended Complaint and the “Amended Petition” clearly fail
to do so and should be dismissed.
Generally, dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint is not warranted unless a
party has had an opportunity to amend. Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d 698, 704-05 (2d Cir.
1991). Here, however, Plaintiff has already availed himself of the opportunity to amend.
Given the particular nature of the pleadings in this case, “[t]here is no basis to believe that
granting leave to amend a second time would induce the plaintiff to add the kind of
allegations needed to establish a facially-plausible claim when he took no steps to do so
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with [the] first opportunity to amend.” Driessen v. Royal Bank Int’l, 2015 WL 1245575,
at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2015) (citing cases). Under the circumstances presented here,
the Court recommends that the Amended Complaint be dismissed without further leave
to amend.1
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, it is hereby
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint be DISMISSED; and it
is further
RECOMMENDED, that Plaintiff’s Motions (Dkt. No. 8, 15, & 19) be DENIED;
and it is
ORDERED, 	that 	the 	Clerk 	of 	the 	Court 	serve 	a 	copy 	of 	this 	Report-
Recommendation and Order upon the parties to this action.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties have fourteen (14)2 days within
which to file written objections to the foregoing report. 	Such objections shall be filed
with the Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN
1 Three additional motions filed by Plaintiff are before the Court. Given the recommendation for dismissal, it is also
recommended that those Motions be denied.
2 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Order by mail, three additional days will be added to the
fourteen-day period, meaning that you have seventeen days from the date the order was mailed to you to serve and
file objections. F ED. R. CIV. P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal
holiday, then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
FED. R. C IV. P. 6(a)(1)(C).
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FOURTEEN (14) DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	Roldan v.
Racette, 984 F.2d 85, 89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.,
892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); F ED . R. CIV . P. 72 & 6(a).
Dated: March 26, 2026
Albany, New York
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Driessen v. Royal Bank Intern., Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1245575, 2016-1 Trade Cases P 79,492
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1
2015 WL 1245575
United States District Court, D. Connecticut.
Rochelle DRIESSEN, Plaintiff,
v.
ROYAL BANK INTERNATIONAL,
a brand of the Royal Bank of
Scotland Group, Defendant.
No. 3:14–cv–1300 (VAB).
|
Signed March 18, 2015.
Attorneys and Law Firms
Rochelle Driessen, Surfside, FL, pro se.
RULING OF DISMISSAL
VICTOR A. BOLDEN, District Judge.
*1 Plaintiff, Rochelle Driessen, filed an
Amended Complaint on January 30, 2015
in response to the Court's dismissal of
this action without prejudice pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Because the Amended
Complaint does nothing to remedy the fatal
defect of her original Complaint, the action is
now dismissed with prejudice.
The plaintiff initiated this action pro se by
filing a Complaint [Doc. No. 1] on September
9, 2014 against “Royal Bank International”
and moving for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis [Doc. No. 2]. The case was referred to
Magistrate Judge Martinez, who reviewed the
plaintiff's filings pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
Judge Martinez granted the in forma pauperis
motion, but recommended that the Complaint
be dismissed without prejudice [Doc. No. 6],
issuing a Recommended Ruling of Dismissal
[Doc. No. 7] on December 17, 2014. The
plaintiff timely objected to the Recommended
Ruling [Doc. No. 8], but the District Court
approved and adopted the Recommended
Ruling on January 6, 2015, ordering that if
no amended complaint were filed by January
26, 2015, “a judgment will enter dismissing
the action with prejudice” [Doc. No. 9].
Even though the plaintiff failed to comply
with this Court's January 6 order and filed
her Amended Complaint four days after the
specified deadline, the Court will entertain the
plaintiff's late filing in light of her pro se status.
The statute that authorizes the court to grant
in forma pauperis relief to a plaintiff contains
the following protection against abuse of such
status: “Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any
portion thereof, that may have been paid, the
court shall dismiss the case at any time if the
court determines that ... the action ... (i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim
on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
(2)(B).
The plaintiff's Amended Complaint [Doc. No.
11] is nearly identical to her original Complaint.
The only substantive difference is the addition
of conclusory allegations that the defendant's
previously alleged actions also violated Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §
1. See Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 11] ¶¶
6, 14, 15. The plaintiff's original Complaint
had been dismissed with leave to amend on
the grounds that it failed to “plausibly allege
that the defendant had any actual involvement
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Driessen v. Royal Bank Intern., Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1245575, 2016-1 Trade Cases P 79,492
© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2
with the purported emails or lottery winnings.”
Recommended Ruling of Dismissal [Doc. No.
7], at 5. The Amended Complaint contains no
new factual allegations against the defendant of
any type, including those that would purport to
connect the defendant to the purported emails
or lottery winnings, and thus does nothing
to address the fatal defect in the original
Complaint, which was clearly identified and
articulated in the Recommended Ruling.
Instead, the plaintiff has alleged an additional
violation, of a completely different statutory
scheme, predicated on the same alleged set of
facts, which necessarily means that this claim,
too, possesses the same fatal pleading defect—
there has been no plausible allegation that the
defendant was involved in any of the activity
alleged. 1 Therefore, this new claim must be
dismissed for the same reasons articulated in
the Recommended Ruling and the January 6
Order.
*2 The Recommended Ruling noted that
the plaintiff's original Complaint “is virtually
identical to another complaint the plaintiff
filed in this court.” Recommended Ruling of
Dismissal [Doc. No. 7], at 4. Indeed, there have
been numerous cases filed by the plaintiff in
which she sued commercial banks implausibly
alleging, as she does in this case, that she was
entitled to a large sum of money that a bank
failed to transfer to her in violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1693(b) of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act
(“EFTA”). 2 Adding a claim, unsupported by
factual allegations that federal antitrust law was
violated, does not differentiate the complaint in
this action from these other complaints in such
manner so that it now states a plausible claim
on which relief may be granted. All claims in
this action shall therefore be dismissed with
prejudice.
When faced with a pro se plaintiff who is
proceeding in forma pauperis, a court “must
liberally construe his pleadings, and must
interpret his complaint to raise the strongest
arguments it suggests,” Abbas v. Dixon, 480
F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.2007), and further
“should not dismiss without granting leave to
amend at least once when a liberal reading
of the complaint gives any indication that
a valid claim might be stated,” Gomez v.
USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d
Cir.1999) (quoting Branum v. Clark, 927 F.2d
698, 705 (2d Cir.1991)). Generally, however, an
action may be dismissed with prejudice “where
it appears that granting leave to amend is
unlikely to be productive.” Preston v. New York,
223 F.Supp.2d 452, 463 (S.D.N.Y.2002). For
example, where amendment would be futile,
“denial of an opportunity to amend is within
the discretion of the District Court,” Foman
v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), and “the
standard for denying leave to amend based on
futility is the same as the standard for granting
a motion to dismiss,” Delollis v. Friedberg, No.
13–1628–cv, slip op. at 5 (2d Cir. Feb. 9, 2015).
In this action, the plaintiff's original Complaint
was given a liberal reading and the plaintiff
was granted leave to amend. The plaintiff
subsequently failed to amend her Complaint in
a manner that addressed the Court's clearly-
expressed basis for dismissal. There is no basis
to believe that granting leave to amend a second
time would induce the plaintiff to add the kind
of allegations needed to establish a facially-
plausible claim when she took no steps to
do so with her first opportunity to amend.
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See, e.g., Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163
F.3d 706, 712 n. 4 (2d Cir.1998) (denying
leave to replead because “the district court
already gave [plaintiff] an opportunity to file an
amended complaint designed to cure the very
defect that remains”); Cellular Technical Servs.
Co. v. TruePosition, Inc., 609 F.Supp.2d 223,
246–47 (D.Conn.2009) (dismissing case with
prejudice and without leave to amend because
plaintiffs had already been given an opportunity
to replead to cure identified deficiencies “and
since they did not take advantage of that
opportunity, the Court sees no reason to
provide yet a third chance to plead [the
same element]”). Under these circumstances,
the Court determines that further amendment
would be futile with respect to all claims in
the plaintiff's Amended Complaint that were
repeated from her original Complaint.
*3 The new antitrust claim fails because
of the same lack of facial plausibility. There
are no new factual allegations regarding the
defendant. The plaintiff's antitrust allegations
amount, in their entirety, to the following:
Defendant is in violation of
15 USC § 1 ... by price
fixing the cost of transfer
fee of £650, and price fixing
the cost of transfer fee
of £650 for international
transfers that exceeds the
sum of one hundred thousand
United States dollars under
its Anti–Money Laundering
Decree.... The anti-money
laundering programs to
guard against money
laundering through financial
institutions do not provide
a fixed price for the
international transfer of
money pursuant to 31 USC §
5318(h)(1).
Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 11] ¶¶ 14–15.
All the conduct alleged here, as throughout the
Amended Complaint, was already alleged in
the original Complaint, and thus the plaintiff
asserts this purported antitrust violation against
the defendant based solely on facts previously
pleaded. Just as in the original Complaint,
there is absolutely nothing in the Amended
Complaint connecting the defendant to the
conduct alleged to have occurred.
Even construing the Amended Complaint
in the most liberal manner imaginable, the
plaintiff has also wholly failed to allege a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. The statute is by its terms limited to
collusive conduct—to contracts, combinations,
and conspiracies that restrain the nation's
domestic or foreign trade or commerce. See
15 U.S.C. § 1. The key inquiry therefore in
any case brought under Section 1 is whether
the challenged conduct consists of concerted
action between separate entities or “conduct
that is ‘wholly unilateral.’ “ Copperweld Corp.
v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752,
768 (1984) (quoting Albrecht v. Herald Co.,
390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)); see also VI Phillip
Areeda & Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶
1402a, at 10 (3d ed. 2010) (“A sharp distinction
between unilateral and concerted action is
apparent from the structure of the basic antitrust
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Driessen v. Royal Bank Intern., Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1245575, 2016-1 Trade Cases P 79,492
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statute. Sherman Act § 1 reaches concerted
action in unreasonable restraint of trade[.]”).
A business unilaterally setting the price of
a service it provides is not the type of
“price fixing” contemplated by federal antitrust
prohibitions. In fact, “setting one's own profit-
maximizing price is entirely lawful under the
antitrust laws.” VI Areeda & Hovenkamp ¶
1402a, at 10. Therefore, in addition to curing
the previously-identified defects in this action,
the plaintiff would also have had to add
plausible allegations of concerted action by
the defendant with others in order for this
claim to survive. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l
Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 190 (2010)
(“Section 1 applies only to concerted action
that restrains trade.... And because concerted
action is discrete and distinct, a limit on such
activity leaves untouched a vast amount of
business conduct.”); Copperweld, 467 U.S. at
775 (1984) (holding that “the Sherman Act
does not prohibit unreasonable restraints of
trade as such—but only restraints effected by a
contract, combination, or conspiracy—it leaves
untouched a single firm's anticompetitive
conduct”).
*4 In any event, as discussed supra with
respect to the claims repeated from the
original Complaint, allowing the plaintiff to
replead concerning the antitrust claim would
likewise be futile because the plaintiff has
demonstrated no inclination to attempt to
plead the necessary facts plausibly tying the
defendant to the existing allegations, even
when explicitly prompted to do so by the Court.
See Recommended Ruling of Dismissal [Doc.
No. 7], at 5 (“the complaint in this case does
not plausibly allege that the defendant bank
had any actual involvement with the purported
emails or lottery winnings”); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged.”).
For the reasons set forth above, the Court
DISMISSES WITH PREJUDICE this action
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) on the
ground that the Amended Complaint fails to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
All Citations
Not Reported in F.Supp.3d, 2015 WL 1245575,
2016-1 Trade Cases P 79,492
Footnotes
1 Furthermore, the plaintiff has failed to allege any facts that would constitute a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Setting the price of a service
(see Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 11] ¶¶ 14–15) does not constitute the type of
“price-fixing” that is contemplated by federal antitrust law. See infra.
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Driessen v. Royal Bank Intern., Not Reported in F.Supp.3d (2015)
2015 WL 1245575, 2016-1 Trade Cases P 79,492
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2 See, e.g., Driessen v. Natwest Bank PLC, No. 3:13–cv–00217–MPS (alleging that
two banks, including The Royal Bank of Scotland, violated the EFTA by failing to
transfer her purported European lottery winnings to her bank account); Driessen
v. United Nations, No. 1:12–cv–08289–LAP (S.D.N.Y), transferred, No. 1:13–cv–
20065–CMA (S.D.Fla.) (claiming that the defendant bank was liable under EFTA for
failing to transfer her $1.2 million inheritance check to her bank account after she
refused to pay the transfer fee); Driessen v. Citibank, N.A., No. 4:13–cv–04018–
LLP (D.S.D.) (alleging that the defendant bank violated EFTA by failing to remit her
winnings to her bank account both times that she won the UK National Lottery);
Driessen v. Home Loan State Bank, No. 1:12–cv–02220–MSK–KLM (D.Colo.)
(alleging that the defendant bank violated EFTA by failing to transfer a £3.5 million
prize to her); Driessen v. Woodforest Nat'l Bank, No. 3:12–cv–00091 (S.D.Ohio)
(alleging that the defendant bank violated EFTA by failing to transmit $8.3 million
allegedly deposited with the defendant bank by the United Nations for her benefit);
Driessen v. S. African Reserve Bank, No. 4:12–cv–00309–RAS–DDB (E.D.Tex.)
(claiming that the defendant bank wrongfully withheld $30.5 million in violation of
EFTA); see also Driessen v. Clinton, No. 4:12–cv–00227–RC–ALM (E . D.Tex.)
(claiming that U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton informed her that she
had inherited $10.5 million from a Nigerian relative but then unlawfully prevented
the transfer of funds on the grounds that the funds were terrorist- and drug-related).
The Court may take judicial notice of Plaintiff's other lawsuits. See Kavowras v. N.Y.
Times Co., 328 F.3d 50, 57 (2d Cir.2003) (“Judicial notice may be taken of public
filings[.]”).
End of Document © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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